Managing the CBW risks posed by cloud labs and other new actors in the biotechnology ecosystem requires awareness by relevant stakeholders and effective export control compliance measures. European Union member states and Australia Group participating states should therefore continue to assess and discuss the development of cloud labs, work to provide relevant guidance materials and develop good practices for conducting outreach activities targeting cloud lab providers and other relevant actors to reduce CBW proliferation risks.
Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into the military domain presents a number of significant challenges that have contributed to a deadlock in global governance deliberations.
This brief aims to contribute to discussions on the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and nuclear export controls in enabling or inhibiting transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.
This paper looks at the risks that come with linking research security and export controls and provides recommendations for the European Union and its member states.
The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control establishes limitations on the numbers of major conventional arms and provides for arms control verification in, at present, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. Signed in 1996 and based on the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is still duly implemented, even against the backdrop of rising regional tensions and the crisis in arms control in Europe.
This paper identifies the different factors at work in the continuous implementation of the Agreement, discusses the Agreement’s ability to contribute to regional conflict prevention and addresses its outlook for the near future. As the European Union (EU) is interested in the region both as its close security environment and in terms of enlargement, the EU should consider ways to use its political leverage to promote a conducive political climate for arms control and integrate transparency and confidence-building measures into its approach to conflict prevention.
This multiauthored compendium offers a state-of-the-art summary of the artificial intelligence (AI) issues facing non-proliferation and disarmament. It pulls together four topics—Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain: Technical, Legal and Ethical Perspectives by Thomas Reinhold, Elisabeth Hoffberger-Pippan and Alexander Blanchard (section I); Artificial Intelligence and Chemical Weapons by Marc-Michael Blum (section II); Artificial Intelligence and Biological Weapons by Filippa Lentzos (section III); and Assessing the Implications of Integrating AI in Nuclear Decision-making Systems by Alice Saltini (section IV)—that, taken together, offer a concise overview of the proliferation- and disarmament-related challenges and opportunities that AI presents.
The updated European Union (EU) Indo–Pacific Strategy does not fully address the significant nuclear escalation risks among the Indo–Pacific region’s nuclear-armed states, which could stem from both traditional and non-traditional security issues. Among other things, this paper proposes that the EU should incorporate non-traditional security risk reduction measures into its Indo–Pacific Strategy, alongside traditional nuclear risk reduction efforts.
This paper posits that the combination of emerging and disruptive technologies and strategic conventional weapons may have a revolutionary impact on the future of the debate about nuclear weapons.