7. Europe: towards a new regional security regime

Summary

Basic questions were raised in 1993. How should the European security system be
transformed? Could Russia and the CEE states be integrated into existing West
European security structures, and if so how? What kind of relations would
develop between NATO and Russia? Should the CEE states be kept out of NATO and
be recognized as a zone of special security interest for Russia? What kind of
US or transformed NATO involvement in the security of CEE was possible—common
defence or a co-operative security organization? What role was to be played by
the CSCE in the functioning of a new European security system? Some of these
questions are addressed below.

The new threats call not only for new instruments of action but, first of all,
for a new philosophy and a new political strategy adequate to the new
challenges. The issue is not only to create new institutions or to agree on new
political declarations, however necessary and useful both often prove: it is
rather the sufficient adjustment of the mandate and functions of the European
security institutions to the new requirements. The multilateral security
structures are tools which work of the will of member states, commensurate with
their political and military commitment. In other words, the operation of NATO,
the EU/WEU and the CSCE cannot be analysed and assessed without an
understanding of the policies of the main powers—France, Germany, Russia, the
UK and the USA—as well as numerous other small- and medium-sized states.
Regrettably, international organizations and states which belong to them
attached much more weight to their own areas of action and responsibility than
to declarations on `common', `co-operative' and `indivisible' security.

The most serious challenge for the system of regional security in Europe is
conflicts—ethnic, national and religious. Some of them can be solved through
preventive diplomacy and by means of the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Others require determined joint action by the international community if the
latter wishes to maintain its credibility. In extreme cases this entails armed
intervention. However, acting on behalf of and on the mandate of the
international community should not mean legitimizing a carve-up into new zones
of influence of the great powers or a policy of hegemonism. The main task of
the system that emerges after the breakup of the bipolar world is the final
overcoming of the existing divisions, not the creation of new ones.

Neither the Partnership for Peace programme nor NATO expansion nor the
strengthening of new CSCE mechanisms will in themselves solve Europe's security
problems. Institutional improvements can contribute to the alleviation of
tensions and to co-operation between states, but the factors determining
security remain the stabilization of the economic and social situation in the
region as well as power politics. 1993 brought a foretaste of the opening up of
Western structures towards the CEE states. Putting into effect the concept of 'expanded security' would require the adoption of decisions which would cause
impotent institutions to become so important that they would be able not only
to take new resolutions but even to stave off armed conflicts and aggression.

Appendix 7A. Documents on European security