The peace process in Colombia has transformed the country’s security landscape. With the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), once the largest guerrilla force in the Western hemisphere, laying down its arms, environmental degradation has become a major national security concern, fuelled by illegal logging, deforestation, wildlife trafficking, mining, and the cultivation and processing of coca and other drug crops. The rise in environmental crime not only endangers Colombia’s rich biodiversity but also risks destabilizing the fragile peace.
Successive Colombian governments have pursued an increasingly militarized approach to environmental protection since 2010. This has exacerbated the suffering of marginalized ethnic communities and subsistence farmers—who are vital to environmental stewardship and conservation and have already endured some of the harshest impactsof over 50 years of armed conflict. The militarized approach perpetuates cycles of violence and neglect, reinforcing the historical power imbalances that have driven Colombia’s past conflicts and could well drive new ones, while the scale of environmental degradation has grown. By undermining and even criminalizing those who have sustainably managed the land for generations, the militarized approach not only deepens their marginalization but also threatens the ecosystems that sustain them and the well-being of future generations.
This blog explores why this is happening and what needs to be done.
The peace process and the rise of environmental crime
A 2016 peace agreement formally ended over 50 years of armed conflict between FARC and the Colombian government. FARC had already declared a unilateral indefinite ceasefire in December 2014, which—although it was occasionally breached—significantly de-escalated the conflict, particularly in the rural areas where the conflict had been most intense. These areas were predominantly inhabited by marginalized small-scale subsistence farmers (campesinos) and ethnic communities, including Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.
The agreement explicitly recognized these communities as some of the main victims of the armed conflict, due to both direct violence and state neglect. Social inclusion and the integration of Colombia’s peripheral and conflict-affected regions are at the heart of the agreement’s ‘territorial-based approach’; a chapter on comprehensive rural reform seeks to close the gap between marginalized rural areas and prosperous urban centres.
By mid 2017, FARC had ceased to exist and by 2020, more than 13 000 former FARC combatants had demobilized. However, around 800former FARC members rejected the peace agreement and thousands who initially demobilized have taken up arms again, joining either FARC dissident groups—whose members are believed to total more than 5200—or other non-state armed groups.
Before the peace process, FARC’s control over certain regions of Colombia—many of them environmentally sensitive—unintentionally acted as a safeguard for biodiversity by limiting deforestation. FARC forces used the forest canopyto provide cover and in some cases protected the environment for local farmers, penalizing excessive logging and hunting. Their presence also blocked infrastructure development, industrial agriculture, and resource extraction by national or foreign companies.
FARC’s demobilization, however, created a security vacuum that criminal organizations, including FARC dissident groups, were quick to exploit for unsustainable resource extraction. FARC’s departure also provided smallholders, large landowners and international companies with opportunities to expand into remote forest areas that had previously been too dangerous. Post-conflict investment and economic expectations led to land grabbing, speculation and conversion.
Amid these changes environmental crime surged. Between 2015 and 2017, deforestation—driven mainly by cattle ranching, illegal mining and drug trafficking—increased by 77 per cent and only in 2022 did rates come back down to the 2015 level. From 2016 to 2020, areas impacted by alluvial gold mining rose by 20 per cent, with two thirds of the mining being illegal. Despite a slight decline in the total area used for mining in 2022, the share of mining that was illegal grew to 73 per cent between 2021 and 2022. Nearly half of all alluvial gold mining sites overlap with coca cultivation areas, which themselves expanded by 140 per cent between 2015 and 2022.
Deforestation is also tied to illegal land grabbing, where state-owned land, forest reserves and Indigenous territories are cleared and occupied. By converting forested land into, for example, cattle pasture, land grabbers gain short-term profits and lay the groundwork for future legal ownership.
Militarized environmental protection
In response to these developments, as well as mounting international pressure on the Colombian government to protect the Amazon as a crucial carbon sink, Colombia’s armed forces have become deeply involved in environmental protection and the fight against environmental crime.
In 2018 the government created the Comprehensive Environmental Protection Force (Fuerza Integral de Protección Ambiental). This body, involving the Ministry of National Defence along with environmental authorities and the Attorney General’s Office, was tasked with safeguarding ecosystems, biodiversity and natural resources. A year later, a military operation, Operación Artemisa, was launched to combat deforestation, illegal mining and wildlife trafficking, deploying 23 000 members of Colombia’s police and armed forces during its first year. Although the operation recovered 21 480 hectares of forest, it faced strong opposition and criticism for targeting smallholder farmers and violating their human rights while failing to stop the larger financiers of deforestation.
The defence and security policy adopted under the presidency of Iván Duque Márquez (2018–22) emphasized the protection of water, biodiversity and natural resources as a strategic priority. It created specialized military units focused on environmental protection. The Zonas Futuro strategy, launched in 2019 as part of the peace process implementation, further intensified militarization by integrating army, navy and police efforts to bolster security presence and intelligence in violence-prone areas. Despite criticism of militarized approaches to environmental protection, the government formed in 2022 has maintained environmental security as a central element of its security and defence strategy.
Mixed results and unintended consequences
Data suggests that, aside from the recent decline in deforestation, the militarized approach has largely failed not only to curb environmental crime but also to protect its victims. Since the peace agreement was signed, more than 1200 human rights defenders and líderes sociales (social leaders) have been killed, and in 2023 alone, 79 environmental human rights defenders were killed, most of them members of ethnic communities and campesinos fighting to defend their land.
The main perpetrators of the violence are non-state armed groups that drive and profit from environmental crime and the shadow economy it supports. They also commit kidnappings, child recruitment, coercive displacement or confinement, and other abuses.
However, the armed forces have also been accused of victimizing marginalized ethnic groups and subsistence farming communities, employing excessive force, sexual violence, unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests, and the destruction of homes and livelihoods. Much of this has been officially justified as part of combating environmental crime, but many claim that it has been used as a means to repress, silence and stigmatize those exercising their rights.
While some campesinos and members of ethnic communities do engage in illegal activities such as land clearing, coca cultivation and informal mining, this has often been a survival strategy in response to long-standing state neglect in rural areas. Despite this, and the fact that they play only a minor role in large-scale environmental destruction and are often coerced by armed groups, the militarized response has disproportionately targeted small-scale farmers at the lowest echelons of criminal enterprises or who are simply farming in protected areas.
Ways forward
Since the new government took office in 2022, there has been growing recognition of the challenges marginalized communities face in relation to environmental crime and official responses to it. The latest national development plan and security policy emphasize a people-centred, community-based approach focused on addressing the root causes of conflict and crime. This hopefully heralds a shift from prosecuting small-scale farmers to targeting the criminal organizations behind illegal economies, including those funding deforestation.
While this is a welcome development, it is essential that the role of the armed forces in environmental protection is reduced to a minimum. Striking a balance between enforcing environmental laws and safeguarding human rights is crucial. Although the military may be necessary to confront non-state armed groups contributing to violence and fuelling environmental crime, the marginalized populations who feel the most negative effects from these activities should instead be supported by strong, democratic institutions that prioritize equity as well as security.
At the heart of this issue lies the need to protect biodiversity and the people safeguarding these areas. Colombia’s struggles against deforestation and environmental crime stem from a complex interplay of legal and illegal activities, sociopolitical dynamics, and economic incentives. These challenges are deeply rooted in more than half a century of armed conflict, including the profound disconnect between the socio-economic models shaped by the state and elites—often enforced through violence by the illegal armed groups, in particular paramilitaries—and the survival strategies of marginalized local communities. Ethnic groups, particularly Indigenous peoples, and campesinos are among the most committed defenders of biodiversity. Their ancestral practices and traditional knowledge could be crucial to preserving ecosystems.
Although Indigenous knowledge systems are diverse, many share a common understanding of ecological degradation: it stems from the denial of the interdependence between humans and nature. Indigenous worldviews emphasize this interconnectedness and the responsibilities that flow from it.
In Colombia’s struggle to address its environmental challenges, these communities, alongside other ethnic minorities and campesinos, should be treated as partners in conservation efforts, not penalized by a militarized response.
On 29 October Caroline Delgado will be a panellist in a side event of the 16th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP16 CBD), entitled ‘Biodiversity, Land Use Change and the Implications for Conflict in Latin America’ (La pérdida de biodiversidad y sus vínculos con la seguridad). The interactive panel discussion will explore strategies to enhance food security in regions affected by land degradation and climate change.
The side event is made possible by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and the Swedish International Agricultural Network Initiative (SIANI). Click here to read more about the side event and how to register, as well as about recent work by SIPRI and FES on issues of climate and environmental justice and food security in Latin America. COP16 CBD runs from 21 October to 1 November 2024 in Cali, Colombia.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Dr Caroline Delgado is a Senior Researcher and Director of the Food, Peace and Security Programme at SIPRI.
The peace process in Colombia has transformed the country’s security landscape. With the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), once the largest guerrilla force in the Western hemisphere, laying down its arms, environmental degradation has become a major national security concern, fuelled by illegal logging, deforestation, wildlife trafficking, mining, and the cultivation and processing of coca and other drug crops. The rise in environmental crime not only endangers Colombia’s rich biodiversity but also risks destabilizing the fragile peace.
Successive Colombian governments have pursued an increasingly militarized approach to environmental protection since 2010. This has exacerbated the suffering of marginalized ethnic communities and subsistence farmers—who are vital to environmental stewardship and conservation and have already endured some of the harshest impacts of over 50 years of armed conflict. The militarized approach perpetuates cycles of violence and neglect, reinforcing the historical power imbalances that have driven Colombia’s past conflicts and could well drive new ones, while the scale of environmental degradation has grown. By undermining and even criminalizing those who have sustainably managed the land for generations, the militarized approach not only deepens their marginalization but also threatens the ecosystems that sustain them and the well-being of future generations.
This blog explores why this is happening and what needs to be done.
The peace process and the rise of environmental crime
A 2016 peace agreement formally ended over 50 years of armed conflict between FARC and the Colombian government. FARC had already declared a unilateral indefinite ceasefire in December 2014, which—although it was occasionally breached—significantly de-escalated the conflict, particularly in the rural areas where the conflict had been most intense. These areas were predominantly inhabited by marginalized small-scale subsistence farmers (campesinos) and ethnic communities, including Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.
The agreement explicitly recognized these communities as some of the main victims of the armed conflict, due to both direct violence and state neglect. Social inclusion and the integration of Colombia’s peripheral and conflict-affected regions are at the heart of the agreement’s ‘territorial-based approach’; a chapter on comprehensive rural reform seeks to close the gap between marginalized rural areas and prosperous urban centres.
By mid 2017, FARC had ceased to exist and by 2020, more than 13 000 former FARC combatants had demobilized. However, around 800 former FARC members rejected the peace agreement and thousands who initially demobilized have taken up arms again, joining either FARC dissident groups—whose members are believed to total more than 5200—or other non-state armed groups.
Before the peace process, FARC’s control over certain regions of Colombia—many of them environmentally sensitive—unintentionally acted as a safeguard for biodiversity by limiting deforestation. FARC forces used the forest canopy to provide cover and in some cases protected the environment for local farmers, penalizing excessive logging and hunting. Their presence also blocked infrastructure development, industrial agriculture, and resource extraction by national or foreign companies.
FARC’s demobilization, however, created a security vacuum that criminal organizations, including FARC dissident groups, were quick to exploit for unsustainable resource extraction. FARC’s departure also provided smallholders, large landowners and international companies with opportunities to expand into remote forest areas that had previously been too dangerous. Post-conflict investment and economic expectations led to land grabbing, speculation and conversion.
Amid these changes environmental crime surged. Between 2015 and 2017, deforestation—driven mainly by cattle ranching, illegal mining and drug trafficking—increased by 77 per cent and only in 2022 did rates come back down to the 2015 level. From 2016 to 2020, areas impacted by alluvial gold mining rose by 20 per cent, with two thirds of the mining being illegal. Despite a slight decline in the total area used for mining in 2022, the share of mining that was illegal grew to 73 per cent between 2021 and 2022. Nearly half of all alluvial gold mining sites overlap with coca cultivation areas, which themselves expanded by 140 per cent between 2015 and 2022.
Deforestation is also tied to illegal land grabbing, where state-owned land, forest reserves and Indigenous territories are cleared and occupied. By converting forested land into, for example, cattle pasture, land grabbers gain short-term profits and lay the groundwork for future legal ownership.
Militarized environmental protection
In response to these developments, as well as mounting international pressure on the Colombian government to protect the Amazon as a crucial carbon sink, Colombia’s armed forces have become deeply involved in environmental protection and the fight against environmental crime.
In 2018 the government created the Comprehensive Environmental Protection Force (Fuerza Integral de Protección Ambiental). This body, involving the Ministry of National Defence along with environmental authorities and the Attorney General’s Office, was tasked with safeguarding ecosystems, biodiversity and natural resources. A year later, a military operation, Operación Artemisa, was launched to combat deforestation, illegal mining and wildlife trafficking, deploying 23 000 members of Colombia’s police and armed forces during its first year. Although the operation recovered 21 480 hectares of forest, it faced strong opposition and criticism for targeting smallholder farmers and violating their human rights while failing to stop the larger financiers of deforestation.
The defence and security policy adopted under the presidency of Iván Duque Márquez (2018–22) emphasized the protection of water, biodiversity and natural resources as a strategic priority. It created specialized military units focused on environmental protection. The Zonas Futuro strategy, launched in 2019 as part of the peace process implementation, further intensified militarization by integrating army, navy and police efforts to bolster security presence and intelligence in violence-prone areas. Despite criticism of militarized approaches to environmental protection, the government formed in 2022 has maintained environmental security as a central element of its security and defence strategy.
Mixed results and unintended consequences
Data suggests that, aside from the recent decline in deforestation, the militarized approach has largely failed not only to curb environmental crime but also to protect its victims. Since the peace agreement was signed, more than 1200 human rights defenders and líderes sociales (social leaders) have been killed, and in 2023 alone, 79 environmental human rights defenders were killed, most of them members of ethnic communities and campesinos fighting to defend their land.
The main perpetrators of the violence are non-state armed groups that drive and profit from environmental crime and the shadow economy it supports. They also commit kidnappings, child recruitment, coercive displacement or confinement, and other abuses.
However, the armed forces have also been accused of victimizing marginalized ethnic groups and subsistence farming communities, employing excessive force, sexual violence, unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests, and the destruction of homes and livelihoods. Much of this has been officially justified as part of combating environmental crime, but many claim that it has been used as a means to repress, silence and stigmatize those exercising their rights.
While some campesinos and members of ethnic communities do engage in illegal activities such as land clearing, coca cultivation and informal mining, this has often been a survival strategy in response to long-standing state neglect in rural areas. Despite this, and the fact that they play only a minor role in large-scale environmental destruction and are often coerced by armed groups, the militarized response has disproportionately targeted small-scale farmers at the lowest echelons of criminal enterprises or who are simply farming in protected areas.
Ways forward
Since the new government took office in 2022, there has been growing recognition of the challenges marginalized communities face in relation to environmental crime and official responses to it. The latest national development plan and security policy emphasize a people-centred, community-based approach focused on addressing the root causes of conflict and crime. This hopefully heralds a shift from prosecuting small-scale farmers to targeting the criminal organizations behind illegal economies, including those funding deforestation.
While this is a welcome development, it is essential that the role of the armed forces in environmental protection is reduced to a minimum. Striking a balance between enforcing environmental laws and safeguarding human rights is crucial. Although the military may be necessary to confront non-state armed groups contributing to violence and fuelling environmental crime, the marginalized populations who feel the most negative effects from these activities should instead be supported by strong, democratic institutions that prioritize equity as well as security.
At the heart of this issue lies the need to protect biodiversity and the people safeguarding these areas. Colombia’s struggles against deforestation and environmental crime stem from a complex interplay of legal and illegal activities, sociopolitical dynamics, and economic incentives. These challenges are deeply rooted in more than half a century of armed conflict, including the profound disconnect between the socio-economic models shaped by the state and elites—often enforced through violence by the illegal armed groups, in particular paramilitaries—and the survival strategies of marginalized local communities. Ethnic groups, particularly Indigenous peoples, and campesinos are among the most committed defenders of biodiversity. Their ancestral practices and traditional knowledge could be crucial to preserving ecosystems.
Although Indigenous knowledge systems are diverse, many share a common understanding of ecological degradation: it stems from the denial of the interdependence between humans and nature. Indigenous worldviews emphasize this interconnectedness and the responsibilities that flow from it.
In Colombia’s struggle to address its environmental challenges, these communities, alongside other ethnic minorities and campesinos, should be treated as partners in conservation efforts, not penalized by a militarized response.
On 29 October Caroline Delgado will be a panellist in a side event of the 16th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP16 CBD), entitled ‘Biodiversity, Land Use Change and the Implications for Conflict in Latin America’ (La pérdida de biodiversidad y sus vínculos con la seguridad). The interactive panel discussion will explore strategies to enhance food security in regions affected by land degradation and climate change.
The side event is made possible by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and the Swedish International Agricultural Network Initiative (SIANI). Click here to read more about the side event and how to register, as well as about recent work by SIPRI and FES on issues of climate and environmental justice and food security in Latin America. COP16 CBD runs from 21 October to 1 November 2024 in Cali, Colombia.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)