

The ENDC and the Press

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Stockholm International Peace
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LOYAL N. GOULD

Stockholm Papers Number 3

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL

Stockholm, Sweden

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SIPRI is an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, with particular attention to the problems of disarmament and arms regulation. It was established in 1966 to celebrate Sweden's 150 years of unbroken peace. The financing is provided by the Swedish Government. The staff, the Governing Board, and the Scientific Council are international.

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Printed in Sweden by
Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, Uppsala 1969

PREFACE

It is a matter of general knowledge that international events are reported differently in different mass media. The manner in which media such as the press of various countries come to present divergent pictures is not so obvious, however. It is usually not possible, furthermore, to determine the degree or kind of selection in the reporting of an international event because there is no objective record of what happened with which to make a comparison. An international meeting where a verbatim record of the proceedings is kept and published provides an almost unique solution to this difficulty: there is an objective record on which a study of international press coverage may be based.

At a workshop on mass media and international conflicts held by SIPRI in the summer of 1967, Professor Marten Brouwer of the Steinmetz Institute, Amsterdam, suggested that it might be possible to take advantage of the verbatim records of United Nations public meetings for a study of international press reporting. Since SIPRI is especially concerned with disarmament, reporting of the meetings of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva was chosen for study.

This study was undertaken during a summer spent at the Institute by the Director of International Journalism at the Ohio State University, a former journalist who has served as foreign correspondent in Geneva among other places. The inquiry was aimed at describing (1) the ways in which news is disseminated in Geneva, (2) the proceedings of the ENDC over a two week period, (3) the picture of these proceedings given to people in different parts of the world.

The first part of the report, based on a visit to Geneva in the summer of 1968, gives the author's impression of the press arrangements in Geneva and the sources from which the journalists sought their information, as well as of the journalists themselves and their activities. Next, a full timetable is given of the meetings, press conferences and surrounding activities. The press coverage is then described and its relation to the verbatim records of the ENDC discussed.

In an Appendix, prepared by Mrs. Randall Forsberg and other members of the SIPRI staff after the author had returned home, a quantitative analysis of this coverage is made. The section shows, among other things, that newspaper coverage of the points at issue in the Geneva discussions—that is, the points on which delegations differed—was distinctly thin. It shows, too, the extent to which papers tended to concentrate on the speeches of their own delegates to the conference (if they had one), and on the speeches of delegates from countries aligned with their own.

It is, in the nature of things, not possible to demonstrate conclusively a connection between the inadequacy of the press arrangements and any deficiencies in reporting. However, the ENDC press arrangements described in the report were unusually bad: and it is very likely that this contributes to the patchiness of the press coverage.

Since the middle of 1968, when this report was prepared, six new delegations have joined the ENDC, which is now called the Disarmament Committee. There have also been changes within some of the delegations, as well as in the group of correspondents present in Geneva. There has been no radical change in the press arrangements, however. Indeed the amount of information available to journalists has been somewhat reduced because of a growing tendency in the Committee to hold informal, unrecorded meetings. There is certainly a strong case, as Professor Gould points out, either for opening the formal meetings to the press or for providing an official press spokesman, or both.

5 September 1969

Robert Neild

Director of SIPRI

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The press arrangements in Geneva

Before delegates to the ENDC began their deliberations in Geneva in 1962, they arrived at two "gentleman's" agreements for controlling the press:

1. Journalists would be barred from their meetings.
2. Delegates speaking to the press would limit themselves to their own activities and would not under any circumstances discuss the activities or speeches of other delegations.

The reason for the first agreement was that the diplomats feared that public revelation of their negotiations could slow them down or damage their interests. In the case of the second, they suspected that delegates speaking about the activities of another nation might misconstrue the facts to that nation's detriment. Presumably many delegates also felt that they could put their own activities in the best possible light, especially for the home audience.

The delegates also decided that full transcripts of their proceedings would be made public, but not until each delegation had had an opportunity to correct the official record of what it said at the twice weekly meetings. Two or three weeks thus elapse before a transcript is issued. There is evidence, however, that changes are rarely made.

The diplomats did not provide a corporate press spokesman for the ENDC.

If these arrangements were properly observed, they would mean:

1. There would be no permanent secrets—a full record would be available three weeks later. The only secrets would be the corrections.
2. Journalists would be forced to rely on national spokesmen at times when they actually wanted news and did their reporting, i.e., while the news was "hot".

The arrangements do not actually work like this. The more formal parts of the rules, which can easily be enforced, are enforced:

journalists are barred from ENDC sessions, and the official verbatim records are available only after several weeks delay. But among the delegations two important developments have occurred.

Some delegates hand out verbatim copies of their own speeches straight away. Only five do this regularly and on a large scale, providing enough copies for all the journalists—the American, Canadian, British, Roumanian and Swedish delegates. Others often provide too few copies or none. The result is that verbatims are available immediately, but only on a piecemeal basis.

Secondly, some delegates do not confine themselves to discussing their own affairs with the journalists. The press officer of one country, the United States, has gained a remarkable position as a general spokesman. The way in which this happened seems to have been almost accidental.

The role of the US press spokesman

At the start of the ENDC in 1962, it was common practice for the British, American, Italian and Soviet delegations, among others, to include press spokesmen who gave so-called “national” press briefings. These were sessions limited to journalists from the country whose delegation sponsored the affair. The British and Americans also gave rather short, cursory briefings open to all newsmen except those from Socialist countries: the cold war was a reality.

Over the years all ENDC members except the American have dropped their full time press spokesmen. When they do meet the press, either their chief delegate or some other delegation member answers questions. The British and Italians give briefings only periodically.

The US spokesman, as the only remaining professional, has achieved a dominant position. A highly skilled, former professional journalist with wide experience in both US and foreign news reporting, he began holding press briefings after every ENDC session. Initially, like the press briefings given by nearly all Western delegations, these were solely for non-Communist journalists. But that changed as work focused on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which the Americans and Soviets have a common interest. Suddenly, the American press conferences were thrown open to all journalists regardless of political ideology. The American press spokesman also

made it a rule to bring the chief American disarmament delegate to the first briefing held after the resumption of another go-around of ENDC meetings.

Gradually this press spokesman has developed a method of outlining—often in significant detail—activities of delegations other than his own, especially those of the Soviet delegation, whose members do not often speak to the press. This, coupled with a willingness to meet journalists at practically any hour of the day or night, quickly assured him a large group of admirers among the newsmen. He says he is the personal friend of nearly every correspondent there—a statement with which the majority agree. In discussing the US spokesman's activities with correspondents, this writer did not find one—even among East European newsmen—who felt he had ever lied to them. One summed up what appeared to be the general view: "His job is to advance the American point of view, but lie—no."

Aside from making himself available to the press on days when the ENDC is not meeting, the American press spokesman is found outside the conference chambers talking with assembled journalists before every session and he frequently exits from the meetings to brief newsmen on developments. He insists that he need not consult America's chief disarmament negotiator, William Foster, on what to tell the press, that he is so close to Foster he knows his thinking without seeking guidelines.

In addition, he arranges private "backgrounders" for "big name" journalists—both American and non-American—with Foster and Foster's top aides. This is the practice of nearly every disarmament delegation, with one qualification: the private "backgrounders" are solely for journalists from the country whose delegation arranges the event.

A member of the United Nations Secretariat in Geneva reported "some complaints from some of the delegations about this talking out of school," i.e., discussing activities of ENDC delegations other than one's own. He said, though, that the complaints have been fewer in number and less severe in the past few years. The delegation press spokesman identified most often as "talking out of school", the American, insisted he has never personally received complaints regarding his statements on ENDC activities of other delegations. On the contrary, he said, other delegations often seek his advice on dealing with

the press and frequently ask him to mention their activities at his briefings. A check with some other delegations showed this to be true.

The role of delegation heads

Since the other ENDC delegations have no permanent press spokesmen, they perforce rely on heads or other members of delegations. The Soviet delegation is in this position.

At the start of ENDC, Soviet delegates gave journalists a wide berth. When Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin became his country's chief disarmament delegate, however, he developed a more open style. He appeared to regard himself as his own best press spokesman, and he made himself available to the journalists. As ENDC discussions focused on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Soviet press relations continued to improve. Delegation members held more "impromptu" briefings—talks with journalists waiting outside the session chambers—and showed greater willingness to answer questions. But they failed—and continue to fail—to provide the journalists with sufficient texts of speeches made by Soviet delegation heads at the ENDC. When Soviet texts are distributed, about 40 journalists scramble for an average of five.

The current Soviet disarmament negotiator, Alexei A. Roshchin, who replaced Tsarapkin in February 1966, has a less open style with the press and rarely holds briefings for the journalists. Instead, he appears to use the Tass correspondent to pass on his thoughts to the Western journalists. Reports based on information coming through the Tass correspondent are filed by the Western newsmen with references to East European, Soviet or Communist sources. Asked why they do not hold regularly scheduled press briefings and prepare sufficient texts of their speeches for the journalists, a Soviet diplomat answered in English: "No time. No time."

Like the Soviets, all delegations except the American use their chief negotiator or subordinates to meet with the press. Such meetings are rare, and when they do occur, the diplomat in charge often fails to understand the needs of the press, i.e., he is unable to explain clearly and succinctly just what his delegation considers important and why. Delegates can be questioned by newsmen before and after ENDC sessions. But some refuse to answer.

In one area, the non-aligned countries definitely do not want

press coverage—their weekly Wednesday meetings, started in 1962 by India's Krishna Menon. In theory these are highly secret, but as with so many closed-door affairs, secrets do seep out. Leaks are attributed to squabbles among the neutrals in their inability to come to agreement. Disgruntled delegation leaders frequently reveal the causes of their unhappiness to journalist friends.

There is growing sentiment that much of what is significant in the ENDC discussions falls within the realm of technology and science—an area newsmen are usually unable to understand without someone skilled at interpreting for them. The journalists frequently mentioned the name of a former scientific member of the Swedish delegation who, they said, was most talented at explaining the short- and long-term ramifications of ENDC scientific developments. Currently, they feel, no ENDC delegation has a scientist with the freedom or skill to do the necessary job.

The journalists

Of the 115 people accredited to the Palais des Nations through the Correspondents' Association of the United Nations in Geneva, 40 to 50 are "stringers", free lancers working either on a "pay by piece" basis or on a retainer plus so much per story published. Others, some of whom give office addresses as far away as Paris or London, are listed as working for one particular news organization. But there are also those who are not completely dependent upon journalism for a livelihood. These are said to be "doing everything but journalism" in Geneva, a city that despite its fears of overpopulation by foreigners readily gives residency permits and tax advantages to people accredited through the Correspondents' Association. The Association annually attempts to "purge" its membership of those with doubtful journalistic qualifications. But this is difficult and at times has resulted in prolonged, bitter disputes which have nearly wrecked the organization.

There are in Geneva today, in contrast to earlier years, fewer "staff correspondents"—full-time employees of one news organization. Some staff men, especially those working for newspapers, are required to do considerable traveling to other parts of Europe, even outside the continent, and they often fail to cover major U.N. developments. One very well known American journalist headquartered in Geneva by an important American newspaper was traveling

throughout the Middle East during the ENDC session covered by this report. Another was on holiday in Southern Europe. His paper was protected by a stringer on a retainer basis.

Another change from past years has been the replacement by the two American news agencies, the Associated Press and United Press International, of higher paid American staff correspondents with lower paid European staffers. The British, French, West German, Japanese and Italian agencies, however, as well as those of the Soviet Union, Roumania, Yugoslavia and East Germany, have their own nationals running their respective operations. The British agency, Reuters, sends many of its brightest young staffers to Geneva to get their first experience as foreign correspondents. The second Soviet news agency, Novosti, has a correspondent accredited in Geneva, but he is rarely there. Neither he nor his colleague from the Yugoslav agency Tanjug was there for the period of this report. The New China News Agency and the Czechoslovak agency, CTK, no longer keep permanent correspondents in Geneva.

In this study, ENDC stories from Geneva that appeared in the *New York Times*, *The Times* and the *Daily Mirror* were reported by stringers. Of doubtful origin were those appearing in the *Hindu*, which gave no source but could have come from the British or American agencies, and in *Pravda* and *Rude Pravo*. Although a July 15 story in *Pravda* was credited to one of its correspondents, B. Dubrovnin, the newspaper did not have a correspondent in the Palais des Nations on that date. The story could have been rewritten from Tass. *Rude Pravo* stories had CTK as a source, but there were no CTK correspondents in Geneva then. CTK subscribes to the important world agencies. All other ENDC stories in this analysis were reported by staff correspondents, largely those of the major Western news agencies.

As well as seeing who the journalists were, the author sought to determine what views they held on the press arrangements and the problems of reporting the ENDC. The results are necessarily impressionistic. It had been hoped that some journalists might be persuaded to provide copies of the full stories they filed so that the analysis could be made in two stages: how the proceedings were reported by the correspondents, and then what selection from their stories was eventually used by the newspapers under study. This was not possible.

Some journalists, but comparatively few considering the reporter's traditional complaint about what his editors do to his copy, say they hardly recognize their stories when they see them in print. In other words, their dispatches are drastically re-written in the home office. "They stand my copy on its head to make it more exciting," reported the stringer for a British national daily. Some German reporters feel their newspapers only print disarmament stories if they conform to the paper's editorial policy. The German journalist in Geneva with the strongest feelings against his country's signature on the Non-Proliferation Treaty writes for Axel Springer's *Die Welt* and for two Swiss newspapers, the *National Zeitung* in Basel and the *Weltwoche* in Zurich. Other journalists say they sometimes get callbacks based on "jazzed up" copy filed by agencies attempting to squeeze the last drop of drama from what would be an unexciting but otherwise newsworthy story. The majority of journalists, however, say their copy goes into their respective publications pretty much the way they write it.

Japanese correspondents report there is such great interest in disarmament among the Japanese that their papers print anything and everything they file on the subject. When an ENDC story strikes them as particularly newsworthy, the Japanese correspondents file between 4,000 and 5,000 words to Tokyo on a press urgent basis at 50 Swiss centimes (12 US cents) per word.

In general, staff journalists representing newspapers in Geneva would like the ENDC meetings opened to the press. Staff correspondents of news agencies and most stringers like the system the way it is, i.e., relying on the US press spokesman, since it gives them more time to cover other activities within the Palais des Nations. Many of the journalists would appreciate the services of a scientist able to explain to them the meaning of technological and scientific proposals made at the ENDC.

The timetable and action

The following "timetable" lists the main events in and around the ENDC from 10 July through 25 July 1968. During that period, the ENDC met four times: 16 July, 18 July, 23 July and 25 July.¹ The timetable gives a summary of what happened and was said in so far as this could be covered by the author. It is an attempt to give a rounded picture of the events from which the newspaper stories were derived.

Members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: USSR (co-Chairman), USA (co-Chairman), UK, United Arab Republic, Sweden, Roumania, Poland, Nigeria, Mexico, Italy, India, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Burma, Bulgaria, Brazil. France is also a member, but she refuses to be seated.

10 July

1. U Thant press conference. On disarmament the U. N. Secretary-General said:

Regarded the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a step forward towards general and complete disarmament and hoped the treaty would be signed by as many states as possible. The General Assembly resolution on the matter was one of the most important decisions ever adopted. The refusal of the People's Republic of China to attend the conference of non-nuclear weapon states was not unexpected. In the introduction to his annual report, he would deal with the serious matter of biological and chemical warfare because he believed that this means of mass warfare had not received sufficient attention. It was more serious than nuclear weapons since that was the property of rich countries, while the former was the property of poor countries. There were heartening trends in the field of disarmament, but the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee should also take up certain relevant questions, such as underground nuclear tests and limitation of strategic nuclear vehicles.

12 July

2. Geneva airport arrival statement by William C. Foster, head of US delegation to the ENDC, at 12:50 pm (sufficient copies for all journalists):

¹ Serial numbers of verbatim records for ENDC sessions incorporated in this study and cited in the following excerpts are: ENDC/381 for 16 July; ENDC/382 for 18 July; ENDC/383 for 23 July; ENDC/384 for 25 July. They may be obtained by writing Dr. D. Protitch, special representative of the U. N. Secretary-General to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.

Since leading US Arms Control and Disarmament delegation, he could recall few moments, if any, when there was greater recognition of need for further progress. President Johnson characterized Non-Proliferation Treaty as "the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began" and Foster said he believed progress achieved in this treaty is source of great satisfaction and relief to entire world. Perhaps too optimistic to see Non-Proliferation Treaty, even before it has entered into force, as beginning to carry out one of its important functions—that of paving way for further arms control measures. United States is very heartened by expression of willingness of Soviets to discuss mutual limitations on strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons delivery systems. Soviet co-Chairman and Foster will have a number of points to discuss concerning arrangements for this session of the Disarmament Conference and Foster looked forward to meeting Roshchin shortly.

3. After reading above statement, Foster answered questions posed by journalists:

Will meet Roshchin 13 July, 14 July and 15 July before the ENDC resumed sessions get underway 16 July. A decision on time and place for American-Russian talks on limiting nuclear missiles "is still being studied in the two capitals", i.e., Washington and Moscow. As yet there is no decision. Answered "no comment" when asked if he would discuss this subject with Soviet delegation in Geneva. However, he stressed its overriding importance. Said "single most important item" in arms control "is obviously the limitation on ICBMs and ABMs". Noted that this ENDC session probably "will be a reasonably brief conference". Still hopeful West Germany will be an early signer of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

4. Geneva airport arrival statement by Alexei Roshchin, chief Soviet disarmament negotiator, at 5 pm (five copies of statement for about 40 journalists):

ENDC entering new stage of its work. Satisfied to note that Non-Proliferation Treaty already signed by some 60 countries. Of high importance that treaty signed in near future by greatest number of states and that it enter into force as soon as possible. Conclusion of treaty paves the way for solving other disarmament problems. Ever accelerating arms race adds to importance of negotiations on disarmament and of concluding new agreements in this field. Non-Proliferation Treaty envisages negotiations for further steps toward disarmament to be held in spirit of good will. When Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signature, Soviet government addressed to all states the memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping arms race, and for disarmament. Memorandum contains broad program of measures the implementation of which should be agreed upon without delay in order to consolidate the success resulting in sphere

of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Soviet delegation to ENDC will do its best to contribute to successful work of the committee in carrying this out.

5. After reading above statement, Roshchin answered questions of newsmen:

Said he expected Russian-American talks on limiting nuclear missiles to be held in Moscow and Washington, not Geneva. Asked if he would discuss nuclear missiles in Geneva with Foster, Roshchin answered: "I will tell you that we do not envisage it at this particular moment, but it is not excluded." Where then would the talks be held? "I think that probably in the capitals." When would they begin? "After some consultation it will be agreed upon." Urged by journalists to be more specific, Roshchin added: "This requires some preliminary consultation. I could not tell you now. Gentlemen, for me this is rather difficult to talk on this matter. It requires some preliminary talks, consultation and I don't want to engage in any." Also said he would meet privately with Foster before start of ENDC.

16 July

6. First resumed session of ENDC began at 2:30 pm and ended at 4:45 pm. Before session began, Foster and Roshchin separately appeared in hall outside conference chamber. Both apparently in an informal mood. Foster showed postcard to Roshchin. Both laughed. Photographers crowded in. Two journalists, Andrew Waller of Reuters and Gustav Svensson of Swedish Radio and Television, spoke to Roshchin about five minutes in Russian. Foster entered conference chambers, followed shortly thereafter by Roshchin.

7. Journalists allowed into session chambers for opening ceremonies only. Dr. D. Protitch, special representative of U Thant to ENDC, read U.N. Secretary-General's message of welcome to delegates. In part it said: U Thant "deeply gratified by the positive statements made by the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States on matters concerning disarmament following the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty." Journalists asked to leave at 2:55 pm. After five minute recess, session resumed.

8. First to speak Roshchin:

Discussed Soviet's nine-point disarmament plan: prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; measures for stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons and for reducing and destroying stockpiles; limitation and subsequent reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons; prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bombers carrying nuclear weapons; limitation of navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines; ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests; prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; elimination of foreign military bases; measures

for regional disarmament; peaceful uses of the sea bed and ocean floor. Roshchin also reiterated Soviet opposition to permitting on-site inspection of suspected illegal underground nuclear tests.

9. At 3:20 pm, member of Soviet delegation exited session chambers to announce Soviet briefing in ground floor press room. Tass correspondent introduced the diplomat who read Roshchin's speech to newsmen. No copies of speech for journalists. Diplomat then stressed Soviets unwilling to discuss international inspection. Every question answered by re-reading the relevant section of Roshchin's speech. Briefing ended at 3:45 pm. Correspondent for Radio Bucharest present; no other journalists, except Tass correspondent, from Socialist countries. Neither Roumanian nor Tass correspondent asked questions. All other correspondents present were from West Europe, Britain, the United States, Latin America or Japan. Following briefing, journalists returned to hall outside session chambers.

10. Next to speak was Foster. Shortly after he began speaking, American press spokesman exited from chambers with stack of texts. Sufficient copies for waiting journalists—many of whom left immediately for their offices within the Palais des Nations to write and file their dispatches. Before they left, however, American press spokesman pointed out what he considered to be the important passages.

11. Foster read message from President Johnson to ENDC. Message in part:

“High on the disarmament agenda of mankind is the need to halt the strategic arms race. Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. It is expected that the two sides will shortly reach a decision on the time and place for talks . . . If we can make progress on limiting strategic delivery systems, the United States would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems . . . We must soon take up the question of arms limitations on the seabed in the light of the consideration being given by the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds to a number of proposals for arms limitation on the seabed. Your Conference should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction . . . Finally, we must be alert to opportunities for achieving regional limitations on armaments . . . The United States attaches particular importance to halting non-nuclear arms races. We must achieve regional limitations on conventional armaments . . .”

12. Next to speak was Fred Mulley, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. As soon as he began to speak, 4 pm, member of British delega-

tion exited from session chambers to give journalists texts of message to ENDC from Prime Minister Harold Wilson, plus texts of Mulley's speech.

13. Wilson message:

"At its last session, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee's long and patient labours on the non-proliferation treaty were finally crowned with success and with the opening of the treaty for signature the Committee will be free to turn its attention to other measures of arms control and disarmament. This is a tremendous opportunity which must be exploited to the full. I am sure the Disarmament Committee will be equal to its responsibilities and trust that in its present session it will initiate work that will enable further steps to be taken on the long road that leads to general and complete disarmament."

14. Mulley speech (in part):

"If I may now return to my brief preliminary comments on the Soviet memorandum, the Committee may not be surprised to hear that I do not share the Soviet view that first priority should be given to the conclusion of an international agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons. My Government strongly supports all efforts to remove the danger of nuclear war. That is indeed one of the basic considerations underlying our whole approach to the question of progress in the disarmament field. But we do not believe that the danger of nuclear war can be eliminated by a simple prohibition on the use of the weapons concerned . . . For all those reasons, my Government believes that the only sure way to remove the danger of nuclear war is by general and complete disarmament under effective international control . . . Equally we do not think that the Committee will be profitably employed in discussing items 4 and 7 of the Soviet memorandum, which suggest the prohibition of flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond national boundaries, the limitation of zones of operation of missile-carrying submarines and the dismantling of foreign military bases . . . In the nuclear field, my own priority is a ban on underground tests, and we have given particular thought ourselves to the problems of a comprehensive test ban treaty . . . The Soviet Union has consistently opposed the whole principle of on-site inspection. We can understand fears that such inspections might provide opportunities for espionage, but we think that those fears might be dispelled if arrangements could be made by which on-site inspection could only take place if there were strong seismological or other evidence that treaty had been infringed. I should therefore like to suggest, that consideration be given to the possibility of the treaty's providing for a special committee whose function it would be to consider complaints of infringements of the treaty and assess the evidence produced in support of the complaint. Such a committee might be composed of the representatives of the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty, the representatives of three non-aligned countries and a nominee of the United Nations Secretary-General or the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

There should be the right of on-site inspection if the committee decided by a majority of five to two that a *prima facie* case had been made out in support of the complaint. Our thought is that a committee of this composition would be able to carry out on-site inspection only if there were very strong evidence that the treaty had been infringed . . . We have been wondering whether the comprehensive test ban itself might not be made a phased operation by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground weapon test explosions. We feel that it might be possible for the treaty to provide for quotas on a descending scale over a period of, say, four or five years, ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely. Alternatively, the quotas might not be written into the treaty but fixed annually, possibly by a committee of the kind I have already suggested . . . However, my own priority for action in the non-nuclear field concerns chemical and biological warfare . . . I would like to suggest that we should try to go beyond the Geneva Protocol . . . and actually ban the production and possession of agents of biological warfare . . . As an aid to further action, however, I would take up a proposal contained in the draft resolution submitted by the Maltese delegation at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly and suggest that our co-Chairmen on behalf of this Committee should request the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use, with a view to giving this Committee an international scientific basis for future consideration of further measures for their limitation and control, as well as focusing public opinion on the issues involved . . .”

15. Polish representative thanked co-Chairmen of ENDC for their opening words of welcome.

Meeting adjourned at 4:40 pm until Thursday, 18 July, at 10:30 am.

16. Delegates emerged from session chambers. Roshchin surrounded by West German television crew with correspondent who interviewed him briefly in English. Audio tape interview made at same time by BBC stringer. Other newsmen crowded in, asking questions. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, chief Swedish disarmament negotiator, stopped by Swedish radio-TV correspondent. A few correspondents approached Foster. Spoke briefly with him.

17. Journalists left hall outside session chambers for ground floor press room to attend briefing by Mulley. Briefing began at 5 pm. American press spokesman and Foster not giving their usual opening day briefing. Americans were asked by British to let them have the journalists for the day.

18. Mulley stressed what he said were highlights of his speech before ENDC:

ENDC must move into both nuclear and non-nuclear fields of disarma-

ment beyond the Non-Proliferation Treaty; priority of ENDC should be given to a comprehensive test ban treaty; priority also should be given to chemical and biological fields: absolute ban on biological weapons; in chemical field we need an authoritative scientific study before anything else is undertaken; his proposal for a committee consisting of three nuclear weapon states, three non-aligned countries and a nominee of the United Nations or of the International Atomic Energy Agency for monitoring suspected secret underground nuclear testing. Mulley also mentioned his other approach centering on an agreed annual quota of underground weapon test explosions.

No Soviet or other East European journalists present at Mulley briefing. Briefing ended at 5:20 pm.

18 July

19. ENDC session began at 10:30 am. Roshchin and Foster arrived early and made themselves available to gathering newsmen. No questions. Two co-Chairmen moved toward each other, shook hands and compared dates in notebooks. West German TV cameraman recorded the scene. Small group of journalists gathered around Mrs. Myrdal. No other delegates stopped. Delegates entered session chambers for start of meeting.

20. Only speaker E. L. M. Burns, Canada's chief delegate. At 10:35 am an aide brought out sufficient copies of Burns' text to journalists:

"... Of course, we are anxious to hear when and where these negotiations [between Soviets and Americans to halt missile race] are to be held. No doubt the negotiations will be mainly the concern of the super Powers but the results will be so important for progress in disarmament generally that it is very desirable that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should have as much information about them as can be given without prejudicing their progress ... In the opinion of the Canadian delegation there could be a useful discussion of the means of verification of prohibition of underground testing ... The Eighteen-Nation Committee could decide where the technology now stands and discuss possible forms of an agreement ... Another point: if there is to be prohibition of underground weapon testing, special arrangements will have to be made if experiments in the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes are to be continued ... It may at the moment be much too optimistic to envisage such a conference in which all five nuclear Powers [United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, France, China] would take part. Nevertheless, it is something which will have to happen at some time if there is eventually to be complete nuclear disarmament ... Stopping production of fissile material for weapons use would be a highly desirable measure for reinforcing the non-proliferation treaty. If it were agreed to, the obligations of the nuclear Powers in respect of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency could be made the same as those of the States not having nuclear weapons, and this would remove a grievance of the latter group of States who point to the differing obligations as to

inspection as one of the inequities of the non-proliferation treaty. We were greatly interested in the views expressed by Mr. Mulley on the need to do something to bring up to date the Geneva Protocol prohibiting use of chemical and bacteriological weapons . . . As I see it, our first task is to reach agreement on the area in which negotiations should take place in this Committee now that the negotiations regarding the non-proliferation treaty have been concluded and the treaty has been opened for signature. That is to say, we need to decide on an agenda . . .”

21. Meeting adjourned at 11 am. Journalists did not desire American press briefing usually held after each session. This is exceptional. The newsmen found no need for explanation of Burns address by others from within the session chambers.

23 July

22. ENDC session began at 10:30 am. Mrs. Alva Myrdal first to speak. Sufficient copies of her text given waiting newsmen at 11 am by Swedish delegation member. In part:

“If we judge as having top priority that matter which is of utmost urgency for the world as a whole we must, I am sure, so denote the negotiations on an agreement to restrict strategic nuclear missile systems, both offensive and defensive, their development, their production and, I take it, also their deployment . . . When we look for a top priority item in the nuclear field for the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament itself, the comprehensive test ban is the most logical choice . . . Another important measure, also mentioned by Mr. Burns in his recent statement, is the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes . . . I wish to turn now to consider as a third priority for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the question of biological and chemical weapons. Our delegation finds itself in great sympathy with the proposal made on 16 July by Mr. Mulley to move this item up for urgent consideration . . . In the tentative list of topics suitable for treatment by this Committee at this session, two other items must be mentioned, although placed in a somewhat different category. They should be dealt with partially by the ENDC . . . the suggested ban on military installations on the sea-bed and an international régime for the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

23. Next speaker Ambassador Kroum Christov, chief Bulgarian disarmament negotiator. At 11:20 am, a Bulgarian delegation member exited to give the press a three paragraph extract in French of Christov's 27-paragraph speech. Christov's speech in part:

“The war in South-East Asia continues to poison the political atmosphere. The aggression of Israel in the Near East, with all its consequences, and the occupation by Israeli forces of territories belonging to the Arab States have created an extremely tense situation which threatens at any moment to cause dangerous explosions . . . We consider therefore that in

order to achieve this elimination of the danger of nuclear war we must place among the first problems to be considered by the Committee that of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons ... The Bulgarian delegation feels that a question that should be among the first to be taken up by the Committee is that of the prohibition of underground tests ... My delegation considers that the Committee must devote its efforts to other problems also, especially the question of the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of the sea-bed for military purposes and the question of the strict observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as problems connected with denuclearized zones and military bases on foreign territory ..."

24. Canada's Burns read for the record a statement made by Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, on 22 July authorizing Canadian ambassadors in Washington and Moscow to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

25. Last speaker was Tomas Lahoda, head Czechoslovak delegate. No copies of text available:

"We still have to complete the signing and ratification procedures in the course of which other States should accede to the treaty; without some of them the treaty could hardly have the efficacy expected of it by its present signatories. I have in mind countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany, whose attitude to this question affects its immediate neighbours. From the Czechoslovak point of view this aspect is vitally important in connection with putting the non-proliferation treaty into force and we have paid great attention to it. We are confident that before long we shall have no such worries and that the treaty will come into force with the participation of the greatest possible number of States.. In accordance with article VI of the treaty, we should permit no delays in taking further steps that would bring us one step nearer to real disarmament ... A memorandum of 1 July 1968 has been submitted to us by the Government of the USSR containing positive proposals for settling a number of outstanding questions in the field of collateral disarmament measures and steps for reducing the risk of war. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic welcomes this initiative by the Soviet Union as a significant contribution in support of peace and international understanding. The proposed measures and the manner of their implementation correspond to our ideas on the progress to be desired in the field of disarmament and have our full support. Similarly, we have given careful consideration to the message sent to this committee by President Johnson, read at our opening meeting by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, and the suggestions by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, which we were promised would be formulated in working papers ... Proceeding from this position and paying due regard to the terms of reference given to this Committee by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Czechoslovak delegation

believes that the first item to which we should devote our full attention is questions of nuclear disarmament. This group of problems includes the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the banning of underground tests, measures aimed at the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and the limitation and liquidation of their stockpiles, and the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which is to be the subject of bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States of America . . . In this connexion we deem it necessary to put on record the interest of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in bringing about a solution of the varied and complex problems connected with the establishment of nuclear-free zones on the continent of Europe, and particularly in Central Europe. We attach great importance to this question and believe it to be closely connected with the opportunities open in the field of the reduction of conventional armaments on the regional scale . . . At the present juncture I must say that the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons has come to the fore in connexion with the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States which, by acceding to the non-proliferation treaty, voluntarily relinquish the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons. It certainly leaves nobody in doubt that a similar obligation expressed in an international convention would have as much weight and efficiency as, for example, the equally desirable and useful prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare, the extension of which we are ready to discuss in this Committee or elsewhere . . . After all, all partial measures have a limited nature; yet their importance is no longer denied by anybody. Moreover, this is a case in which the adoption of appropriate measures depends only on the political decision and good will of the governments concerned. Agreement on this significant proposal would constitute further evidence of the sincerity of various declarations renouncing nuclear weapons as instruments of force and pressure. Similarly, the demand for the final elimination of all nuclear tests has become a categorical imperative of the present day, particularly if we bear in mind the cessation of the nuclear armaments race. This Committee and other forums of the United Nations have heard a more than sufficient number of convincing statements and arguments offering clear evidence that the current level of science and technology in the world is capable of ensuring a satisfactory measure of control over the test ban through national detection means. Together with a number of other delegations, the Czechoslovak delegation regards the extension of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests to underground explosions as an important task of this Committee . . . This does not mean, however, that we would shut the door on the consideration of any other positive proposals. One such proposal, in our view, might be the demand that the sea-bed be used exclusively for peaceful purposes."

ENDC session ended at 11:35 am.

26. American press briefing began at 11:45 am. American press spokesman discussed talks by Bulgarian, Canadian and Czech delegates:

Bulgarian was said to have spoken on Viet-Nam and Israeli "aggression." He was reported to have given brief credit to President Johnson and to Prime Minister Harold Wilson for their thoughts on disarmament. Supported Soviet proposals on renouncing nuclear weapons and underground tests.

Canadian reminded delegates why Canada had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 1 July and announced that his Foreign Minister had authorized it to be signed.

Czech delegate spoke on significance of Non-Proliferation Treaty, said common sense to sign it, ENDC must not rest but must push ahead, more nations plus West Germany must sign treaty. This would open doors for more international co-operation. Czech delegation supported nine points of Soviet memorandum. These nine points corresponded to Czech government's ideas of disarmament. He credited President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson. What is now needed is a comprehensive test ban, elimination of stock piles. Czech government is eagerly awaiting outcome of Soviet-US bilateral talks on missiles. He made "strong pitch" for reduction of forces in Central Europe. Political decisions are needed.

American press briefing ended at 12:15 pm.

25 July

28. ENDC session convened at 10:30 am.

America's Foster was sole speaker of the day. American press spokesman emerged from conference chambers as soon as Foster began speaking with sufficient copies of Foster text for journalists.

29. Foster speech:

"Today, I should like to speak briefly about nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes . . . Article V preserves for non-nuclear-weapon parties the option to obtain peaceful nuclear explosion services from nuclear-weapon parties pursuant to bilateral agreements. But it also calls upon the parties to ensure that the benefits of such explosions can be obtained by non-nuclear parties through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. President Johnson's message of 16 July to this Committee states my Government's belief that the International Atomic Energy Agency should be that international body . . . The United States will continue to conduct within the limitations of available funds an active programme to develop nuclear explosive devices particularly suited for peaceful applications and to develop the technology of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Let me emphasize that we are still in a relatively early stage of development . . . As our research and development efforts proceed, we will continue to make freely available the information and data obtained, except information relating to the design or manufacture of the nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, we will be prepared to make arrangements whereby we will make available technical advice and assistance, within our capability, to those non-nuclear-weapon parties which seek assistance in studying specific

peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. The knowledge we would gain from assisting in such studies should also permit us to take into account in our research and development programme various applications in which other countries are interested . . . When particular applications are found to be feasible, we plan to make a nuclear explosion service available to domestic users and to non-nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty. In addition to the nuclear explosive devices used and any technical review of the project undertaken by the United States Government, the nuclear explosion service would include the transportation of the devices from the assembly plant to the project site, their emplacement at the prepared site and their arming and firing. The users of the service, whether it is furnished domestically or pursuant to article V, will pay for the service in accordance with the rates established for its various elements. These rates would be no less favorable for the non-nuclear-weapon parties than for the United States domestic users . . . To be consistent with articles I and II of the treaty, arrangements must be made to ensure that the nuclear explosive devices used in furnishing such a service to non-nuclear-weapon parties remain at all times under the custody and control of the nuclear-weapon State. Thus, the appropriate international observation contemplated by the treaty cannot include access by the observers to the design or internal operation of nuclear explosive devices. Consequently, there will be no transfer of nuclear explosive devices or control over them. Nor will the service in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices."

Session adjourned at 11 am.

32. No briefing for press by American press spokesman as he pointed out what he considered significant passages in Foster speech when passing out texts to journalists.

The press coverage

Selection of newspapers

Sixteen newspapers from ten countries were used in this study: the *New York Times*, United States; *The Times*, the *Daily Mirror*, United Kingdom; *Pravda*, Soviet Union; *Le Monde*, *France-Soir*, France; *Rude Pravo*, *Vecerni Praha*, Czechoslovakia; *Dagens Nyheter*, *Aftonbladet*, Sweden; *O Estado de São Paulo*, Brazil; the *Hindu*, the *Indian Express*, India; *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily), People's Republic of China; *Asahi*, *Yomiuri*, Japan.²

Originally, the author planned to use two newspapers from each country included in the study—one prestige paper and one popular paper. But as a result of mechanical difficulties, three newspapers initially slated for the analysis could not be incorporated—the *New York Daily News*, *Vechernaya Moskva* of the Soviet Union and *O Globo* of Brazil.

Newspapers were selected from the United States and the United Kingdom because these countries represent the two leading NATO members participating in the ENDC. Those from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were incorporated as both countries are members of the Warsaw Pact and both send delegations to the ENDC. Sweden, Brazil and India represent three neutral countries taking part in the ENDC. China and France are the two nuclear powers that do not participate in the negotiations. Japan was chosen because it is the only country to have experienced an atomic attack and it is not a member of the ENDC.

Consultants translated newspapers from the following countries: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Brazil, China and Japan.

Photo-copies of the newspaper stories analyzed in this report may be obtained from the author.

² The 1968 circulation figures of the newspapers were: the *New York Times*, 870,163; *The Times*, 364,193; the *Daily Mirror*, 5,282,137; *Pravda*, about 7 million; *Rude Pravo*, about 1 million total for Czech and Slovak language editions; *Vecerni Praha*, about 500,000; *Le Monde*, 381,000; *France-Soir*, 1,300,000; *Dagens Nyheter*, 440,644; *Aftonbladet*, 438,758; the *Hindu*, 143,681 (1966); the *Indian Express*, 732,000 (1966); *Asahi*, 5,350,372 (1966). Figures could not be obtained for *O Estado de São Paulo*, *Jen Min Jih Pao*, or the *Yomiuri English* language edition, said to be widely read by young Japanese intellectuals.

Tables

Three tables are given at the end of this study. Table A gives an analysis by paper, showing the total space in column centimeters devoted in each newspaper to disarmament from all sources, and the total space devoted to disarmament reporting solely from Geneva. Table B presents an analysis by day, showing the space used per day for disarmament coverage from all sources, and from Geneva alone. Table C gives certain details about each disarmament article: the number of columns and the space; the page and column placement; and the headline or lead sentence.

In placing the Japanese and Chinese newspapers—which are so different in makeup from newspapers in the Americas and Europe—into the scheme of the following tables, no attempt was made to determine the column placement. Because ideograms allow so much to be reported in rather limited space when compared with European newspapers, the English words used for translating the Chinese and Japanese articles were counted and transformed into column centimeters on the basis of 100 English words equalling seven column centimeters. Thus the column lengths of the Japanese and Chinese articles are the approximate lengths they would be in an English language newspaper. The number of English words needed to translate the articles is also given.

Summary of press coverage

(The coverage is analyzed in greater detail in the Appendix, page 39.)

Despite the great space given to the world's main news story—on Czechoslovakia—in the period studied, the selected newspapers devoted a total of 1400 column centimeters to disarmament stories from all sources and 741 column centimeters to disarmament stories originating in Geneva.

By and large, the reporting from Geneva followed closely session by session developments of the ENDC. Usually, it centered on speeches made by ENDC chief delegates with some explanation (especially in the *Asahi*) of the why and wherefore of their proposals.

Greatest coverage came on 17 July, the day after the ENDC resumed its session following a recess of several months. It was on

Table A. Space devoted to disarmament, by paper

Newspaper	Centimeters	
	I. From all sources	II. From Geneva
Asahi	298	51
The Yomiuri	219	59
O Estado De Sao Paulo	172	172
The Times	137	72
The New York Times	127	127
Aftonbladet	91	31
Jen Min Jih Pao	79	0
Pravda	61	61
The Hindu	53	34
The Daily Mirror	52	30
Rude Pravo	50	50
Dagens Nyheter	39	39
Le Monde	11	11
France-Soir	11	4
The Indian Express	0	0
Vecerni Praha	0	0
Total	1400	741

16 July that three chief delegates spoke: Alexei Roshchin of the Soviet Union, William C. Foster of the United States and Fred Mulley of the United Kingdom. Both Foster and Mulley, in addition to their own statements before the ENDC, read messages from their respective heads of state, President Lyndon Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson. A message from U Thant, U.N. Secretary-General, was also read to the delegates at the 16 July meeting.

The second heaviest coverage of disarmament was on 16 July. But two of the longer stories appearing that day did not originate in Geneva (the second part in the *Asahi* two part series on disarmament and the *Daily Mirror's* London story headlined "Britain Not Armed for Germ Warfare"); and the day with the next largest coverage was 24 July, when 166 column centimeters were used for stories originating in the main from Geneva. The majority of the stories on that day centered on the four speakers before the ENDC on 23 July: Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden, Kroum Christov of Bulgaria, E. L. M. Burns of Canada and Tomas Lahoda of Czechoslovakia.

Of all the speeches delivered during the ENDC period under study, the message from President Johnson read by Foster on 16 July won the greatest play. In his message, the President announced

Table B. Space devoted to disarmament, by day

Date	Centimeters	
	I. From all sources	II. From Geneva
July 12	95	0
July 13	93	31
July 14	72	23
July 15	142	18
July 16	170	64
July 17	347	268
July 18	55	49
July 19	49	49
July 20	0	0
July 21	17	0
July 22	73	0
July 23	0	0
July 24	166	143
July 25	29	11
July 26	92	85
Total	1400	741

that the Soviet Union and the United States expected shortly to decide on a time and place for their bilateral talks to limit ballistic missiles. He also referred to proposals for the peaceful use of the sea bed. On the same day Roshchin elaborated a position his government had announced a few weeks earlier, the Soviet nine-point disarmament plan. This was old news to the journalists covering the ENDC.

Considerable prominence on 24 July was given to Mrs. Myrdal's speech and to the fact that at a time of national crisis in Czechoslovakia, that country's delegate supported the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals. It is doubtful that Lahoda would have received so much press attention had it not been for events in Czechoslovakia at the time.

Czechoslovakia's Communist Party daily, *Rude Pravo*, did not, however, devote a single word in its 24 July edition to Lahoda's speech. On other days during the period *Rude Pravo* did publish three Geneva datelined stories. Similarly, *Pravda* did not publish a story on the 17 July session or Roshchin's speech. It did, however, publish an "opener" on 16 July in which it reported what the Soviet disarmament delegation would discuss.

Of the various newspapers represented in this study, the Japanese

Table C. Day-by-day breakdown of the total disarmament coverage: articles'

Paper	Date	Number of Columns Centimeters		Placement	
				Page	Column
Aftonbladet	July 12	1	11	2	3
The Times	July 12	5	65	6	3-7
The Hindu	July 12	1	19	1	3
The New York Times	July 13	1	12	4	3
Asahi ^a	July 13		21	1	
Asahi	July 13		8	3	
Asahi	July 13		5	3	
Jen Min Jih Pao ^a	July 13		41	5	
The Yomiuri	July 13	1	6	1	3
Aftonbladet	July 14	5	49	2	1-5
O Estado De Sao Paulo	July 14	1	23		
The Times	July 15	1	11	5	6
The Yomiuri	July 15	1	7	1	1
Asahi	July 15		28	3	
Asahi	July 15		96	3	
Asahi	July 16		84	3	
O Estado De Sao Paulo	July 16	2	24	2	5-6
Pravda	July 16	2	29	5	2-3
The Daily Mirror	July 16	4	22	2	4-7
The New York Times	July 16	1	11	3	2
The Times	July 17	2	30	4	1-2
The New York Times	July 17	1	24	1	2
		2 (cont)	33	5	1-2
Dagens Nyheter	July 17	1	3	4	5
Dagens Nyheter	July 17	2	18	5	1-2
The Yomiuri	July 17	2	47	1	2-3

^a For *Asahi* and *Jen Min Jih Pao*, printed in Japanese and Chinese ideograms, columns are not given; and length estimate is based on the English translation, at 100 words to 7 centimeters.

date, source, length, placement and headline

Source	Headline or Lead Sentence
(none given)	Kosygin about Disarmament
Richard Wigg, New York	Russia's call to Avert Ocean-floor Arms Race
UPI, London	Anti-Missile Moratorium Issue
Special to NYT, Geneva	Missiles Not Topic For Geneva Parley
UPI, Kyodo, Washington	Chairman of American AEC Proposed to Signatory Powers: Nuclear Energy Service for Peaceful Use on Commercial Base
AP, Geneva	No Suggestions from USSR, American Comment about time for missile Negotiations
AFP, Geneva	Disarmament Committee Re-opens on 16th
New China News Agency	Carrying Out the Dirty Work for US-Soviet Hegemony and their Nuclear Blackmail Plot and Braying with all his Might Sato Once again Sets up an anti-China Hue and Cry to Step up Japanese Nuclear Arming—Financial Magnate Openly Clamours that "Japan too Must Possess Nuclear Weapons"
AP, Geneva	Foster in Geneva
(editorial)	Who Can Stand the Arms Race?
Reuters, Geneva	Chemical Arms on the Agenda
Our Correspondent, Geneva	Geneva Talks on Arms Agenda
AP, Geneva	US-Soviets Discuss Disarm Agenda
Kimura, Special Correspondent, Stockholm	The Significance of the Non-proliferation Treaty Appraised
(Asahi Comments)	After the Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Part One)
(Asahi Comments)	After the Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Part Two)
UPI, Reuters, AFP, ANSA, DPA, Geneva	Powers Want Sea Without Bombs
Special Correspondent B. Dubrovnik, Geneva	Toward the Next Phase
John Desborough	Britain "Not Armed" for Germ Warfare
Special to NYT, Geneva	British Seek to End Atom Test Dispute
Our Own Correspondent, Geneva	Britain Tries to End Nuclear Deadlock
Special to NYT	Johnson Hopeful on Disarmament
("In Brief"), Geneva	President Johnson ... to the disarmament conference ... soon reach agreement on time and place for talks on ... missiles.
UPI, AP, Reuter, TT, Geneva	LBJ to the Disarmers: Meeting Soon with USSR
AP, London	Miki Sidesteps UK Plea on N-Treaty

Table C (continued).

Paper	Date	Number of Columns Centimeters		Placement	
				Page	Column
The Yomiuri	July 17	2	16	1	2-3
Rude Pravo	July 17	2	22	7	3-4
The Daily Mirror	July 17	2	30	11	6-7
O Estado De Sao Paulo	July 17	1	31	1	8
O Estado De Sao Paulo	July 17	4	61	2	5-8
Jen Min Jih Pao	July 17		32	6	
Jen Min Jih Pao	July 18		6	6	
The Hindu	July 18	2	34	7	2-3
France-Soir	July 18	2	5	4	6-7
The Yomiuri	July 18	1	11	3	3
Rude Pravo	July 19	2	16	7	6-7
Pravda	July 19	1	9	5	4
Asahi	July 19		12	3	
The New York Times	July 19	1	5	2	5
The Yomiuri	July 19	1	7	1	2
The Yomiuri	July 21	1	17	1	4
The Yomiuri	July 22	3	73	6	5-7
The Times	July 24	1	6	6	6
O Estado De Sao Paulo	July 24	2	33	8	7-8
Aftonbladet	July 24	2	31	10	4-5
Dagens Nyheter	July 24	1	3	5	1
Dagens Nyheter	July 24	1	15	5	2
The New York Times	July 24	1	13	12	5
Pravda	July 24	2	23	5	1-2
Asahi	July 24		6	3	
Asahi	July 24		19	3	
The Yomiuri	July 24	1	9	1	4

Source	Headline or Lead Sentence
AFP, AP, Geneva	Disarm Meet Opens
CTK, Geneva	18 Nations Again About Disarmament
William Wolf	Private File ... On the Bid to End Germ Warfare
AFP, ANSA, AP, DPA, Reuters, UPI, Geneva	The Meeting Starts Well
Geneva	Message from Johnson at the Meeting in Geneva
Tirana, New China News Agency	The Albanian newspaper <i>Zeri i Popullit</i> condemns the new deal between the US and USSR on the missile front—The US and USSR step up military collusion in demented opposition to China—This new plot of US imperialists and Soviet revisionists will not fool the peoples of the world
New China News Agency	US—Soviet counter revolutionary collusion swells and grows—The new Soviet revisionist leaders' treachery becomes more barefaced and more shameless
Geneva	Halt to Arms Race: Johnson on Role of US and Russia
AFP	Johnson Message to the Disarmament Conference
AFP, Geneva	US, UK Air Plans at Disarm Meeting
Special Correspondent of CTK, Geneva	Twice from Geneva
Tass, Geneva	The 18-Nation Committee at Work
Yagisawa, Special Correspondent, Geneva	Canadian Delegate Requests: Decide the Agenda Immediately at the Geneva Disarmament Conference
Special to NYT, Geneva	Missile Talks Welcomed
AFP, Geneva	Canada Calls for 5-Power N-Parley
AP, London	US—Soviets Swap Plans for N-Talks
(none given)	Leading Light in Move for N-Nonproliferation
Our Correspondent, Geneva	Prague's Hope of Disarmament
ANSA, DPA, Reuters, Geneva	Sweden Wants to Stop Tests
Bertil G. Nilsson	Ban on Manufacture of War Gases
("In Brief"), Geneva	Mrs. Alva Myrdal wants to give priority to complete halt in testing
AP, AFP, TT, DAP, UPI, Geneva	57 States have Signed
Special to NYT, Geneva	Czech Backs Soviet on Nuclear Curbs
Tass, Geneva	In the 18-Nation Committee
Kyodo News Service, New York	Participation in the Conference of the World's Non-nuclear Nations: An Announcement to UN from Japan
Yagisawa, Special Correspondent, Geneva	Complete Stop on Nuclear Weapons Has Highest Priority Sweden Suggests for Agenda at Disarmament Committee
AFP, New York	Japan Attending N-Meet in Geneva from August 29

Table C (continued).

Paper	Date	Number of Columns Centimeters		Placement	
				Page	Column
The Yomiuri	July 24	1	8	1	4
Asahi	July 25		12	3	
The Yomiuri	July 25	1	6	3	1
Le Monde	July 25	1	11	3	1
The Yomiuri	July 26	1	12	1	3
Asahi	July 26		7	3	
Rude Pravo	July 26	2	12	7	4-5
The Times	July 26	2	25	4	7-8
France-Soir	July 26	1	7	7	1
The New York Times	July 26	3	29	10	4-6

ones, *Asahi* and the English language edition of *Yomiuri*, gave the heaviest coverage to disarmament. A series of two articles on disarmament published by *Asahi* on 15 and 16 July were the most detailed in explaining various disarmament proposals, with emphasis on the differences between US and Soviet proposals.

Two newspapers reported nothing on disarmament: *Vecerni Praha*, a popular mass circulation tabloid in Prague, and the *Indian Express* of Bombay.

French newspapers gave little coverage to disarmament, 22 column centimeters. The articles in the Chinese daily, *Jen Min Jih Pao*, none of which originated in Geneva, contained largely diatribes against what it called the co-operation aimed at seeking nuclear hegemony between Soviet revisionists and US imperialists.

With the exception of Czechoslovakia, newspapers from countries whose ENDC delegates spoke displayed a natural chauvinism in giving prominence to statements made by their own nationals. At the same time, the majority gave resumés, often in significant detail, of what other delegates had said.

It would be a mistake to believe that if a particular newspaper devoted relatively little space to a report by comparison with others, the newspaper in question had an editorial policy designed to "soft play" the story. It could be due to the relatively small size of the

Source	Headline and lead sentence
AFP, Ottawa	Canada Signs Pact
Kyodo News Service, Paris	Abolish the Present Stockpiles—France Confirmed Her Standpoint
AP, Bonn	Bonn May Sign N-Pact Before US Election
Reuters, Geneva	At the Disarmament Conference the Representative of Czechoslovakia Supports the Soviet Memorandum
AFP, Geneva	US Offers N-Service
Yagisawa, Special Correspondent, Geneva	No Move at the Disarmament Committee
CTK Correspondent, Geneva	About Commercial Nuclear Explosions
Our Correspondent, Geneva	Nuclear Explosives for Industry on the Way
(none given)	De Gaulle: Yes for a Total Nuclear Disarmament
Special to NYT, Geneva	Geneva Arms Parley to Turn to Sea-Bed Treaty

paper or to brief coverage of the story by the news agencies. It appears, however, that the agencies gave the ENDC considerable attention.

In a study entitled "How the Press Covers the Geneva Negotiations",³ Derrick Sington found that while four leading American newspapers gave large coverage to both US and Soviet concessions at an earlier ENDC session, three Soviet papers carried nothing on the American or Soviet moves. Sington also found that the American papers gave more space to the Soviet concessions than to their own. The ENDC developments included in this report did not have the dramatic implications involved in the US-Soviet confrontation considered by Sington's study. There are many variables that may have changed: the international atmosphere was different, East-West tension was a prominent feature at the ENDC then, and now both the Soviets and the Americans want a Non-Proliferation Treaty. In any case, it appears that newspaper coverage of the four ENDC meetings from 16 July through 23 July was slightly more objective than the coverage studied by Sington. In its 24 July story, *Pravda* emphasized the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak support for the Soviet position, but it also reported the Swedish delegation's proposals.

³ *Disarmament and Arms Control*, Autumn 1964, Volume 2, Number 4 (Pergamon Press, London).

Conclusions

The press arrangements made by the ENDC in 1962—and possibly the meetings themselves—have not worked out as was foreseen. So far, they have not succeeded in keeping the journalists uninformed about ENDC activities—almost exclusively the reading of set pieces with little give and take negotiation—that take place behind locked doors. They have led to a reliance on handouts and on whomever has the best press officer. This seems to work better than might be expected because one delegation, the American, has a first class press officer.

If anyone is hurt by these arrangements, it is those delegations, especially from Socialist and some neutral countries, who apparently either do not wish or do not know how to deal with the press. But such positions seem questionable with regard to the Soviet Union, especially when, as now seems to be the case, the two major powers have a common interest in slowing down their arms race.

Given the inadequacy of the press arrangements at the ENDC, it is perhaps surprising that the reporting was not more unbalanced. There is clearly a case for improving the arrangements so that there is less reliance on the existence, which cannot always be guaranteed, of a good honest press officer in one of the delegations. The Secretariat could be asked to provide a press officer or the meetings could be opened, or both. Opening the meetings might not greatly change the quality of reporting, since many journalists would probably still use ready made material where they could get it. But it is the one way to ensure that bias in the supply of the information to journalists, and suspicions of it, are avoided.

A quantitative analysis of the press coverage

Introduction

This Appendix contains the results of further analysis of the press cuttings and the verbatim record which was prepared by Mrs. R. Forsberg after Professor Gould had completed his main report and left SIPRI. The object of the analysis was to describe in more quantitative terms the extent and depth of the ENDC coverage in general, and to discuss some of the differences in the pictures of the negotiations given in different countries. The Appendix begins by describing the method of analysis, and sets out the way in which the material was classified. It then examines in what detail the ENDC meetings were covered by the papers as a group: which speeches and which proposals were given most attention, and how many of the issues were reported. The third section looks at some of the differences in treatment given by the different papers. It analyses the extent to which papers were influenced, in the space they gave to the various speeches, by the interests of the country in which they are published. At the end there is a short summary description of the distinctive aspects of some of the individual papers' accounts of the ENDC meetings.

Method of analysis

Only the ENDC coverage of one paper from each country is examined here.¹ All articles which referred to ENDC matters were included; some of these were published just before the opening of the session. Articles on disarmament which did not mention the

¹ *Asahi* (Japan), *Dagens Nyheter* (Sweden), *Hindu* (India), *Jen Min Jih Pao* (China), *Le Monde* (France), *New York Times* (USA), *O Estado de São Paulo* (Brazil), *Pravda* (USSR), *Rude Pravo* (Czechoslovakia), *Times* (UK). The six popular papers were also examined: *Aftonbladet* (Sweden), *Daily Mirror* (UK), *France-Soir* (France), *Indian Express* (India), *Vecerni Praha* (Czechoslovakia), and *Yomiuri* (Japan). They yielded the general conclusion that popular papers give little space to reporting the ENDC; and they did not as a group provide sufficient material for meaningful analysis.

ENDC were not included. The contents of the articles were classified by line count² into one of the following categories:

Background. All material for which there was no specified source in Geneva during the time covered: editorial comment, past disarmament positions of various countries, technical information about the topics of negotiation, etc. Also included here was reporting of factual information on the ENDC not derived directly from the delegates' speeches: the names of the delegates, the times of the meetings, and so on.

Bilateral talks. Reporting on the expected time and place for the proposed talks between the USA and USSR on the limitation of strategic missile systems. Most of this material arose from the Foster and Roshchin pre-ENDC press conferences.

ENDC interventions. The core of the subject—reporting of statements made at the four ENDC meetings during the period, in interventions, or speeches (the two words are used interchangeably), by delegates from:

16 July: USSR, USA, UK

18 July: Canada

23 July: Sweden, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia

25 July: USA

Both the verbatim record³ and the reporting of the first seven interventions⁴ were further classified in this way:

Major proposals

Qualifications to major proposals

Positive and negative responses to proposed topics

Attitude statements

In these interventions the delegates were discussing what subjects the ENDC should take up next. For the analysis the subjects proposed were grouped into twelve areas. In some cases the question was simply whether or not the area should go on the agenda: some delegates proposed it, some did not. For example, Canada and Sweden proposed as a subject for discussion the cessation of production of

² The material in *Asahi*, printed in Japanese ideograms, was classified by the English translation at five words per line.

³ ENDC/PV. 381-384; 16, 18, 23, 25 July 1968. (Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Provisional Verbatim Record.)

⁴ The reasons for omission of the eighth intervention are given on page 42.

fissile material for weapons purposes. The question was simply—should this be discussed or not. A proposal of this kind was classed, straightforwardly, as a *major proposal*.

In other areas, there were differences among delegates proposing an area on the specific subject to be included in the agenda. For example, in the area of the “peaceful use of the seabed and ocean floor”, the Soviet proposal suggested negotiations “to ensure the use of the seabed beyond the limits of present territorial waters exclusively for peaceful purposes”. The United States suggested negotiation “to prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction”. Proposals like this were listed as *major proposals with qualifications*: the qualifications are the distinctive characteristics of the individual proposal, such as the United States suggestion, in the example just given, that the negotiations be limited to “the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction”.

When a delegate simply expressed approval of or interest in a subject, rather than actually proposing ENDC debate on it, this was listed as a *positive response*. When—as occasionally happened—a delegate requested that a proposed subject be postponed or not given high priority, this was listed as a *negative response*.

In addition to positions on specific subjects proposed for negotiation, each intervention included, usually at the beginning and the end, statements of a more general nature, such as support for general and complete disarmament, for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for vigorous renewal of ENDC negotiations; citations of UN resolutions and of statements by national officials; expression of a sense of urgency in the matter of deciding on an agenda. All such statements, expressing in general terms an attitude of support for disarmament and disarmament negotiations, were classified in a single group as *attitude statements*. Any statement not related to a position on a specific negotiation subject was included in this category. There are examples of this type of statement in the short message from U Thant which was read to the delegates at the opening of the session. An extract from it is given here in illustration:

I was deeply gratified by the positive statements made by the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States on matters concerning disarmament, following the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. These statements, I believe, have not only improved

Table 1. Negotiation areas

	Abbreviation
1. Limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive strategic missile systems (subject for planned US-USSR bilateral talks, rather than ENDC discussion)	Limit missile systems
2. Measures relating to the peaceful use of the seabed and ocean floor	Ocean floor
3. Measures for regional arms control and disarmament, and control of the international trade in arms (particularly conventional weapons)	Regional arms control
4. Measures relating to biological and chemical warfare	BCW
5. Prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, in particular underground tests	Underground tests
6. Cessation of production and reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons	Cease n. weapon production
7. Creation of nuclear-free zones	Create nuclear-free zones
8. Liquidation of foreign military bases	Liquidate foreign bases
9. Draft convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons	Ban use nuclear weapons
10. Limitation of areas traversed by nuclear weapon bearing planes and submarines	Limit n. planes & submarines
11. Cessation of production of fissile material for weapons purposes	Cease fissile production
12. Creation of an international body to supervise the peaceful use of nuclear explosives, and other measures relating to peaceful uses (Non-Proliferation Treaty, article V)	Peaceful nuclear explosives

the prospects for further measures to control the nuclear arms race, but also give rise to hopes for improvement in the international political climate and for the relaxation of international tension. Taking advantage of these favorable elements in the situation, the Committee must now strive to open a new and fruitful chapter in disarmament negotiations.

The twelve negotiation areas and an abbreviation for each are shown in table 1. Table 2 shows the general position taken by each delegate in each area.

The United States' second intervention, the eighth and last intervention in the four days covered, is omitted from some of the analysis,⁵ because in it the United States takes up one of the proposals presented earlier—the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives—and develops the US position on it at some length. This speech therefore

⁵ In all cases tables are marked as covering either seven or eight interventions.

Table 2. Positions taken on twelve negotiation areas

Negotiation areas	Major proposal		Response	
	Proposed area only	Proposed area with qualification(s)	Positive	Negative
1. Limit missile systems	USSR USA		All	
2. Ocean floor		USSR USA Swed Bul Czech	UK	
3. Regional arms control		USSR USA UK	Czech (Bul) ^a	Swed
4. BCW		USSR UK Swed Bul	Can (Czech) ^a	
5. Underground tests	Swed Bul	USSR UK Can Czech		
6. Cease n. weapon production	USSR Czech		UK (Bul) ^a	
7. Create nuclear-free zones	USSR Bul		UK Czech	Swed
8. Liquidate foreign bases	USSR Bul		(Czech) ^a	UK Swed
9. Ban use nuclear weapons	USSR Bul Czech			UK Swed
10. Limit n. planes & submarines	USSR		(Bul Czech) ^a	UK
11. Cease fissile production	Can Swed			
12. Peaceful nuclear explosives		USA UK Swed	Can	

^a Before making specific proposals, the delegates of both Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia expressed support for the Soviet memorandum and all proposals in it (areas 1-10). For areas where no other specific statement was made by these delegates, the general support is shown here in parentheses.

could not be broken down into the categories suitable for the first seven interventions, which outlined each country's position on a whole range of subjects. It did not seem worthwhile to create a special set of categories for it, since it was reported in only two newspapers in the group examined here.

A full account of the positions taken by each country in each negotiation area is given in table 3. The words in which qualifications and positive and negative responses were expressed are quoted,⁶ and the positions covered by each newspaper are shown. There is an arithmetic summary for each paper (table 4), showing how many points⁷ of each kind were reported, and which areas were covered. Another summary table (table 5) shows how each paper divided its space among the seven interventions. These are the primary tables on which the analysis is based.

Of course, all the points into which the speeches have been analysed were not of equal importance. Some of them were news and some were not: the Soviet memorandum had been announced two weeks before the session; the British proposal for test ban control was completely new. The nuclear powers have the major responsibility for disarmament, and from this point of view a United States proposal is more important than, for example, a Canadian proposal. But there is no objective "neutral" way of determining their relative importance. Indeed one of the conclusions that emerges from the analysis which follows is that there is little international journalistic consensus about which points are important and which are not. In the tables, therefore, no weighting system has been used.

Scope of ENDC coverage by the papers as a group

Amount of attention given to the ENDC

The amount of attention—in terms of space—given to the ENDC is shown in table 6.

Jen Min Jih Pao did not cover the ENDC at all, and so is excluded from most of the remaining tables and discussion. *Le Monde* had only one short article. Reporting on the negotiations themselves, the

⁶ There is one exception: the various phrases with which other countries expressed approval of the major powers' intention to have bilateral missile talks are not given.

⁷ A point is a proposal, a qualification or a response.

interventions, occupied the bulk of the space in ENDC-related articles in all papers but *Asahi*. This paper took the Soviet memorandum and the opening of a new ENDC session as an occasion to review, in a long two-part article, the history of post-war disarmament negotiations, and the likelihood of progress on currently proposed measures.

Range and focus of negotiation coverage

A. By intervention (country)

Table 7 shows three measures of the amount of attention given to each country. First, there is the average share of space in nine papers. Second, there is the number of times, on average, each major proposal was reported. Third, there is the number of times, on average, that a point was reported.

In average space, the USA and USSR are joined at the top of the list by the UK. This is partly because a great deal of *The Times'* space is given to the UK (table 5). The *New York Times* also gave the UK more space than any other country. The only non-aligned country represented during the period, Sweden, drew more attention than the aligned, non-nuclear Canada, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

The picture shown by the number of times proposals or points were mentioned is slightly different. The USA and USSR are well ahead of any other country; and Sweden comes before the UK. The UK position was stated in considerable detail on a number of proposals; many of the detailed positions were not covered at all (table 3).

Czechoslovakia's intervention was mentioned in a large number of papers. This may well be because Czechoslovakia was in the news for other reasons at the time. The papers selected two items: the Czechoslovak support for the Soviet memorandum, and its expression of interest in nuclear-free zones. Only two papers mentioned any of the other Czechoslovak major proposals (table 3).

B. By negotiation subject

Most of the articles were organised around the interventions being reported, rather than around the negotiation subjects. The subjects which received the most widespread coverage and the most attention were thus, in general, those proposed in the most widely and thoroughly covered interventions, those of the USSR, USA, UK and Sweden.

Table 3. Analysis of (a) the positions taken in seven interventions, and (b) the

X Mentioned in news article covering the ENDC meeting at which statement was made
 Y Mentioned in another ENDC article

Positions	Qualifications	Pos. or Neg. Response	Major Proposals
1. Limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive missile systems.^b			
<i>Positive response:</i>		UK Canada Sweden Bulg. Czech.	USSR USA
2. Disarmament measures relating to the use of the ocean floor:			
<i>Positive response:</i> — “the other [Soviet] items ... are matters to which consideration should be given, namely, ... the use of the sea bed ...”		UK	q. USSR q. USA q. Sweden q. Bulg. q. Czech.
<i>Qualifications:</i> — “ensure the use ... exclusively for peaceful purposes” — “prevent the use ... for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction” — “ban on military installations on the sea bed” — “should be dealt with partially by the ENDC” — “demand [for use] exclusively for peaceful purposes” — “treaty prohibiting use ... for military purposes”	USSR USA Sweden Sweden Czech. Bulg.		
3. Measures for regional arms control and disarmament:			
<i>Positive response:</i> — (see footnote ^a) — (see footnote ^a)		(Czech.) (Bulg.)	q. USSR q. USA q. UK
<i>Negative response:</i> — “some subjects on which it might be preferable to postpone discussion until somewhat later: ... regional arrangements for balanced disarmament, both nuclear and conventional”		Sweden	
<i>Qualifications:</i> — “measures [for regions] including the Near East region, [to be examined] only after the liquidation			

extent of reporting in nine papers

() Qualification or response partially covered

q. Major proposal was qualified: the qualification(s) is given below

Reported in:

N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda	Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Es- tado	Asahi	Le Monde
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Y	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	X	X	
X	X		X	X	X	X	Y	Y

X			X					
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X				X		X		X
X	X			X	X	X		X
					X	X		X
						X		

Y								X
X				X	X	X		
					X	X		X
								X

X						X		X
X	X			X	X	X		

X

Table 3 (continued).

Positions	Qualifications	Pos. or Neg. Response	Major Proposal
of the consequences of Israeli aggression ... and ... the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops [from occupied Arab territories]"	USSR		
— "... ready to support any reasonable measure affecting the major weapons-producers ... including a requirement that suppliers publicize or register their arms shipments to a particular region"	USA		
— "would welcome international agreement on effective measures to control the arms trade"	UK		
4. Measures relating to biological and chemical warfare:			q. USSR q. UK q. Sweden q. Bulg.
<i>Positive response:</i> — "greatly interested in [UK views expressing the] need to do something to bring up to date the Geneva Protocol" — (see footnote 4)			Canada (Czech.)
<i>Qualifications:</i> — "examine ways and means of securing the observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925"			USSR
— "cannot agree that [adherence by all States to 1925 Protocol] is all that is needed"			UK
— "seek to conclude an instrument on biological warfare which would ... actually ban the production and possession of agents of biological warfare"			UK
— "suggest that our co-Chairmen ... request the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use"			UK
— "[UK proposal] a timely initiative ... to widen ... the prohibition [on biological weapons] to cover not only their use but also their production ... What is needed now is [Geneva Protocol's] strengthening through accession by all States and the abolition of many reservations in it"			Sweden
— "[should consider] the question of the strict observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925"			Bulg.
5. Prohibition of underground testing of nuclear weapons:			q. USSR q. UK q. Canada Sweden Bulg. q. Czech.

Reported in:

N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda	Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Es-tado	Asahi	Le Monde
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X				(X)				
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X								
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X	X		Y Y		X X	X Y X	X X	
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			X					
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							X	
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					X	X		
--	--	--	--	--	---	---	--	--

	X							
--	---	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

		(X)						
--	--	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--

					(X)			
--	--	--	--	--	-----	--	--	--

						(X)		
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Y X X X X	X	X		Y	X X	Y X X X	X X	X
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Table 3 (continued).

Positions	Qualifications	Pos. or Neg. Response	Major Proposal
<i>Qualifications:</i>			
— "prohibiting underground ... tests on the basis of using national means of detection for the control of such prohibition"	USSR		
— "suggest ... the treaty's providing for a special committee whose function it would be to consider complaints of infringements of the treaty and assess the evidence produced in support of the complaint. Such a committee ... would be able to carry out on-site inspection only if there were strong evidence that the treaty had been infringed"	UK		
— "test ban itself might ... be made a phased operation by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground ... explosions ... quotas on a descending scale, ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely, [or] quotas might not be written into the treaty but fixed annually"	UK		
— "there could be a useful discussion of the means of verification of prohibition of underground testing ... The ENDC could decide where the technology now stands and discuss ... forms of agreement"	Canada		
— "This Committee has heard a more than sufficient number of convincing statements ... offering clear evidence that the current level of science ... is capable of ensuring a satisfactory measure of control over the test ban through national detection means"	Czech.		
— "The most feasible way of [banning underground tests] would be by the expansion of the validity of the 1963 Moscow Treaty"	Czech.		
— "a transition period—the compromise suggestion [of the UAR] that the problem should be solved ... by combining the prohibition of ... explosions above a certain seismic magnitude with a moratorium on explosions below that level"	Czech.		
6. Cessation of production and reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons:			USSR Czech.
<i>Positive response:</i>			
— "We welcome unreservedly the inclusion [by the USSR] of item 2, measures on stopping the production of nuclear weapons, and on the reduction and elimination of stockpiles"		UK (Bulg.)	
— (see footnote ^a)			
7. Creation of nuclear free zones:			USSR Bulg.
<i>Positive response:</i>			
— "nuclear free zones ... present another possibility			

Reported in:

N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda	Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Es- tado	Asahi	Le Monde
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X	X					X		
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X	X							
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	X							
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		X						
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						X		
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							X	
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Table 3 (continued).

Positions	Qualifications	Pos. or Neg. Response	Major Proposal
for progress and equally deserve our support although depending for their negotiation on the initiative of countries in the area concerned"		UK	
— "put on record the interest of [Czechoslovakia] in bringing about a solution of the ... problems connected with the establishment of nuclear free zones on the continent of Europe and particularly in Central Europe"		Czech.	
— "We attach great importance to this ... and believe it to be closely connected with the opportunities open in the field of the reduction of conventional armaments on the regional scale"		Czech.	
<i>Negative response:</i>			
— "some subjects on which it might be preferable to postpone discussion until somewhat later: ... regional arrangements for balanced disarmament, both nuclear and conventional"			Sweden
8. Liquidation of foreign military bases:			USSR Bulg.
<i>Positive response:</i>			
— (see footnote ^a)		(Czech.)	
<i>Negative response:</i>			
— "we do not think that the Committee would be profitably employed in discussing ... the dismantling of foreign military bases"		UK	
— "some subjects on which it might be preferable to postpone discussion until somewhat later: ... the elimination of foreign military bases"			Sweden
9. Draft convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons:			USSR Bulg. Czech.
<i>Negative response:</i>			
— "I do not share the Soviet view that first priority should be given to the conclusion of an international agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons"		UK	
— "some subjects on which it might be preferable to postpone discussion until somewhat later: ... the proposed convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons"			Sweden
10. Limitation on the areas traversed by nuclear weapons bearing planes and submarines:			USSR
<i>Positive response:</i>			
— (see footnote ^a)		(Bulg.)	
— (see footnote ^a)		(Czech.)	

Reported in:

N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda	Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Es- tado	Asahi	Le Monde
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	X	X				X	(X)	X
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	X						(X)	X
--	---	--	--	--	--	--	-----	---

		X		Y		X		X
--	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---

								X
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	---

Y		X	X	X	X	Y	X	
X						X		
X								

			X					
--	--	--	---	--	--	--	--	--

						X	X	
--	--	--	--	--	--	---	---	--

								X
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Table 3 (continued).

Positions	Qualifications	Pos. or Neg. Response	Major Proposal
<i>Negative response:</i>			
— “we do not think that the Committee would be profitably employed in discussing ... the prohibition of flight of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond national boundaries, and the limitation of zones of operation of missile carrying submarines”		UK	
<hr/>			
11. Cessation of production of fissile material for weapons purposes:			Canada Sweden
<hr/>			
12. Establishment of an international body to supervise the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, and other measures relating to peaceful uses:^c			q. USA q. UK q. Sweden
<i>Positive response:</i>			
— “if there is to be a prohibition of underground testing [proposed, area 5] special arrangements will have to be made if experiments using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes are to be continued”		Canada	
<i>Qualifications:</i>			
— “In the view of the U.S., the IAEA is the ‘appropriate international body’ through which the non-nuclear-weapons parties to the [non-proliferation] treaty may obtain these benefits [from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions]”	USA		
— “We also believe ... the IAEA is the appropriate forum for developments of procedures and agreements relating to the furnishing of peaceful nuclear explosive services”	USA		
— “It is not for us to discuss what part the IAEA could play in implementing article V [non-proliferation treaty], but ... the co-Chairmen should write to the Chairman of the IAEA ... asking him to arrange for the IAEA to study and in due course to report on the part it might play in implementing article V”	UK		
— “There is everything to be said for letting as much of the job as possible be done by the IAEA”	UK		
— “agree ... that the IAEA might have an active role to play”	Sweden		
— “appropriate and opportune for this Committee to agree now [on UK proposal] to ask IAEA for a report”	Sweden		

Reported in:

N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda	Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Es- tado	Asahi	Le Monde
---------------	-------	--------	---------------	-------	-------------------	---------------	-------	-------------

X

X

X

X

Y

Y

X

X

X

Y

Table 3 (continued).

Positions	Qualifications	Pos. or Neg. Response	Major Proposal
<i>Positive response.^a</i>			
— "the proposed [Soviet] measures and the manner of their implementation ... have our full support"		Czech.	
— "my delegation supports the proposals contained in document ENDC/227 [Soviet memorandum]"		Bulg.	

^a Soviet memorandum (proposals 1-10): Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria indicated their general support of the memorandum. This support has been shown in the table in parentheses in areas where they made no further reference to the matter.

The limitation of strategic missile systems, a subject for US-USSR bilateral talks rather than ENDC talks, was covered in all papers except *Le Monde*.

Among the eleven areas proposed for ENDC discussion, five received fairly widespread coverage: 6 to 7 papers mentioned each of them at least once in covering the positions of various countries. Four of these—underground tests, ocean floor, biological and chemical warfare, and regional arms control—were the four areas in which proposals were made by both Eastern and Western nuclear powers. The fifth, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, was distinguished as the top priority subject among the ten subjects proposed by the USSR. The relatively widespread coverage of these areas consisted mainly of reporting nuclear power positions (table 8).

There were, however, two areas where, although proposals were made by nuclear powers, attention was given solely to positions of non-nuclear powers. These were the creation of nuclear-free zones and the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. For the former, the only position reported by any paper was Czechoslovakia's expression of interest in the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, as a step toward the reduction of conventional arms in the area. The nuclear power positions in the area (USSR major proposal, UK positive response) were not covered at all; five papers covered the Czechoslovak response—the most widespread coverage given to any of the Czechoslovak proposals. The Czechoslovak statement was distinctive in specifying where such a zone might be created, and associating with it the reduction of conventional arms in that area.

Reported in:

N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda	Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Es- tado	Asahi	Le Monde
X		X			X			X
		X					X	X

^b For this area, a bold X indicates that the paper was reporting the statement made in the intervention. A bold Y indicates a reference to the forthcoming talks, without mentioning the ENDC announcement.

^c These proposals, qualifications and positive response were all made in the first three meetings. If a paper covered the point in its reporting on the fourth meeting, this is entered as a bold Y.

The peaceful uses of nuclear explosives was proposed during the first three meetings by the USA, the UK and Sweden. Of these proposals, the only one reported by any paper was that of Sweden, covered by three papers which covered all of Sweden's five major proposals. Further, when the United States reverted to this topic at the fourth meeting, only two papers covered the speech, as opposed to at least five covering each of the seven preceding speeches.

There were four areas which received little coverage: 5 to 8 papers did not mention them at all, and the papers which did mention gave them little space. These were the areas which received least support among the various interventions: they were proposed by only one or two countries, including only one nuclear power, if any. These were cessation of production of fissile material, cessation of production of nuclear weapons, limitation on nuclear weapon-bearing planes and submarines, and liquidation of foreign military bases.

Among the nine papers, five reported only 2 to 5 of the 11 areas proposed for ENDC debate; two reported 6 to 7 areas (*Pravda*, *Dagens Nyheter*); and two reported 10 to 11 areas (*O Estado*, *Asahi*) (table 4).

Depth of negotiation coverage

For an understanding of the state of play in any set of disarmament negotiations, it is not enough simply to know what the various main

Table 4. The reporting on seven interventions in nine papers: arithmetic

	Total number of proposals, etc.	Number of proposals, etc., mentioned		
		N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda
Twelve negotiation areas				
1		1	1	1
2		1	1	
3		1	1	
4		1	1	1
5		1	1	1
6				1
7			1	1
8				1
9		1		1
10				
11				
12			1	
Total areas:	12	6	7	7
Major proposals:				
USA	4	3	4	—
UK	4	2	2	—
Canada	2	—	—	—
USSR	10	5	1	5
Bulgaria	6	2	—	—
Czech.	4	2	—	—
Sweden	5	1	—	2
Total major proposals:	35	15	7	7
Qualifications & negative responses:				
USA	4	2	1	—
UK	11	1	3	—
Canada	1	—	—	—
USSR	4	3	1	—
Bulgaria	2	—	—	—
Czech.	4	—	—	—
Sweden	9	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$
Total qualifications & negative responses:	35	6	5	$\frac{1}{2}$
Positive responses:^b				
UK	4	—	—	—
Canada	3	1	—	—
Bulgaria	2	—	—	1
Czech.	4	1	2	2
Sweden	1	—	—	—
Total positive responses:	14	2	2	3
Total "points": major proposals, qualifications & responses:				
	84	23	14	$10\frac{1}{2}$
Of which:				
3 Western countries	33	9	10	0
3 Eastern countries	36	13	4	8
1 Non-aligned country	15	1	0	$2\frac{1}{2}$

^a If a qualification or response was partially covered, this is counted as $\frac{1}{2}$.

^b There were no positive responses for the USA or USSR.

summary^a

in:

Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Estado	Asahi	Le Monde	Total number of mentions
1	1	1	1	1		8
	1	1	1	1		6
	1	1	1	1		6
1		1	1	1		7
	1	1	1	1	1	8
			1	1		3
			1	1	1	5
	1		1	1		4
1	1	1	1	1		7
				1		1
1		1	1	1		4
1		1	1	1		5
5	6	8	11	12	2	64
2	3	3	3	1	—	19
1	—	2	2	—	—	9
1	—	—	1	—	—	2
3	5	2	6	9	—	36
—	—	—	3	—	—	5
—	—	—	1	—	—	3
—	—	5	5	5	1	19
7	8	12	21	15	1	93
—	1	1	1	—	—	6
1	—	1	1	—	—	7
—	—	—	—	—	—	0
—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—	2	1	—	$7\frac{1}{2}$
—	—	—	—	—	—	0
—	—	—	—	—	—	0
—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	5	—	$9\frac{1}{2}$
1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{1}{2}$	6	0	32
—	—	—	1	—	—	1
2	—	—	—	—	—	3
—	—	—	—	1	1	3
—	—	2	—	1	3	11
—	—	—	—	—	—	0
2	0	2	1	2	4	18
10	$9\frac{1}{2}$	$17\frac{1}{2}$	$28\frac{1}{2}$	23	5	141
7	4	7	9	1	0	47
3	$5\frac{1}{2}$	4	12	12	4	$65\frac{1}{2}$
0	0	$6\frac{1}{2}$	$7\frac{1}{2}$	10	1	$28\frac{1}{2}$

Table 5. Proportions of space in all ENDC articles in nine papers given to seven interventions

	Per cent, total space to seven interventions=100								
	N.Y. Times	Times	Pravda	Rude Pravo	Hindu	Dagens Nyheter	O Estado	Asahi	Le Monde
1st day									
USSR	18.6	—	42.0	22.1	28.9	5.0	17.9	24.2	—
USA	27.1	19.8	—	19.5	71.1	12.5	18.5	—	—
UK	35.3	73.8	—	15.6	—	17.5	19.5	—	—
2nd day									
Canada ^a	5.2	—	8.8	42.9	—	10.8	6.0	35.4	—
3rd day									
Sweden	2.0	—	11.7	—	—	34.2	24.8	30.3	28.6
Bulgaria	3.9	—	19.3	—	—	—	5.0	2.0	17.9
Czechoslovakia	7.8	6.3	18.2	—	—	20.0	8.3	8.1	53.6
Total	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1
of which:									
3 Western countries	67.6	93.6	8.8	78.0	71.1	40.8	44.0	35.4	0
3 Eastern countries	30.3	6.3	79.5	22.1	28.9	25.0	31.2	34.3	71.5
1 Non-aligned country	2.0	0	11.7	0	0	34.2	24.8	30.3	28.6
<i>Total space in lines</i>	<i>153</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>137</i>	<i>38.5</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>151</i>	<i>99</i>	<i>14</i>

^a Space given to Canada's announcement at the 3rd meeting that she would sign the non-proliferation treaty was counted with space given to the Canadian intervention.

Table 6. Space given to the ENDC in ten papers

	Number of lines									
	O Es- tado ^a (Brazil)	N.Y. Times (USA)	Pravda (USSR)	Times (UK)	Asahi (Japan)	Rude Pravo (Czech.)	Hindu (India)	Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)	Le Monde (France)	Jen Min Jih Pao (China)
Total space in ENDC articles^b of which	265	316	224	166	632	106	128	85	29	0
Space to ENDC interventions^c	171	160	137	117	99	79	76	65	14	0
<i>Number of ENDC articles published 12–26 July 1968:</i>	4	6	3	4	7	3	2	2	1	0

^a In covering the first meeting (16 July), O Estado published a news article and, on a different page, the verbatim text of the message from President Johnson which constituted the major portion of the US intervention. This was the only instance of reproduction of more than 10 lines of an intervention. To allow a more meaningful comparison of O Estado's news articles with those in the remaining papers, the space given to the verbatim text—160 lines—has been omitted here and in the rest of the analysis.

^b Includes, in addition to coverage of the ENDC interventions themselves, background material concerning the delegates and the subjects discussed and reporting on the question of US-USSR bilateral talks.

^c Reporting of Thant's message and 8 interventions.

Table 7. Attention given to seven ENDC interventions

Inter- vention	Derived from official record		Analysis of reporting in nine papers			
	No. of major proposals	No. of points made ^a	No. of papers giving any space	Average per cent of space given ^b	Average no. of times a proposal was reported	Average no. of times a point was reported
USA	4	8	6	19	4.7	3.1
UK	4	19	5	18	2.2	0.9
Canada	2	6	6	12	1.0	0.8
USSR	10	14	7	17	3.6	3.1
Bulgaria	6	10	5	5	0.8	0.8
Czech.	4	12	7	13	0.7	1.2
Sweden	5	15	6	15	3.8	1.9

^a The total number of major proposals, qualifications, positive and negative responses.

^b Unweighted average: that is, each paper's percentage is given equal weight.

proposals are. They are often couched in language which makes them sound the same. It is perhaps more important to have a clear idea of the *differences* between the national positions. These were the issues in the ENDC meetings: the differences among the stated positions on the areas proposed for negotiation.

There were some areas for which the differences were straightforward: some delegates proposed or supported discussion on the area, others requested that discussion be postponed (table 2, areas 7-10). The indications of the issues here were the requests for postponement (that is, the negative responses).

For other areas (2-5 and 12) there were a number of variants on the actual subject proposed for discussion. For example, while six delegates supported discussion on a comprehensive test ban, only two (Swedish and Bulgarian) proposed the area without qualification. The Soviet delegate proposed that there be discussion on a prohibition of underground tests "on the basis of using national means of detection for the control of such prohibition." The UK proposal was qualified by the comment, "it is difficult to see how a complaint . . . that the treaty had been infringed could be substantiated without on-site inspection"; and two "sub-proposals" were suggested: one on control, an international committee to assess evidence of infringement and decide when inspection was warranted; the other a plan for phased reduction in the number of permitted tests. Canada supported

Table 8. Attention given to twelve negotiation areas^a

Negotiation area	Major proposals by:	Number of papers giving any space to area	Average per cent of space given to area ^b
1. Limit missile systems	USSR USA	8	16
2. Ocean floor	USSR USA Swed Bul Czech	6	7
3. Regional arms control	USSR USA UK	6	7
4. BCW	USSR UK Swed Bul	7	11
5. Underground tests	USSR UK Can Swed Bul Czech	7	25
6. Cease n. weapon production	USSR Czech	3	2
7. Create nuclear-free zones	USSR Bul	5	11
8. Liquidate foreign bases	USSR Bul	3	2
9. Ban use nuclear weapons	USSR Bul Czech	7	16
10. Limit n. planes & submarines	USSR	1	1
11. Cease fissile production	Can Swed	4	2
12. Peaceful nuclear explosives	USA UK Swed	3	2

^a In nine papers. In each paper the total space given to 12 areas in reporting seven interventions=100 per cent.

^b Unweighted average.

discussion on the means of verification (control), and expressed interest in (though not support for) the UK proposals. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, opposed discussion on the means of verification, stating that "This Committee . . . has heard more than a sufficient number of convincing statements . . . that the current level of science and technology . . . is capable of ensuring a satisfactory measure of control over the test ban through national detection means"; and the Czechoslovak delegate presented a different plan for phased reduction in the number of permitted tests.

The qualifications to major proposals were thus, like the requests for postponement, points at which differences in national positions arose. In nine of the eleven areas proposed for ENDC debate some or all positions involved qualifications or requests for postponement. (These are set out in full in table 3.) To what extent did the reporting make apparent the differences concerning the nine areas at issue?

Very little. Of the 35 qualifications and negative responses—that

is, the items which showed the distinctive characteristics of countries' positions—17, virtually half, were not reported at all; a further 16 were mentioned in only one or two papers. Two—test ban by national detection (USSR) and demilitarization of the seabed (Sweden) were reported in three papers; and one—prevention of “emplacement of weapons of mass destruction” (USA) was covered in four papers. The greatest number of qualifications and negative responses covered by one paper was 6 1/2 (*O Estado*). In no case were the specified positions of more than two countries in one area reported by one paper (tables 3 and 4).

In general, therefore, the reader would not have been left with a clear idea either of the main points at issue or the range of positions taken on those points. The coverage on the ocean floor area, where there was greatest reporting of qualifications, is an example of this issueless reporting. The statements made by six delegates differed on the question of how comprehensive a measure should be discussed. The British delegate made the most comprehensive—or general—suggestion, in supporting consideration of “the use of the seabed”. The most limited—or specific—proposal came from the US delegate (in Johnson's message): “Your Conference should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.” The Soviet, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak proposals were more general than that of the US, supporting prohibition of the use of any sort of weapon in the ocean floor environment: USSR, “The Soviet delegation asks the ENDC to undertake negotiations . . . with a view to ensuring the use of the sea-bed beyond the limits of present territorial waters exclusively for peaceful purposes”; Bulgaria, “the Committee must devote its efforts to . . . the question of the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of the sea-bed for military purposes”; Czechoslovakia, “[a proposal we are willing to consider is] the demand that the seabed be used exclusively for peaceful purposes”. The Swedish proposal, for a “ban on military installations on the seabed” was close to the positions of the Warsaw Pact countries, although it did not specify “exclusively” peaceful purposes as clearly as their statements.

Three papers did not mention the area at all in their ENDC coverage (*Le Monde*, *Pravda*, *Rude Pravo*). None of the six remain-

ing papers covered the statements of either the UK or Czechoslovak delegates. *The Times* covered only the US proposal and did not mention the portion at issue, reporting only suggested discussion on "arms limitation on the seabed". *Dagens Nyheter* covered US and Swedish positions, quoting the crucial phrase for both, but did not cover any of the Warsaw Pact proposals in the area. *Asahi* reported the qualifying phrase for the Soviet and Swedish proposals, but did not cover the US position. The *New York Times*, *O Estado* and the *Hindu* covered the proposals of the USSR and USA. Among these papers only the *New York Times* covered the distinctive qualifications for both countries, and even there the distinction was minimized:

The growing concern felt over this problem ["the use of the seabed as a hiding place for nuclear missiles"] was reflected by President Johnson last week when he urged the conference . . . to begin exploring the means of preventing the use of the ocean floor for the "emplacement of weapons of mass destruction." The Soviet Union reflected the same concern in a more broadly worded proposal that called on the . . . conference to begin "negotiations on the question of the utilization, exclusively for peaceful purposes, of the seabed beyond the limits of the present territorial waters." With the two co-chairmen of the conference interested in the problem, the prospects for a start on the seabed issue are considered to be good.

Both *O Estado* and the *Hindu* covered the US qualification only, and reported the Soviet proposal in general terms, as support for discussion in the same area. *O Estado* covered in addition the Swedish proposal, as stated, and the Bulgarian proposal, in general terms: "peaceful uses of the seabed". Thus even on the area for which qualifications were most widely and fully reported, no single paper reported a sufficient number of specified positions to make the issue apparent, or to give a balanced perspective on the specified positions which were reported.

Summary on the scope of negotiation coverage in the papers as a group

The reporting was concentrated on the seven opening interventions, in which positions on a range of subjects were outlined. Among the seven countries represented, the three nuclear powers and Sweden

received the most attention. The areas proposed by nuclear powers from both alignments were, in general, those to receive the most widespread coverage. There were, however, several nuclear power positions which were given little or no coverage. Two Czechoslovak positions were given prominence, no doubt because reporters were especially interested in the relationship between Czechoslovak and Soviet statements at that particular time. Aside from these areas of overlap, the accounts of the negotiations were varied and somewhat limited in their selection. Only one paper reported more than half of the major proposals. No two papers reported the same positions or even the same set of negotiation subjects.

In general, only the major proposals were reported, that is, the expressions of a desire to negotiate in various areas. The more detailed positions, in particular the qualifications and negative responses, were, for the most part, not picked up. Probably one of the reasons for the lack of coverage of the issue-defining qualifications is that, to be meaningful, they require a fairly full range of specialist knowledge. For example, it would have been useful to know about the Geneva Protocol, methods of seismological detection of underground explosions, and the constitution of the IAEA. The technicality of the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives may explain why it was so little covered (UK and US major proposals not reported at all, eighth intervention covered by only two papers). It is especially difficult to present national positions in this area concisely, and impossible to make differences in the positions apparent without reporting them in great detail. Both papers which covered the eighth intervention, the *Times* and *Rude Pravo*, gave it more space than any of the other interventions.

The analysis throughout deals with the day-to-day reporting of the ENDC: it includes only those articles which mentioned the ENDC. These are the articles from which readers would normally get their information about the subjects discussed there. But this restriction—to ENDC-related articles—may give a slightly unfair impression of the disarmament coverage of one or two papers. *Asahi*, which gave very little ENDC space to the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, had in fact covered the US position in some detail in a non-ENDC article (13 July), reporting AEC Chairman Seaborg's testimony before a US House sub-committee. The *Times*, which reported very little on the ocean floor matter, had in another non-ENDC article

covered USSR, US and UK positions, as stated in the United Nations, in great detail. (This article, published on 12 July, occupied about as much space as total ENDC-related coverage in *The Times*.)

There is another possible reason for the lack of the kind of reporting which would emphasize the issues in disarmament: the nature of the ENDC negotiations themselves (page 9). They proceed with one delegate after another making prepared statements, rather than with give and take discussion on various subjects. They are closed to the press, so that reporters do not even hear the prepared speeches. The three least covered interventions, Canada, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, were those for which no national spokesman commented on the substance of the intervention. For two of these, furthermore, there was no text (Czechoslovakia) or only an incomplete paraphrase (Bulgaria) given out to reporters (page 23). Finally, in the interventions made in this period at least, statements on points of divergence were usually subordinated to suggestions of broader areas on which agreement was more likely. The lack of coverage of the issues is thus probably due, in part, to the extent to which the issues are buried by diplomacy and by the closed door policy of the ENDC.

Analysis of the differences in the coverage of various papers

Up to now, we have been considering how well the ENDC was covered by the papers in general. The rest of this Appendix looks at some of the differences in the treatment given by the various papers. Conclusions are drawn both about groups of papers and about some of the papers individually.

Some differences can no doubt be explained by the idiosyncracies of the editor or the tradition or style of the paper. Others can probably be explained by the tendency of the paper to be influenced by the country in which it is published. This influence may take a number of forms. The paper may concentrate on its own country's disarmament position. It may be interested in items of news affecting its neighbours. The Japanese paper, for example, was the only one to report a particular item concerning China (page 76). It may present material in a way which corresponds with its government's "world picture": the *New York Times* concentrated heavily on the interests

of the USA and USSR. All this may not necessarily be bias in the pejorative sense of the word. It is, for instance, probably quite appropriate that a paper give a relatively large proportion of its space to the speech and proposals of the delegate from its own country. He is speaking on behalf of his country and it is the responsibility of the various media in that country to tell people what proposals are being put forward in their name. The figures which follow simply document the evidence for this kind of influence. The degree of preoccupation with national interest which should be considered excessive is a matter for individual judgment.

Bias towards national interests

In their ENDC reporting, the papers might have been influenced by the positions of their country with respect to: defence alignment, nuclear power status, or ENDC participation. The set of national positions for each paper is shown in table 9.

These influences might be expected to lead to differences in the proportions of space given to the various speeches: this is the most easily quantifiable difference. They are likely to give rise to a large number of other kinds of difference as well, such as the order in which items are placed; the tenor of the words used, presenting countries or proposals in more or less favourable lights; or the type of explanatory material (*Background*, page 40). For examples of the last two points, the *New York Times* said, in relation to the UK proposal for underground test ban control, "Moscow's opposition to the inspection which Washington says is required to differentiate with certainty between earthquakes and underground explosions makes any progress on this issue unlikely at the current session"; *Pravda* said, in relation to the USSR proposal for a draft convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons, "The support for this measure expressed by a majority of delegates at the 23rd session of the General Assembly shows that it is a good measure for which there is great likelihood of agreement"; *Asahi* said, in relation to the USSR BCW proposal, "The USSR has been urging the USA to ratify the Geneva Protocol at the UN Security Council since 1952; meanwhile one-sixth of the ammunition deployed by the USSR in Europe is said to be CB weapons". There was no objective and quantifiable way of dealing with the kind of slant in presentation illustrated in these

Table 9. Positions of the countries in which ten papers are published

	ENDC PARTICIPANT		NON-PARTICIPANT
NUCLEAR POWERS	West (NATO)	East (Warsaw Pact)	China (<i>Jen Min Jih Pao</i>)
	USA (<i>New York Times</i>)	USSR (<i>Pravda</i>)	France (<i>Le Monde</i>)
	UK (<i>Times</i>)		
NON- NUCLEAR POWERS		Czechoslovakia (<i>Rude Pravo</i>)	Japan (<i>Asahi</i>)
	Non-aligned		
	Sweden (<i>Dagens Nyheter</i>)		
	Brazil (<i>O Estado</i>)		
	India (<i>Hindu</i>)		

examples. Only differences in the space given to the ENDC and in the proportions of space given to particular speeches or negotiation areas are examined here.

"Narcissism"

There were five papers from countries whose representatives spoke in the ENDC meetings. The figures certainly show a tendency for the papers from these countries to give a greater proportion of space than other papers to their own representative's speech (table 10).

The Times gave three-quarters of its total space, in reporting on all seven interventions, to the British delegate's speech. There may have been some slight justification for this. Three of the four papers which covered all three interventions on the first day gave most space to the British delegate: but the highest of these, the *New York Times*, gave the intervention only 35 per cent of its total space (table 5). *Rude Pravo* is an exception to the general rule. It gave no space at all to the Czechoslovak intervention; it did not have an article covering the third meeting.

There is another aspect of "narcissism". One might expect that the papers from countries whose delegates spoke would give the ENDC more space than the papers from countries whose delegates, although members of ENDC, did not speak. Further, one might expect that both these groups of papers would give more space than the papers from countries which do not participate in the ENDC at all.

There is no evidence of the first of these two effects: the Indian and Brazilian papers (whose delegates participated but did not speak)

Table 10. Attention given by five papers to their own country's intervention, compared with the average of other eight papers

Per cent of space given to 7 interventions

	Intervention				
	USA	UK	USSR	Czech.	Sweden
Per cent of space given to intervention by:					
National paper	27 (<i>N.Y. Times</i>)	74 (<i>Times</i>)	42 (<i>Pravda</i>)	0 (<i>Rude Pravo</i>)	35 (<i>Dagens Nyheter</i>)
Average of 8 other papers ^a	18	11	15	12	13

^a Unweighted average.

gave the ENDC somewhat above average coverage. Of the three papers from non-participant countries, two—*Le Monde* and *Jen Min Jih Pao*—gave the ENDC considerably less space than the rest. The third, on the other hand, *Asahi*, had more ENDC-related articles than any other paper (table 6).

Bias towards allies

In addition to bias towards their own country, three of the four aligned papers show a bias towards their country's allies (table 11). To demonstrate this it is not enough simply to total the percentage of space given by each paper to its own alignment, because this includes the "narcissism" effect. So, for each of the four aligned papers, the space allotted to its own country is excluded, and table 11 gives the percentage of the remaining space given to its allies. This figure is then contrasted with the comparable figure for the five non-aligned or non-participant papers taken together. This group is treated as a control group. Again, *Rude Pravo* is the exception: the other three all give a higher proportion of space to their allies than the control group does.

There is another way of looking at the question of bias in the aligned papers toward their alignment. Certain areas were of particular interest to the Western delegates at the ENDC, and other areas of particular interest to the Eastern delegates. Again, the five non-aligned or non-participant papers act as a kind of control group.

Table 11. Attention given by four papers to the interventions of their country's allies, compared with the average in five papers from non-aligned and non-participant countries

Per cent of space

	Interventions			
	UK and Canada ^a	USA and Canada ^b	Czech. and Bulgaria ^c	USSR and Bulgaria ^d
Per cent of space given by:				
Paper from allied country	56 (<i>N.Y. Times</i>)	76 (<i>Times</i>)	65 (<i>Pravda</i>)	22 (<i>Rude Pravo</i>)
Average of 5 papers from non-aligned or non-participant countries ^e	20	33	24	25

^a USA

^b UK

^c USSR

^d Czech.

^e Unweighted average.

} excluded from calculations. Remaining 6 interventions = 100 per cent.

They gave 52 per cent of their space to the areas of particular interest to the West:⁸ the Western papers gave much more than this—81 per cent, and the Eastern papers much less—19 per cent (table 12). The pattern for the areas of particular interest to the East shows the same bias. As against the control group's 33 per cent to these areas, the Western papers gave 5 per cent and the Eastern 52 per cent.

One non-aligned country, Sweden, spoke in the first three days; and the Swedish paper, as we have seen, gave this intervention a greater share of space than any other paper. Apart from this, did the other papers which might be called non-aligned—*O Estado*, the *Hindu*, *Asahi* and *Le Monde*⁹—give Sweden's intervention more space than the papers from the two blocs? They did, by a wide mar-

⁸ The "Western" areas were proposed by Western, Eastern and non-aligned delegates; the "Eastern" areas by Eastern delegates alone. This may account for the different proportions of space given to the two sets of areas by the control group.

⁹ We have included in this group the two papers from non-participant countries: *Le Monde* since France's alignment to NATO is now rather weak; and *Asahi* since Japan, although linked to the United States by a defence pact, is not a member of NATO.

Table 12. Attention given to areas of particular interest to two alignments^a

	<i>Per cent of space</i>	
	Areas of particular interest to West ^b	Areas of particular interest to East ^c
Per cent of space given by:		
New York Times	78	4
Times	84	6
Western papers, average	81	5
Pravda	20	72
Rude Pravo	17	32
Eastern papers, average	19	52
Asahi	49	41
Dagens Nyheter	75	7
Hindu	24	38
Le Monde	44	56
O Estado	69	22
Non-aligned and non-parti- cipant papers, average	52	33

^a In each paper the total space given to 12 areas in reporting seven interventions=100 per cent.

^b Areas 2, 3, 4, 5, 12. Proposed by two Western countries, or proposed by one and supported by one.

^c Areas 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Proposed by Eastern countries only.

gin. There is, perhaps, a certain alignment among the non-aligned. These four papers gave, on average, 21 per cent of their space to the Swedish delegate's speech, as against an average of only 3 1/2 per cent in the four aligned papers (table 5). Three of the non-aligned papers each gave 25 to 30 per cent of their space to Sweden. The *Hindu* is the exception, giving it no space at all. This paper covered only the interventions of the USA and USSR.

Nuclear power bias

There is also the question of nuclear bias: whether the nuclear power papers gave proportionately more space than the non-nuclear power papers to the interventions of delegates from nuclear powers, and vice versa. The figures do not show any such general tendency (table 5). The one possible piece of evidence of this sort of bias is that the only area where there were no nuclear power proposals—

cessation of production of fissile material, proposed by Canada and Sweden—was covered only in papers from non-nuclear countries (table 3).

Distinctive features in the coverage in individual papers

From the analysis, a fairly distinctive picture emerged for the treatment given to the ENDC by a number of the papers. Some gave comprehensive coverage, some fragmentary; some presented the proposals, and some concentrated on the issues, and so on. It seemed useful to summarise and present these—and other—differences. They are certainly not to be treated as conclusions about the way in which these papers deal with foreign news in general: the analysis covers a very small sample of reporting. But they are of some interest in their own right, and may suggest hypotheses which could be useful in a fuller investigation.

A short account is given, therefore, first for the aligned papers and then for the non-aligned. There was so little material in *Rude Pravo* and *Le Monde*—38 and 14 lines, respectively, given to the first seven interventions—that no summaries have been made for them.

New York Times

Among the three aligned papers, the *New York Times* had the most extensive and balanced coverage—though in both respects it came behind some of the non-aligned papers. The interventions of all seven countries were covered, and they were covered on the day following the meeting. The distribution of space among the speeches was fairly even. Of all the papers, the *New York Times* comes second in the number of “points” which it noted—that is, major proposals, qualifications or responses.

There was, however, strong emphasis on the positions of the USA and USSR. All the qualifications reported, with one exception, were made by the two big powers. The *New York Times* gave a higher proportion of its space than any other paper except the *Hindu* to the bilateral talks. The space which was given to the non-nuclear aligned countries was devoted to their support for one or other of the major powers; and most of the reporting of the UK intervention was given to the suggested compromise solution to the US-USSR test ban deadlock. The Swedish speech was given very little space.

The Soviet position itself was reported rather narrowly. The top priority proposal of the USSR, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, was not reported in the article covering the intervention, but in a later one covering Czechoslovak and Bulgarian support of the proposal. In general the *New York Times* only gave space to the Soviet positions in the areas on which the United States had also made proposals. There was, therefore, a strong bias towards the interests of the two great powers, and a further bias towards the areas of concern to the United States.

Pravda

While *Pravda* gave a good deal of attention to the ENDC, its coverage was devoted mainly to reporting attitude statements. There were virtually no statements of this kind in the Western nuclear power papers (including *Le Monde*): they occupied only 2 per cent of the space given to the interventions. They took up about 31 per cent of the space in the five non-nuclear papers. In *Pravda* the proportion was 58 per cent. This gave its total coverage a rhetorical character in sharp contrast to the more dry, point by point coverage in the Western papers. In the remaining space *Pravda* did cover a moderate number of negotiation areas (one more than the *New York Times*) through reporting major proposals. There was virtually no coverage of the issues or the positions at issue: part of one qualification was reported.

Pravda's coverage had a strong Eastern bias: 80 per cent of the coverage of the interventions went to the three Eastern bloc countries, and the interventions of the USA and UK were not reported at all. The planned bilateral talks were not mentioned; the subject of a limitation on missile systems was reported as a Soviet proposal for ENDC discussion.

However, *Pravda* did give space to Sweden and Canada—a higher proportion of its space than the *New York Times*. For Sweden it included two major proposals and a part of one qualification (ban on the production of BCW materials) which was not in agreement with the Soviet position.

The Times

The ENDC coverage in *The Times* was most uneven and patchy: but the subjects which it did cover, it reported in greater depth than

any other paper. Only three of the first seven interventions were reported: *The Times* said nothing about the interventions of the Soviet Union, Sweden, Bulgaria or Canada; and a very large proportion of its space was given to the United Kingdom. Even the UK intervention was given selective treatment: out of four proposals and eleven qualifications, *The Times* reported only two proposals and three qualifications. Nearly all the space was given to the underground test ban proposal, which was reported in more detail here than anywhere else.

The Times' apparent excessive preoccupation with Britain and its strong pro-Western bias are moderated to some extent if two other articles are taken into account: the long report of the United States' second intervention, on peaceful nuclear explosives, and the non-ENDC article on problems of the ocean floor, published a few days before the opening of the ENDC session. Both articles provided more detailed treatment of their subject than the day-to-day ENDC coverage in the other papers; and in the article on the ocean floor, the Soviet position was given first place and most space. The main positions of third world countries were also reported.

The general conclusion remains, however, that the day-to-day reporting of the ENDC meetings would have given the reader a highly selective picture of the proceedings.

O Estado de São Paulo

O Estado, among the papers in the group, provided the most comprehensive and regular coverage of the negotiations. It was also rather well balanced. It covered all seven interventions, reporting at least one proposal from each intervention. It covered all the negotiation areas bar one; it reported more of the major proposals than any other paper; and it also noted more of the qualifications and negative responses than any other newspaper did.

There was also a reasonable balance in the coverage. The three Western interventions received somewhat more space than the three Eastern ones (44 per cent to the West, 31 per cent to the East); but somewhat fewer points were reported for the West. There was an unusual degree of attention to the three smaller, aligned countries: *O Estado* reported their major proposals, not merely their expressions of support for their nuclear allies.

The highest proportion of space went to Sweden. Like *Asahi* and

Dagens Nyheter, *O Estado* covered all the major proposals in the Swedish intervention.

However, while *O Estado* was very comprehensive in reporting proposals, its reporting of issues was less satisfactory. Although it mentioned as many of the qualifications as any other paper, some of the reporting was rather unclear, and in two cases the paper got the positions of the two great powers backwards, attributing one Soviet position to the United States and conversely.

Asahi

During the two weeks under study, *Asahi* gave far more attention to disarmament than any other paper. Its ENDC coverage was extensive; in addition, *Asahi* carried four non-ENDC articles in which disarmament was either the subject or the item emphasized with headlines. Compared with *O Estado*—the other non-aligned paper which gave a good deal of space to this question—*Asahi*'s coverage was perhaps not as well balanced on the various interventions: on the other hand, there was rather more attention to the issues.

Asahi's reporting on Eastern and Western interventions appears uneven partly because of the way in which the opening of the ENDC session was covered. The paper published a two-part article on the day before the opening and the day of the opening: this article went through the points in the Soviet memorandum, which had been released some time before the Conference, and used it to discuss the main subjects for negotiation. The article discussed both Eastern and Western positions on each subject. Presumably due to this extensive treatment just before the ENDC began, *Asahi* did not have an article following the first day of the Conference: the US and UK interventions were consequently not reported at all.

The coverage of the four non-nuclear interventions was also somewhat uneven. Canada was given a great deal of space—not for any of its proposals, but for its comment on the need for a nuclear power conference including France and China. No other paper picked up this comment. There was very little on the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak interventions. Sweden's contribution, on the other hand, was covered more thoroughly in *Asahi* than in any other paper (including the Swedish *Dagens Nyheter*).

The question of the issues, or differences in positions, was raised

more often in *Asahi* than in any other paper. However, the positions at issue in these meetings received only moderate attention, because the reporting was somewhat uneven and occasionally inaccurate.

Dagens Nyheter

Dagens Nyheter's reporting was remarkably concise. Six interventions were covered in two articles totalling just 85 lines. Within this limited space, there was a fairly balanced distribution of space among the six interventions, and a moderate amount of attention was given to the issues. But the substantive reporting concentrated on the positions of the nuclear powers and Sweden. Like *Asahi* and *O Estado*, *Dagens Nyheter* reported all five Swedish major proposals, and some of their qualifications. The paper did not report any major proposals for the smaller aligned countries.

Hindu

The *Hindu's* treatment of the ENDC was quite different from that of the other three non-aligned papers. All three gave a reasonable amount of space to the interventions of the minor powers; and in particular, all three reported fully on Sweden. The *Hindu*, on the other hand, reported only the US and USSR interventions. The space division gives much greater weight to the United States than to the Soviet Union (table 5): an examination of the points reported corrects the impression of bias somewhat. The number of Soviet points reported was in fact slightly higher than the number of United States points. The Soviet top priority proposal was, furthermore, reported in greater detail in the *Hindu* than in any other paper. The points which the *Hindu* did cover were covered accurately: it used much more direct citation than any other paper.

SIPRI Publications

Stockholm Papers (short reports in paperback format)

1. *Communication satellites*, Ingemar Dörfer, Stockholm. A report on problems of a new and powerful means of communication.
2. *Seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions*. Leading seismologists from 10 countries outline the current state of the art in a report from a symposium with agreed conclusions. Rapporteur David Davies, Cambridge, England.
3. *The ENDC and the Press*, Loyal Gould, the Ohio State University. A study of the press arrangements for the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and a comparative analysis of ENDC coverage in 16 newspapers from various countries.

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The ENDC and the Press

Difference in the reporting of international events in different countries can be an important element in international misunderstanding. This is a case study of these differences and of how they occur.

The subject is a set of meetings of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee held in Geneva in July 1968.

The first part of the study is an account of the press arrangements and of the ways in which information reached the journalists from day to day. The arrangements are found to be noticeably defective.

The second part of the study gives a detailed analysis into 84 "points" of the delegate's speeches, as reported in the verbatim record several weeks later. The prestige papers from ten countries are then examined to see which of these points they reported. Two of the conclusions are that the press coverage of the points at issue between the delegates is distinctly thin; and that papers in aligned countries give little space to the proposals made by delegates from countries in the opposite camp.

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