1989 several Western states imposed arms embargoes on China. Nevertheless, China has continued to benefit from the transfer of military-relevant Western goods and technologies in its efforts to modernize its defence forces’ industrial and technological capabilities.
Russia has identified the Arctic as both a strategic priority and a resource base for the 21st century. Against a backdrop of expectations about the opportunities available in the Arctic, Russia has primarily pursued a policy focused on strengthening national sovereignty in the region. However, despite the considerable attention given to the development of the Arctic by the Russian leadership, progress in achieving Russia's goals in the Arctic has been slow.
Non-interference is one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that is core to China’s foreign policy and to its self-image. But in a pragmatic and incremental adaptation to its globalizing economic and security interests, Chinese foreign policy is slowly shifting away from a strict interpretation of this principle. However, the debate on China’s overseas interests and noninterference is far from over.
In the period between North Korea’s second and third nuclear tests, and in the midst of the succession to Kim Jong Il, China’s economic relations with North Korea expanded at an unprecedented pace. It is a widely held view in China that this increase in economic exchanges can help make non-proliferation measures more effective and revive the disarmament process.
Little attention has been paid to the limited, but not negligible, nuclear proliferation risks associated with the mining of uranium. As the global market for uranium changes and as more African countries become uranium suppliers, there is a need for them to be vigilant of those risks.
China is a leading exporter of small arms and lights weapons (SALW) and is a popular supplier among states looking for inexpensive or alternative sources of SALW. While China has stated its commitment to preventing the illicit trade in SALW and formally recognizes the destabilizing effect that SALW transfers can have, it is one of the least transparent arms exporters.
In the 10 years since the European Union adopted its Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, it has succeeded in developing a distinctive approach to the non-proliferation of WMD. Developments over the decade provide a solid platform from which the EU could now expand its non-proliferation efforts in ways that increase its effectiveness and efficiency, in particular, by emphasizing the security of European citizens alongside the traditional security of the state.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was conceived in 2003 as a response to a growing threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As it marks its 10th anniversary, the initiative faces a continually evolving set of challenges in its efforts to target the transport of consignments of proliferation concern: despite the participation of over 100 states, a number of key states remain opposed, and questions about its legality, activities and effectiveness persist.
Chemical weapon disarmament remains central to the implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). But full and effective implementation also entails a wide variety of other activities. To achieve all these goals, in the coming months and years the states parties to the CWC will determine how the regime will adapt to the changing international security environment and to developments in science and technology.
China wants to be part of the Arctic order and, as a rising power, emphasizes the global implications of the Arctic’s melting ice. Although several non-Chinese observers have described China’s actions in the Arctic as 'more assertive', and the Chinese Government has taken steps to protect what it perceives as its key interests in the region, China’s Arctic policies are still in a nascent stage of formulation.