In the last twenty years the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, the UN Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty have drawn the attention to the human suffering caused by the illicit trafficking and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). While there has been some progress, these instruments are yet to fully realize their potential. Despite the initial consensus on the importance of addressing both supply- and demand-side factors in achieving effective control of SALW, these instruments have focused almost exclusively on technical supply-side factors.
This paper analyses key issues for the European Union (EU) regarding the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) after the 2023 Fifth Review Conference. It reviews the EU’s longstanding support to strengthen CWC implementation across five areas: upholding the norm against chemical weapons use; adapting the verification regime; capacity building; organizational governance; and external engagement.
This paper asks how Feminist Foreign Policies (FFP) fit with non-proliferation and disarmament goals. In particular, it highlights the multifarious and overlapping approaches to FFP and locates nuclear weapons as a feminist issue that requires a feminist response. How transformative the adoption of an FFP might be for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is dependent on the specific vision of feminism adopted by a state.
Emerging and disruptive technologies and their security and defence uses have become central to European Union (EU) initiatives. Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are no exception. As the focus of great power rivalry and increasing weaponization, AI technologies present both risks and opportunities in terms of transforming civil–military relations, due to their dual-use characteristics, and their increasing deployment in the cyber-physical domain.
Satellite navigation, communications and imagery are critical to military doctrine. They provide the capability and functionalities required to operate increasingly complex military assets with unprecedented precision. On account of their growing importance, there is a need for EU member states to develop their own satellite infrastructure, and to ensure control over and superiority in the space landscape in which satellites operate in order to protect their security.
This paper provides a range of potential policy recommendations and actionable steps that the EU and its member states could take at legal, institutional and operational levels to minimize the nuclear security threats posed by armed conflict in the future.
The European Union (EU) has a long history of commitment to improving biological security and supporting multilateral approaches to arms controls and non-proliferation. It has supported various biosecurity programmes in recent years and continues to increase its financial support towards these, with a focus on the universalization of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the centrepiece of global efforts to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and further the goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament.
The supposed benefits of hypersonic missile technology and the reconsideration of the European security landscape following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine may act as a catalyst for multiple European states to acquire or develop high-speed systems. Although these systems are currently challenging to develop, trends in other missile technology point towards a gradual diffusion of explicit and tacit knowledge that ultimately lowers production costs, resulting in greater affordability and accessibility.
