Since the election of Donald J. Trump to a second presidential term in the United States, the question of Europe’s reliance on US arms imports and US security commitments has become ever more salient. SIPRI’s new data on international arms transfers reveals not only that arms imports by European states surged between the five-year periods 2015–19 and 2020–24, but also that the share of those imports that came from the USA grew markedly. In this Q&A, Katarina Djokic, Researcher in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme, examines the current status of arms imports in Europe, with a focus on the European members of NATO, as well as the considerations guiding their procurement decisions.
Demand for arms increased substantially among the European NATO allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. There has been an even bigger jump in rates of procurement, including imports, in the years since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
This latest round of increases is not only a direct response to heightened threat perceptions concerning Russia. Although transatlantic relations have been under strain many times since NATO’s foundation in 1949, Trump’s election has raised serious doubts about the credibility of the USA’s security guarantees for its European allies. Among other things, Trump has repeatedly and publicly expressed an ambition to bring Greenland—the sovereign territory of NATO ally Denmark—under US control; sought to improve relations with Russia while temporarily suspendingUS support to Ukraine; demanded that European NATO states substantially increase their military spending to compensate for years of ‘free-riding’ on the USA’s military might; and cast doubt on whether the USA would come to the support of a NATO ally under attack.
This deterioration in relations has amplified calls within Europe for European states to reduce their dependence on imported arms and to strengthen the European arms industry.
Q: To start us off, could you summarize what the latest SIPRI data on international arms transfers tells us about arms imports by NATO’s European members, and in particular their imports from the USA?
KDj: According to our latest data, imports of major conventional arms by the European NATO members more than doubled between 2015–19 and 2020–24. That included some very large increases by individual states, like Hungary’s +1454 per cent, Belgium’s +1338 per cent and Poland’s +508 per cent.
Almost two thirds—64 per cent—of the imports by European NATO states in 2020–24 came from the USA, a substantially larger share than in 2015–19, when it accounted for 52 per cent. Of the next four biggest suppliers, only two were European states: France accounted for 6.5 per cent of imports and Germany for 4.7 per cent. Another 6.5 per cent came from South Korea and 3.9 per cent from Israel.
Q: How dependent are the European NATO states on US-produced arms currently? Which arms do they import?
KDj: The 64 per cent of arms imports by European NATO states that came from the USA in 2020–24 was the largest share in any five-year period of the past two decades. However, the level of reliance on US imports varies a lot depending on the types of arms. For instance, European states tend to procure European-produced ships and submarines rather than importing them from non-European states.
When it comes to arms for land forces, such as tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery systems, reliance on US suppliers is also low. Most European NATO states tend to buy from domestic suppliers, from other European states or from other non-European states (e.g. Israel and South Korea), but not from the USA. The exception to this is some NATO members in Central Europe, including Croatia, Poland and Romania, where a preference for US-produced arms for land forces has been driven by considerations such as strengthening their security partnership with the USA. Also, the USA has delivered second-hand armoured personnel carriers to several European states as aid.
What really boosts the volume of arms imports from the USA in the SIPRI data is combat aircraft. European NATO states received over 150 combat aircraft and over 60 combat helicopters from the USA in the past five years and, at the end of 2024, they had another 472 combat aircraft and 150 combat helicopters on order from the USA.
Q: Why do European states buy so many combat aircraft and other arms from the USA when they could procure similar systems within Europe?
KDj: European states have produced and could produce combat aircraft. Admittedly, the justifications for buying from the USA have included the fact that there are no comparable European products—for instance, when it comes to larger combat helicopters. But three main considerations have motivated European states’ decisions to procure US-produced combat aircraft and other arms in recent decades. The first one is political: by procuring US arms, states have hoped to strengthen their relations with the USA, prominently in the security sphere. The Central European states I mentioned before are certainly not alone in this.
The second consideration is related to military wish lists, and this is particularly the case with air forces. In the past few years, the availability of fifth-generation combat aircraft produced in the USA has been enticing even for air forces whose doctrine and capability requirements could be fulfilled with aircraft produced within Europe, which are seen as being fourth-generation. I ought to emphasize here that this classification into generations is very informal and there are no universally accepted definitions of what constitutes fourth- or fifth-generation.
Finally, there are military–economic considerations pertaining to costs and life-cycle support. Since the USA orders significant volumes of arms for its own armed forces, economies of scale make US-produced arms cheaper and their delivery times shorter in comparison to buying European, especially in cases when governments would have to invest in development of entirely new systems. Also, the steady production of arms in the USA means that its customers can count on getting spare parts in a timely manner as well as maintenance and other support for the whole life cycle of the arms they obtain from the USA.
Buying combat aircraft and helicopters, in particular, creates long-term relationships because they will stay in service for decades, and you need good relations with the producer in order to provide for maintenance and modernization.
One more point to keep in mind when we talk about imports from the USA is that arms-production relations between Europe and the USA are more complex than a simple seller–buyer model. The European and US arms industries are deeply intertwined—through supply chains, joint ventures, licensed production deals and more. For instance, several European NATO members are involved in producing components for F-35 combat aircraft, both for themselves and for other customers. But they are counted in SIPRI’s arms transfers monitoring methodology as imports from the USA because they were designed there.
Q: What about other non-European suppliers? Are they expanding their presence in Europe?
KDj: The next biggest non-European suppliers to European NATO states in 2020–24 were South Korea and Israel. While their shares of European NATO states’ arms imports only increased slightly, the volumes grew more substantially with the increase in European NATO states’ imports. For example, the volume of imports from South Korea in the past five years grew by 130 per cent in comparison to 2015–19, while the volume from Israel trebled.
Israel mostly supplies artillery, anti-tank missiles, drones and radars to European NATO states, and Israeli companies are already well-established suppliers in these niches, so the increase in the imports from Israel simply confirms that Europe is buying more. South Korea, on the other hand, has been expanding its presence since 2016, when it first started delivering major arms to European NATO states by offering relatively low-cost equipment, speedy deliveries and options to engage national arms industries through licensed production of the procured arms.
A new supplier to Europe is Türkiye, which only started delivering major arms to European NATO members in the past five years. Its share of imports by European NATO states is relatively small (0.5 per cent) and unlikely to significantly grow. However, Türkiye has been able to carve out a market for its armoured personnel carriers and armed drones in Central Europe. Turkish armoured personnel carriers are produced under licence in Hungary, while Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania have all either imported or ordered armed Bayraktar TB-2 drones from Türkiye. In the Western Balkans, Türkiye uses transfers of arms and military equipment, including types of equipment SIPRI does not include in its Arms Transfers Database, as a way of strengthening bilateral political relationships.
However, overall the primary considerations behind buying arms from non-European states other than the USA are commercial rather than political.
Q: We have talked so far mainly about NATO Europe’s own defence; what about Ukraine? Would European states be able to meet Ukraine’s need for arms if the USA permanently stops providing military aid to the country?
KDj: Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the USA has accounted for 45 per cent of the arms imported by Ukraine, while European NATO states together have supplied 47 per cent. European states could potentially supply more major conventional arms to Ukraine, such as combat aircraft, long-range missiles and ground-based air-defence systems if they decided to prioritize this over domestic procurement and exports to third states. But the withdrawal of US aid would create other gaps that are harder for European states to fill, from promptly supplying Ukraine’s need for ammunition to intelligence sharing to strategic capabilities such as air and missile defence, for which European states still rely on the USA.
These gaps would also make it difficult for Europe to provide security guarantees to Ukraine without US involvement, following a future peace agreement.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Katarina Djokic is a Researcher in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
Since the election of Donald J. Trump to a second presidential term in the United States, the question of Europe’s reliance on US arms imports and US security commitments has become ever more salient. SIPRI’s new data on international arms transfers reveals not only that arms imports by European states surged between the five-year periods 2015–19 and 2020–24, but also that the share of those imports that came from the USA grew markedly. In this Q&A, Katarina Djokic, Researcher in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme, examines the current status of arms imports in Europe, with a focus on the European members of NATO, as well as the considerations guiding their procurement decisions.
Demand for arms increased substantially among the European NATO allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. There has been an even bigger jump in rates of procurement, including imports, in the years since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
This latest round of increases is not only a direct response to heightened threat perceptions concerning Russia. Although transatlantic relations have been under strain many times since NATO’s foundation in 1949, Trump’s election has raised serious doubts about the credibility of the USA’s security guarantees for its European allies. Among other things, Trump has repeatedly and publicly expressed an ambition to bring Greenland—the sovereign territory of NATO ally Denmark—under US control; sought to improve relations with Russia while temporarily suspending US support to Ukraine; demanded that European NATO states substantially increase their military spending to compensate for years of ‘free-riding’ on the USA’s military might; and cast doubt on whether the USA would come to the support of a NATO ally under attack.
This deterioration in relations has amplified calls within Europe for European states to reduce their dependence on imported arms and to strengthen the European arms industry.
Q: To start us off, could you summarize what the latest SIPRI data on international arms transfers tells us about arms imports by NATO’s European members, and in particular their imports from the USA?
KDj: According to our latest data, imports of major conventional arms by the European NATO members more than doubled between 2015–19 and 2020–24. That included some very large increases by individual states, like Hungary’s +1454 per cent, Belgium’s +1338 per cent and Poland’s +508 per cent.
Almost two thirds—64 per cent—of the imports by European NATO states in 2020–24 came from the USA, a substantially larger share than in 2015–19, when it accounted for 52 per cent. Of the next four biggest suppliers, only two were European states: France accounted for 6.5 per cent of imports and Germany for 4.7 per cent. Another 6.5 per cent came from South Korea and 3.9 per cent from Israel.
Q: How dependent are the European NATO states on US-produced arms currently? Which arms do they import?
KDj: The 64 per cent of arms imports by European NATO states that came from the USA in 2020–24 was the largest share in any five-year period of the past two decades. However, the level of reliance on US imports varies a lot depending on the types of arms. For instance, European states tend to procure European-produced ships and submarines rather than importing them from non-European states.
When it comes to arms for land forces, such as tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery systems, reliance on US suppliers is also low. Most European NATO states tend to buy from domestic suppliers, from other European states or from other non-European states (e.g. Israel and South Korea), but not from the USA. The exception to this is some NATO members in Central Europe, including Croatia, Poland and Romania, where a preference for US-produced arms for land forces has been driven by considerations such as strengthening their security partnership with the USA. Also, the USA has delivered second-hand armoured personnel carriers to several European states as aid.
What really boosts the volume of arms imports from the USA in the SIPRI data is combat aircraft. European NATO states received over 150 combat aircraft and over 60 combat helicopters from the USA in the past five years and, at the end of 2024, they had another 472 combat aircraft and 150 combat helicopters on order from the USA.
Q: Why do European states buy so many combat aircraft and other arms from the USA when they could procure similar systems within Europe?
KDj: European states have produced and could produce combat aircraft. Admittedly, the justifications for buying from the USA have included the fact that there are no comparable European products—for instance, when it comes to larger combat helicopters. But three main considerations have motivated European states’ decisions to procure US-produced combat aircraft and other arms in recent decades. The first one is political: by procuring US arms, states have hoped to strengthen their relations with the USA, prominently in the security sphere. The Central European states I mentioned before are certainly not alone in this.
The second consideration is related to military wish lists, and this is particularly the case with air forces. In the past few years, the availability of fifth-generation combat aircraft produced in the USA has been enticing even for air forces whose doctrine and capability requirements could be fulfilled with aircraft produced within Europe, which are seen as being fourth-generation. I ought to emphasize here that this classification into generations is very informal and there are no universally accepted definitions of what constitutes fourth- or fifth-generation.
Finally, there are military–economic considerations pertaining to costs and life-cycle support. Since the USA orders significant volumes of arms for its own armed forces, economies of scale make US-produced arms cheaper and their delivery times shorter in comparison to buying European, especially in cases when governments would have to invest in development of entirely new systems. Also, the steady production of arms in the USA means that its customers can count on getting spare parts in a timely manner as well as maintenance and other support for the whole life cycle of the arms they obtain from the USA.
Buying combat aircraft and helicopters, in particular, creates long-term relationships because they will stay in service for decades, and you need good relations with the producer in order to provide for maintenance and modernization.
One more point to keep in mind when we talk about imports from the USA is that arms-production relations between Europe and the USA are more complex than a simple seller–buyer model. The European and US arms industries are deeply intertwined—through supply chains, joint ventures, licensed production deals and more. For instance, several European NATO members are involved in producing components for F-35 combat aircraft, both for themselves and for other customers. But they are counted in SIPRI’s arms transfers monitoring methodology as imports from the USA because they were designed there.
Q: What about other non-European suppliers? Are they expanding their presence in Europe?
KDj: The next biggest non-European suppliers to European NATO states in 2020–24 were South Korea and Israel. While their shares of European NATO states’ arms imports only increased slightly, the volumes grew more substantially with the increase in European NATO states’ imports. For example, the volume of imports from South Korea in the past five years grew by 130 per cent in comparison to 2015–19, while the volume from Israel trebled.
Israel mostly supplies artillery, anti-tank missiles, drones and radars to European NATO states, and Israeli companies are already well-established suppliers in these niches, so the increase in the imports from Israel simply confirms that Europe is buying more. South Korea, on the other hand, has been expanding its presence since 2016, when it first started delivering major arms to European NATO states by offering relatively low-cost equipment, speedy deliveries and options to engage national arms industries through licensed production of the procured arms.
A new supplier to Europe is Türkiye, which only started delivering major arms to European NATO members in the past five years. Its share of imports by European NATO states is relatively small (0.5 per cent) and unlikely to significantly grow. However, Türkiye has been able to carve out a market for its armoured personnel carriers and armed drones in Central Europe. Turkish armoured personnel carriers are produced under licence in Hungary, while Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania have all either imported or ordered armed Bayraktar TB-2 drones from Türkiye. In the Western Balkans, Türkiye uses transfers of arms and military equipment, including types of equipment SIPRI does not include in its Arms Transfers Database, as a way of strengthening bilateral political relationships.
However, overall the primary considerations behind buying arms from non-European states other than the USA are commercial rather than political.
Q: We have talked so far mainly about NATO Europe’s own defence; what about Ukraine? Would European states be able to meet Ukraine’s need for arms if the USA permanently stops providing military aid to the country?
KDj: Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the USA has accounted for 45 per cent of the arms imported by Ukraine, while European NATO states together have supplied 47 per cent. European states could potentially supply more major conventional arms to Ukraine, such as combat aircraft, long-range missiles and ground-based air-defence systems if they decided to prioritize this over domestic procurement and exports to third states. But the withdrawal of US aid would create other gaps that are harder for European states to fill, from promptly supplying Ukraine’s need for ammunition to intelligence sharing to strategic capabilities such as air and missile defence, for which European states still rely on the USA.
These gaps would also make it difficult for Europe to provide security guarantees to Ukraine without US involvement, following a future peace agreement.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)