Chinese and Russian approaches to peacebuilding are part of the evolving and indeed contested landscape of international peace and security. Understanding their impacts requires understanding the similarities and differences between them.
Japan is undergoing the most significant changes to its security strategy since the end of World War II. What is behind these changers, what do they mean for Indo-Pacific security, and what challenges lie ahead for their implementation?
This topical backgrounder presents several indications that a more regionally grounded, cohesive perspective and approach for Afghanistan is emerging—small seeds from which a sustainable response to Afghanistan’s peace, security and development challenges might grow.
On 26 January 2018 China’s State Council Information Office published a white paper clarifying China’s vision of the Arctic, its intentions, goals and objectives in the region.
Lora Saalman provides the context for how threat perceptions are manifested in China's hypersonic glide capabilities.
Jiayi Zhou discusses the penetration of Chinese labour migrants of Russia’s Far East Federal District (RFE), juxtaposing their commercial interests with local fears of land grabbing.
Lora Saalman explores the appropriation of cyberspace as the newest domain for hybrid warfare, citing cases of alleged cyber intrusion and attack from Ukraine to the South China Sea.
When it comes to the arms trade, China has not only learned from Russia, but succeeded in challenging it.
The EU has so far reacted hesitantly to China's Belt and Road Initiative amid concerns over transparency, feasability and sustainability. However, it risks being left behind as China takes a stronger lead in shaping the Eurasian landscape.
On the day of the 10th Arctic Council Ministerial meeting, this backgrounder looks at the status of Chinese–Russian cooperation in the Arctic.
China's ambitious Silk Road Economic Belt aims to provide critical infrastructure across Eurasia. How does this interact with security dynamics in Central and South Asian states?
China has seen dramatic domestic growth in agricultural production, but now it must navigate the pressures of a growing food demand and the negative effects of climate change.
On 5 March, the opening day of the annual National People’s Congress, China announced a 7.6 per cent increase in its National Defense budget for 2016—or a total of 954 billion yuan ($146 billion).
In the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, there is an often overlooked strategic interest pursued by China: the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) quest for a credible undersea nuclear deterrent.
Will China be forced to become more active in the fight against ISIS to protect its citizens and economic interests in Iraq?
The evacuation of Chinese citizens from Viet Nam in May 2014 and a possible new evacuation from Iraq in the next few days are just two recent examples which demonstrate that, for China, protecting its overseas interests is becoming an increasingly complex challenge. A new SIPRI Policy Paper, launched today, outlines this challenge within the context of China’s traditional policy of non-interference in other nations’ affairs, which is also coming under increased domestic scrutiny.
On 4 March the Chinese Government presented its 2014 budget to the National People's Congress (NPC), but it does not accurately represent the total amount spent by China on its military.
The influence of conflict, competition and cooperation on China–India relations continues to produce an unbalanced power dynamic.
China plays a central role in international efforts to curb the North Korean nuclear programme, but chooses a strategy of closer economic and political ties rather than of applying sanctions.
As the Communist Party of China prepares for a once-in-a-decade change of leadership at the 18th Party Congress in November, the country’s foreign relations are in worse shape than they were 10 years ago, especially in East Asia but also in terms of heightened strategic rivalry with the United States. How the incoming leadership chooses to manage further the expansion of Chinese economic and security interests has huge implications for the rest of the world. If the incoming Party leadership fails to prevent widening political rifts in China’s political system (including the People’s Liberation Army, PLA), foreign policy could take on an even more assertive tone, complicating international cooperation with China on issues of international security.
The future looked bleak for the Chinese people on 1 October 1989 at the 40th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Less than four months had passed since 4 June, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had killed hundreds of unarmed civilians in Beijing to put an end to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased its participation in a broadening array of multilateral security arrangements in recent years. One of the most high-profile aspects of this trend is the dramatic expansion in Chinese peacekeeping deployments (of civilian police, military observers, engineering battalions and medical units) to UN operations: since 2000, when China deployed fewer than 100 peacekeepers, there has been a dramatic 20-fold increase in its contributions.