A historical and often overlooked source of uranium for weapons and nuclear power is the extraction of uranium from phosphate fertilizers. In this way, uranium can be acquired legally but in an undeclared fashion, invisible to international commerce and export controls. One example is the production of 109 tonnes of uranium in Iraq, which was dedicated to a clandestine weapons programme. The equipment and processes used were European, supplied legally and openly.
The European Union (EU) should undertake a new and dedicated effort to deal with the problems related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). More specifically, one or more new strategy documents are required and, in this context, the EU should also pursue WMD-related contingency planning to increase preparedness and prevent or counter crises. If the EU does not undertake these efforts, something much more will be at stake than the effectiveness of EU programmes in the areas of nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament.
Iran’s ballistic missile programme has long been a source of tension in Iran’s immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Providing Iran with a diverse and extensive arsenal, the ballistic missile programme plays multiple roles: it is an important element of military doctrine, a means of deterrence, and a tool of statecraft.
The primary threat posed by the programme stems from its potential connection to Iran’s nuclear programme, and the international community has consequently sought to address it as such. Supply-side restrictions and missile defences have played a prominent role.
The post-cold war generation of citizens is forgetting nuclear weapon-related dangers and becoming indifferent to the issue. At the same time, the absence of mass grassroots, anti-nuclear protest suggests tacit support for current nuclear weapon policies. These three common diagnoses are potentially contradictory and, more importantly, are only assumptions. This paper is the first systematic attempt at assessing the attitude of the under 30s generation of European Union (EU) citizens with regard to nuclear weapons.
Three-dimensional (3D) printing is an evolving technology that can produce objects from plastics and metals. It works by building up layers of material hardened by a laser. The process is driven by computers that generate the enabling laser beams from highly detailed computer drawings and models. The parts that can be produced can be accurate copies of the enabling drawings, but they will have different material properties from items produced by traditional manufacturing such as casting, forging and machining.
The Centres of Excellence (COE) initiative began in 2010 as a new methodology for providing technical assistance to countries outside the European Union (EU) in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation. The initiative was designed as a ‘bottom-up’ methodology that combines a (trans-) regional networking approach with national needs assessments and action plans developed by the partner countries, and a project delivery system to transfer EU expertise in a tailored manner to partner countries.
Since the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine, development of the Ukrainian Government’s nuclear security policy has sought to strengthen the protection of civilian nuclear facilities, materials and sources inside the country from emerging threats arising from the changed security environment.
States with biodefence programmes have a special responsibility to ensure high standards of transparency. Most submit declarations about their programmes under the confidence-building measures (CBMs) of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Some states have recently gone further in their voluntary efforts through interactive information exchanges and on-site visits.
The secure and sustainable use of outer space has become a concern. More than 60 nations and regional governmental organizations operate satellites in earth orbit and a large number of private companies operate commercial satellite systems. The number of systems deployed in low earth orbit and on the geostationary ring creates new risks of interference and of physical collision.
The Iran nuclear issue has been a test case for the role of the European Union (EU) as a global actor. The Iran deal, agreed on 15 July 2015, was a victory for EU diplomacy. Initiated at the time of the Iraq war by three European foreign ministers, the 12-year-long negotiations proved that military interventions were not the only answer to nuclear proliferation threats. However, the EU’s responsibility does not end with the Iran deal and the EU will chair the monitoring of its implementation.
