15. Non-cooperative responses to proliferation: multilateral dimensions

Summary

In 1998 continued actual or suspected cases of the
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the
absence of a comprehensive arms control and disarmament agenda raised
the question of whether to respond using the threat or actual use of
force, sanctions or technology denial. 

In
1998 the threat and actual use of force, along with sanctions, were
used to address breaches of disarmament commitments by Iraq. 

In
the case of Iraq, the use of force in support of disarmament objectives
by the UK and the USA in December 1998 underlined the failure of
external powers to achieve implementation of UN Security Council
resolutions short of the use of force. In practice, the use of force
may have hastened the modification of the decisions of the UN Security
Council rather than bringing about Iraqi compliance.

India
and Pakistan violated the widely supported norm against nuclear testing
that was established by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) by conducting nuclear tests in May 1998. Some states introduced
sanctions in response to the tests, but the international community in
general showed little enthusiasm for coercive measures or sanctions.
Responses were mainly based on diplomacy - increased efforts to
persuade India and Pakistan to join the CTBT - and narrowly focused
export controls - a technical barrier to arms acquisition that raises
the costs of nuclear weapon development for India and Pakistan. 

Appendix 15A. Multilateral weapon and technology export controls

IAN ANTHONY AND JEAN PASCAL ZANDERS

Appendix 15A is a discussion of multilateral weapon
and technology export controls. It contains a table of the membership
of the control regimes.