Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization and Proliferation

After more than three decades of sporadic negotiations, the CTB appears finally to be within the grasp of the international community. This long-awaited accomplishment is already falling victim to rising expectations and attendant cynicism occasioned by the end of the cold war; critics claim that the CTB will not constrain nuclear weapon programmes in a meaningful way because knowledge about nuclear weapons is widespread and some relevant technologies are relatively simple.

This book addresses the likely effects of the CTB on nuclear programmes and decision making in the nuclear weapon states, the threshold states and the non-nuclear weapon states of proliferation concern. The book concludes that, while some states will indeed maintain their nuclear weapon arsenals and options under the CTB and one or two may even undertake some modernization, the CTB will foreclose a number of technologies to all three groups of states and will probably be signed and ratified by all of them. Further, the CTB will codify a norm against nuclear modernization and strengthen the norm against nuclear proliferation in a way that reinforces other efforts to restrict nuclear activities. The book elucidates the significance of treaty provisions that will be included to accommodate existing stockpiles or options and their significance as possible modernization or proliferation loopholes. It closes with a review of practical steps that can be taken, unilaterally and multilaterally, to further strengthen these norms and reinforce the CTB regime.