China is a leading exporter of small arms and lights weapons (SALW) and is a popular supplier among states looking for inexpensive or alternative sources of SALW. While China has stated its commitment to preventing the illicit trade in SALW and formally recognizes the destabilizing effect that SALW transfers can have, it is one of the least transparent arms exporters.
In the 10 years since the European Union adopted its Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, it has succeeded in developing a distinctive approach to the non-proliferation of WMD. Developments over the decade provide a solid platform from which the EU could now expand its non-proliferation efforts in ways that increase its effectiveness and efficiency, in particular, by emphasizing the security of European citizens alongside the traditional security of the state.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was conceived in 2003 as a response to a growing threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As it marks its 10th anniversary, the initiative faces a continually evolving set of challenges in its efforts to target the transport of consignments of proliferation concern: despite the participation of over 100 states, a number of key states remain opposed, and questions about its legality, activities and effectiveness persist.
Chemical weapon disarmament remains central to the implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). But full and effective implementation also entails a wide variety of other activities. To achieve all these goals, in the coming months and years the states parties to the CWC will determine how the regime will adapt to the changing international security environment and to developments in science and technology.
China wants to be part of the Arctic order and, as a rising power, emphasizes the global implications of the Arctic’s melting ice. Although several non-Chinese observers have described China’s actions in the Arctic as 'more assertive', and the Chinese Government has taken steps to protect what it perceives as its key interests in the region, China’s Arctic policies are still in a nascent stage of formulation.
The renewed momentum behind international efforts to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) has focused attention on how the proposed ban on the production of fissile material will be verified: what type of organization should be given this responsibility and what technical expertise will it require?
Military spending has risen considerably in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years and several states in the region are engaged in major arms acquisition programmes. Despite generally positive interstate relations, fears have been expressed about the impact of these developments on regional stability and poverty-reduction efforts. Allaying such fears requires high levels of transparency in military spending and arms acquisitions in order to build confidence among states and permit informed public debates on the appropriate allocation of national resources.
Concerns regarding arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa are widespread and have motivated worldwide efforts to control arms flows. Although volumes of arms transferred to the region are low by global standards, even supplies of relatively small quantities of older weapons can have a notable impact on conflicts.
The leaders of China and Russia like to speak in public of the strategic partnership between the two countries, based on mutual interests and trust. In reality, the two cornerstones of the relationship—arms sales and energy cooperation—are crumbling. China has not placed a significant order for Russian arms since 2005 and buys only a fraction of its energy imports from Russia.