This paper highlights the need for a human-centred approach in security strategies that can bridge the divide between development and security policies.
European Union civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (EU CSDP) missions were designed as time-limited tools. Yet many persist for years—tying up scarce resources and limiting new deployments. This paper argues that the EU needs an updated closure and transition policy to react to new priorities in the absence of matching budget growth.
Civilian CSDP missions have become ‘stuck’ due to rushed and overambitious mandates, weakly defined end-states and strategic reviews that do not enable political decisions beyond routine extensions. Civilian CSDP needs to develop a culture of planned endings by strengthening political steering, and requiring realistic end-states and exit strategies from the start. Closure and transition should also be linked to evidence, partners and funding so handovers are orderly and sustainable. Staying too long can undermine both the mission’s and EU’s credibility.
This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States.
This paper examines the drivers and implications of naval build-ups in the Indo-Pacific, considering key actors’ security objectives and threat perceptions, as well as the interplay of regional dynamics and strategic relations between nuclear-armed states. The focus is on undersea armament involving submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, which constitute a significant focus of military investments. The paper considers the related horizontal and vertical escalation risks, meaning a potential increase in the scope and scale of conflict.
This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union.
In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge.
Inspections in the 1990s and early 2000s in South Africa, Iraq and Libya were designed to discover the details of nuclear weapon programmes and destroy any remnants. As the global norm against nuclear weapons strengthens, the international community may once more require verification of a state’s denuclearization.
Current understanding of the cyber postures of China, Russia, the United States and the European Union (EU) merits re-evaluation. It is often assumed that China and Russia are aligned, yet this is not always the case. Unlike Russia, which has an ongoing focus on information security, China’s official documents incorporate both information security and cybersecurity concerns that are similar to those of the EU and the USA. Moreover, while often paired, the EU and the USA have differing regulatory structures in cyberspace.
Armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region remain dependent on weapon systems imported from foreign suppliers. This is despite the efforts of many governments in the Indo-Pacific to implement policies that support the development of local arms industrial capabilities with the aim of increasing self-reliance.
This report develops three indicators to give a score and regional ranking of self-reliance in arms production to 12 jurisdictions in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam.