Annex A. Arms control and disarmament agreements

This annex lists multi- and bilateral treaties, conventions, protocols and agreements relating to arms control and disarmament. Unless otherwise stated, the status of agreements and of their parties and signatories is as of 1 January 2020. On the International security cooperation bodies mentioned here, see annex B.

Notes

1. The agreements are divided into universal treaties (i.e. multilateral treaties open to all states, in section I), regional treaties (i.e. multilateral treaties open to states of a particular region, in section II) and bilateral treaties (in section III). Within each section, the agreements are listed in the order of the date on which they were adopted, signed or opened for signature (multilateral agreements) or signed (bilateral agreements). The date on which they entered into force and the depositary for multilateral treaties are also given.

2. The main source of information is the lists of signatories and parties provided by the depositaries of the treaties. In lists of parties and signatories, states whose name appears in italics ratified, acceded or succeeded to, or signed the agreement during 2019.

3. States and organizations listed as parties had ratified, acceded to or succeeded to the agreements by 1 January 2020. Since many agreements delay the entry into force for a state for a certain period after ratification or accession, when that occurred late in 2019 the agreement may not have fully entered into force for that state by 1 January 2020.

4. Former non-self-governing territories, upon attaining statehood, sometimes make general statements of continuity to all agreements concluded by the former governing power. This annex lists as parties only those new states that have made an uncontested declaration on continuity or have notified the depositary of their succession. The Russian Federation continues the international obligations of the Soviet Union.

5. Unless stated otherwise, the multilateral agreements listed in this annex are open to all states, to all states in the respective zone or region, or to all members of a certain international organization for signature, ratification, accession or succession. Not all the signatories and parties are United Nations members. Taiwan, while not recognized as a sovereign state by many countries, is listed as a party to the agreements that it has ratified.

6. Where possible, the location (in a printed publication or online) of an accurate copy of the treaty text is given. This may be provided by a treaty depositary, an agency or secretariat connected with the treaty, or in the United Nations Treaty Series (available online at <https://treaties.un.org/>).
I. Universal treaties

**Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)**

*Signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925; entered into force on 8 February 1928; depositary French Government*

The protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. The protocol remains a fundamental basis of the international prohibition against chemical and biological warfare, and its principles, objectives and obligations are explicitly supported by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.

**Parties (143):** Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen

**Notes:** On joining the protocol, some states entered reservations which upheld their right to employ chemical or biological weapons against non-parties to the protocol, against coalitions which included non-parties or in response to the use of these weapons by a violating party. Many of these states have withdrawn these reservations, particularly after the conclusion of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention since the reservations are incompatible with their obligation under the conventions.

In addition to these, ‘explicit’, reservations, a number of states that made a declaration of succession to the protocol on gaining independence inherited ‘implicit’ reservations from their respective predecessor states. For example, these implicit reservations apply to the states that gained independence from France and the UK before the latter states withdrew or amended their reservations. States that acceded (rather than succeeded) to the protocol did not inherit reservations in this way.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)

Opened for signature at Paris on 9 December 1948; entered into force on 12 January 1951; depositary UN Secretary-General

Under the convention any commission of acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such is declared to be a crime punishable under international law.

Parties (152): Afghanistan, Albania*, Algeria*, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain*, Barbados, Belarus*, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China*, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary*, Iceland, India*, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia*, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia*, Montenegro*, Morocco*, Mozambique, Myanmar*, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines*, Poland*, Portugal, Romania*, Russia*, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia*, Seychelles, Singapore*, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Ukraine*, United Arab Emirates*, Uruguay, USA*, Uzbekistan, Venezuela*, Viet Nam*, Yemen*, Zimbabwe*  
* With reservation and/or declaration.

Signed but not ratified (1): Dominican Republic


Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

Opened for signature at Geneva on 12 August 1949; entered into force on 21 October 1950; depositary Swiss Federal Council

The Geneva Convention (IV) establishes rules for the protection of civilians in areas covered by war and in occupied territories. Three other conventions were formulated at the same time, at a diplomatic conference held from 21 April to 12 August 1949: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; and Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

A party may withdraw from the convention, having given one year’s notice. But if the party is involved in an armed conflict at that time, the withdrawal will
not take effect until peace has been concluded and that party’s obligations under the convention fulfilled.

**Parties (196):** Afghanistan, Albania*, Algeria, Andorra, Angola*, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia*, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh*, Barbados*, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China*, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of the), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia*, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany*, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau*, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran*, Iraq, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (North)*, Korea (South)*, Kuwait*, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand*, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia*, Norway, Oman, Pakistan*, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal*, Qatar, Romania, Russia*, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname*, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, UK*, Ukraine*, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay*, USA*, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam*, Yemen*, Zambia, Zimbabwe

* With reservation and/or declaration.

**Convention text:** Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/dam/eda/fr/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/geneve/070116-conv4_e.pdf>

**Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts**

**Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts**

*Opened for signature at Bern on 12 December 1977; entered into force on 7 December 1978; depositary Swiss Federal Council*

The protocols confirm that the right of parties that are engaged in international or non-international armed conflicts to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited and that the use of weapons or means of warfare that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.

Article 36 of Protocol I requires a state party, when developing or acquiring a new weapon, to determine whether its use could be prohibited by international law.

**Parties to Protocol I (174) and Protocol II (169):** Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria*, Angola*, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia*, Austria*, Bahamas,

* With reservation and/or declaration.
1 Party only to Protocol I.

Signed but not ratified Protocols I and II (3): Iran, Pakistan, USA


**Antarctic Treaty**

Signed by the 12 original parties at Washington, DC, on 1 December 1959; entered into force on 23 June 1961; depositary US Government

The treaty declares the Antarctic an area to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It prohibits any measure of a military nature in the Antarctic, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, and the carrying out of military manoeuvres or the testing of any type of weapon. The treaty bans any nuclear explosion as well as the disposal of radioactive waste material in Antarctica.

States that demonstrate their interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition, are entitled to become consultative parties. Consultative parties meet at regular intervals to exchange information and hold consultations on matters pertaining to Antarctica, as well as to recommend to their governments measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty. Consultative parties have a right to inspect any station or installation in Antarctica to ensure compliance with the treaty’s provisions.

* Consultative party (29) under Article IX of the treaty.


The Protocol on Environmental Protection (**1991 Madrid Protocol**) was opened for signature on 4 October 1991 and entered into force on 14 January 1998. It designated Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.


*Signed by three original parties at Moscow on 5 August 1963 and opened for signature by other states at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 8 August 1963; entered into force on 10 October 1963; depositaries British, Russian and US governments*

The treaty prohibits the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion (*a*) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; and (*b*) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted.

A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given three months' notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty's subject matter.

**Parties (126):** Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia
Signed but not ratified (10): Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Paraguay, Portugal, Somalia

Treaty text: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://mddoc.mid.ru/api/ia/download/?uuid=561590f5-ed1a-4e2a-a04e-f715bcbc16ad>

**Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)**

*Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 27 January 1967; entered into force on 10 October 1967; depositaries British, Russian and US governments*

The treaty prohibits the placing into orbit around the earth of any object carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapon of mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of them in outer space in any other manner. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapon and the conducting of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies are also forbidden.

A party may withdraw from the treaty having given one year’s notice.

**Parties (110):** Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Signed but not ratified (25): Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Iran, Jordan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Montenegro, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Somalia, Trinidad and Tobago

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 1 July 1968; entered into force on 5 March 1970; depositaries British, Russian and US governments

The treaty defines a nuclear weapon state to be a state that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. According to this definition, there are five nuclear weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. All other states are defined as non-nuclear weapon states.

The treaty prohibits the nuclear weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them to any recipient and prohibits them from assisting, encouraging or inducing any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire such a weapon or device. It also prohibits non-nuclear weapon states parties from receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from any source, from manufacturing them, or from acquiring them in any other way.

The parties undertake to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to ensure that potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty. They also undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Non-nuclear weapon states parties undertake to conclude safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A Model Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreements, strengthening the measures, was approved in 1997; additional safeguards protocols are signed by states individually with the IAEA.

A review and extension conference, convened in 1995 in accordance with the treaty, decided that the treaty should remain in force indefinitely. A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given three months' notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty's subject matter.


* Party (181) with safeguards agreements in force with the IAEA, as required by the treaty, or concluded by a nuclear weapon state on a voluntary basis. In addition to these 181 states, as of 1 Jan. 2020 Cabo Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Micronesia, Palestine, Timor-Leste had each signed a safeguards agreement that had not yet entered into force.
† Nuclear weapon state as defined by the treaty.
‡ On 12 Mar. 1993 North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT with effect from 12 June 1993. It decided to ‘suspend’ the withdrawal on 11 June. On 10 Jan. 2003 North Korea announced its ‘immediate’ withdrawal from the NPT. A safeguards agreement was in force at that time. The current status of North Korea is disputed by the other parties.


Additional safeguards protocols in force (137): Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark¹, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Euratom, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam

¹ A separate additional protocol is also in force for the Danish territory of Greenland.

Note: Taiwan has agreed to apply the measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol.

Additional safeguards protocols signed but not yet in force (14): Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran*, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Zambia

* Iran notified the IAEA that as of 16 Jan. 2016 it would provisionally apply the Additional Protocol that it signed in 2003 but has not yet ratified.

**Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)**

*Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 11 February 1971; entered into force on 18 May 1972; depositaries British, Russian and US governments*

The treaty prohibits implanting or emplacing on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a 12-nautical mile (22-kilometre) seabed zone any nuclear weapon or any other type of weapon of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.

A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given three months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

**Parties (95):** Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil*, Bulgaria, Canada*, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, China, Congo (Republic of the), Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India*, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy*, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea (South), Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico*, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia*, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey*, UK, Ukraine, USA, Viet Nam*, Yemen, Zambia

* With reservation and/or declaration.

**Signed but not ratified (21):** Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Myanmar, Paraguay, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uruguay


**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BWC)**

*Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 10 April 1972; entered into force on 26 March 1975; depositaries British, Russian and US governments*

The convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition by other means or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins (whatever their origin or method of production) of types and in quantities that have no justification of prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also prohibits weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The destruction of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery in the possession of the parties, or their diversion to peaceful purposes, should be completed not later than nine months after the entry into force of the convention for each country.

The parties hold annual political and technical meetings to strengthen implementation of the convention. A three-person Implementation Support Unit (ISU), based in Geneva, was established in 2007 to support the parties in implementing the treaty, including facilitating the collection and distribution of annual confidence-building measures and supporting their efforts to achieve universal membership.

A party may withdraw from the convention, having given three months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

*Parties (184):* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria*, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain*, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China*, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of the), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia*, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India*, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland*, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (North), Korea (South)*, Kuwait*, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia*, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico*, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia*, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland*, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK*, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

* With reservation and/or declaration.

*Signed but not ratified (4):* Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syria

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (Enmod Convention)

Opened for signature at Geneva on 18 May 1977; entered into force on 5 October 1978; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention prohibits military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques that have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to states parties. The term ‘environmental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space. Understandings reached during the negotiations, but not written into the convention, define the terms ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’.

Parties (78): Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentinia*, Armenia, Australia, Austria*, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala*, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea (North), Korea (South)*, Kuwait*, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Laos, Malawi, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands*, New Zealand*, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland*, Tajikistan, Tunisia, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Signed but not ratified (16): Bolivia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Ethiopia, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Morocco, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Turkey, Uganda


Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

Original convention opened for signature at New York and Vienna on 3 March 1980; entered into force on 8 February 1987; amendments adopted on 8 July 2005; amended convention entered into force for its ratifying states on 8 May 2016; depositary IAEA Director General

The original convention—named the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—obligates its parties to protect nuclear material for peaceful purposes while in international transport.

The convention as amended and renamed also obligates its parties to protect nuclear facilities and material used for peaceful purposes while in storage.

A party may withdraw from the convention, having given 180 days’ notice.

Parties to the original convention (160): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria*, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia*, Austria*, Azerbaijan*, Bahamas*, Bahrain*, Bangladesh, Belarus*, Belgium*, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Signed but not ratified (1): Haiti

Note: In addition to the 160 parties as of 1 Jan. 2020, Eritrea acceded to the convention on 13 Mar. 2020.


Parties to the amended convention (123): Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia*, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan*, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium*, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada*, Chad, Chile, China*, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Euratom*, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ireland*, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar*, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan*, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore*, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria*, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey*, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK*, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA*, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Note: In addition to the 123 parties as of 1 Jan. 2020, Eritrea accepted the amended convention on 13 Mar. 2020.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, or ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention)

Opened for signature with protocols I, II and III at New York on 10 April 1981; entered into force on 2 December 1983; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention is an ‘umbrella treaty’, under which specific agreements can be concluded in the form of protocols. In order to become a party to the convention a state must ratify at least two of the protocols.

The amendment to Article I of the original convention was opened for signature at Geneva on 21 November 2001. It expands the scope of application to non-international armed conflicts. The amended convention entered into force on 18 May 2004.

Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons intended to injure using fragments that are not detectable in the human body by X-rays.

Protocol II prohibits or restricts the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices. Amended Protocol II, which entered into force on 3 December 1998, reinforces the constraints regarding anti-personnel mines.

Protocol III restricts the use of incendiary weapons.

Protocol IV, which entered into force on 30 July 1998, prohibits the employment of laser weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.

Protocol V, which entered into force on 12 November 2006, recognizes the need for measures of a generic nature to minimize the risks and effects of explosive remnants of war.

A party may withdraw from the convention and its protocols, having given one year’s notice. But if the party is involved in an armed conflict or occupation at that time, the withdrawal will not take effect until the conflict or occupation has ended and that party’s obligations fulfilled.

Parties to the original convention and protocols (125): Afghanistan\(^2\), Albania, Antigua and Barbuda\(^1\), Argentina*, Australia, Austria, Bahrain\(^5\), Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin\(^2\), Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi\(^4\), Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada\(^4\), Chile\(^2\), China*, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire\(^4\), Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus\(^4\), Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia\(^2\), Finland, France\(^4\), Gabon\(^2\), Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada\(^2\), Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See*, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel\(^1\), Italy*, Jamaica\(^2\), Japan, Jordan\(^2\), Kazakhstan\(^2\), Korea (South)\(^3\), Kuwait\(^2\), Laos, Latvia, Lebanon\(^2\), Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania\(^2\), Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives\(^2\), Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco\(^3\), Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco\(^4\), Nauru, Netherlands\(^4\), New Zealand, Nicaragua\(^2\), Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine\(^2\), Panama, Paraguay, Peru\(^3\), Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar\(^2\), Romania*, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines\(^1\), Saudi Arabia\(^2\), Senegal\(^5\), Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone\(^2\), Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey\(^*3\), Turkmenistan\(^1\), Uganda, UK*, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates\(^2\), Uruguay, USA*, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia

* With reservation and/or declaration.
^1 Party only to 1981 protocols I and II.
^2 Party only to 1981 protocols I and III.
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3 Party only to 1981 Protocol I.
4 Party only to 1981 Protocol II.
5 Party only to 1981 Protocol III.

Signed but not ratified the original convention and protocols (4): Egypt, Nigeria, Sudan, Viet Nam

Parties to the amended convention and original protocols (86): Afghanistan, Algeria, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See*, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea (South), Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico*, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Zambia

* With reservation and/or declaration.


* With reservation and/or declaration.

Parties to Protocol IV (109): Afghanistan, Algeria, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia*, Austria*, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium*, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada*, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany*, Greece*, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland*, Israel*, Italy*, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein*, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nauru, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland*, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, UK*, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA*, Uzbekistan

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Parties to Protocol V (96): Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina*, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See*, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos,
Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA*, Zambia

* With reservation and/or declaration.

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC)**

Opened for signature at Paris on 13 January 1993; entered into force on 29 April 1997; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The CWC regime consists of four ‘pillars’: disarmament, non-proliferation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and international cooperation on the peaceful uses of chemistry. The convention established the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as its implementing body.

Each party undertook to destroy its chemical weapon stockpiles by 29 April 2012. Of the seven parties that had declared stocks of chemical weapons by that date, three had destroyed them (Albania, India and South Korea). Libya and Russia completed the destruction of their stockpiles in 2017 and Iraq did so in 2018, while the USA continues to destroy its stocks. The stockpile of chemical weapons that Syria declared when it acceded to the CWC in 2013 was destroyed in 2016, although gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the 2013 declaration continue to be investigated. Old and abandoned chemical weapons will continue to be destroyed as they are uncovered from, for example, former battlefields.

A party may withdraw from the convention, having given 90 days’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

*Parties (193):* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria*, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium*, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China*, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of the), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba*, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark*, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France*, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany*, Ghana, Greece*, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See*, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran*, Iraq, Ireland*, Italy*, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg*, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan*, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal*, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain*, Sri Lanka, Sudan*, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria*, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, UK*, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA*, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Signed but not ratified (1): Israel


Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Opened for signature at New York on 24 September 1996; not in force; depositary
UN Secretary-General

The treaty would prohibit the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and urges each party to prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control and refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The verification regime established by the treaty will consist of an International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect signs of nuclear explosions, an International Data Centre to collect and distribute data from the IMS, and the right to on-site inspection to determine whether an explosion has taken place. Work under the treaty will be implemented by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

The treaty will enter into force 180 days after the date that all of the 44 states listed in an annex to the treaty have deposited their instruments of ratification. All 44 states possess nuclear power reactors or nuclear research reactors. Pending entry into force, a Preparatory Commission is preparing for the treaty’s implementation and the establishment of the CTBTO and the IMS.

After entry into force, a party will be able to withdraw from the treaty, having given six months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.
States whose ratification is required for entry into force (44): Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China*, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Egypt*, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India*, Indonesia, Iran*, Israel*, Italy, Japan, Korea (North)*, Korea (South), Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan*, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA*, Viet Nam

* Has not ratified the treaty.

Ratifications deposited (168): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo (Republic of the), Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Signed but not ratified (16): China, Comoros, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Iran, Israel, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, USA, Yemen


Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention)

Opened for signature at Ottawa on 3–4 December 1997 and at New York on 5 December 1997; entered into force on 1 March 1999; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention prohibits anti-personnel mines (APMs), which are defined as mines designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and which will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.

Each party undertakes to destroy all of its stockpiled APMs as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of the convention for that state party. Each party also undertakes to destroy all APMs in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention for that state party. Of the 164 parties, 161 no longer have stockpiles
of APMs and 31 of the 64 parties that reported areas containing APMs have cleared them.

A party may withdraw from the convention, having given six months' notice. But if the party is involved in an armed conflict at that time, the withdrawal will not take effect until that conflict has ended.

**Parties (164):** Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Australia*, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada*, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile*, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of the), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia*, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece*, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania*, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro*, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland*, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia*, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, UK*, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

* With reservation and/or declaration.


### Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

**Opened for signature at Rome on 17 July 1998 and at New York on 18 October 1998; entered into force on 1 July 2002; depository UN Secretary-General**

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent international court dealing with accusations of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The ICC can investigate and prosecute an alleged crime that takes place on the territory of a state party, is committed by a state party or is referred to it by the UN Security Council. The ICC may only prosecute a crime if the domestic courts are unwilling or unable to do so.

The Amendment to Article 8 adopted on 10 June 2010 makes it a war crime to use chemical weapons and expanding bullets in non-international conflicts. A series of Amendments to Article 8 adopted on 14 December 2017 make it a war crime to use weapons which use microbial or other biological agents, or toxins; weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments undetectable by x-rays in the human body; and blinding laser weapons. Amendments to Article 8 enter
into force for the parties that have accepted them one year after that acceptance. The Amendments adopted on 11 June 2010 define the crime of aggression. The ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression was activated on 17 July 2018. From that date, an apparent act of aggression may be referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council regardless of whether it involves parties or non-parties to the statute.

A state may withdraw from the statute and the ICC by giving 12 months’ notice.

*Parties to the Rome Statute (123):* Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Australia*, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia*, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of the), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France*, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan*, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (South), Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta*, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand*, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal*, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden*, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UK*, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia

*With reservation and/or declaration.

Signed but not ratified (31): Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iran, Israel*, Jamaica, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Oman, Russia*, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sudan*, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine†, United Arab Emirates, USA*, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe

* These states have declared that they no longer intend to become parties to the statute.
† Ukraine has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to alleged crimes committed on its territory since 21 Nov. 2013.


*Parties to the Amendment to Article 8 of 10 June 2010 (38):* Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guyana, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay

*Parties to the Amendments of 11 June 2010 defining the crime of aggression (39):* Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay

*Parties to the Amendment to Article 8 of 14 December 2017 on weapons which use microbial or other biological agents, or toxins (2):* Luxembourg, Slovakia
Parties to the Amendment to Article 8 of 14 December 2017 on weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments undetectable by x-rays in the human body (2): Luxembourg, Slovakia

Parties to the Amendment to Article 8 of 14 December 2017 on blinding laser weapons (2): Luxembourg, Slovakia


Convention on Cluster Munitions

Opened for signature at Oslo on 3 December 2008; entered into force on 1 August 2010; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention’s objectives are to prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. It also establishes a framework for cooperation and assistance to ensure adequate provision of care and rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education and destruction of stockpiles. The convention does not apply to mines.

Each party undertakes to destroy all of its stockpiled cluster munitions as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of the convention for that state party. The first deadlines for stockpile destruction were in 2018. Each party also undertakes to clear and destroy all cluster munitions in contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention for that state party. The first deadlines for clearance are in 2020.

A three-person Implementation Support Unit (ISU), based in Geneva, was established in 2015 to, among other things, provide advice and technical support to the parties.

A party may withdraw from the convention, having given six months’ notice. But if the party is involved in an armed conflict at that time, the withdrawal will not take effect until that conflict has ended.
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

*Opened for signature at New York on 3 June 2013; entered into force on 24 December 2014; depositary UN Secretary-General*

The object of the treaty is to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms; and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion.

Among other things, the treaty prohibits a state party from authorizing a transfer of arms if they are to be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The treaty also requires the exporting state to assess the potential for any arms proposed for export to undermine peace and security or be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.

Each party must submit an annual report on its authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms.

The treaty established the ATT Secretariat, based in Geneva, to support the parties in its implementation. Among other tasks, it collects the annual reports submitted by each party on imports and exports of conventional arms.

A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given 90 days’ notice.

*Parties (105):* Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jamaica, Japan,
Kazakhstan*, Korea (South), Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein*, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand*, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland*, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, UK, Uruguay, Zambia

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Signed but not ratified (33): Andorra, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Republic of the), Djibouti, Eswatini, Gabon, Haiti, Israel, Kiribati, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, USA*, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe

* This state has declared that it no longer intends to become a party to the treaty.


Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

Opened for signature at New York on 20 September 2017; not in force; depositary UN Secretary-General

In its preamble, the treaty cites the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and invokes the principles of international humanitarian law and the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. The treaty prohibits parties from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing or stockpiling nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Parties are prohibited from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Finally, parties cannot allow the stationing, installation or deployment of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in their territory.

The treaty outlines procedures for eliminating the nuclear weapons of any party that owned, possessed or controlled them after 7 July 2017, to be supervised by a ‘competent international authority or authorities’ to be designated by the states parties. Each party is required to maintain its existing safeguards agreements with the IAEA and must, at a minimum, conclude and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency. The treaty also contains provisions on assisting the victims of the testing or use of nuclear weapons and taking necessary and appropriate measures for the environmental remediation of contaminated areas.

The treaty will enter into force 90 days after the deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification. Membership of the treaty does not prejudice the parties’ other, compatible international obligations (such as the NPT and the CTBT). After entry into force, a party will be able to withdraw from the treaty, having given 12 months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter. But if the party is involved in an armed conflict at that time, the withdrawal will not take effect until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.
Ratifications deposited (34): Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cook Islands*, Costa Rica, Cuba*, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Guyana, Holy See, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Laos, Maldives, Mexico, New Zealand*, Nicaragua, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Signed but not ratified (47): Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of the), Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Zambia

Note: In addition to the 34 states that had ratified the treaty as of 1 Jan. 2020, Paraguay ratified it on 23 Jan. 2020 and Namibia on 20 Mar. 2020. In addition to the 47 states that had signed but not ratified the treaty as of 1 Jan. 2020, Belize signed it on 6 Feb. 2020.


II. Regional treaties

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)


The treaty prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means, as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons by any country of Latin America and the Caribbean and in the surrounding seas.

The parties should conclude agreements individually with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to their nuclear activities. The IAEA has the exclusive power to carry out special inspections. The treaty also established the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe, OPANAL) to ensure compliance with the treaty.

The treaty is open for signature by all the independent states of Latin America and the Caribbean. A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given three months' notice, if it decides that its supreme interests or the peace and security of another party or parties have been jeopardized by new circumstances related to the treaty’s content.

Under Additional Protocol I states with territories within the zone—France, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA—undertake to apply the statute of military denuclearization to these territories.

Under Additional Protocol II the recognized nuclear weapon states—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—undertake to respect the military denuclearization of Latin America and the Caribbean and not to contribute
to acts involving a violation of the treaty, nor to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the treaty.

**Parties to the original treaty (33):** Antigua and Barbuda\(^1\), Argentina\(^1\), Bahamas, Barbados\(^1\), Belize\(^2\), Bolivia, Brazil\(^1\), Chile\(^2\), Colombia\(^1\), Costa Rica\(^1\), Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic\(^2\), Ecuador\(^3\), El Salvador\(^4\), Grenada\(^3\), Guatemala\(^3\), Guyana\(^3\), Haiti, Honduras\(^3\), Jamaica\(^1\), Mexico\(^1\), Nicaragua\(^3\), Panama\(^1\), Paraguay\(^1\), Peru\(^1\), Saint Kitts and Nevis\(^1\), Saint Lucia\(^1\), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines\(^4\), Suriname\(^3\), Trinidad and Tobago\(^3\), Uruguay\(^1\), Venezuela\(^1\)

\(^2\) Has ratified the amendments of 1990 and 1992 only.
\(^3\) Has ratified the amendment of 1992 only.
\(^4\) Has ratified the amendments of 1991 and 1992 only.

**Parties to Additional Protocol I (4):** France*, Netherlands*, UK*, USA*

**Parties to Additional Protocol II (5):** China*, France*, Russia*, UK*, USA*

* With reservation and/or declaration.


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**South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)**

*Opened for signature at Rarotonga on 6 August 1985; entered into force on 11 December 1986; depositary Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat*

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone is defined as the area between the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the east and the west coast of Australia and the western border of Papua New Guinea and between the zone of application of the Antarctic Treaty in the south and, approximately, the equator in the north.

The treaty prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device, as well as possession or control over such device by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone. The parties also undertake not to supply nuclear material or equipment, unless subject to IAEA safeguards, and to prevent in their territories the stationing or testing of any nuclear explosive device and undertake not to dump, and to prevent the dumping of, radioactive waste and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the zone. Each party remains free to allow visits, as well as transit, by foreign ships and aircraft.

The treaty is open for signature by the members of the Pacific Islands Forum. If any party violates an essential provision or the spirit of the treaty, every other party may withdraw from the treaty, having given 12 months’ notice.

Under Protocol I France, the UK and the USA undertake to apply the treaty prohibitions relating to the manufacture, stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories situated within the zone for which they are internationally responsible.
Under Protocol 2 China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA undertake not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against the parties to the treaty or against any territory within the zone for which a party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.

Under Protocol 3 China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA undertake not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the zone.

**Parties (13):** Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

**Parties to Protocol 1 (2):** France*, UK*; *signed but not ratified (1):* USA

**Parties to Protocol 2 (4):** China*, France*, Russia*, UK*; *signed but not ratified (1):* USA

**Parties to Protocol 3 (4):** China*, France*, Russia*, UK*; *signed but not ratified (1):* USA

* With reservation and/or declaration.


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**Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)**

*Original treaty signed by the 16 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 6 member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) at Paris on 19 November 1990; entered into force on 9 November 1992; depositary Dutch Government*

The treaty sets ceilings on five categories of treaty-limited equipment (TLE)—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery of at least 100-mm calibre, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (the Atlantic-to-the-Urals, ATTU). The treaty established the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) to promote its objectives and implementation.

The treaty was negotiated by the member states of the WTO and NATO within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (from 1995 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE).

The 1992 **Tashkent Agreement**, adopted by the former Soviet republics with territories within the ATTU area of application (with the exception of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and the 1992 **Oslo Document** (Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty) introduced modifications to the treaty required because of the emergence of new states after the break-up of the USSR.

A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given 150 days’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

**Parties (30):** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium², Bulgaria², Canada², Czechia², Denmark², France, Georgia, Germany², Greece, Hungary², Iceland², Italy², Kazakhstan, Luxembourg², Moldova², Netherlands², Norway, Poland, Portugal², Romania, Russia¹, Slovakia², Spain, Turkey², UK², Ukraine, USA²
1 On 14 July 2007 Russia declared its intention to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty and associated documents and agreements, which took effect on 12 Dec. 2007. In Mar. 2015 Russia announced that it had decided to completely halt its participation in the treaty, including the JCG.

2 In Nov.–Dec. 2011 these countries notified the depositary or the JCG that they would cease to perform their obligations under the treaty with regard to Russia.

The first review conference of the CFE Treaty adopted the **1996 Flank Document**, which reorganized the flank areas geographically and numerically, allowing Russia and Ukraine to deploy TLE in a less constraining manner.


**Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement)**

_Signed by the parties to the CFE Treaty at Helsinki on 10 July 1992; entered into force simultaneously with the CFE Treaty; depositary Dutch Government_

This politically binding agreement sets ceilings on the number of personnel of the conventional land-based armed forces of the parties within the ATTU area.


**Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe**

_Signed by the parties to the CFE Treaty at Istanbul on 19 November 1999; not in force; depositary Dutch Government_

With the dissolution of the WTO and the accession of some former members to NATO, this agreement would have replaced the CFE Treaty’s bloc-to-bloc military balance with a regional balance, established individual state limits on TLE holdings, and provided for a new structure of limitations and new military flexibility mechanisms, flank sub-limits and enhanced transparency. It would have opened the CFE regime to all other European states. It would have entered into force when ratified by all of the signatories.

_The 1999 Final Act of the Conference of the CFE States Parties, with annexes, contains politically binding arrangements with regard to Georgia, Moldova and Central Europe and to withdrawals of armed forces from foreign territories (known as the Istanbul commitments). Many signatories of the Agreement on Adaptation made their ratification contingent on the implementation of these political commitments._
**Ratifications deposited (3):** Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia*¹

* With reservation and/or declaration.

**Signed but not ratified (27):** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Moldavia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine², UK, USA

¹ On 14 July 2007 Russia declared its intention to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty and associated documents and agreements, which took effect on 12 Dec. 2007. In Mar. 2015 Russia announced that it had decided to completely halt its participation in the treaty, including the JCG.

² Ukraine ratified the Agreement on Adaptation on 21 Sep. 2000 but did not deposited its instrument with the depositary.


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**Treaty on Open Skies**

*Opened for signature at Helsinki on 24 March 1992; entered into force on 1 January 2002; depositaries Canadian and Hungarian governments*

The treaty obligates the parties to submit their territories to short-notice unarmed surveillance flights. The area of application stretches from Vancouver, Canada, eastward to Vladivostok, Russia. The treaty was negotiated between the member states of the WTO and NATO. Since 1 July 2002 any state can apply to accede to the treaty. A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given six months’ notice.

**Parties (34):** Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada*, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain*, Sweden*, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA*

* With reservation and/or declaration.

**Signed but not ratified (0):** Kyrgyzstan


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**Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)**

*Signed by the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at Bangkok on 15 December 1995; entered into force on 27 March 1997; depositary Thai Government*

The South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone includes the territories, the continental shelves and the exclusive economic zones of the states parties. The
treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition or testing of nuclear weapons inside or outside the zone as well as the stationing and transport of nuclear weapons in or through the zone. Each state party may decide for itself whether to allow visits and transit by foreign ships and aircraft. The parties undertake not to dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the zone any radioactive material or waste or dispose of radioactive material on land. The parties should conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of full-scope safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

The treaty is open for accession by all states of South East Asia. If any party breaches an essential provision of the treaty, every other party may withdraw from the treaty.

Under a Protocol to the treaty, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty. They should further undertake not to use nuclear weapons within the zone. The protocol will enter into force for each state party on the date of its deposit of the instrument of ratification.

Parties (10): Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam

Protocol (0): no signatures, no parties


African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

Opened for signature at Cairo on 11 April 1996; entered into force on 15 July 2009; depositary Secretary-General of the African Union

The African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone includes the territory of the continent of Africa, island states members of the African Union (AU) and all islands considered by the AU to be part of Africa.

The treaty prohibits the research, development, manufacture and acquisition of nuclear explosive devices and the testing or stationing of any nuclear explosive device in the zone. Each party remains free to allow visits and transit by foreign ships and aircraft. The treaty also prohibits any attack against nuclear installations. The parties undertake not to dump or permit the dumping of radioactive waste and other radioactive matter anywhere within the zone. Each party should individually conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of comprehensive safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities. The treaty also established the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) to ensure compliance with the treaty.

The treaty is open for accession by all the states of Africa. A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given 12 months' notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

Under Protocol I China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA undertake not to
use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against the parties to the treaty.

Under Protocol II China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA undertake not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone.

Under Protocol III France and Spain are to undertake to observe certain provisions of the treaty with respect to the territories within the zone for which they are internationally responsible.

**Parties (41):** Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Republic of the), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), Seychelles, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Signed but not ratified (13): Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Liberia, Morocco, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda

**Parties to Protocol I (4):** China, France*, Russia*, UK*; signed but not ratified (1): USA*

**Parties to Protocol II (4):** China, France*, Russia*, UK*; signed but not ratified (1): USA*

**Parties to Protocol III (1):** France*

* With reservation and/or declaration.

**Treaty text:** African Union, [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37288-treaty-0018_-_the_african_nuclear-weapon-free_zone_treaty_the_treaty_of_pelindaba_e.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37288-treaty-0018_-_the_african_nuclear-weapon-free_zone_treaty_the_treaty_of_pelindaba_e.pdf)

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**Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Florence Agreement)**

**Adopted by the 5 original parties at Florence and entered into force on 14 June 1996**

The agreement was negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE in accordance with the mandate in Article IV of Annex 1-B of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement). It sets numerical ceilings on armaments of the former warring parties. Five categories of heavy conventional weapons are included: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery (75 mm and above), combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The limits were reached by 31 October 1997; by that date 6580 weapon items, or 46 per cent of pre-June 1996 holdings, had been destroyed. By 2014 a further 3489 items had been destroyed voluntarily.

The implementation of the agreement was monitored and assisted by the OSCE’s Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office and the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the USA) and supported by other OSCE states. Under a two-phase action plan agreed in November 2009, responsibility for the implementation of the agreement was transferred to the parties on 5 December 2014, following the signing of a new set of amendments to the agreement.

**Parties (4):** Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia

**Agreement text:** Croatian Ministry of Defence, [https://www.racviac.org/downloads/treaties_agreements/aIV.pdf](https://www.racviac.org/downloads/treaties_agreements/aIV.pdf)
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)

*Opened for signature by the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) at Washington, DC, on 14 November 1997; entered into force on 1 July 1998; depositary General Secretariat of the OAS*

The purpose of the convention is to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and the trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials; and to promote and facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information and experience among the parties. A party may withdraw from the convention, having given six months’ notice.

*Parties (31): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

* With reservation.

*Signed but not ratified (3): Canada, Jamaica, USA*


Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

*Opened for signature by the member states of the OAS at Guatemala City on 7 June 1999; entered into force on 21 November 2002; depositary General Secretariat of the OAS*

The objective of the convention is to contribute more fully to regional openness and transparency in the acquisition of conventional weapons by exchanging information regarding such acquisitions, for the purpose of promoting confidence among states in the Americas. A party may withdraw from the convention, having given 12 months’ notice.

*Parties (17): Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela

*Signed but not ratified (6): Bolivia, Colombia, Dominica, Haiti, Honduras, USA*

Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region

Opened for signature by the members states of SADC at Blantyre on 14 August 2001; entered into force on 8 November 2004; depositary SADC Executive Secretary

The objectives of the protocol include the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials, and the prevention of their excessive and destabilizing accumulation, trafficking, possession and use in the region. A party may withdraw from the protocol, having given 12 months’ notice.

Parties (11): Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Signed but not ratified (2*): Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Seychelles†

* Three member states of SADC—Angola, the Comoros and Madagascar—have neither signed nor ratified the protocol.
† Seychelles signed the protocol in 2001 but did not ratify it before withdrawing from SADC in 2004. It rejoined SADC in 2008.


Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa

Signed by the 10 member states of the Nairobi Secretariat on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Seychelles at Nairobi on 21 April 2004; entered into force on 5 May 2006; depositary Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA)

The objectives of the protocol include the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit manufacture of, trafficking in, possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the subregion. Its implementation is overseen by RECSA.

Parties (12): Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of the), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

Signed but not ratified (3*): Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania

* The accuracy of this list is uncertain. Some or all of these 3 states may have ratified the treaty.

ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials

Adopted by the 15 member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at Abuja, on 14 June 2006; entered into force on 29 September 2009; depositary President of the ECOWAS Commission

The convention obligates the parties to prevent and combat the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of SALW in the ECOWAS member states. The convention bans the transfer of SALW into, through or from the territories of the parties. The ECOWAS member states may, by consensus, grant a party an exemption for national defence and security needs or for use in multilateral peace operations. Possession of light weapons by civilians is banned and their possession of small arms must be regulated. Each party must also control the manufacture of SALW, establish registers of SALW and establish a national commission to implement the convention.

A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given 12 months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

Parties (14): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

Signed but not ratified (1): Gambia


Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk)

Signed by the 5 Central Asian states at Semipalatinsk on 8 September 2006; entered into force on 21 March 2009; depositary Kyrgyz Government

The Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone is defined as the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. The treaty obligates the parties not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere. A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given 12 months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

Under a Protocol China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA undertake not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against the parties to the treaty.

Parties (5): Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Parties to the protocol (4): China, France*, Russia, UK*; signed but not ratified (1): USA

* With reservations and/or declaration.

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)

Opened for signature by the 10 member states of the Communauté économique d’États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC, Economic Community of Central African States) and Rwanda at Brazzaville on 19 November 2010; entered into force on 8 March 2017; depositary UN Secretary-General

The objectives of the convention are to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trade and trafficking in SALW in Central Africa (defined to be the territory of the members of CEEAC and Rwanda); to strengthen the control in the region of the manufacture, trade, transfer and use of SALW; to combat armed violence and ease the human suffering in the region caused by SALW; and to foster cooperation and confidence among the states parties.

A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given 12 months’ notice.

Parties (8): Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Republic of the), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe

Signed but not ratified (3): Burundi, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Rwanda


Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

Adopted by the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe at Vienna on 30 November 2011; entered into force on 1 December 2011


The Vienna Document 2011 incorporates revisions on such matters as the timing of verification activities and demonstrations of new types of weapon and equipment system. It also establishes a procedure for updating the Vienna Document every five years. The reissue due in 2016 did not occur.

Participating states of the OSCE (57): See annex B

III. Bilateral treaties

**Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)**

*Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow on 26 May 1972; entered into force on 3 October 1972; not in force from 13 June 2002*

The parties—Russia and the USA—undertook not to build nationwide defences against ballistic missile attack and to limit the development and deployment of permitted strategic missile defences. The treaty prohibited the parties from giving air defence missiles, radars or launchers the technical ability to counter strategic ballistic missiles and from testing them in a strategic ABM mode. It also established a standing consultative commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty introduced further numerical restrictions on permitted ballistic missile defences.

In 1997 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the USA signed a memorandum of understanding that would have made Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine parties to the treaty along with Russia as successor states of the USSR and a set of agreed statements that would specify the demarcation line between strategic missile defences (which are not permitted under the treaty) and non-strategic or theatre missile defences (which are permitted under the treaty). The 1997 agreements were ratified by Russia in April 2000, but the USA did not ratify them and they did not enter into force.

On 13 December 2001 the USA notified Russia that it had decided to withdraw from the treaty, citing the ballistic missile threat to its territory from other states; the withdrawal came into effect six months later, on 13 June 2002.


**Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, TTBT)**

*Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow on 3 July 1974; entered into force on 11 December 1990*

The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The 1974 verification protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol.

Either party may withdraw from the treaty, having given the other 12 months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.

**Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, PNET)**

*Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow and Washington, DC, on 28 May 1976; entered into force simultaneously with the TTBT, on 11 December 1990*

The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any individual underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons or any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1500 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The treaty established a joint consultative commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The 1976 verification protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol.

The treaty cannot be terminated while the TTBT is in force. If the TTBT is terminated, then either party may withdraw from this treaty at any time.


*Signed by the USA and the USSR at Washington, DC, on 8 December 1987; entered into force on 1 June 1988; not in force from 2 August 2019*

The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to destroy all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500–5500 kilometres (intermediate-range, 1000–5500 km; and shorter-range, 500–1000 km) and their launchers by 1 June 1991. The treaty established a special verification commission (SVC) to promote its objectives and implementation.

A total of 2692 missiles were eliminated by May 1991. For 10 years after 1 June 1991 on-site inspections were conducted to verify compliance. The use of surveillance satellites for data collection continued after the end of on-site inspections on 31 May 2001.

In 1994 treaty membership was expanded to include Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

On 2 February 2019 the USA notified the other parties that it would withdraw from the treaty in six months, citing the alleged deployment by Russia of a missile in breach of the treaty’s limits. The USA and then Russia also suspended their obligations under the treaty. The withdrawal came into effect on 2 August 2019.

Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)

Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow on 31 July 1991; entered into force on 5 December 1994; expired on 5 December 2009

The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to make phased reductions in their offensive strategic nuclear forces over a seven-year period. It set numerical limits on deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs)—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers—and the nuclear warheads they carry.

In the Protocol to Facilitate the Implementation of START (1992 Lisbon Protocol), which entered into force on 5 December 1994, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also assumed the obligations of the former USSR under the treaty alongside Russia.


Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)

Signed by Russia and the USA at Moscow on 3 January 1993; not in force

The treaty would have obligated the parties to eliminate their ICBMs with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3000–3500 each (of which no more than 1750 were to be deployed on SLBMs) by 1 January 2003. On 26 September 1997 the two parties signed a Protocol to the treaty providing for the extension until the end of 2007 of the period of implementation of the treaty.

The two signatories ratified the treaty but never exchanged the instruments of ratification. The treaty thus never entered into force. On 14 June 2002, as a response to the taking effect on 13 June of the USA's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia declared that it would no longer be bound by START II.

Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT, Moscow Treaty)

Signed by Russia and the USA at Moscow on 24 May 2002; entered into force on 1 June 2003; not in force from 5 February 2011

The treaty obligated the parties to reduce the number of their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads so that the aggregate numbers did not exceed 1700–2200 for each party by 31 December 2012. The treaty was superseded by New START on 5 February 2011.


Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START, Prague Treaty)

Signed by Russia and the USA at Prague on 8 April 2010; entered into force on 5 February 2011

The treaty obligates the parties—Russia and the USA—to each reduce their number of (a) deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to 700; (b) warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers to 1550; and (c) deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to 800. The reductions were achieved by 5 February 2018, as required by the treaty.

The treaty established a bilateral consultative commission (BCC) to resolve questions about compliance and other implementation issues. A protocol to the treaty contains verifications mechanisms.

The treaty followed on from START I and superseded SORT. It will remain in force for 10 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. If both parties agree, it can be extended for 5 years, but no more. Either party may also withdraw from the treaty, having given the other three months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter.