On Wednesday 18 December SIPRI will host a public webinar on ‘The UN discussion on technology transfers and “peaceful uses”: Balancing non-proliferation and economic development’. This backgrounder aims to provide some insight on this topic in advance of the webinar. More details and information on how to register are available here.
On 2 December the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution submitted by China, and co-sponsored by 27 other states, on ‘Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security’.
The new resolution, like its two predecessors adopted in 2021 and 2022,‘reaffirms’ that the right to benefit from international cooperation in science and technology for ‘peaceful uses’ should not be hampered by states’ implementation of non-proliferation obligations—a principle reflected in different treaties. All three resolutions also ‘note with concern’ that multilateral and national export control measures are infringing on this right by creating ‘undue’ restrictions on transfers of goods and technology for peaceful purposes.
The three resolutions have been viewed by many states as a critique of the multilateral export control regimes—the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement—and a threat to their long-term viability. This criticism comes at a time when the regimes are facing multiple challenges to their relevance and functioning.
This backgrounder assesses the motivations behind the support for the resolutions, the concerns they have raised, and their potential impact on the regimes and global non-proliferation efforts.
The 2024 resolution
The 2024 resolution on ‘Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security’ repeats many of the points that were made in 2021 and 2022. However, it adds more critical language about the controls that supplier states are imposing. While the 2022 resolution noted with concern that ‘undue restrictions . . . persist’, the 2024 text states they are ‘increasing’ and include ‘unilateral coercive measures that violate international law’. The 2024 resolution also adds that the ‘non-proliferation control arrangements’ are being used as vehicles for these efforts.
The list of steps that states are encouraged to take to implement the resolution now includes ‘formulating guiding principles as appropriate’. However, the language also indicates support for a less radical overhaul of how the regimes should operate than was outlined in 2021 and 2022. For example, while the 2022 resolution emphasized that the regimes ‘should be transparent and open to participation by all states’, the 2024 version says that the regimes should be ‘transparent and inclusive, in line with their respective mandates’.
Debates around the ‘peaceful uses’ resolutions
China submitted all three resolutions and has put significant effort into building support for them. The number of states voting in favour has increased with each resolution, going from 78 in 2021 to 94 in 2022 and 105 in 2024. Among the states that voted in favour in 2024 were 15 that had either voted against the 2022 resolution (Liberia and Nauru), abstained (Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Madagascar, Maldives, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Seychelles) or registered no vote (Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Guinea, Somalia and Zambia). However, four states that had voted in favour in 2022 abstained in 2024 (Côte d’Ivoire) or registered no vote (Central African Republic, El Salvador and Papua New Guinea).
China’s efforts have been viewed by many states and commentators as an attempt to highlight and delegitimize the widening set of export control measures that the United States, either alone or in partnership with its allies, has imposed on China in recent years. These include controls on transfers of advanced semiconductors and related manufacturing equipment and quantum computers.
When adopting these controls, the USA has argued that they are aimed at limiting transfers of technology that might advance China’s military capabilities. The USA has also asserted that they are motivated by China’s military–civil fusion strategy,which has the goal of helping the Chinese military to benefit from developments in China’s civilian sectors and necessitates treating all exports to China as potential transfers to its defence industry. However, at the same time, US officials have spoken about using export controls, domestic subsidies and other policy tools to stay ahead of other states in key technology areas. China has argued that the USA is using export controls as tools of geopolitical competition and has requested dispute-resolution consultations with the USA through the World Trade Organization.
The level of support for the resolutions suggests that China and the other co-sponsors tapped into a wider set of grievances, particularly among developing states, concerning the imposition of supply-side controls on transfers of goods and technologies. These grievances include concerns not only about the multilateral export control regimes, including their admission processes and practices, but perhaps more so about national export control measures and the use of sanctions measures by the USA, the European Union (EU) and other Western states. They also reflect disappointment at the perceived failure of some states to honour commitments made in non-proliferation and disarmament treaties to ensure that restrictions are not placed on transfers of technology for peaceful purposes or peaceful uses.
Mechanisms for enabling technology transfers for peaceful uses
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) all recognize the right of states parties to participate in the ‘fullest possible exchange of’ equipment, material, and scientific and technical information for ‘peaceful purposes’ or ‘peaceful uses’. However, none of these treaties oblige states parties to transfer technologies and all place requirements that need to be fulfilled by the importing states before such transfers can occur. For example, under the NPT, states should transfer sensitive nuclear technology only if the recipients have effective safeguards measures in place.
Mechanisms are available to facilitate international cooperation and access to technologies for peaceful uses. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) implements various international cooperation activities designed to help states parties to the CWC develop capabilities in areas related to peaceful uses of chemistry, particularly in those with developing economies. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an important role in achieving the NPT objective to foster international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For instance, the IAEA has established the Technical Cooperation Programme to support ‘transferring nuclear technology to [IAEA] member states’ in support of their ‘key development priorities’. The BWC Implementation Support Unit acts as a ‘clearinghouse for assistance with national implementation’ and manages a database to coordinate assistance requests and offers among BWC states parties, which can include scientific cooperation and joint research.
However, these mechanisms, and the ways states have interpreted and implemented relevant treaty provisions, have long been a focus of criticism for developing states. The members of the Non-Aligned Movement have complained for many years that their right to access technology for peaceful uses under the non-proliferation and disarmament treaties is being hampered by trade restrictions on developing states. Countries in the Group of 77 have also highlighted the uneven allocation of resources between programmes facilitating access to peaceful uses and security-oriented activities that organizations like the IAEA are tasked with implementing.
In response to this criticism, several initiatives have been launched in recent years to expand on existing efforts to facilitate transfers of technology for peaceful purposes. In 2022 a group of states launched the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU) at the NPT Review Conference. During its first year of activity, the SDPU focused on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear science in the fields of water security, health, and climate change response. Also in 2022, the BWC Review Conference mandated states to develop a mechanism to support the full implementation of Article X of the BWC (‘International Cooperation’), something the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC is currently addressing. In September 2024, UN member states adopted the Pact for the Future, which recognizes the importance of digital cooperation and sharing science, technology and innovation for sustainable development, and outlines a series of actions to advance progress in these areas.
The 2024 resolution welcomes the various initiatives for promoting international cooperation for peaceful uses but implies that more needs to be done, urging states ‘to take concrete measures to promote international cooperation on materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes’. It also reiterates concerns that developing states have voiced in other forums that both the way the multilateral export control regimes operate and the manner in which export controls are being applied clash with states’ obligations under other instruments.
Efforts to clarify the aims of the export control regimes
In response to the resolutions, Western states, both at the UN General Assembly and other relevant forums, have noted that the multilateral export control regimes provide many public goods to the benefit of all states, including guidelines, control lists, outreach and engagement opportunities. They have also sought to highlight the role that the export control standards formulated by the regimes play in building trust and confidence and enabling transfers of technology for peaceful uses. Moreover, some states have argued that there is no evidence that the implementation of export controls has a measurable impact on states’ economic development and access to advanced technologies. In support of these arguments, they have referenced studies that indicate that there is a positive correlation between the adoption of export controls and participation in the trade in high-technology and dual-use items.
In some cases, these arguments became more pointed during UN General Assembly discussions in 2024. For example, some states made more or less explicit statements that China’s grievances about the imposition of Western trade restrictions were the motivation for the resolution and that China’s military–civil fusion strategy was one of the main challenges to effective multilateral export controls.
EU-led side events on the margins of the NPT and UN General Assembly meetings, in which SIPRI took part, sought to facilitate discussions about the regimes’ role in promoting or hampering technology transfers and scientific exchanges. Participating states, in particular the USA, and the EU are also active in the implementation of export control outreach and capacity-building activities that have resulted in many beneficiaries adopting the regimes’ standards and control lists.
In public messaging, representatives of the regimes have also sought to show more sensitivity in responding to concerns about the possible impacts of export controls on economic development. For instance, representatives of the regimes have taken steps to raise awareness about the regimes’ functioning, to demonstrate the regimes’ commitment to not impeding legitimate trade and to show the regimes’ willingness to engage with non-participating states.
The previous Swiss chair of the MTCR has stressed some of these points during outreach visits and other public events. Argentina and Brazil, in their recent roles as chairs of the NSG, have highlighted ‘the need to balance non-proliferation and international security objectives with the potential impact on states’ technological and industrial development’. The current South African chair of the NSG has announced his commitment to working with both participating and non-participating states to facilitate the responsible transfer of technology ‘with special consideration for the needs of developing states’.
Despite these efforts, several states that participate in at least one of the regimes have either supported the three resolutions or abstained. In addition to China, Kazakhstan, Russia and South Africa have consistently voted in favour, while India and Mexico have abstained. Brazil, a participating state and outgoing chair of both the NSG and the MTCR, switched from abstaining in 2022 to voting in favour of the 2024 resolution. Conversely, Argentina, which participates in all the regimes, switched from abstaining in 2022 to voting against in 2024.
However, there have been few if any indications that the resolutions have adversely affected the substantive work of the regimes. China continues to participate in the NSG and the resolutions do not appear to have had any impact on its and any other participating state’s willingness to join in the group’s work. In contrast, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had a profound impact on the regimes’ work. Russia participates in the NSG, the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement, and all three require consensus on significant decisions, something that has proved highly challenging to achieve on many occasions since 2022.
Risks ahead
While the immediate impact of the peaceful uses resolutions on the substantive work of the regimes appears limited, the growing support for the resolutions makes it important to consider the potential broader impact on the global adoption and implementation of export control measures. At the same time, growing support for the resolutions makes it difficult for states participating in the regimes not to engage on the substance of some of the criticism that has emerged at the UN General Assembly and other forums. A deeper analysis of the claims raised by states supporting the resolutions—and whether these point to effects created by the regimes or focus on issues that are outside their purview—could help to identify areas that the regimes could look to strengthen.
Many of the states that voted in favour of the resolutions or abstained have engaged with export control-related capacity-building programmes and have put in place national export control systems that apply the control lists and other standards established by the regimes. If emerging economies and non-aligned states move away from working with these programmes and become less willing to adopt the regimes’ standards—something that both the heated discourse and further unilateral actions by regime participants risks provoking—this could leave the regimes significantly weaker and have a negative impact on non-proliferation efforts.
Conclusions and ways forward
The 2024 resolution on ‘Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses’ achieved an even stronger result in the UN General Assembly vote than its predecessors in 2021 and 2022. This occurred despite efforts by the regimes and participating states to clarify the roles of multilateral and national export controls and highlight their positive impact on enabling trade in dual-use items.
The new resolution comes at a time when the multilateral export control regimes face a growing list of challenges. For example, Russia has reportedly vetoed recent efforts to add new control list entries to the Wassenaar Arrangement, and this is driving calls for the establishment of new mechanisms for adopting multilateral export controls. The adoption of the 2024 resolution, and uncertainties about how exactly the process of ‘formulating guiding principles’ will work, potentially adds to the challenges.
One step to move the discussion forward would be to assess how well the current mechanisms for enabling the sharing of equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and peaceful uses are working and what obstacles they have faced. Discussions in the UN General Assembly during 2024 did little to increase knowledge of this issue, as they focused mostly on the proportion of trade that is captured by export controls and how many licences are issued and denied. Recent analyses of efforts to enable transfers of technology show the issue is more complex, with supply-side restrictions being one factor among many, and sanctions measures often being more significant than multilateral and national export controls.
The momentum generated by the Pact for the Future potentially creates space to bring diplomats working on non-proliferation, disarmament and development issues into a more comprehensive discussion about how to address challenges related to transfers of technology for peaceful uses.
If the multilateral export control regimes are to maintain their role as key providers of global standards in the field of non-proliferation then both the regimes and their participants need to find ways to demonstrate their ability to continue doing their substantive work and overcome fundamental internal divisions. They should also explore how to become more transparent in sharing outputs and creating opportunities for substantive input from non-participants, as appropriate and feasible.
The regimes should also participate more actively in meetings and events connected to the non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. In addition, they should play a bigger part in outreach and capacity-building activities conducted by participating states, or like-minded partners such as the EU, to further clarify their roles and create opportunities for dialogue. Finally, states participating in the regimes could also seek to articulate more clearly their regional and international security objectives, and the role export control measures have in supporting the implementation of the non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and international law more broadly.
This backgrounder forms part of a wider project on the future of the multilateral export control regimes which SIPRI is conducting with support from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Kolja Brockmann is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
Dr Mark Bromley is the Director of the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
Giovanna Maletta is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
On Wednesday 18 December SIPRI will host a public webinar on ‘The UN discussion on technology transfers and “peaceful uses”: Balancing non-proliferation and economic development’. This backgrounder aims to provide some insight on this topic in advance of the webinar. More details and information on how to register are available here.
On 2 December the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution submitted by China, and co-sponsored by 27 other states, on ‘Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security’.
The new resolution, like its two predecessors adopted in 2021 and 2022, ‘reaffirms’ that the right to benefit from international cooperation in science and technology for ‘peaceful uses’ should not be hampered by states’ implementation of non-proliferation obligations—a principle reflected in different treaties. All three resolutions also ‘note with concern’ that multilateral and national export control measures are infringing on this right by creating ‘undue’ restrictions on transfers of goods and technology for peaceful purposes.
The three resolutions have been viewed by many states as a critique of the multilateral export control regimes—the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement—and a threat to their long-term viability. This criticism comes at a time when the regimes are facing multiple challenges to their relevance and functioning.
This backgrounder assesses the motivations behind the support for the resolutions, the concerns they have raised, and their potential impact on the regimes and global non-proliferation efforts.
The 2024 resolution
The 2024 resolution on ‘Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security’ repeats many of the points that were made in 2021 and 2022. However, it adds more critical language about the controls that supplier states are imposing. While the 2022 resolution noted with concern that ‘undue restrictions . . . persist’, the 2024 text states they are ‘increasing’ and include ‘unilateral coercive measures that violate international law’. The 2024 resolution also adds that the ‘non-proliferation control arrangements’ are being used as vehicles for these efforts.
The list of steps that states are encouraged to take to implement the resolution now includes ‘formulating guiding principles as appropriate’. However, the language also indicates support for a less radical overhaul of how the regimes should operate than was outlined in 2021 and 2022. For example, while the 2022 resolution emphasized that the regimes ‘should be transparent and open to participation by all states’, the 2024 version says that the regimes should be ‘transparent and inclusive, in line with their respective mandates’.
Debates around the ‘peaceful uses’ resolutions
China submitted all three resolutions and has put significant effort into building support for them. The number of states voting in favour has increased with each resolution, going from 78 in 2021 to 94 in 2022 and 105 in 2024. Among the states that voted in favour in 2024 were 15 that had either voted against the 2022 resolution (Liberia and Nauru), abstained (Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Madagascar, Maldives, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Seychelles) or registered no vote (Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Guinea, Somalia and Zambia). However, four states that had voted in favour in 2022 abstained in 2024 (Côte d’Ivoire) or registered no vote (Central African Republic, El Salvador and Papua New Guinea).
China’s efforts have been viewed by many states and commentators as an attempt to highlight and delegitimize the widening set of export control measures that the United States, either alone or in partnership with its allies, has imposed on China in recent years. These include controls on transfers of advanced semiconductors and related manufacturing equipment and quantum computers.
When adopting these controls, the USA has argued that they are aimed at limiting transfers of technology that might advance China’s military capabilities. The USA has also asserted that they are motivated by China’s military–civil fusion strategy, which has the goal of helping the Chinese military to benefit from developments in China’s civilian sectors and necessitates treating all exports to China as potential transfers to its defence industry. However, at the same time, US officials have spoken about using export controls, domestic subsidies and other policy tools to stay ahead of other states in key technology areas. China has argued that the USA is using export controls as tools of geopolitical competition and has requested dispute-resolution consultations with the USA through the World Trade Organization.
The level of support for the resolutions suggests that China and the other co-sponsors tapped into a wider set of grievances, particularly among developing states, concerning the imposition of supply-side controls on transfers of goods and technologies. These grievances include concerns not only about the multilateral export control regimes, including their admission processes and practices, but perhaps more so about national export control measures and the use of sanctions measures by the USA, the European Union (EU) and other Western states. They also reflect disappointment at the perceived failure of some states to honour commitments made in non-proliferation and disarmament treaties to ensure that restrictions are not placed on transfers of technology for peaceful purposes or peaceful uses.
Mechanisms for enabling technology transfers for peaceful uses
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) all recognize the right of states parties to participate in the ‘fullest possible exchange of’ equipment, material, and scientific and technical information for ‘peaceful purposes’ or ‘peaceful uses’. However, none of these treaties oblige states parties to transfer technologies and all place requirements that need to be fulfilled by the importing states before such transfers can occur. For example, under the NPT, states should transfer sensitive nuclear technology only if the recipients have effective safeguards measures in place.
Mechanisms are available to facilitate international cooperation and access to technologies for peaceful uses. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) implements various international cooperation activities designed to help states parties to the CWC develop capabilities in areas related to peaceful uses of chemistry, particularly in those with developing economies. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an important role in achieving the NPT objective to foster international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For instance, the IAEA has established the Technical Cooperation Programme to support ‘transferring nuclear technology to [IAEA] member states’ in support of their ‘key development priorities’. The BWC Implementation Support Unit acts as a ‘clearinghouse for assistance with national implementation’ and manages a database to coordinate assistance requests and offers among BWC states parties, which can include scientific cooperation and joint research.
However, these mechanisms, and the ways states have interpreted and implemented relevant treaty provisions, have long been a focus of criticism for developing states. The members of the Non-Aligned Movement have complained for many years that their right to access technology for peaceful uses under the non-proliferation and disarmament treaties is being hampered by trade restrictions on developing states. Countries in the Group of 77 have also highlighted the uneven allocation of resources between programmes facilitating access to peaceful uses and security-oriented activities that organizations like the IAEA are tasked with implementing.
In response to this criticism, several initiatives have been launched in recent years to expand on existing efforts to facilitate transfers of technology for peaceful purposes. In 2022 a group of states launched the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU) at the NPT Review Conference. During its first year of activity, the SDPU focused on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear science in the fields of water security, health, and climate change response. Also in 2022, the BWC Review Conference mandated states to develop a mechanism to support the full implementation of Article X of the BWC (‘International Cooperation’), something the Working Group on Strengthening the BWC is currently addressing. In September 2024, UN member states adopted the Pact for the Future, which recognizes the importance of digital cooperation and sharing science, technology and innovation for sustainable development, and outlines a series of actions to advance progress in these areas.
The 2024 resolution welcomes the various initiatives for promoting international cooperation for peaceful uses but implies that more needs to be done, urging states ‘to take concrete measures to promote international cooperation on materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes’. It also reiterates concerns that developing states have voiced in other forums that both the way the multilateral export control regimes operate and the manner in which export controls are being applied clash with states’ obligations under other instruments.
Efforts to clarify the aims of the export control regimes
In response to the resolutions, Western states, both at the UN General Assembly and other relevant forums, have noted that the multilateral export control regimes provide many public goods to the benefit of all states, including guidelines, control lists, outreach and engagement opportunities. They have also sought to highlight the role that the export control standards formulated by the regimes play in building trust and confidence and enabling transfers of technology for peaceful uses. Moreover, some states have argued that there is no evidence that the implementation of export controls has a measurable impact on states’ economic development and access to advanced technologies. In support of these arguments, they have referenced studies that indicate that there is a positive correlation between the adoption of export controls and participation in the trade in high-technology and dual-use items.
In some cases, these arguments became more pointed during UN General Assembly discussions in 2024. For example, some states made more or less explicit statements that China’s grievances about the imposition of Western trade restrictions were the motivation for the resolution and that China’s military–civil fusion strategy was one of the main challenges to effective multilateral export controls.
EU-led side events on the margins of the NPT and UN General Assembly meetings, in which SIPRI took part, sought to facilitate discussions about the regimes’ role in promoting or hampering technology transfers and scientific exchanges. Participating states, in particular the USA, and the EU are also active in the implementation of export control outreach and capacity-building activities that have resulted in many beneficiaries adopting the regimes’ standards and control lists.
In public messaging, representatives of the regimes have also sought to show more sensitivity in responding to concerns about the possible impacts of export controls on economic development. For instance, representatives of the regimes have taken steps to raise awareness about the regimes’ functioning, to demonstrate the regimes’ commitment to not impeding legitimate trade and to show the regimes’ willingness to engage with non-participating states.
The previous Swiss chair of the MTCR has stressed some of these points during outreach visits and other public events. Argentina and Brazil, in their recent roles as chairs of the NSG, have highlighted ‘the need to balance non-proliferation and international security objectives with the potential impact on states’ technological and industrial development’. The current South African chair of the NSG has announced his commitment to working with both participating and non-participating states to facilitate the responsible transfer of technology ‘with special consideration for the needs of developing states’.
Despite these efforts, several states that participate in at least one of the regimes have either supported the three resolutions or abstained. In addition to China, Kazakhstan, Russia and South Africa have consistently voted in favour, while India and Mexico have abstained. Brazil, a participating state and outgoing chair of both the NSG and the MTCR, switched from abstaining in 2022 to voting in favour of the 2024 resolution. Conversely, Argentina, which participates in all the regimes, switched from abstaining in 2022 to voting against in 2024.
However, there have been few if any indications that the resolutions have adversely affected the substantive work of the regimes. China continues to participate in the NSG and the resolutions do not appear to have had any impact on its and any other participating state’s willingness to join in the group’s work. In contrast, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had a profound impact on the regimes’ work. Russia participates in the NSG, the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement, and all three require consensus on significant decisions, something that has proved highly challenging to achieve on many occasions since 2022.
Risks ahead
While the immediate impact of the peaceful uses resolutions on the substantive work of the regimes appears limited, the growing support for the resolutions makes it important to consider the potential broader impact on the global adoption and implementation of export control measures. At the same time, growing support for the resolutions makes it difficult for states participating in the regimes not to engage on the substance of some of the criticism that has emerged at the UN General Assembly and other forums. A deeper analysis of the claims raised by states supporting the resolutions—and whether these point to effects created by the regimes or focus on issues that are outside their purview—could help to identify areas that the regimes could look to strengthen.
Many of the states that voted in favour of the resolutions or abstained have engaged with export control-related capacity-building programmes and have put in place national export control systems that apply the control lists and other standards established by the regimes. If emerging economies and non-aligned states move away from working with these programmes and become less willing to adopt the regimes’ standards—something that both the heated discourse and further unilateral actions by regime participants risks provoking—this could leave the regimes significantly weaker and have a negative impact on non-proliferation efforts.
Conclusions and ways forward
The 2024 resolution on ‘Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses’ achieved an even stronger result in the UN General Assembly vote than its predecessors in 2021 and 2022. This occurred despite efforts by the regimes and participating states to clarify the roles of multilateral and national export controls and highlight their positive impact on enabling trade in dual-use items.
The new resolution comes at a time when the multilateral export control regimes face a growing list of challenges. For example, Russia has reportedly vetoed recent efforts to add new control list entries to the Wassenaar Arrangement, and this is driving calls for the establishment of new mechanisms for adopting multilateral export controls. The adoption of the 2024 resolution, and uncertainties about how exactly the process of ‘formulating guiding principles’ will work, potentially adds to the challenges.
One step to move the discussion forward would be to assess how well the current mechanisms for enabling the sharing of equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and peaceful uses are working and what obstacles they have faced. Discussions in the UN General Assembly during 2024 did little to increase knowledge of this issue, as they focused mostly on the proportion of trade that is captured by export controls and how many licences are issued and denied. Recent analyses of efforts to enable transfers of technology show the issue is more complex, with supply-side restrictions being one factor among many, and sanctions measures often being more significant than multilateral and national export controls.
The momentum generated by the Pact for the Future potentially creates space to bring diplomats working on non-proliferation, disarmament and development issues into a more comprehensive discussion about how to address challenges related to transfers of technology for peaceful uses.
If the multilateral export control regimes are to maintain their role as key providers of global standards in the field of non-proliferation then both the regimes and their participants need to find ways to demonstrate their ability to continue doing their substantive work and overcome fundamental internal divisions. They should also explore how to become more transparent in sharing outputs and creating opportunities for substantive input from non-participants, as appropriate and feasible.
The regimes should also participate more actively in meetings and events connected to the non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. In addition, they should play a bigger part in outreach and capacity-building activities conducted by participating states, or like-minded partners such as the EU, to further clarify their roles and create opportunities for dialogue. Finally, states participating in the regimes could also seek to articulate more clearly their regional and international security objectives, and the role export control measures have in supporting the implementation of the non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and international law more broadly.
This backgrounder forms part of a wider project on the future of the multilateral export control regimes which SIPRI is conducting with support from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)