The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy

The breakup of the Soviet Union left a cold war nuclear legacy consisting of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and a sprawling infrastructure for their production and maintenance. This book examines the fate of this vast nuclear weapon complex and the unprecedented non-proliferation challenges associated with the breakup of a nuclear weapon state. It describes the high-level diplomatic bargaining efforts to consolidate in Russia the nuclear weapons based in newly independent Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and to strengthen central control over these weapons. It surveys the problems associated with dismantling nuclear weapons and the difficulties involved in safely storing and disposing of large stockpiles of fissile material. It reviews the key provisions of the principal nuclear arms control measures and initiatives, including the START I and START II treaties. Finally, the book assesses the contribution of international assistance programmes to the denuclearization process underway in the former Soviet Union.

Highlights and key conclusions of the book
The nuclear disarmament process in the former Soviet Union is taking place in a political and social framework that is far from stable.

The denuclearization assistance provided by the USA and other countries to the former Soviet Union represents only a tiny fraction of their annual defence outlays.

• • The process of change in the former Soviet Union has not yet reached its turning point: the economic and political outlook remains clouded and tensions are high both within the republics of the former Soviet Union and between them.
  • The nuclear disarmament process in the former Soviet Union must be accelerated.
  • The nuclear disarmament process must be speeded up: even the nearest START II deadline, the year 2000, looks far in the future in the light of the current political volatility in the former Soviet Union.
  • Assisting with the speeding up of the nuclear disarmament process is well within the technological and economic capabilities of the industrialized world.
  • The pressing questions concerning the final disposition of fissile material, particularly plutonium, extracted from nuclear weapons must be resolved.
  • Although it is impracticable to attach a monetary value to the security obtained through various assistance programmes, the findings in this research report indicate that the security benefit received through these disbursements far exceeds the cost.
• Financial assistance to Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union must be significantly increased in order to:
  • build more secure storage sites for nuclear weapons and fissile materials;
  • raise the level of security at existing sites via, among other measures, the rapid adoption of more sophisticated methods for material control and accountancy;
  • improve export and border controls;
  • improve the living conditions of nuclear custodians, technicians and scientists; and
  • double or triple the rate of dismantlement of nuclear warheads.

  A division of labour between wealthy non-nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon states could be envisaged whereby:

  • wealthy non-nuclear weapon states could concentrate their efforts outside the sensitive areas of warhead dismantlement and fissile material; and
  • France, the UK and the USA could concentrate on the sensitive areas of warhead dismantlement and fissile material.

  The European Union, as a whole, and its non-nuclear weapon state members in particular, are well-suited to provide crucial assistance in a range of areas:

  • environmental recovery and restoration (the cleanup of nuclear and chemical waste);
  • provision of Science and Technology Centres and other research opportunities for former nuclear weapon scientists;
  • the establishment of effective export controls (from assistance in drafting regulations and laws to the training of personnel);
  • conversion of industry from military to civilian purposes; and
  • programmes and techniques of energy conservation.

  No effort should be spared to make the fissile materials extracted from nuclear warheads as impervious as possible to recycling into the manufacture of new explosive devices.

  • One of the various options available for plutonium disposition should be quickly agreed and implemented as soon as possible.
  • To prevent illicit use in bombs, stocks of highly enriched uranium should be blended down to lower enrichment immediately.

  A verified global inventory of nuclear warheads and fissile material should be established as soon as possible.