

I. Key general developments in the region

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There were at least 20 states with active armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2020 (see table 7.1). This was three more (Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea) than in 2019. Ten were low-intensity, subnational armed conflicts (i.e. with fewer than 1000 conflict-related deaths), and 10 were high-intensity armed conflicts (with 1000–9999 deaths). Ethiopia, Mozambique and Niger moved from being low-intensity armed conflicts in 2019 to high-intensity armed conflicts in 2020.¹

Except for the Central African Republic (CAR) and Somalia, all the other 18 armed conflicts had higher estimated conflict-related fatalities in 2020 than in 2019; for the region as a whole the increase was about 40 per cent. Sub-Saharan Africa also overtook the Middle East and North Africa in 2020 as the region with the most conflict-related fatalities.

Almost all of the armed conflicts were internationalized, and many of them overlapped across states and regions as a result of state actors, whether directly or through proxies, and/or the transnational activities of violent Islamist groups, other armed groups and criminal networks.² The conflict dynamics and ethnic and religious tensions were often rooted in a combination of state weakness, corruption, ineffective delivery of basic services, competition over natural resources, inequality and a sense of marginalization. Among the world's economies for which poverty can be measured, 18 of the 20 poorest countries were in sub-Saharan Africa, as were 31 of the 47 least developed countries in 2020.³ Except for Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Nigeria, all the other countries in the region with armed conflicts in 2020 were least developed countries.

Developments in each of the armed conflicts and any related peace processes in 2020 are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. The security situation in West Africa (section II) deteriorated rapidly in 2020, with transnational armed groups extending their grip in the region and a continuing proliferation of community-based militias adding an additional level to the violence. In Central Africa (section III) there was

¹ For conflict definitions and typologies see chapter 2, section I, in this volume. For armed conflicts in North Africa see chapter 6 in this volume.

² On the extent of cross-border state support to parties involved in intrastate armed conflict and its under-representation in Africa conflict data sets see Twagiramungu, N. et al., 'Re-describing transnational conflict in Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 57, no. 3 (2019), pp. 377–91.

³ World Bank, *Poverty and Shared Prosperity: Reversals of Fortune* (International Bank for Reconstruction/World Bank: Washington, DC, Oct. 2020), p. 13; and United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development, *The Least Developed Countries Report 2020* (UN: Geneva, 2020), p. ix. On the factors that influence unrest in the region see Adelaja, A. and George, J., 'Grievances, latent anger and unrest in Africa', *African Security*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2019), pp. 111–40.

Table 7.1. Estimated conflict-related fatalities in sub-Saharan Africa, 2017–20

Country	2017	2018	2019	2020
<i>West Africa</i>				
Burkina Faso	117	303	2 220	2 298
Côte d'Ivoire	43 ^a	16 ^a	45 ^a	132
Guinea	47 ^a	39 ^a	41 ^a	145
Mali	948	1 747	1 875	2 849
Niger	240	506	719	1 114
Nigeria	4 947	6 243	5 431	7 760
Subtotal	6 342	8 854	10 331	14 298
<i>Central Africa</i>				
Angola	67	41 ^a	23 ^a	74
Cameroon	717	1 530	1 232	1 589
Central African Republic	1 829	1 171	573	428
Chad	296	259	567	738
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	3 210	3 189	3 843	5 767
Subtotal	6 119	6 190	6 238	8 596
<i>East Africa</i>				
Burundi	285	327	303	329
Ethiopia	1 355	1 565	667	3 553
Kenya	745	407	269	297
Madagascar	210	142	350	354
Mozambique	129	223	663	1 782
Somalia	5 835	5 101	4 031	3 140
South Sudan	4 847	1 700	1 806	2 371
Sudan	1 291	1 054	776	957
Uganda	66	146	159	290
Subtotal	14 763	10 665	9 024	13 073
Total	27 224	25 709	25 593	35 967

Notes: Fatality figures are collated from four event types: battles; explosions/remote violence; protests, riots and strategic developments; and violence against civilians—see Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), ‘ACLED definitions of political violence and protest’, 11 Apr. 2019. A country is treated as being in an armed conflict if there were 25 or more battle-related deaths in a given year—see chapter 2, section I, in this volume.

^aBattle-related deaths were below 25.

Source: ACLED, ‘Data export tool’, accessed 22 Feb.–5 Mar. 2021.

a large upsurge in violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), while in East Africa (section IV) the increase in conflict-related fatalities was driven by deteriorating situations in Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Sudan, as well as ongoing large-scale violence in Somalia.

Only one peace process in sub-Saharan Africa made substantive progress in 2020: throughout the year the transitional government of Sudan signed a series of peace agreements with various opposition armed groups, culminating in the Juba Peace Agreement on 3 October 2020 (see section IV). States in sub-Saharan Africa continued to host more multilateral peace operations than in any other region of the world. There were 22 multilateral peace

operations active in the region in 2020, 2 more than in 2019.⁴ The African Union and the European Union each deployed a new peace operation to CAR in 2020: the African Union Military Observers Mission to the CAR and the European Union Advisory Mission in the CAR.⁵ Meanwhile, the number of personnel in multilateral peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 3.4 per cent in 2020, from 97 519 on 31 December 2019 to 94 201 on 31 December 2020. The number of deployed personnel in the region decreased for the fifth consecutive year. Nonetheless, the missions deployed in sub-Saharan Africa accounted for almost three quarters of the personnel deployed in all multilateral peace operations globally.⁶

Five cross-cutting issues shaped security challenges in sub-Saharan Africa in 2020: (a) the presence of militant Islamist groups, other armed groups and criminal networks; (b) the security activities of external actors; (c) election-related violence; (d) the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic; and (e) water insecurity and the growing impact of climate change.⁷ The subsections below briefly examine how these five issues evolved in 2020.

Despite these setbacks and persistent problems, significant social, economic and political progress has also been made in the region in the last two decades, with the promise of more to come in the longer term, post Covid-19.⁸ Much may depend on the newly created African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) that the World Bank suggested has potential to yield up to \$450 billion in regional income and bring millions out of poverty. Headquartered in Accra, Ghana, AfCFTA is expected to catalyse market integration, accelerate industrial development and enhance competitiveness.⁹

The growing influence of militant Islamist groups and local 'identity militias'

Many of the countries suffering from armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are afflicted by extremist Islamist violence. While this is not new, the epicentre of Islamist violence appears to have moved from the Middle East

⁴ The peace operations were deployed across 10 countries see chapter 2, section II, in this volume. On the role of regional organizations in Africa see Coe, B. and Nash, K., 'Peace process protagonism: The role of regional organisations in Africa in conflict management', *Global Change, Peace & Security*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2020), pp. 157–77.

⁵ For developments in CAR see section III in this chapter.

⁶ For further details see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.

⁷ On developments in some of these issues in 2018–19 see Davis, I and Melvin, N., 'Armed conflict and peace processes in sub-Saharan Africa', *SIPRI Yearbook 2019*, pp. 115–21; and Davis, I., 'Key general developments in the region', *SIPRI Yearbook 2020*, pp. 176–79.

⁸ See e.g. Rosenthal, J., 'The African century: Africa is changing so rapidly, it is hard to ignore', *The Economist*, 26 Mar. 2020.

⁹ Ighobor, K., 'AfCFTA secretariat commissioned in Accra as free trade is set to begin in January 2021', *Africa Renewal*, 17 Aug. 2020; and 'Trade pact could boost Africa's income by as much as \$450 billion: World Bank', UN News, 27 July 2020.

and North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa, and is particularly pronounced in Central Sahel and the Lake Chad region (section II) and in the Horn of Africa, from where Islamist and criminal violence has spread into other parts of East Africa (section IV).¹⁰ A range of problems have followed or have been exacerbated by this violence, such as economic fragility, increased poverty, marginalization of certain groups and low resilience to shocks—natural disasters, economic downturns and further outbursts of armed violence. The violence is not just between governments and insurgents, but also includes intra-insurgent violence, especially between supporters and affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Since March 2020, for example, there have been occasional clashes between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the local al-Qaeda-aligned Group to Support Islam and Muslims (Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin).¹¹

The problem of violent extremism has deep societal roots. The increased use of military force (see below) has not prevented the violence spreading to previously unaffected areas. Human rights abuses by state security forces have added to the cycle of violence, and there have been calls for the military response to be backed by a comprehensive political strategy to address the factors driving radicalization.¹²

Militias are another key cause of violence in sub-Saharan Africa and are often formed in response to threats of violent extremism and to counter rival local 'identity militias' (i.e. non-state armed groups that almost exclusively engage in identity-based intercommunity violence in a pattern which is most similar to communal, ethnic or religious groups). According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project an additional 270 militias became active in Africa in 2020 (an increase of 46 per cent compared to 2019), although sometimes this resulted from the fragmentation of existing

¹⁰ Gardner, F., 'Is Africa overtaking the Middle East as the new jihadist battleground?', BBC News, 3 Dec. 2020; Demuyne, M. and Coleman, J., 'The shifting sands of the Sahel's terrorism landscape', International Centre for Counter-terrorism, 12 Mar. 2020; and 'African militant Islamist groups set record for violent activity', Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 21 July 2020.

¹¹ United Nations, Security Council, 'Eleventh report of the secretary-general on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of member states in countering the threat', S/2020/774, 4 Aug. 2020, p. 4; and Nsaibia, H. and Weiss, C., 'The end of the Sahelian anomaly: How the global conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida finally came to West Africa', *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 13, no. 7 (July 2020), pp. 1–14.

¹² On the drivers behind support for and engagement in violent extremism in Mali see e.g. Coleman, J. et al., *Dynamics of Support and Engagement: Understanding Malian Youths' Attitudes Towards Violent Extremism* (UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism: Feb. 2021). Also see Nsaibia, H., 'State atrocities in the Sahel: The impetus for counterinsurgency results is fuelling government attacks on civilians', Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 20 May 2020; Venturi, B. and Toure, N., 'The great illusion: Security sector reform in the Sahel', *International Spectator*, vol. 55, no. 4 (2020), pp. 54–68; and Tinti, P., 'How counterinsurgency campaigns are fuelling human rights abuses in the Sahel', *World Politics Review*, 30 Apr. 2020.

militias. The DRC, Nigeria and South Sudan experienced the greatest rises in the number of active identity militias during 2020.¹³

External actors

Sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly treated as an arena for great power competition. Not only the global powers are involved. In the Horn of Africa for example, there are actors from Asia, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and North America—their presence is largely driven by geopolitical, commercial and military competition.¹⁴ The United States and European states in particular are also centrally involved in the fight against transnational jihadist groups in sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of European states this fight also extends to criminal networks and irregular migration, especially in the Sahel. Most Western forces are deployed to train and build capacity in local forces, including the two subregional counterterrorism task forces in the Sahel: the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad region and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.¹⁵

While the aim has been for African partners to gradually take on a larger share of crisis management and counterterrorism activities, the opposite seems to have been the case, with Western forces becoming even more entrenched. France has a long tradition of maintaining a significant military footprint in sub-Saharan Africa, and in 2020 this consisted of about 5100 troops focused on Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, and included command of the new European military task force (Task Force Takuba), launched in March 2020 (see section II). At the annual African Union summit meeting in February 2020 there were calls for stronger African-based joint counterterrorism forces, reflecting growing concerns particularly in the Sahel over this reliance on foreign powers.¹⁶

While the USA claims to maintain a ‘light and relatively low-cost footprint’ in Africa as a whole, independent estimates suggest at least 6000 military personnel are deployed across 13 countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region.¹⁷ Since 2018 the USA has been making modest reductions in troop

¹³ Raleigh, C. and Kishi, R., ‘Africa: The only continent where political violence increased in 2020’, *Mail & Guardian*, 1 Feb. 2021; and Kishi, R. et al., ‘ACLED 2020: The year in review’, Mar. 2021, p. 4.

¹⁴ Melvin, N. J., ‘The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa region’, SIPRI Background Paper, Apr. 2019; and Melvin, N. J., ‘The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2019/2, Apr. 2019. Also see section IV in this chapter.

¹⁵ Petesch, C., ‘US leads training exercises in Africa amid focus on Sahel’, *ABC News*, 22 Feb. 2020; and Hickendorff, A. and Acko, I., ‘The European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic: An assessment’, SIPRI Background Paper, Feb. 2021.

¹⁶ Herszenhorn, D. M. and Marks, S., ‘African leaders call for home-grown counterterrorism force’, *Politico*, 10 Feb. 2020. Also see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.

¹⁷ Turse, N., ‘Pentagon’s own map of US bases in Africa contradicts its own claim of “light” footprint’, *The Intercept*, 27 Feb. 2020. Also see Turse, N., Mednick, S. and Sperber, A., ‘Inside the secret world of US commandos in Africa’, *Mail & Guardian*, 11 Aug. 2020.

numbers in Africa as part of a reset towards great power competition. In December 2020 President Donald J. Trump announced the withdrawal of all US troops from Somalia (thought to number about 700), but it was expected many of these would be repositioned to neighbouring countries in East Africa.¹⁸

Russia, China and France were the largest arms exporters to sub-Saharan Africa in 2016–20, accounting for 30, 20 and 9.5 per cent, respectively, of total sub-Saharan arms imports.¹⁹ Russia's military relationships in sub-Saharan Africa are growing and sometimes involve the use of private mercenary groups, as for example in CAR (section III).²⁰ China's military presence in sub-Saharan Africa is linked to its growing economic presence, as well as its role as a leading supplier of United Nations peacekeepers in the region.²¹ Finally, the region has also become a theatre for Middle East and North African power struggles, with Turkey and the Gulf states particularly active in the Horn of Africa (section IV).²²

Election-related violence

Election transition processes are a major source of instability in sub-Saharan Africa. The causes of electoral instability and violence in the region are multidimensional but broadly fall into two categories: the underlying power structures in new and emerging democracies, and flaws in the electoral process itself.²³

African governance worsened for the first time in a decade in 2019 due to a broad deterioration in the areas of human rights, security and rule of law, according to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.²⁴ This deterioration added to the risk of pre- or post-election violence around several important national and local elections that took place in the region in 2020 (see

¹⁸ Cooper, H., 'Trump orders all American troops out of Somalia', *New York Times*, 4 Dec. 2020; and 'Statement from AFRICOM Commander US Army Gen. Stephen Townsend on the activation of Joint Task Force—Quartz', US Africa Command, 19 Dec. 2020.

¹⁹ On arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa see chapter 9, section III, in this volume.

²⁰ 'Russia in Africa: What's behind Moscow's push into the continent?', BBC News, 7 May 2020.

²¹ Walsh, B., 'China's pervasive yet forgotten regional security role in Africa', *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 28, no. 120 (2019), pp. 965–83; and McAllister, P., 'China in Mali and the Sudan: A stepping stone to greater Chinese influence in the UN?', *Global Risks Insights*, 17 Feb. 2021.

²² Heibach, J., 'Sub-Saharan Africa: A theater for Middle East power struggles', *Middle East Policy*, vol. 27, no. 2 (summer 2020), pp. 69–80.

²³ Nordic Africa Institute, 'Electoral violence in Africa', Policy Notes no. 2012/3, Sep. 2012; and Kovacs, M. S. and Bjarnesen, J. (eds), *Violence in African Elections: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics* (Nordic Africa Institute and Zed Books: Uppsala and London, 2018). Also see the discussion in *SIPRI Yearbook 2019* (note 7), pp. 117–20. On the linkages between violence and democracy in Africa see Obiagu, U. C., 'A third wave? Creeping autocracy in Africa', *African Studies Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Jan. 2021), pp. 114–24.

²⁴ '2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance—Index Report', Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Nov. 2020.

table 7.2).²⁵ While several of the elections were marred by serious irregularities and security clampdowns, the worst electoral violence took place in Cameroon, CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania.²⁶ The Covid-19 pandemic further complicated matters by preventing or restricting oversight by foreign election observers, and led to elections being postponed in Chad and Ethiopia.²⁷ Elections due to take place in Somalia and Sudan were postponed for other reasons (see section IV).

The impact of Covid-19

The Covid-19 pandemic appears to have had minimal direct impact on most of the region's armed conflicts in 2020. A few armed groups in Angola, Cameroon, South Sudan and Sudan either extended existing ceasefires or declared temporary unilateral ceasefires in response to the UN secretary-general's March call for a Covid-19-related global ceasefire (see sections III and IV). However, the Islamist armed groups operating in sub-Saharan Africa seemingly refused to acknowledge the call and many of them appeared to exploit the disruption caused by the pandemic to recruit new members and carry out attacks.²⁸

In the longer term the pandemic is likely to affect many of the key political, social and economic drivers of peace and conflict in the region. For example, the International Monetary Fund estimated that the economy in sub-Saharan Africa contracted by 2.6 per cent in 2020 (after growing by 3.2 per cent in 2019), while the World Bank suggested it would be the second

²⁵ '2020 African election calendar', Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, Jan. 2021.

²⁶ 'Cameroon: Election violence in anglophone regions', Human Rights Watch, 12 Feb. 2020; 'Central African Republic election held amid violence', BBC News, 27 Dec. 2020; 'Ivory Coast election violence leaves a "dozen dead"', Deutsche Welle, 1 Nov. 2020; 'Malian parliamentary elections marred by kidnappings, attacks', Al Jazeera, 31 Mar. 2020; 'UN rights chief Bachelet condemns Tanzania election violence', UN News, 10 Nov. 2020; and 'Nearly two dozen dead in Guinea post-election violence: State TV', Al Jazeera, 27 Oct. 2020.

²⁷ 'Covid-19 helps ballot-dodgers in Africa', *The Economist*, 16 May 2020. On the impact of Covid-19 on African democracy more broadly see 'Taking stock of regional democratic trends in Africa and the Middle East before and during the Covid-19 pandemic', Special brief, International Institute for Democracy Electoral Assistance, Jan. 2021.

²⁸ 'Coronavirus: Sudan rebels extend ceasefire', Dabanga, 31 Mar. 2020; 'SSOMA response to UN Secretary General call for immediate global ceasefire in armed conflict countries related to Covid-19', Statement by South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance, 9 Apr. 2020; Esau, I., 'Insurgents hit second Mozambique town as Islamic State claims earlier attack', *Upstream*, 25 Mar. 2020; 'Al Shabaab terrorists claim deadly attack in heart of Somali capital', 23 Mar. 2019, *France 24*; and Coleman, J., 'The impact of coronavirus on terrorism in the Sahel', International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 16 Apr. 2020. On the global ceasefire see chapter 2, section I, in this volume.

Table 7.2. Election calendar in sub-Saharan Africa, 2020

Country	Election	Date
Angola	Local	Due 2021 (postponed from 2020)
Benin	Local	Held 17 Apr. 2020
Burkina Faso	President and National Assembly	Held 22 Nov. 2020
Burundi	President	Held 20 May 2020
	Due National Assembly, local, Collines Senate (indirect)	Held 7 June 2020
Cameroon	National Assembly, Senate and local	Held 9 Feb. 2020
Central African Republic	President and National Assembly	Held 27 Dec. 2020 (run-off 14 Feb. 2021)
Chad	National Assembly	Due 2021 (postponed from 2018–20)
Comoros	Parliamentary	Held 19 Jan. 2020 (run-off held 23 Feb. 2020)
Côte d'Ivoire	President and National Assembly	Held 31 Oct. 2020
Ethiopia	House of People's Representatives, regional state councils and local	Due 5 June 2021 (postponed from 29 Aug. 2020)
	House of the Federation (indirect, by regional state councils)	Indirect, after regional state councils 2021
Ghana	President and National Assembly	Held 7 Dec. 2020
Guinea	National Assembly and Referendum	Held 22 Mar. 2020
	Presidential	Held 18 Oct. 2020
Liberia	Senate and Referendum	Held 8 Dec. 2020
Malawi	President	Held 23 June 2020 (rerun)
Mali	National Assembly	Held 29 Mar. 2020 (run-off held 19 Apr. 2020)
Namibia	Regional councils and local	Held 25 Nov. 2020
	National Council (indirect, by regional councils)	Held Nov.–Dec. 2020
Niger	Local	Held 13 Dec. 2020
	President and National Assembly	Held 27 Dec. 2020 (run-off 21 Feb 2021)
Senegal	Local	Due 2021 (postponed from 2020)
Somalia	House of the People (indirect)	Due 2021 (postponed from 10–27 Dec. 2020)
	Senate (indirect)	Due 2021 (postponed from 1 Dec. 2020)
Somaliland (autonomous region)	House of Representatives and Senate	Due 2021 (postponed from late 2019 and Mar. 2019)
Seychelles	President and legislative	Held 22–24 Oct. 2020

Country	Election	Date
Sudan	President, legislative, states and local	Due late 2022 (postponed from Feb. 2020)
Tanzania	President, National Assembly, Zanzibar House of Representatives and Zanzibar President and local	Held 28 Oct. 2020
Togo	President	Held 22 Feb. 2020

Source: '2020 African election calendar', Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, Jan. 2021.

most severely affected region (after South Asia), with 26 million to 40 million more of its people falling into extreme poverty through 2021.²⁹

Water insecurity and climate change

Of the 21 countries globally facing the highest risk from the double burden of climate-related factors and political fragility, 12 are in sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.³⁰ Climate-related security risks include 'forced migration and displacement, livelihood insecurity, food and water insecurity, rising levels of intercommunal conflict between pastoralists and farmers, protracted cross-border resource conflicts and unsustainable resource exploitation'.³¹ It has been estimated that an additional 86 million people in the region could be displaced by climate change by 2050.³² In Somalia, for example, climate change has amplified existing challenges, including those faced by peace operations, and strengthened radical groups.³³

Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are dependent on rain-fed agriculture, making the region particularly vulnerable to changes in climatic conditions such as seasonal floods and prolonged droughts.³⁴ For example at the beginning of the year a drought in Lesotho led to increased food insecurity, while in Nigeria's Kebbi state floods in September 2020 destroyed about

²⁹ 'World Economic Outlook update', International Monetary Fund, Jan. 2021; and World Bank (note 3), p. 15. Also see Nash, K., 'Responses by African intergovernmental organisations to Covid-19', Political Settlements Research Programme, 24 June 2020.

³⁰ Moran, A. et al., *The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks* (US Agency for International Development: Sep. 2018), pp. 11–13.

³¹ Aminga, V. and Krampe, F., 'Climate-related security risks and the African Union', SIPRI Policy Brief, May 2020.

³² Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), *Ecological Threat Register 2020: Understanding Ecological Threats, Resilience and Peace* (IEP: Sydney, Sep. 2020), p. 51.

³³ Eklöw, K. and Krampe, F., *Climate-related Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Somalia*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 53 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Oct. 2019); and Krampe, F., 'Why United Nations peace operations cannot ignore climate change', SIPRI Commentary, 22 Feb. 2021.

³⁴ IEP (note 32), p. 16.

90 per cent of the state's crops, putting the country's food security at risk.³⁵ Accessing safe drinking water is also a challenge for more than 300 million people in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa.³⁶ Arguably the highest profile water resource dispute in the region is between Egypt and Ethiopia over the River Nile. These tensions have been exacerbated by Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, as well as a shifting regional power struggle that has been playing out in the South Sudan civil war (see section IV).

³⁵ Charumbira, S., 'Drought leaves tens of thousands in Lesotho "one step from famine"', *The Guardian*, 30 Jan. 2020; and 'Floods, food shortages threaten to push Nigeria into food crisis', *Al Jazeera*, 14 Sep. 2020.

³⁶ Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), *The State of Food and Agriculture: Overcoming Water Challenges in Agriculture* (FAO: Rome, 2020), p. 21.