Related commentary: Asia

For a peacebuilding and reconstruction policy to succeed, it must consider how people are affected by war and violence.

The influence of conflict, competition and cooperation on China–India relations continues to produce an unbalanced power dynamic.

June 2012 marks what many have called a milestone in the ongoing war on narco-terrorism: the sentencing of Haji Bagcho, the biggest opium and heroin dealer in Central Asia.

The evacuation of Chinese citizens from Viet Nam in May 2014 and a possible new evacuation from Iraq in the next few days are just two recent examples which demonstrate that, for China, protecting its overseas interests is becoming an increasingly complex challenge. A new SIPRI Policy Paper, launched today, outlines this challenge within the context of China’s traditional policy of non-interference in other nations’ affairs, which is also coming under increased domestic scrutiny.

On 30–31 October China hosted the postponed fourth ‘Heart of Asia’ ministerial conference in the framework of the Istanbul Process. Inaugurated in 2011, the Process is the only multilateral vehicle led by Afghanistan, thus permitting the country a greater say in its own affairs. Its objective is to facilitate Afghanistan’s reconstruction through interregional collaboration. To this end, and in a short period of time, the Process has successfully managed to commit 14 participating members, some of which previously had difficulty coming together, to cooperate. However, the Process is beset by a number of internal and external challenges that necessitate attention. Newly elected Afghan president Ashraf Ghani and his administration will have to designate ample human resources and diplomacy efforts to guarantee the process’ effectiveness and sustainability.

The election of cleric Hassan Rouhani as the seventh president of the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed both the unpredictability and the enduring adaptability of Iran's political landscape.

The future looked bleak for the Chinese people on 1 October 1989 at the 40th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Less than four months had passed since 4 June, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had killed hundreds of unarmed civilians in Beijing to put an end to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations.

Will China be forced to become more active in the fight against ISIS to protect its citizens and economic interests in Iraq?

In the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, there is an often overlooked strategic interest pursued by China: the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) quest for a credible undersea nuclear deterrent.

On 4 March the Chinese Government presented its 2014 budget to the National People's Congress (NPC), but it does not accurately represent the total amount spent by China on its military.

China plays a central role in international efforts to curb the North Korean nuclear programme, but chooses a strategy of closer economic and political ties rather than of applying sanctions.

As the Communist Party of China prepares for a once-in-a-decade change of leadership at the 18th Party Congress in November, the country’s foreign relations are in worse shape than they were 10 years ago, especially in East Asia but also in terms of heightened strategic rivalry with the United States. How the incoming leadership chooses to manage further the expansion of Chinese economic and security interests has huge implications for the rest of the world. If the incoming Party leadership fails to prevent widening political rifts in China’s political system (including the People’s Liberation Army, PLA), foreign policy could take on an even more assertive tone, complicating international cooperation with China on issues of international security.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased its participation in a broadening array of multilateral security arrangements in recent years. One of the most high-profile aspects of this trend is the dramatic expansion in Chinese peacekeeping deployments (of civilian police, military observers, engineering battalions and medical units) to UN operations: since 2000, when China deployed fewer than 100 peacekeepers, there has been a dramatic 20-fold increase in its contributions.

On 5 March, the opening day of the annual National People’s Congress, China announced a 7.6 per cent increase in its National Defense budget for 2016—or a total of 954 billion yuan ($146 billion).

China has seen dramatic domestic growth in agricultural production, but now it must navigate the pressures of a growing food demand and the negative effects of climate change.

In 2015 over $131 billion was spent in official development assistance, an increase of nearly 7% compared to 2014, but there is litte evidence to suggest this money goes towards interventions that work.

China's ambitious Silk Road Economic Belt aims to provide critical infrastructure across Eurasia. How does this interact with security dynamics in Central and South Asian states?

Afghanistan's political power struggle keeps the country in a deadlock of security and socio-economic crises. Achieving stability in Afghanistan, and the wider region, will require effective power-sharing from Afghanistan's two competing political camps.

On the day of the 10th Arctic Council Ministerial meeting, this backgrounder looks at the status of Chinese–Russian cooperation in the Arctic.

The EU has so far reacted hesitantly to China's Belt and Road Initiative amid concerns over transparency, feasability and sustainability. However, it risks being left behind as China takes a stronger lead in shaping the Eurasian landscape.

May 21 is the UN World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development. Given today’s conflicts, political uncertainties and support for nationalism, it is important to be reminded of the benefits that diversity brings to development.

Kyrgyzstan’s experience as a member of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) from mid-2015 to late 2016 has been largely frustrating, alhtough any analysis is complicated by the regional economic and political shocks during this time.

When it comes to the arms trade, China has not only learned from Russia, but succeeded in challenging it.

Lora Saalman explores the appropriation of cyberspace as the newest domain for hybrid warfare, citing cases of alleged cyber intrusion and attack from Ukraine to the South China Sea.

Jiayi Zhou discusses the penetration of Chinese labour migrants of Russia’s Far East Federal District (RFE), juxtaposing their commercial interests with local fears of land grabbing.

Lora Saalman provides the context for how threat perceptions are manifested in China's hypersonic glide capabilities.

On Friday 29 September, an Islamic State suicide bomber disguised as a shepherd attacked a Shiite mosque in Kabul as worshippers were leaving. They killed five people and wounded at least 20 others. It was one of numerous attacks in Afghanistan this year.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), the number of people in need of humanitarian aid in 2017 rose to 141.1 million and they were located in 37 countries. The Global Humanitarian Appeal stood at nearly $13 billion as of November 2017, which represented 58 per cent of the total fund target set for humanitarian assistance.

On 26 January 2018 China’s State Council Information Office published a white paper clarifying China’s vision of the Arctic, its intentions, goals and objectives in the region.