This brief aims to contribute to discussions on the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and nuclear export controls in enabling or inhibiting transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.
This paper looks at the risks that come with linking research security and export controls and provides recommendations for the European Union and its member states.
The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control establishes limitations on the numbers of major conventional arms and provides for arms control verification in, at present, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. Signed in 1996 and based on the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is still duly implemented, even against the backdrop of rising regional tensions and the crisis in arms control in Europe.
This paper identifies the different factors at work in the continuous implementation of the Agreement, discusses the Agreement’s ability to contribute to regional conflict prevention and addresses its outlook for the near future. As the European Union (EU) is interested in the region both as its close security environment and in terms of enlargement, the EU should consider ways to use its political leverage to promote a conducive political climate for arms control and integrate transparency and confidence-building measures into its approach to conflict prevention.
This multiauthored compendium offers a state-of-the-art summary of the artificial intelligence (AI) issues facing non-proliferation and disarmament. It pulls together four topics—Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain: Technical, Legal and Ethical Perspectives by Thomas Reinhold, Elisabeth Hoffberger-Pippan and Alexander Blanchard (section I); Artificial Intelligence and Chemical Weapons by Marc-Michael Blum (section II); Artificial Intelligence and Biological Weapons by Filippa Lentzos (section III); and Assessing the Implications of Integrating AI in Nuclear Decision-making Systems by Alice Saltini (section IV)—that, taken together, offer a concise overview of the proliferation- and disarmament-related challenges and opportunities that AI presents.
The updated European Union (EU) Indo–Pacific Strategy does not fully address the significant nuclear escalation risks among the Indo–Pacific region’s nuclear-armed states, which could stem from both traditional and non-traditional security issues. Among other things, this paper proposes that the EU should incorporate non-traditional security risk reduction measures into its Indo–Pacific Strategy, alongside traditional nuclear risk reduction efforts.
This paper posits that the combination of emerging and disruptive technologies and strategic conventional weapons may have a revolutionary impact on the future of the debate about nuclear weapons.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put arms control and arms export controls at the heart of the political discussion. Since February 2022, European Union (EU) member states have changed their approach to the support provided to Ukraine. From an initially cautious stance, they have moved towards the transfer of both light and heavy weapons and equipment through bilateral agreements or within the framework of the European Peace Facility.
This paper outlines how reviving discussions on demand-side factors could accelerate progress in preventing SALW-related human suffering by drawing insight from fields such as criminology, anthropology, sustainable development and community violence prevention.
This paper analyses key issues for the European Union (EU) regarding the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) after the 2023 Fifth Review Conference. It reviews the EU’s longstanding support to strengthen CWC implementation across five areas: upholding the norm against chemical weapons use; adapting the verification regime; capacity building; organizational governance; and external engagement.