

**RUSSIA:
ARMS CONTROL,
DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY**

**MEMO CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION
OF THE SIPRI YEARBOOK 2003**

Institute of World Economy and International Relations

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(IMEMO)

**RUSSIA:
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

IMEMO CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF THE SIPRI
YEARBOOK 2003

Compiled and edited by
VLADIMIR BARANOVSKY and VLADIMIR DVORKIN

Moscow 2004

УДК 327
ББК 64.4 (0)
Rus 95

Rus 95

Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security. IMEMO contributions to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2003 / Compiled and edited by V. Baranovsky, V.Dvorkin. – Moscow: IMEMO, 2004. – 114 p.

ISBN 5-9535-0038-6

Your comments and requests for obtaining the book should be sent to:

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ISBN 5-9535-0038-6

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PREFACE

The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) presents the fourth edition of *Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security*. It contains the results of the IMEMO research, published in the Special supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2003, which covers events up to the middle of 2003. The questions, related to impact of the war in Iraq on international security are elucidated here; its lessons are analyzed for the reform of the Armed Forces of the RF. Special attention was paid to the tendencies in the sphere of international arms control, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counteraction problems and the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime. New developments in the international security institutions (Russia–NATO Council, Shanghai Cooperation Organization) are considered in this study. The Russian defense budget for 2004 is also analyzed. An annexe containing a general review of key documents of the Russian Federation on national security, defense and arms control will assist readers who are looking for official documents. The estimates presented in the IMEMO Supplement, in a number of cases, differ from the positions taken by the SIPRI researchers. This permits the elucidation of the most significant events in the international security sphere from different aspects.

I would like to express my thanks to Dr Vladimir Baranovsky and Dr Vladimir Dvorkin who had the overall responsibility for compiling and editing this volume.

My special gratitude is due to the authors of the papers, included in the IMEMO Special supplement—SIPRI Director Dr Alyson Bailes, Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Alexandre Kaliadin, Daniil Kobayakov, Galina Oznobishcheva, Vladimir Orlov, Ludmila Pankova, Alexander Hkayev, Pyotr Romashkin, Alexander Savelyev, Tamara Farnasova and Boris Khalosha.

I would like to thank the IMEMO Center for International Security employees George Bechter, Vadim Vladimirov, Valentina Matveeva, Jeanna Shatilova and also Olga Maltseva for the laborious work in preparing the Special supplement to the SIPRI Yearbook 2003 in English.

Boris Klimenko deserves gratitude for his professional contribution to the artwork production.

I would like to express my deep thanks to Dr Theodor Winkler, Director of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) for his assistance in publishing this edition.

Academician Nodari Simonia
Director
Institute of World Economy and International Relations
Russian Academy of Sciences
January 2004

ACRONYMS

ABM	– Anti-ballistic missile
ABM Treaty	– Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems
ACM	– Advanced Cruise missile
AF	– Armed Forces
ALCM	– Air-launched cruise missile
APMC	– Anti-personnel mines Convention
ASEAN	– Association of South East-Asia
BMD	– Ballistic missile defence
BTWC	– Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CFE	– Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CICA	– Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
CSIS	– Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSPR	– Council for Sustainable Partnership for Russia
CTR	– Cooperative Threat Reduction
CWC	– Chemical Weapons Convention
DPRK	– Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EADRCC	– Euro–Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
EMI	– Electromagnetic impulse
ESA	– European Space Agency
EU	– European Union
EU SPSEE	– EU’s Stability Pact for South Eastern Asia
FC	– Federal Council
G8	– Group of Eight
GCS	– Global Control System
GDP	– Gross Domestic Product
IAEA	– International Atomic Energy Agency
ICOC	– International Code of Conduct (Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation)
ISS	– International Space Station
ISTC	– International Science and Technology Center
KEDO	– Korean Energy Development Organization
MIC	– Military–industrial complex
MNERF	– Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation
MTCR	– Missile Technology Control Regime

NAVSTAR	– Space Navigation System
NBC	– Nuclear, biological, chemical (weapons)
NCO	– Non – Commissioned Officer
NEA	– North East Asia
NMD	– National missile defence
NPT	– Non-Proliferation Treaty
NASA	– National Aeronautic and Space Agency
NSG	– Nuclear Suppliers Group
PAROC	– Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
RASA	– Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviacosmos)
RATS	– Regional Anti-Terrorist Center
RNC	– Russia-NATO Council
RF	– Russian Federation
SCO	– Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SC	– Security Council
SD	– State Duma
SOG	– Senior Official Group (Global Partnership)
SORT	– Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
TMD	– Theatre missile defence
TNF	– Theatre nuclear forces
UNGA	– UN General Assembly
UNSC	– UN Security Council
WMD	– Weapons of mass destruction
WMO	– World Meteorological Organization

PART I. ANALYSES, FORECASTS, DISCUSSIONS

1. What is the Future for Arms Control?
2. Iraq Crisis in World Politics: Background and Prospects
3. The Second Gulf War and Reform of Russia's Armed Forces
4. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Are there any Prospects for a Settlement?
5. International Anti-proliferation Strategy
(role of collective enforcement measures)
6. Outer Space and BMD: Prospects for Russia-USA Cooperation
7. Account of the Seminar "Imperatives of the Global Strategy of Counteraction against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in a New International Environment"

1. WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR ARMS CONTROL?¹

Alyson J. K. BAILES

This is not an easy time in history to be the Director of an Institute dedicated to peace and arms control. Ideas of what peace is, of what threatens our peace, and of how it is proper to react to such threats are developing fast and diverging widely, even among the close partners of the Euro-Atlantic community. Whereas arms control used to be regarded as an automatically good thing, and was even given kind of moral respect, today its place in international policy is under attack from two sides. First, there are many people and even some governments who say that arms control has failed to do its job of guaranteeing security for the good and punishing the bad, and that perhaps it was the wrong kind of instrument to try to use for such purposes in the first place. Secondly and more subtly, since the end of the Cold War our ideas about the function of arms and of military strength in general have been shifting. Very few people would now say unhesitatingly that reducing arms must always and everywhere be a good thing. We have learned within Europe in particular that former enemies can become better friends by going out and taking military actions together for humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping and peace enforcement. That most peaceful of organizations, the European Union, has deliberately set out to build a new military capacity for crisis management and to make its members increase their defence efforts to support it. Even the European institutions who most specifically try to promote peaceful and democratic behaviour are focussing on ways to organize and control military capacities better, not actually to get rid of them. And this model of positive military cooperation as a contribution to integration and stability is being repeated—or at least attempts are being made to copy it—in just about every other region of the world.

¹ A speech to honour the public launch of the SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Russian version. IMEMO, Moscow, 15 April 03

It would be fairly hopeless to try to stand up for some abstract ideal of arms control in the face of these tides of history, and personally I would not want to try. It is certainly not SIPRI's policy today to say that all arms are bad, or that all money spent on internal and external security is wasted. I am even ready to admit that in some circumstances, arms control itself can be a bad thing. It is certainly bad for security if countries make a great show of signing an agreement and then fail to ratify it or to abide by its terms, and it is even worse if we have no way of catching and punishing such dishonesty. It is also bad if countries claim a great success in controlling some

kind of weapons which are cheap and easy to control, while ignoring other weapons which are really far more dangerous for security but which they do not want or dare to address. It is also bad if agreements are designed in a way that doesn't actually include or constrain the people presenting the greater danger, whether that means certain states or certain types of people like actors in civil wars or terrorists. Last but not least, if arms control is forced on someone as a kind of punishment without attempting to change and improve the security situation in other ways, it is very likely that that person will become obsessed with getting his weapons back again and may find even more dishonest and dangerous ways to do so in future.

All that this is really saying, however, is that arms control is a policy instrument like any other whose value and effect depends on the context in which it is used. It is very, very rarely the arms control measures themselves that do the damage. They certainly have costs, like the costs of destroying weapons, but these are always far less than the costs of going to war and still smaller than the costs of a spiralling arms race. If cutting weapons didn't sometimes make sense, we would not have seen so many countries—including Russia—making very large cuts by purely voluntary national decisions in the last decade. In short, what creates the risk of negative results from arms control is not so much the technical features of the measures themselves as the contradictions in the environment in which they are taken and in the motivations of the people involved.

This was in fact always the case, even in the Cold War period when so many of the classic arms control treaties were signed. They were signed and respected when everyone concerned had a strong enough motive to do so, and that motive was certainly not created just by the technical excellence of the treaties on offer. We should admit that fear was often a factor—either fear of what the adversary might do without restraints, or fear of the destruction that certain kinds of weapons like chemical and biological ones might bring to all of us if the taboo upon their use was not reinforced. Sometimes positive political motives came into play as well, from fields not directly linked with arms control itself: such as the recognition of mutual economic benefits, or improvements in political dialogue, or the realization of common interests against some third state or against a global challenge. This becomes especially clear when you consider that the final

successful negotiations for arms control agreements often took place among top politicians, who certainly could not appreciate all the technical details but who perhaps had better instincts than anyone about when the general dynamics of the relationship made it right to strike a deal.

In our present times as well, arms control has to be a child of its environment. It needs to prove again that in the particular circumstances of the early twenty-first century, it still has some comparative advantages and a useful role to play. It needs to find the right combinations with other instruments and policy measures to ensure that it has the best possible effects, and no negative ones, for overall security. It needs to prove that it can be efficient in terms of the output achieved for the effort and resources devoted to it, and in terms of delivering what it says it will deliver. And last but not least, given the seriousness of the doubts and accusations that have been thrown at arms control in recent years, I believe it needs again to prove a kind of moral legitimacy and to relate itself again to the common values that govern or ought to govern international society. In the rest of my talk I will comment in more detail on each of these four challenges.

First, what are the specific useful functions that arms control may perform in a world where military partnerships are growing among partners who behave well, and it sometimes seems that those who behave badly can only be stopped by the threat or use of force? I believe that quite a number of different kinds of arms control are still relevant, for example:

- among relatively recent friends, like the East and West in Europe, the maintenance of agreed arms limits and transparency measures (like the CFE Treaty) can bolster confidence and stability and help in diverting defence resources towards more constructive ends—such as the capacities needed for peacekeeping. Personally I am very much in favour of enlarging this Treaty when NATO is enlarged, so long as the existing parties can take the final steps necessary to bring it into force;

- the arms limits inherited from the Cold War can be pushed even lower (as in the latest strategic nuclear agreement between the US and Russia) as both sides come to feel safe with lower levels of deterrent capacity;

- among new friends, in regions which are still in the early stages of integration and of cooperative security processes, Confidence and Security Building Measures can be both part of the learning process and a reinforcement for stability;

- in post-conflict regions, actual cuts and limitations are generally needed to restrain the past offenders. They will be most truly valuable if they achieve a lasting balance among all parties and thus remove any temptation to start the arms race again;

- export controls on dangerous military products and precursors, especially for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), have even clearer relevance than before and need to be tightened up and supported by as many responsible states as possible. Their great value is the way they can block

supplies to terrorists and non-State combatants as well as irresponsible States. We shall, however, probably need to think more in future about extending this kind of approach to intellectual products and services which may trigger proliferation, not just to hardware;

- other measures against the proliferation of WMD, including the strengthening of legal codes and prohibitions which clearly establish the unacceptability of chemical and biological weapons, can help us at the same time to reinforce the taboo against the actual use of such arms in local conflicts; to reduce the risk of 'rogue' leaders being able to deter interference by brandishing such capacities; and against the dreadful prospect of such technologies getting into terrorist hands;

- the further development of humanitarian "rules of war", including the outlawing of certain practices and whole categories of weapons, can put some restraint upon the demons of military invention and lessen the human misery of those conflicts which persist. There have been some very hopeful experiments lately in getting codes like the Ottawa rules against anti-personnel mines accepted by a number of non-state combatants in civil wars.

As in the past, however, none of these methods is likely to persuade states to sign up in the first place, or to produce the full expected value, unless it is accompanied by other measures in the security and non-security fields. The new environment lends itself increasingly to "package" deals where arms control is linked with other points of agreement, not just because certain powers are losing interest in arms control in its own right, but because of the greater complexity of security and other interrelationships between States which we are witnessing as a result of the disappearance of Cold War barriers and the impact of globalization. Thus, members of the CFE Treaty are at the same time engaging in defence collaboration to build up each others' arms and going on military interventions together even while observing their mutual limitations—and soon the great bulk of them will be in the same Alliance. The latest US/Russian strategic nuclear arms agreement was packaged with elements of positive cooperation, was linked especially with understandings on missile defence, and was arguably part of a much bigger re-thinking of Russia's strategic relations with the West including the handling of the current NATO Enlargement. The idea of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) which Russia and the US have developed together and which the G-8 is now turning into a global partnership, is an imaginative new way to get rid of unnecessary and dangerous weapons (even if not covered by arms control) with the former adversaries working together to share the necessary costs as well as technologies. In general, people planning arms control agreements today are more likely than in the past to think from the outset about financial and technological support for the actual destruction of weapons. The West's old mantra that "people should not be paid for doing what they have agreed to" looks a bit short-

sighted today when we are so much more aware of the risk that left-over weapons could be sold to, or stolen by, even more irresponsible players.

The cases both of Iraq and North Korea have reminded us powerfully that non-proliferation treaties, though useful in establishing rules that help to judge who are the good guys and the bad guys, are not going to get rid of the bad guys' weapons without help of many other kinds. Non-proliferation can and must also be pursued through effective export controls, CTR-type programmes to cut back the actual stocks available for transfer, and where necessary also "counter-proliferation" options including the positive military capacity to deter, interdict, stop and punish the illegal acquisition or use of such weapons. Of course the use of force for such ends is most likely to bear lasting fruits when approved and supported by the international community, and it needs to be reinforced by other (eg political and economic) measures if national and regional security behaviour is to be permanently changed. Regional CBMs and arms cuts are most likely to endure and bolster security if they are combined with positive measures of cooperation in the security sector, and of integration generally—the EU's Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe is a good example. Export controls can be made more acceptable for those outside the groups imposing them if they leave room for legitimate arms sales, industrial collaboration and technology transfer. Even what might appear to be the "purest" arms control measures, the bans on whole categories of weapons (like anti-personnel mines or laser weapons), are more likely to be universally observed if the actors previously most dependent on such weapons are helped to find alternative technologies or other ways of meeting their security needs.

Such 'package' approaches offer one way to bring arms control out of the narrow and shrinking niche which it seemed to occupy at the end of the 20th century. The more we use arms control alongside other security measures, however, the more obvious it becomes that—just like any other measure—it needs some kinds of tests for measuring how useful it is both in absolute terms and within a given situation. The question of efficiency of arms control was not much pursued during the Cold War and was, indeed, difficult to get a grip at that time: partly because the emphasis was on compliance, which readily become a polemical issue between the two sides, and partly because arms control measures did have a strategic and political and cultural importance going well beyond and not strictly linked to their content. In today's conditions when the restrictions biting on "bad guys" are of greater interest, compliance has again become the hottest issue. But it would be a pity to let it stand as the only test of utility, because it makes it just too easy for the enemies of arms control to claim that a Treaty which someone violates is no good at all—forgetting all the other influences that arms control has on international behaviour, stability and

prosperity, and indeed failing to put into the balance the value of compliance by all those who are complying with it.

It would not be easy to draw up a more sophisticated diagnostic system for arms control's "efficiency" and it certainly cannot be reduced to a calculation of the direct financial savings and costs. During a recent study of non-proliferation measures which we carried out at SIPRI, we came up with a large number of possible indicators:

- the Commitment of participants to the regime or measure involved
- the degree of Compliance shown by all participants, and success in catching and correcting cases of non-compliance
- Confidence among participants in the viability of the regime, and its credibility to outsiders
- Consistency and fairness in the way that it is implemented
- The ongoing Engagement and practical cooperation which states provide in order to carry out the commitments and help tackle problems arising
- Flexibility and Resilience to adapt the regime to changing circumstances
- Impact and Influence on the behaviour and views both of members and outsiders: this includes the success of regimes in establishing something like a generally recognized moral standard and arousing moral indignation against offenders
- Institutionalization—how far have the regime's practices become embedded in the participants' mutual relationships and their national systems
- the completeness of Scope/Coverage in terms of the area of impact and number of states taking part
- the quantifiable, and subjective, Costs and Benefits of the regime.

It will be clear that only some of these factors are easy to quantify, while the rating we give to others will depend among other things on how seriously we judge the risks the arms control measure was meant to combat, and how far it we really expected it to overcome them. (Such judgements would of course be made much easier if the people drafting the measures would spell out more clearly the nature and limits of their aims to start with.) Even so, I believe the developing such assessment systems and introducing them to the world of practical policy-making could have a double value at the present time. First, they should offer a correction to over-hasty and partial judgements on the value of joining, implementing, promoting and remaining within such measures—including people who are too idealistic about this as well as those who are too cynical. Secondly, this mode of thinking ought to help the designers (and further developers) of arms control measures to identify from the start the full range of elements which will determine their practical success, and to build in ways of guaranteeing these and so far as practicable: including, where necessary, by bringing non-arms control elements into the game.

If we can correctly identify arms control's comparative advantages; integrate it into many-sided and multi-purpose security strategies; and apply objective measures of value and efficiency, we will have gone a long way to eliminating the causes of 'bad' arms control as I described it at the outset. There is, however, still an important question about those aspects of "good" and "bad" arms control which lie more in the moral and philosophical dimension: what might be summed up as the issue of legitimacy or integrity of arms control.

In the last resort these are issues of personal judgement and belief, but I would suggest that there are at least three principles which are always a good guide and that their value has actually been heightened by the last couple of years' debates. The first and perhaps the biggest point is that if arms control is a good thing, it should not be a thing that only imposes on "bad guys". Keeping one's military capacity at the lowest possible level, holding back from the development of inhumane or destabilizing techniques, avoiding irresponsible exports, reducing other people's fear and uncertainty of one's intentions: these should be seen as the badges of internal democracy and international civilization, which the world's most "developed" countries should be able to wear more prominently and proudly than anyone else. There is of course a price to pay, not just for the capacity and perhaps the industrial profits that are lost, but also in terms of accepting that international legal obligations and scrutiny are going to intrude into our own sovereign territory. It is objectively easier for Europeans, and others who are living in a fully or partly integrated economic community, to go along with this because their territory is subject in so many other ways to common laws and supranational jurisdiction already. But I have to say that if the US as the world's greatest military power seeks to avoid such commitments—and to disown any existing or proposed arms control instruments which only make sense with such universal application—it will not just be putting at risk its chances of imposing lasting restrictions on other people, but its whole legitimacy and standing in the international system. I do not see how this can even help the US's own security in the end because of the implied message that other potential and emerging world powers can expect to obey fewer and fewer rules the more powerful they get. I am well aware that this is an argument that goes much wider than arms control.

All of us need to admit, however, that we have created some tricky problems with the principle of universality in the sphere of non-proliferation, because the very point of non-proliferation regimes is that some people are allowed to have such weapons (and help each other develop such weapons), and others not. Where categories of weapons are treated in such style, not just moral problems but extra practical problems arise because the blocking of transfers, monitoring and detection of what is illegal all become more complicated. The first point I would draw from this is that we should

do anything rather than permit an increase in the number of areas subject to a non-proliferation approach. Sliding into such a policy for arms which are totally banned at present, such as CW or BW, or for border-line inhumane and destabilizing new technologies, would be a grave mistake and one from which we are currently not far away. In the case of nuclear weapons, however, a return to universal abolition is not practical politics, and the challenge of legitimacy thus lies in another domain which I would define as: consistency. The story of the Iraq and North Korea crises in has shown that when problems develop with “proliferation”, the practical recipes for containing and reversing both the capabilities and the specific security threats involved may have to be quite different from case to case. This does not necessarily destroy the legitimacy of those trying to solve the problem, so long as we are very careful to keep a strong boundary between the means and the principle. It is problematic to state a principle that all proliferators have to be stopped by military force, or that one will never negotiate with proliferators, and then within a few months to be obliged to do something different. It is equally damaging to credibility if other known cases of proliferation are consistently handled with double standards and even with a veil of silence. Similar distortions can arise in other fields of arms control, for instance if the export controls applicable to a given region are relaxed to allow military aid to local friends who are helping in a current anti-terrorist campaign—the trouble being that if the friends are not sufficiently virtuous or reliable, the new arms might end up in terrorist hands anyway. The fact is that all judgements made by nations about other nations’ status as “good guys” or “bad guys” are bound to be to some degree subjective, and even when correctly applied at one point in time the labels will not stay stuck for ever. The less that arms control measures are introduced and applied at the discretion of a single State, the better the odds will be on avoiding or at least limiting such inconsistency. Multilateral regimes, and those involving a range of states with different backgrounds, are in this sense the safest: and placing such measures—especially where they involve enforcement, and always where they involve force—under the authority of the United Nations is the best safeguard of all.

Thirdly, transparency and clarity are both a goal of arms control in themselves, and an important condition for its practical and moral strength. As a minimum, it should be clear both to the participants and to outside observers what is to be controlled, what the cuts/controls entail, and how implementation will be measured and disputes adjudicated. Without this, neither the parties nor anyone else can gauge the real security logic of the measure; positive knock-on effects—like other people disarming—are unlikely, and the result could even be to generate greater suspicion and uncertainty. It is fair to say that these minimum requirements can be met in different ways, including unilateral declarations at least on the first two points. In most imaginable circumstances, even a political agreement with-

out transparent verification mechanisms is much better than no arms control at all. In cases of “packaging”, the non-arms control transactions involved may in practice bring extra incentives, checks and balances which help to ensure a positive outcome. All this said, however, I think we would have to agree that legitimacy can best be safeguarded when agreements take a legal and binding form, when all their major operative details can be published, and when adjudication is placed in the hands of some objective international authority. These are also the conditions which are most likely to ensure that the relevant elements of democratic control—involvement of non-governmental experts, free media commentary, and scrutiny by representative institutions—can be guaranteed.

To conclude, I do not believe it is the need for change that threatens the integrity of arms control. Some of the sharper scrutiny which people are subjecting it to today is overdue. Applying criteria of efficiency and practical utility is perfectly fair. Combining arms control with other measures to promote a given security end need not damage it and may indeed be the key to keeping it relevant as well as effective. The real threats to good arms control are pretty much the same as the threats to good security policy generally: selfishness, selectiveness and partiality, lack of transparency and plain bad faith.

Dear friends, I would not wish to close without paying tribute to the relationships based on good faith, transparency, fairness and generosity which have made it possible for us to gather here today to celebrate the Russian edition of our Yearbook. The generous and far-sighted support of the foundation for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the steadfast and highly professional partnership of IMEMO have not only brought great benefits for us at SIPRI but have, I believe, shown a wonderful example of the way different countries and their experts can work together in the greater cause of peace. I hope that you will enjoy what we have jointly produced, and that we shall be able to meet together here to debate the greatest challenges of international cooperation and security for many years to come.

2. IRAQ CRISIS IN WORLD POLITICS: BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS

Aleksei ARBATOV

Not only has the crisis around Iraq become a major international development in 2002–2003, but it will have a long-term impact on regional and global politics, including relations between the leading powers, the prospects for world legal order and the UN role, as well as on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the combat international terrorism.

Hussein's regime—the corpus delicti

It is common knowledge that the Iraqi regime was one of the most cruel, repressive and dangerous dictatorships of our time. It was based on the physical destruction of any kind of political opposition, and the oppression of national minorities and religious dissent within the country. On more than one occasion did Baghdad commit acts of armed aggression against the neighboring Moslem countries, using chemical weapons both in and outside the country. It elaborated large-scale development programs aimed at obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iraq provided support to Palestinian terrorists, systematically violated UN sanctions, and hindered international inspections in the 90s. Having agreed to resume UN inspections under the threat of military action by the United States, the Iraqi regime did not provide adequate support for international inspections (as was stipulated by UN Security Council resolution No. 1441) and turned the inspections into a political bargaining chip.

All this is true, but a fundamental question arose in this respect: what should the civilized world community have done with that regime? Destroy it because the regime was basically “evil”, or put aside any assessment of its nature and, instead of passing judgment, focus on curbing the specific

threats emanating from the regime—attempts to acquire WMD, ties with terrorists and an inclination towards aggression against neighbors? All these specific threats should have been corroborated by convincing proofs, regardless of the generally negative attitude towards Iraq, and corresponding measures should have been taken against Iraq based on the UN Charter.

If the first option was chosen, then which provisions of international law should have been used for punishing Iraq? In the past, there had been convincing reasons for that choice—Iraq had systematically been engaged in genocide of the Kurdish minority between 1960 and 1980 (with over a 100,000 thousand people killed). But at that time, the great powers (and hence the UN Security Council) had more important things than “trifles” on their hands. At first, the USSR was improving its relations with Iraq and inundating it with military hardware. Then it was the US that supported and armed the same “evil” Hussein in his treacherous aggression against Iran. It so happened that it was Iran who had become the main regional enemy for the United States, and that was why Washington, as well as other Western capitals, preferred to turn a blind eye to the Baghdad regime's crimes in a perfectly pragmatic, if not to say cynical, manner.

After Baghdad's defeat in the war of 1990-91 and in accordance with the UN Security Council's sanctions, the Kurds in the North, primarily, due to the “no-fly zones” in Iraq have become virtually independent of and protected from Baghdad. As for the crushing of the Shia opposition in the South, this was ignored even after 1991 because of the Shiites' ties with Iran.

However, a more general question arises in this context—who has the authority to pass a verdict on “evil” regimes and to execute it, and on what grounds? Does it mean, that we should proclaim a crusade and topple them all by an external force? And what is to be done after that—impose democracy and prosperity? It would be interesting to see how that kind of approach would work, for example, in Zaire, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Myanmar... At that moment, the international community had enough problems in Afghanistan on its hands. At the same time, the selection of “rogue states” made by the US, Russia, Western Europe, China or India would be very different, which in itself could result in large-scale international collisions. In any case, there were no grounds for everybody to follow the zigzags of Washington's likes and dislikes in resolving such global problems. This kind of a new all-embracing strategy called for serious transformations in international law and the mechanisms of its implementation.

If the second principle was to be used as a guideline, that is Iraq should have been punished not for its general misbehavior, but rather for specific actions, there existed a solid legal foundation laid by UN Security Council's resolutions. However, no military action against Iraq in late 2002–early 2003, could be viewed as justified by those resolutions. By that time,

UN inspections had disclosed no convincing proofs of Iraq's violations of UN resolutions related to WDM. The lack of any specific "crime" could by no means be interpreted as proof that Iraq was covering-up any related activities that could give ground for the use of force against it,—as a Russian saying goes, "not caught—not a thief." In the absence of facts of Iraqi violations, given the regime's criminal record, the only correct conclusion would have been: the inspections had to be continued on a wider scale without any right for Hussein to reject them. Even if the banned weapons or materials had been detected, this should have resulted in the destruction of the relevant facilities under international supervision, as well as a tightening of the sanctions regime, but not necessarily in the use of military force.

Only Hussein's sabotage of inspections or any hostile action against them, as well as an attack on neighboring countries or foreign forces deployed in the region could have given ground for the use of force and regime change by a foreign power. Even in that case military action against Iraq should have been authorized by a special UN Security Council resolution. Such a course of events would have been longer and more complicated as compared to unilateral military action. However, very often in politics, a seemingly simpler and faster way is not necessarily the correct one, and, in the long-term may prove to be harder, and sometimes even leads to an impasse or defeat. The legal international procedures are aimed exactly at preventing high-handedness, miscalculations or abuse of power by any country that may destroy the world legal order and joint efforts by states to resolve common problems.

Moreover, there were no reasons for a hasty tackling of the Iraq problem once the UN inspections had been resumed, if we do not accept such reasons as the Bush administration's domestic political obligations and the whipping up of war hysteria in the United States in a state of shock after the tragedy of September 11.

Washington's policies aimed at taking hasty military action against Baghdad without waiting for any convincing proof of Iraq's violations took the anti-Saddam measures out of the sphere of international law into a zone of arbitrariness by the strong, thus undermining UN prestige, and splitting the anti-terrorist coalition.

By all accounts, non-proliferation and the war on terrorism were not the only worries for the United States, posed by the Iraqi problem, as shown by later developments. Along with domestic political obligations and general global ambitions, Washington's main goal seemed to be to set up a pro-American regime in Iraq as a new basis for US influence in the region, and, among other things, as a major military and political counterbalance to Iran. That country was and remains an insurmountable obstacle to US hegemony in the region. Iran is getting stronger every year, and even power-

ful pressure was unable to stop contacts between Teheran and Moscow in the sphere of the arms trade and transfer of nuclear-energy technologies.

It may also be supposed that Washington was counting on lower oil prices after the regime change in Baghdad and the “tapping” of Iraqi oil resources. The US also hoped to weaken OPEC and lessen fuel dependence on Saudi Arabia—a politically unstable country that tarnished its image by ties with international terrorism.

Certain people in the US administration and think-tanks close to it, harbored even more far-reaching plans, i.e.—to replace unstable regimes or those not loyal to the United States (in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and certainly, Iran) with more stable and friendly ones, as had been the case in Central and Eastern Europe. In this way, this economically and geostrategically important region, dangerous due to radical Islam, international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, could be turned from a source of threats and vulnerability for the United States into a new bridge-head and reserve of resources for its influence in the world as the only global super-power.

At the same time, the problem of WMD itself, was not just a pretext for Washington. Let us imagine, that the United States had decided not to go to war and to carry on with UN inspections. Baghdad would not stand in the inspectors' way, all the banned “catches” would be destroyed under international supervision and Hussein would stay in power. Logically, after doing their job, the inspectors would pack up and go home, the bulk of the US military contingent would also go home, all the sanctions would be lifted, and Iraqi oil would flow freely to the world market. Quite possibly, after that Iraq might use its petrodollars to covertly renew the development of WMD and their delivery systems. Iraq restores its army to such a degree as to be able, being armed to its teeth, by the time of the next crisis, to confront the US, having among other things, a missile-nuclear potential. It is quite clear that Washington could not have put up with such a prospect. Moscow kept silent about such a scenario, as did all those who were opposed to war.

On the other hand, it does not behove the international community to blindly follow in the wake of the US military strategy, despite the fact that the US is the most powerful country in the world. US policies are aimed at serving exclusively US interests and only such US interests as are advanced by the most hawkish and ideologically radical wing of the present administration. Neither the UN, nor other states are obliged to unconditionally support the US in that respect—since they may have quite different interests and another view of the problem. Moreover, the problem in question is the most serious issue in international relations—the use of force with unpredictable consequences and at tremendous costs. To say nothing of the victims among the civilian population, the devastation and the humanitarian consequences of a war.

Russia's interests and dilemmas

Russia engaged in a very delicate, multilateral diplomacy around the Iraqi question, but perfect tactics were not accompanied by a very visible strategy and priority of goals. Russia seemed to be trying to simultaneously preserve good relations with the US, France, Germany, Baghdad, and in addition, with the possible future Iraqi leadership that would replace the existing one. However, the developing situation put the question ever more bluntly and made Moscow's diverse interests increasingly incompatible. For example, the partnership with the US and the desire not to allow the US to go to war against Iraq; special relations with Washington and policies coordinated with Paris and Berlin; maintaining ties with Hussein and furthering Moscow's interests after a possible regime change, the desire to have the sanctions lifted and high oil prices.

It goes without saying that a political solution to the crisis rather than war, the strengthening of the UN and international legal order, non-proliferation of WMD and consolidation of the anti-terrorist coalition—all these officially proclaimed goals were indeed very noble. Apart from these, Russia had more pragmatic interests, such as the repayment of Baghdad's debt (\$7 billion), the impact of renewed Iraqi oil exports on world oil prices, the development of the West Kurna oil-field promised by Hussein to Lukoil and other Russian oil companies. But how were these related to the concrete situation in the Persian Gulf and the Security Council in New York?

The United States and Great Britain submitted a new draft resolution to the Security Council that gave them a free hand for a military operation based on insufficient proof of Iraqi violations. It was clear that Russia could not vote in favor. Neither could it vote against, i.e. to veto the draft resolution together with France and China (two other permanent members of the Security Council having the right of veto) would have meant directly challenging and confronting the United States. Unilateral military action against Iraq would have undoubtedly taken place anyway, which Russia would have been unable to prevent either politically, let alone, militarily.

It would have been difficult to explain that Russia was acting in support of the supremacy of law and not to defend Hussein, especially in the context of the official attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the Baghdad regime that was maintained until the last moment.

At the same time, Moscow would have paid a higher price than all the others for doing so. France was backed by the whole European Union (EU), and it also had the power of veto in NATO. China is not very vulnerable to the US, apart from the huge economic interests that the two countries have in common. Russia's situation is much more vulnerable and Russia would have been punished in every possible manner—from acces-

sion to WTO to space launches, from problems with CIS and the Baltic states to the \$20 billion that the US and EU were going to pay for the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons, and from Russian involvement in NATO through the Russia–NATO Council to the May, 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. And what for? For a bloody dictator who should be tried by the International Court of Justice in the Hague at best?

In a sense, a unilateral military operation by the US and its allies without any additional resolution by the Security Council was a better option for Russia. This allowed Russia to escape the dilemma of the vote. Formally, Moscow could have denounced the US military action (as it had been the case with the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and NATO enlargement), but in practice, Russia's direct loss would have been less. It could have been anticipated that in the case of a blitzkrieg, Washington would be interested in Moscow's assistance in the post-war settlement and restoration. If the operation had “bogged down” and the situation around Iraq had gone out of control, the US would have sought even more assistance from Russia and would have been ready to “pay” on other issues of mutual relations.

Despite the fact that, for obvious reasons, there is no evidence to that effect, it would be logical to suppose, that such kind of an unpublicized agreement had been the subject of intensive diplomatic exchanges between Moscow and Washington. Moreover, the balance of votes in the UN Security Council showed that even without a veto by any of the permanent members (i.e., if Russia, China and France had abstained), the new resolution had no chance of being adopted, anyway. As a result, the US and Great Britain recalled their draft resolution.

However, a war without a Security Council authorization was far from being the best option. It was clear that this would deal a blow to UN prestige, would cause a rift in the anti-terrorist coalition and other pernicious consequences, as well as an explosion of anti-American sentiment inside Russia. The chain reaction of an escalation of the crisis spreading deep and wide was fraught with the danger of a head-on confrontation between Moscow and Washington (especially given the fact that their political elites have accumulated a large fund of mutual mistrust and anger behind the backs of their presidents, amiably talking to each other).

Special mention should be made of Russia's economic interests in Iraq. It should have been clear, even at that time, that under any scenario the prospects were far from promising. In the case of a regime change, Iraq would start exporting oil, and the Russian budget would lose its main source of surplus. Further more, the total Iraqi debt is \$62 billion, and it would not be the Russian portion that the new regime would hurry to pay back. The West could have written off an equivalent sum from the Russian debt in exchange for Russia's political support on Iraq, but the United

States is not the main creditor, whereas Germany and other main creditors are unwilling to lose money in exchange for Russia's support for dubious US actions. In any case, Russia's losses due to lower oil prices would have been much higher than the repaid debt. As for the oil field, when Hussein allotted it to Russian companies, it was clearly not motivated by economics but by politics, and it was exactly for that reason that the deal was scrapped in late 2002. There was absolutely no guarantee that another Iraqi leader would prefer Russian companies to their western competitors.

What was the best Russia could have done in a situation, when as a Russian saying goes: "whatever you do, you lose." It could be argued that a better scenario could have been possible. Under that scenario, instead of engaging in further diplomatic maneuvering between the United States, Western Europe and Iraq, Moscow should have taken the initiative (and responsibility) for a radically new approach to solving the problem.

A special UN resolution should have authorized broader inspections in Iraq on a long-term basis with the use of all the available technical methods. To support the inspectors (and also to protect them from terrorism) an appropriate international military force should have been deployed in Iraq (such an idea was outlined at some point by France and Germany). To make Saddam more inclined to giving in, the international force should have been deployed in the Persian Gulf area on a long-term basis. In any case, the costs of maintaining such a force would have been lower by one order of magnitude than the costs of a war. Russia should have taken an affordable part in all those operations.

In addition, the Iraqi army should have been radically reduced both in numerical strength and materiel, and together with the secret police, placed under international control. Similar measures should have been taken against the Iraqi industry that may have played a role in the manufacture of WMD and delivery systems. There were also strong grounds for launching an international investigation into acts of genocide against the Kurdish population, as well as into the regime's military crimes against Iran, Kuwait and Israel. Any attempt by Baghdad at thwarting those measures, taken under the UN auspices, could have been considered as a reason for a forceful change of regime.

Under those conditions, Iraq would have posed no threat even after the sanctions were lifted. Hussein would not have become "a hero" and "a martyr" in the eyes of the whole Moslem world. In all probability, he would have lost his influence one way or another and would have been removed from power. It would then have been much easier for Russia to build good relationships with his successor.

It is easy to predict a lot of objections against such an initiative. At the same time, it is clear that if there was anything that could have prevented a war with all its consequences—only radical innovations of this

kind could have done the job. They could have been in line with Russia's regional and global political interests as nothing else could have. They would have given a serious warning to other countries seeking WMD, aiding and abetting terrorism and committing crimes against humanity.

A consolidation of the anti-terrorist coalition including moderate Moslem states would have become possible, as well as a strengthening of the international legal and institutional basis for combating terrorism and stepping-up political, military and intelligence cooperation of countries in that field. That would have contributed to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and to denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, such an initiative by Moscow never materialized, though it had been recommended by certain well-known experts and politicians. The lack of clear priorities in the practice (but not the rhetoric) of Russian foreign policy played a role in this respect as well as the desire not to aggravate relations either with Baghdad or Washington. This, in its turn resulted in a lack of coordination between the executive agencies, and the fact that Russian diplomacy remained timid and passive behind the veil of intensive visits, meetings, consultations and declarations. A certain role was played by the Russian oil lobbyists and contradictory emotions in Parliament (where the majority were sympathetic to Saddam for ideological or more prosaic reasons).

As for the United States, the Bush administration showed no enthusiasm for those ideas. The administration was already set for military action and was afraid that any attractive alternatives would make it harder, and change the balance of forces between the Pentagon and the Department of State in favor of the latter, and invigorate the opposition to the war in Congress and public opinion.

Nevertheless, an alternative to the military operation would have been realistic. It would have been difficult for the United States to oppose such a course, especially if it had been supported by Russia, the majority of West European countries and members of the UN Security Council. It is even more true, because such a course would have led to the removal of Saddam's regime anyway, but without a war, without a deterioration of US relations with Russia and its own allies, without a deterioration contradictions in home-policy in the US and in Europe, and without the US having to bear the brunt of the military conflict, as well as its consequences and a post-war settlement.

The night of March 19th to 20th, 2003 saw the beginning of the war by the US and its few allies against Iraq. A new page in international politics was opened.

A new-type military operation

The military part of the operation, as had been predicted by certain commentators, was conducted by the United States and its allies at the highest level of the modern art of war with the use of state-of-the-art weaponry and equipment. It goes without saying, that there were some surprises, as is always the case in any war. Umm-Kasr and Basra put up resistance until the very end, whereas Baghdad, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein had promised to turn it into another Stalingrad, virtually surrendered without a fight. The army and the militia did not disperse in the first days of the war, as the Americans had thought, but fought stubbornly doing the best they could. As for the proverbial national guard that was expected to stage valiant battles; they, on the contrary, disappeared quietly from the scene leaving their equipment and weaponry behind. This is usually the case with privileged "elite" troops faced by a serious enemy and not engaged in punitive actions against civilians or poorly organized guerrilla forces. The dire prophecies about the future of the anti-Iraqi coalition by eccentric Russian politicians and traditionally thinking military experts once again turned out to be worthless.

Strategic analysts were once again surprised by the US military. This time there were no protracted, weeks-long, aerial and cruise-missile campaigns, as was the case during "Desert Storm" in 1991 or in Yugoslavia in 1999. From the very first day of the war, deep raids of the Army mechanized units were carried out in closest coordination with aerial support, along with strikes by high-accuracy missiles and bombs on targets in the enemy rear.

The US forces did not stage any frontal offensives, or stormed towns, neither did they try to hoist a flag by a date set at the top and report to Washington as soon as possible. The highest priority in this military operation was to minimize the coalition's own casualties, and, if possible, to limit the collateral damage to the local population and property. It goes without saying, that, as is the case in any war, there were errors: crashes, bombs and missiles missing their targets (landing on different facilities and even different countries), there were civilian casualties and those from friendly fire. Exhausted and angry soldiers fired at peaceful civilians, journalists and even diplomats. This was certainly a tragedy, as is any war, regardless of its scale, and in the first place, for those who suffer in it.

However, military analysts discarding their emotions, should first of all assess the objective parameters of the operation. And here it is impossible not to be over impressed. The US and British forces comprising about 250 thousand officers and men, 1,000 aircraft, 2,000 pieces of armor and 1,000 pieces of artillery, 70 ships and submarines and deployed thousands of kilometers away from their bases were able to occupy in

force a big country in four weeks. A little over 100 thousand troops were directly involved in the fighting. The air force made around 30 thousand sorties. The enemy was pounded by 20 thousand missiles and bombs (80 percent of them were guided, high-accuracy weapons). The Iraqi army of 450 thousand men (with 600 thousand reserve troops) having 6,000 pieces of armor and 2,000 pieces of artillery (designed in the 60s and 70s), but with a weak air force and a weak navy was destroyed. The most significant was the ratio of losses sustained by the coalition and the Iraqi army. 200 to 900 killed in action and 270 to 3,000 wounded. The allies lost 3 airplanes and 12 helicopters. Civilian casualties are estimated at 1,300 dead and 5,000 wounded.

A different question is whether the victory was worth the losses. This lies within the sphere of politics and morality. As for the purely military dimension, despite all the sensitivity of the issue, we cannot but make comparisons with the operations of the Russian army in Chechnya. We leave a detailed study of all the aspects of these operations to the military experts, and will limit ourselves only to general remarks.

It goes without saying, that Chechnya is different from Iraq, but in a lot of aspects, these differences objectively both favored and hindered the campaigns of 1994-96 and 1999-2000 in the North Caucasus. Even if we take the relatively better prepared, second operation (the first one was simply a disaster), even so it took over three months for a 100,000-men-strong army to occupy a territory dozens of times smaller than that of Iraq, despite the fact that the enemy numbered at best 10-15 thousand men and had virtually no heavy equipment. According to official data, the Russian army and other units lost about 3 thousand killed and 8 thousand wounded during the active military phase, while the illegal armed formations lost about 10 thousand men killed. Civilian casualties are not known and were not counted by anyone, but are, probably, to the tune of dozens of thousands. The town of Grozny was completely destroyed, as well as a number of other settlements.

A mere statement of these facts should not give rise to any spite, though it cannot but cause bitter feelings about the plight of the Russian army and concern over the future of the country's defense. What is needed from the Russian military leadership is not retreat into insulted silence, but to draw impartial lessons from those two campaigns, different as they are, and to report honestly to the President and Parliament. If, of course, they are guided not by an erroneously perceived "esprit de corps", but by a desire to change the conditions of the Russian army and other armed services for the better.

One can win the war and lose the peace

After the brilliant “feast” of American military might, gloomy post-war days set in. Iraq was engulfed with massive marauding and a wave of crime, coupled with a lack of basic sanitary conditions, water supply and medical care. But these events were “peanuts” compared with much worse that was to come. In the South, the Shia movement gained momentum under fundamentalist colors. In the North, Kurds are awaiting national self-determination as a reward for support given to the United States. Bloody clashes began to take place between the occupation forces and the local population the majority of whom do not greet the Americans as liberators, but on the contrary, demand their speedy withdrawal (the far-sighted British began withdrawing their contingent as soon as the operation was over). A guerilla war began to be waged in Iraq with a wide use of terror, including its most dangerous manifestations—suicide bombers. They target not only servicemen but also civilians and UN facilities and personnel.

The paradox of the situation is that the more democracy Iraq will have, the stronger will be the position of Shiites (60 % of the country's population) and the more regional influence the country will have (and its role in OPEC)—to the indignation of the US and the neighboring Sunni Arab countries. At the same time, the more active and independent the Kurds will be—the greater dissatisfaction of Turkey. On the other hand, the less democracy Iraq will have, the more acute will be the internal conflicts in the country, and tougher the repression by the new Baghdad regime—now under the protection of US bayonets, and the responsibility resting with the US. The idea of Iraqi democratization turned out to be not as glamorous in real life as it had seemed in the White House declarations.

An erosion of the UN mission in Afghanistan takes place on the wave of Islamic extremism and anti-Americanism. The Taliban and Al-Kaida are restoring their influence in the rural areas. As had been expected, international terrorism has begun a new global attack on Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Israel, Spain, France, and Chechnya... Despite the fact that the pro-Western regimes in the Islamic countries of the region are still able to withstand the pressure from fundamentalists, their future after the war has become not more but less secure.

At the same time, the concern that the war might give a strong impetus to the process of the spread of WMD, seems to have come true. North Korea having withdrawn from the Non-proliferation Treaty, has officially declared the revival of its nuclear program. Iran and some other countries will probably follow suit to protect themselves against US military high-handedness and against one another.

Neither large stores of chemical weapons, nor terrorist camps were found in Iraq. Thus, the formal reasons behind the military operations fall

apart, though few people in America question the military operation amidst the fanfare of victory. The hasty demands by Washington to lift the UN sanctions and renew export of oil, as well as the granting of contracts to US companies to restore the oil fields give ground of believing that there had been motives behind the military action other than WMD, links with terrorists or Saddam Hussein's inhumane regime. The growing instability in Iraq and its vicinities, the bogging down of Washington in the Iraqi and regional conflicts may soon radically change the assessment of the Bush administration's policies even in the US itself and among its loyal allies.

Even if the war is to be considered a continuation of policies by other means, as Clausewitz' sacramental formula goes, the US have demonstrated a unique case to the world. The Americans have artfully won the war, but they are failing in the policies that the Iraq war was supposed to be a means for. The colossal military superiority engendered incredible arrogance on the part of the administration, disregard for diplomacy and an information campaign. No attention was paid to giving convincing grounds for the US position and to seeking compromises in the UN and in negotiations with allies and partners within the anti-terrorist coalition. There was no careful planning for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and the region.

As a result, having defeated Hussein's army and regime and having acquired access to Iraqi oil, the US has lost something much more important—the moral and political leadership in the world, the sympathies and support of public opinion in Western Europe and Russia (to say nothing about the Islamic peoples, China, India and other countries), which the US acquired after the tragedy of September 11. Even the unity of the American people is split.

Pragmatists in Russia and abroad might view those as ephemeral factors incomparable to the tangible values of the enlarged US assets in the form of oil (money) and military might. But in the long-term perspective, it is such intangible values that determine the success or failure of policies and even the rise and fall of great powers. It should not be forgotten that many empires (including the Soviet one) broke up when the intangible idea that had cemented them degenerated—and nothing could then save them—neither the huge arsenals of weapons, nor the huge reserves of energy or other resources.

US action in Iraq deeply compromised the very idea of a common front of different countries in the fight against the new common threat—international terrorism and its access to WMD. That coalition was formed after the shock of September 11 and did a brilliant job in conducting, on the basis of UN resolutions, a US-led joint operation to eradicate Taliban hornets' nest of terrorism in Afghanistan. But the way the Iraq expedition

was later conducted greatly undermined the unity of that coalition. In the future any actions against any country under the slogan of combating the proliferation of WMD and terrorism will be viewed due to the Iraqi experience with serious suspicion by the world community that there may be some other tacit and unilateral objectives and interests behind this.

Thus, the US has wasted a great moral and political capital only to gain a military victory over a relatively weak enemy. And now it will be so much harder for the US to find agreement and cooperation with Russia, China, India and other countries in solving the upcoming problems related to North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. Those countries pose a far greater threat than Iraq in terms of WMD proliferation and support for international terrorism.

Russia: balance of payments and credits...

The Iraq crisis provides important lessons for Russia's foreign policy. Being rightly against the hasty and unfounded use of force, Moscow became too much involved in the tactics of diplomatic manoeuvring trying to preserve good relations with everyone: with both the US and the leading countries of Western Europe (France and Germany) and with Hussein's regime (guided by its oil and financial interests). These energetic tactics filled the vacuum created by the lack of strategy and clear-cut foreign-policy priorities.

As a result, Moscow did not succeed in preventing the war and the collapse of the Baghdad regime. Neither did it succeed in strengthening the supremacy of UN Security Council and of international law over the law of the strong. Though the US decided not to have a show-down and recalled the draft resolution authorizing the military action, in order not to force Russia together with France, to use its veto (perhaps, under a backstage agreement)—Russian-American relations were radically spoiled by the whole objective course of the hostilities.

In retrospect, it is always much easier to give advice. In this particular case, the course of events had been predictable for a long time, and proposals had been put forward a long time ago that could have led to different results. As far back as the autumn of 2002, when after the well-known speech by President Bush it should have been clear that Hussein's regime was doomed. In the first place, because of his mockery of the UN resolutions, his brazen sabotage of the inspections in the 1990s (and his derisive actions after their renewal in 2002), and his irresponsible bluffing around WMD and ballistic missiles. No matter what Washington's motives were, the provocative policies of Baghdad made the toppling of the regime inevitable. The only question was how and when.

Under those conditions, the only alternative to unilateral military action by the US inspired by the victory in Afghanistan could only be the above-mentioned widening of the inspections authorized by the UN Security Council with strong military support and deployment of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf area to put pressure on Hussein.

If at that time, in the autumn of 2002, Moscow had made its final choice (and if Evgeny Primakov's mission to propose Saddam's resignation had taken place not in early 2003 but in late 2002) Russia could have become the initiator of a new course toward Iraq—and the whole course of events would have been different, as would have been its consequences for Russian interests. But Russia was unable to drop the Baghdad regime and tried to manoeuvre to keep sitting on several chairs—with the predictable outcome, when the chairs moved apart after the first strikes by US cruise missiles.

But Russia, France and Germany until the last moment, insisted on a continuation of “non-force” UN inspections though the Hussein regime was quite adapted to them and turned them into an object of incessant political tricks.

It is clear that history knows no subjunctive mood, but is Moscow's line correct in the situation developing after the war? Following the swift destruction of the Iraqi army, Moscow started making new mistakes. All of a sudden, after a protracted period of inflexibility before the war, Russian diplomacy became flurried. Declarations were made to the effect that Russia was not interested in a US military defeat. Together with some West European countries Russia demanded that Iraq's post-war reconstruction should be transferred under the UN auspices. In line with a proposal from Washington Moscow spoke about a possibility of writing off the Iraqi debt and hinted that it would be a good idea to give Russian companies access to the restoration of the Iraqi oil sector.

No matter what was said, the main idea of the UN Security Council resolution unanimously passed (in the absence of Syria) on May 22, 2003 was to retroactively legitimize the US and British occupation, and hence the military action in Iraq itself. Having refused its authorization for a war because of the absence of convincing grounds, the UN legalized that action post factum, despite the fact that this absence was fully corroborated. Contrary to the statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry, if a spade is to be called a spade, it was not “the Iraqi issue which was returned to the legal sphere of the United Nations” but the United Nations, due to the efforts by the members of its Security Council, were returned to the sphere of US foreign and military policies.

The UN Special Representative will hardly play a significant role in monitoring the establishment of the new Iraqi government under Washington's leadership, nor will international organizations in monitoring the

use of money from the Iraq Assistance Foundation received from the oil export. The lifting of the UN sanctions without the return of international inspectors, something that Moscow had insisted on, will be by no means compensated for by the planned mission to Iran of IAEA inspectors, or by the vague mentioning of the importance of attesting Iraq's disarmament at some point in the future.

It would be naive to think that as a result of these measures the UN role will increase. On the contrary, it will be weakened because of the serious precedent of military action by the US and its allies despite the UN refusal to authorize such an action even though it was subsequently legalized by the UN Security Council.

That precedent will certainly play a role in future Washington's decisions on future military actions, whereas the reasoning of the American supporters of multilateral and legitimate actions will raise nothing but laughter.

The most paradoxical in all this is that in its paroxysm of self-assurance the US at first put up strong resistance to UN involvement in the Iraqi crisis. Only under pressure from France, Germany and Russia and with British mediation, the US allowed this to happen, having yielded almost nothing and won everything—they received a complete indulgence for the Iraq war and created a precedent for the future.

As for the economic aspect of the problem, the extension by two months of the oil-for-food program (where Russian companies used to make some money), as well as hazy promises to exchange the Iraqi debt for the Soviet one in the Club of Paris, as well as possible compensations that might be paid to Russian companies for the lost contract for the Kurna-2 oil-field—all this could hardly be considered a serious victory by Russian diplomacy. Much more could have been gained, if from the very beginning Moscow had taken its place in the wake of Washington's policy, the way Britain had done, for example. This all the more so, that the previous principled line (not to give UN authorization for an unfounded military action) has now been devalued by voting in favor of a resolution legitimizing the war.

We should not expect any serious economic hand-outs as a result of the Iraq crisis, though in fact, they are not all that important for the Russian economy. Perhaps, with the exception of the world oil prices which will be influenced, first of all, by the line of OPEC, other exporters and the global economic environment, but not by attempts at reaching agreement with Washington. By the way, the above-mentioned UN Security Council resolution has already brought about a reduction in those prices.

The question arises, what Russia had to do in the event—shake fists after the fight and seek a confrontation with the US and veto the new UN resolution, this time alone—without France and Germany? But, in the first place, we should not have pressed for UN interference in the post-war set-

tlement in Iraq with the blessing of the US. In any case, not until the US got bogged down in the Iraqi and regional problems and asked for help. Secondly, when the US decided to raise the question of lifting the sanctions in the Security Council, we should have expeditiously promoted our own resolution covering the whole range of important issues: the UN role, the return of inspectors, the formation of the new Iraqi government and control over Iraq's oil export. Let Washington face the dilemma of either use its veto and aggravate contradictions with the world community even further, or look for a balanced compromise.

Buttresses for Moscow's further policies

Among all the negative aspects of the Iraqi saga for Russia's foreign interests, there are two positive ones from the experience of the pre-war period. The first is the fact that Moscow, for the first time in many years, demonstrated the ability to steer an independent course, not following in the wake of the US, when US policies run counter to the interests of international security, are guided exclusively by unilateral interests and are at odds with international law. What a more, in this case, opposition to the US did not result in sliding down to confrontation and cold war. The other is, that for the first time in New History, in a situation of acute contradictions with the US, Russia acted in close cooperation with the other leading countries of Europe. This fact showed that any accusations from Washington and Brussels against Moscow, that it suffered from a recurrent fit of the cold war, were completely unfounded. At the same time inside Russia, this did not allow nationalists and leftists to, once more, play the card of "eternal confrontation" between Moscow and the West.

Those important assets, few as they are, should be preserved and multiplied, by creating a constructive arsenal of the Russian foreign policies to be used in the long-term. It is necessary to maintain self-restraint and dignity, not to be flurried and not to lose the newly-acquired resource in trying to make some tactical gains. The Iraqi saga is far from over. The process of the stabilization of Iraq and its resurrection must be inseparably linked to the expansion of the international peace-keeping presence in the country and not just returning the problem to the UN. Still more important is the fact that the UN role should not become "a fig leaf" to retroactively legalize the US military action and occupation, but be a real mechanism for a settlement of the crisis in Iraq and around it, as well as of the US conflict with international law and its institutions, in the first place, with the UN. The restoration of peace, law and order in Iraq should proceed in such a way as to exclude in future any military high-handedness against other regions and problems by the US or any other large global or regional power.

As for Russian–American relations, between the extremes of returning to confrontation with the US or of following in its wake, there is a wide range of other political courses, worthy and productive. A principled position on Iraq does not exclude, but rather presupposes continued cooperation with the US in areas where such cooperation is in line with the interests of Russia and global security. Such a course adopted by Moscow would be more respected and taken into account by the US itself. It could lay the foundation for a further rapprochement between Russia and its main neighbors in Europe (and the European Union as a whole) not only in the economic, humanitarian and legal fields, but also in foreign and military policies. It is there that the huge reserves for cooperation and greater joint influence on the world arena lie.

3. THE SECOND GULF WAR AND REFORM OF RUSSIA'S ARMED FORCES

Vladimir DVORKIN, Yuri FEDOROV

Introduction

The decisions taken in mid-2003 (on partial transfer to contract army, on structural reorganization of armed forces and on priorities for military technology developments) have shown that in the military build-up of Russia, the substance of lessons of recent wars, including the second Gulf war, led by the USA and its allies, are not taken into account. Obviously it will take time to make an operational-strategic analysis of the second Gulf War and to draw conclusions. But the time is not the only matter. The Russian military leadership is not ready for a profound reformation of the country's armed forces, though such a reform is necessary to bring the state of the armed forces in accordance with Russia's geostrategic situation and the resources available for defense needs. Discussions about the reasons for the Iraqi war and, more important, its consequences, including Russia's security, are continuing. This makes it more difficult to correct the military build-up, which is impossible without a clear understanding of the big changes in the world.

The second Iraqi War: some strategic results

The war in Iraq has become an element of a new "bipolar" opposition, encompassing most of the key regions of the world. Countries, including Russia, which are interested in stability, development and globalization, have increasingly to face extremist forces, which are getting support from

some governments. Those forces are governed by radical ideologies, mostly stemming from fundamentalist Islam. Their main weaponry is terrorism, efforts to get access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their use them, among other purposes, for terrorist actions.

A failure of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to work out a common position on the eve of the war in Iraq has put in question the future of the UN as an effective instrument for ensuring peace and stability. In addition, rules of international law, based on the so-called West-falen system, do not correspond to the new situation emerging in the world.

The war has proved the effectiveness of the “military revolution”, which found its expression in a massive use of the newest technologies to increase the combat capabilities of conventional armed forces. The USA has demonstrated that it is the only state, which is able and ready to use its power against extremist regimes and terrorist movements on a global scale. Those regimes and movements, according to US logic, give birth to threats that can not be neutralized with the help of the usual means of deterrence, including nuclear weapons. It is necessary to undertake preventive steps in order to eliminate terrorist organization and to replace extremist ruling groups with more reasonable and preferably democratizing regimes. In doing so, the USA does not wish to make its security dependent on decisions taken by the UN, NATO, or to take into account the opinions of some of its allies. If necessary the USA is ready to act unilaterally whether this is approved by the international community or not.

This strategy meets with different reaction in the world, including disapproval from some US allies in NATO. But attempts made by France and Germany to form a coalition, capable of being an effective opponent to the USA, have failed. These attempts have only led to an explosion of contradictions that undermined NATO’s perspectives and European integration in the field of defense and security. If centrifugal tendencies in the Euroatlantic community cannot be overcome, the political and military role of Europe may substantially diminish.

Europe’s lagging behind the USA in military capabilities is the main reason for this. The countries of Europe, except for France and Great Britain, are incapable of undertaking any significant combat operations beyond the borders of the continent on their own. The formation of a united European force is progressing slowly. In 1997-2001 the difference between US military expenditure and that of the European members of NATO has increased from \$130 billion to almost \$160 billion.¹ Europe’s backwardness is particularly sensitive in key areas: high-precision weapons, combat direction, signal, reconnaissance and target designation systems, which all depend mainly on orbital systems. In the last 10–15 years the USA spent al-

¹ The Military Balance. 2001–2002. / The International Institute for Strategic Studies. – Oxford University Press, 2001, p.35.

most \$11 billion annually on military space programs. In Europe similar expenditures will not reach even \$1 billion in the foreseeable future.²

The expectations of extremist forces in the Middle East to be able to oppose the USA militarily have not been realized. Their hope that the war would intensify terrorist activity has not materialized as have their forecasts for an uprising in the Arab world in defense of Iraq. At the same time, having realized that it is impossible for them to defeat the USA in direct military confrontation the extremist forces will finally stake everything on terrorism and attempts to obtain WMD as the only means to countervail overwhelming enemy's forces.

Further developments in the Middle East largely depend on US ability to establish in Iraq a regime capable of becoming a factor of stability in the region, to move the solution of the Palestine–Israeli conflict from a dead point and to neutralize Palestinian terrorist organizations. To achieve these goals the USA will need to mobilize significant military, political and financial resources. This determines the US interest in cooperation with other countries, including Russia, in order to oppose terrorist movements and the regimes, which support them in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Before the wars against Iraq, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan there had been a rather long period—several weeks—for the deployment of forces closer to the planned theater of war. During that time the opponent did not take any actions against the American forces. But this cannot be typical for wars in the beginning of 21st century. For example, during a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula DPRK's armed forces may begin combat operations ahead of the Americans, right up to the threat of using nuclear weapons, and may be able to inflict heavy losses on American troops. In this sense, the USA may give particular importance to the development of means and methods for the “immediate” destruction of key systems of combat direction and the most important elements of the military machines of “rogue states”.

The war in Iraq and Russia: political aspects

A strategy to reform the armed forces of the Russian Federation requires a clear assessment of the emerging global military-political situation, and in the first place a definition of the origins of the military threat, the character of future wars and possible partners.

The preparations for the operation against Iraq has put Moscow in a difficult situation. The USA victory in the war has confirmed once more its position as the sole global power and adaptation to this fact asks for a serious political decision. If Russia opposes this role of the USA, the country will be

² European military satellites. IISS Strategic Comments. – Dec. 2000, vol. 6, issue 10, p.2.

pushed inevitably to the periphery of world politics. A failure of the Anglo–American coalition however could also bring with it grave consequences for Russia. In that case isolationists could gain the upper hand in the USA which would enhance international terrorism and extremist movements in the world, including in areas close to Russia’s borders. As president Putin stressed on April 1, 2003 Russia is in no way interested in a defeat of the USA and Great Britain.

At the same time, anti-American sentiments in the Russian establishment have come to the surface once again. A hysterical anti-American campaign launched in March–April 2003 was aimed, among other targets, at the Russian president. Reversion to confrontation with the USA, which not only the left opposition, but some aggressive groupings within the “party of power” urged on the Kremlin, could discredit Putin’s strategy in the world and weaken his positions at home on the eve of an election campaign. In these circumstances it was necessary to preserve the emerging partnership with the USA while at the same time preventing the president from becoming a target for a critique by demagogues of various ideological colors.

Taking into account these considerations, Moscow preferred to avoid a clear definition of its position³ whether in favor of using force against Saddam Hussein or not. That is why Moscow was interested in a military operation against Baghdad not taking place or, at least, that there would be no voting on the issue in the UNSC. The USA and Great Britain, however, had decided to attack Iraq even without any approval by the UNSC. This left Russia in fact with only one option³ to show its disagreement with a military operation but to do it in such a way as not to provoke a worsening of relations with the USA. China, for example, adopted the same line in the Iraqi crisis. In Russia such a restrained reaction to the Iraqi war was largely spoiled, however, by tough anti-American campaign initiated and orchestrated by revanchist circles in the country.

A crisis in relations between Russia and the USA has been overcome thanks to persistent efforts by the Russian president. A big role in restoring Russian–American relations has been played by the Russia’s support for UNSC Resolution 1483 that provided the legal foundation for an international administration for Iraq until a stable national government is established there. In his interview with BBC, last June, Vladimir Putin stressed that the foundations of Russia’s relations with the USA and Great Britain have proved stronger than the difficulties with which they were confronted.³ These foundations consist of a similar assessment of the external threats. In his address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (May 16, 2003) V. Putin described these threats clearly. He pointed out: “In the modern world relations between states are defined by the existence of

³ Interview with BBC, June 22, 2003, <http://www.president.kremlin.ru>

serious threats, real and potential, of world scale. Among these are international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional and territorial conflicts and drug trafficking".⁴ In substance this coincides with the American view on threats to national security. In contrast to the European capitals both Washington and Moscow consider seriously the possibility of preventive attacks against terrorist bases, including those outside Russian territory. Giving up preventive strikes against terrorists would restrict its victims to retaliatory actions only and would lead to casualties among peaceful population and a loss of initiative in the fight against terrorists.

If the aims which president Putin set out in his address to the Federal Assembly are realized in the Russian military build-up and planning, Moscow and Washington will become real strategic partners. This would require the reform of the Russian armed forces to be carried out in such a way as to make them capable of dealing with the threats typical for the beginning of the 21st century. In Russia stereotypes, traditional views of the Cold War period and attempts to reduce reform of the armed forces to their modernization have not yet been overcome, however. Supporters of these views justify them by saying that the war in Iraq was only the first step in the building of an American empire, which threatens Russia's national interests and national security.

Such opinions are widely held among a part of the Russian High Command which makes it more difficult to modernize the country's armed forces, and their adaptation to current and future demands.

The war in Iraq: realities and forecasts

Reform of the Russian armed forces depends, in part, on how adequately Russian High Command assesses the general strategic situation in the world and in areas of military conflicts. Expert forecasts of the development and result of the military action in Iraq may serve as indicators of the degree of adequacy. Before the war many observers in Russia and other countries predicted a prolonged period of so-called "no contacts war". They foresaw the massive usage of cruise missiles and heavy strikes by aircraft using high precision weapon systems. During the ground operations (which had to follow, according to calculations, a phase of "no contacts" actions) a tough resistance of the Iraqi republican guard and active partisan operations were expected. A quick victory by coalition forces was considered unachievable and the involvement of American and British forces in a prolonged confrontation with heavy losses was seen as quite possible. Even the use of tactical nuclear weapons was envisaged.

⁴ See <http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/446223.shtml>

Many recently retired Russian high military officers held these opinions. Though high military officers on the active list remained mostly silent, it would seem that the official Russian position was based on similar assessments up to the capture of Baghdad. Demands to stop combat actions, to withdraw the Anglo-American forces and return to a solution of the problem in the UN were based on the prediction that quick victory of anti-Saddam coalition was impossible.

There is nothing surprising in that the war in Iraq began, not with massive air strikes, but with limited ones by cruise missiles and aviation, and that the ground operation was started at the same time. In modern warfare there should be several basic and reserve plans for the conduct of combat operations, which are chosen and corrected, taking into account many factors. The overthrow of the Iraqi regime was the main goal of the war but the choice of concrete options took into account many considerations. Among these were the deployment and conditions (including psychological and moral) of the Iraqi armed forces, current intelligence, including information about the dictator's whereabouts, the state of the political leadership and military command, the combat readiness for an attack, weather conditions in areas of the planned operations and many other factors, including developments of a political character. For example, if Turkey allowed American troops to use its territory, the beginning of operations would, perhaps, have been different. Apart from this, there were certain aspects of the operation connected with flaws in the main argument for its beginning—the presence of WMD in Iraq. There was no convincing evidence that they existed. In practice any totalitarian regime is capable of hiding everything. Be that as it may, there existed a set of operation plans which made it possible to select the most optimal in the developing operational situation at that time.

Reasons for mistakes in forecasts can be explained not only by ignorance of the multi-variants of operational planning but by extrapolation of some recent tendencies. For example, the capabilities of high-precision weapons are constantly increasing. Their share in the used weaponry has increased to 80-90 % in 2003 as compared to 10-15 % during the first Gulf war. If in that war ground operations were of short duration, in the war against Yugoslavia there were none at all. That is why it was expected that during the second Gulf war this tendency could develop further.

In addition, forecasts for the outcome of the second Iraqi war failed because they did not take into account Iraq's ability to draw lessons from the first war. In the 1991 war massive concentration by Iraq of armored vehicles, tanks and infantry troops led to heavy losses. According to some estimates Iraq lost nearly 900 000 personnel in killed and wounded and about 80 % of its armored vehicles and tanks. To a great extent this was caused by the successful use of Apache attack helicopters to destroy tanks

and other armored vehicles. Taking into account this experience, in 2003 Iraqi armored vehicles were spread out many places and camouflaged. The idea was to concentrate on local points of resistance, on prolonging combat operations as long as possible, partly by involving the coalition forces in prolonged battles in big cities. In case of success this would allow the neutralization to some extent of the technical superiority of the Anglo-American forces, to increase substantially their losses and to provoke massive casualties among the civilian population. It was assumed that such casualties would create heavy pressure of public opinion in the USA and Great Britain on their governments and force them, after several months of tough fighting, to seek a political settlement. The US and British military commands took, of course, these considerations into account when planning the operation.

Further, mistakes in forecasts of the duration of the operation arose to a certain extent from the fact that the USA and Great Britain used much less troops, aviation and armored vehicles in 2003 than in the first Gulf war. Experts assumed that because of this the war would last a long time. They did not take into account, however, the fact that the increased use of high-precision weaponry and rapid evaluation of reconnaissance data would make it possible to achieve combat tasks with fewer sorties, less ammunition and, in general, with less fire-power and forces. A massive usage of high-precision weapon systems allowed the coalition forces to destroy, in a short time, “nerve centres” of the Iraqi regime, in the first place, centres of the political and military leadership, and signal and control systems. This paralyzed the resistance of the Iraqi troops and, together with active “psychological operations”, led them to disperse.

Finally, there were no grounds for assuming that low-power nuclear warheads with the capability of deep penetration would be used. Firstly, the overwhelming tactical-operative and military-technical superiority of the anti-Iraq coalition forces made the use of nuclear weapons needless. Secondly, even if the USA has more perfect warheads than the new aviation bomb B61-11 their capability of deep penetration would be limited by solidity of frames and the capability of the “stuffing” to bear the moment of impact with the earth. Of course, even minor penetration of the earth by a nuclear warhead inflicts much more seismic pressure on highly protected underground facilities than pressure caused by air and ground nuclear explosions. However, as underground nuclear tests in the Plowshare program have shown explosions of relatively low power, even at a depth of 100 m throw up earth on the surface and lead to radioactive contamination of the area. It could, among other things, make an advance of the Anglo-American forces more difficult.

Lessons for the reform of the Russian armed forces

The experience of the war in Iraq has shown the need for multi-variant planning. This should be done in good time by the General Staff and joint command staffs (which do not exist in Russia as yet). This requires powerful computing complexes and professionally trained officers. They must be ready to react operatively to developments in the situation and to correct existing plans in accordance with a quickly changing situation.

In these circumstances we may define control of military operations as an art only if in contemporary and future wars this art of the control of military operations and the use of weapons is reinforced by computer systems. The latter should permit to calculate quickly the necessary supplies of materials, equipment weapons and ammunition as well as the redeployment of troops and the best routes, along which one's own and the enemy troops might move. In other words, powerful information calculation and control computing systems at various levels are required.

The results of war in Iraq should encourage the Russian leadership if not to reduce then at least to halt the widening gap between Russia and the USA in high-precision weapons, in modern and prospective aviation and space reconnaissance, targeting, combat control and signal systems.

In the USA all these assets are integrated in a united all-weather, strike-information and control system, capable of detecting and hitting targets on a real time scale. The main reason for Russia's backwardness in this field is that the country's military-industrial complex (MIC) suffered most of all industries of the Russian economy as a result of the perturbation of the last 10-15 years and it cannot now supply Russia's Armed Forces with modern weapon systems. At the same time, the country's scientific-technological potential in many fields has not suffered and in certain circumstances a number of key technologies can be developed. To overcome the crisis of MIC, the country needs not only money. There is also the need to select the right priorities for technological developments as well as of research centres and design bureaus that have preserved their potential and prospective research developments.

It is important to overcome the inertia of the Soviet past when priority was given to the development and mass production of excessive amounts of weapons at the expense of signal and control systems. But the latter are much more cost-effective from the point of view of use in combat operations. The outcome of combat operations in the second Iraqi war have proved once more the significant and constantly increasing role of the space navigation system NAVSTAR. High-precision weapon systems, with a possible circular deviation of a few meters, can be used beyond the range of enemy's anti-aircraft defense under any weather conditions. These weapon systems are not influenced by sand storms and the smoke of fires. In addition,

NAVSTAR defines with unfailing accuracy the movement routes of troops, sharply increases the effectiveness of air reconnaissance and agents' intelligence, and to a great extent contributes to the success of ground operations.

It is necessary to provide a defense of ground facilities against highly effective electromagnetic impulse (EMI) ammunition. Generating electromagnetic impulses they are capable, over a relative long distance to cause interference in wire telecommunication systems, and signal and control systems, and inflict damage on apparatus of various kinds, in the first place computing systems. This damage can be inflicted, not only during combat operations of various intensities, but as a result of terrorist actions as well. Means of defense against electromagnetic -impulse warheads are known and are successfully used to protect strategic objects though it will take time and require significant funds to provide the bulk of conventional forces with these defense means. It is quite important to preserve and train new professional cadres of high quality in the armed forces and MIC. The personnel of anti-Iraq coalition forces differ markedly from the personnel of the Russian armed forces. The former has equipment, weapons and professional skills of much higher quality, is submitted to stricter discipline, and has a better understanding of general and local combat tasks. In the Russian armed forces the personnel crisis is continuing. The motivation for military service, and the level of qualification and social status of military officers is declining. Military formations do not have their full complement of career officers. There is not enough junior officers and sergeants personnel. As a result frequent changes in legislation only about 10 % of people of conscript age can be called up for military service. The low level of education of privates leads to their inability to handle modern weaponry, even simple ones. Together with the widespread fagging system among conscripts speedy transforming of the conscript into a contract system is essential.

Conclusion

Apart from the lessons in strategic and operational planning of the operations of combat forces, the experience of the Iraqi war has hardly indicated any new directions in the reform of the Russian armed forces that have not been discussed in recent years in Russia. However, this experience should provide a serious, additional boost to speed up military reform. The possibility of implementing this reform is to a great extent due to the unique historic situation in which Russia finds itself at the beginning of 21st century: Russia does not have enemies representing an immediate threat, while nuclear weapons are capable of restraining hypothetical a large-scale aggression in future. This provides an exclusively

favorable chance for Russia to create a compact core limited in numbers of a modern army equipped with advanced technology in the first stage of the reforming process.

At the same time, a new global “bipolar” conflict, created by the increasing aggressiveness of extremist forces and regimes in the third world, leads to greater unpredictability of the political-military situation in the world. In these circumstances a continuation of a vague imitation of military reform is no longer permissible. Political and military experience of events in Iraq has shown that Russia is more and more in need of modern armed forces, particularly capable taking part in coalitions with developed countries as an equal partner to repulse threats typical for the beginning of this century. International terrorism is only part of the whole system of threats which Russia faces and in order to be capable to repulse them it needs a radical review of the military doctrine and the goals for its armed forces. Regional instability in a belt of totalitarian regimes is fraught with the possibility of an unpredictable escalation of military conflicts. In perspective the need may arise to conduct combat operations on a scale comparable to the second war in Iraq.

4. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS: ARE THERE ANY PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT?

Alexander PIKAYEV

In the autumn 2002, when the international community was preoccupied with the Iraqi crisis, a new challenge to the non-proliferation regimes of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has emerged. North Korea terminated its membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), expelled the inspectors of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and ended international monitoring of a storage place of spent nuclear fuel, which can be used for producing weapon-grade fissile materials. Moreover, Pyongyang announced that it had everything needed to manufacture nuclear weapons, but, for the moment, had not intention to do so. The DPRK possesses, some experts believe, already one or two “raw” nuclear devices.

Agreed Framework 1994

In fact, the North Korean nuclear crisis emerged as far back as in 1993 when it became known that the country was undertaking attempts to create nuclear weapons, thus violating its obligations in accordance to the NPT. Then, in response to calls to stop its unlawful activity, Pyongyang refused to accept IAEA’s inspections and threatened to quit the NPT. Some experts explained the North Korean behavior by the serious deterioration of the country’s position in the world. South Korea came out of international isolation, obtained wide diplomatic recognition and demonstrated a high rate of economic growth. At the same time, the overmilitarized economy of the North found itself on the brink of collapse with famine spreading across the country. External security guaranties, provided for several decades by the USSR—DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mu-

tual Assistance, have lost their reliability since the collapse of the Soviet Union and this was followed by a sharp deterioration of Moscow—Pyongyang relations. Russia did not agree to prolong the Treaty. At the same time, most Western countries continued to refuse the establishment of diplomatic ties with Pyongyang.

It seems that under these circumstances the DPRK decided to increase tension around its nuclear program. By doing so, North Korea hoped to raise its international standing and the chances of trading its nuclear program for foreign assistance. At that time the DPRK succeeded in achieving its goal. Initially, the USA reacted to Pyongyang's attitude quite angrily and even considered military options to deal with the problem. Apparently, a large scale invasion was not on the cards, but an attack on North Korean nuclear facilities in order to destroy the country's nuclear infrastructure and thus prevent North Korea from continuing its nuclear weapons program.

Bearing in mind, however, the possible negative consequences of a military option the Clinton administration decided against it. Instead negotiations were started with, as a result, the so-called Agreed Framework was concluded in 1994. Pyongyang agreed to (subject to verification procedures) close down its nuclear reactor. In response, the USA agreed to provide North Korea on regular basis with food supplies and fuel oil for its thermal power plants. Moreover, Washington promised to replace two gas-graphite reactors, based on Soviet technology, with light-water reactors to reduce the risk of violation of the non-proliferation regime.

To finance the retooling of the North Korean nuclear energy industry and supplies of fuel oil the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established. Among member-states of KEDO were Japan, South Korea and a number of European countries. It was assumed that their financial contributions would be used for the purchase and an installation of Westinghouse light-water nuclear reactors.

The idea of supplying North Korea with new nuclear reactors came under serious criticism as soon as it was proposed. Although, spent fuel of light-water reactors has a much lower level of enrichment of nuclear materials, there exist certain technologies which allow to raise it to weapon-grade. It was not without reason that Washington has been against the supply of the Russian version of that type of nuclear reactor for Iran for all these years. Besides, shipments of new fuel for such reactors in the DPRK would violate the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines, which prohibit such supplies to a country which refuses to put its peaceful nuclear activity under comprehensive verification guarantees. Finally, KEDO happened to be closed to two out of four the DPRK's neighbors—Russia and China. This fact could not but negatively influence the international standing of this organization as well as Beijing's and Moscow's attitude towards the Agreed Framework, in general.

It should be pointed out that a re-equipment of the North Korean nuclear energy industry with American reactors meant for Russia the loss of one of the few potential foreign markets for its energy generating equipment. Of course, in current economic situation in North Korea, Pyongyang cannot pay for new reactors and new fuel for them. But in case of the peaceful reunification of Korea the situation could change. In addition, functioning reactors of the Soviet type in the North would make it easier for Russia to have access to the energy markets in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula.

The fact that Russia was denied access to KEDO clearly demonstrated that the course of cutting off comprehensive political relations with the DPRK, taken by the Yeltsin administration, was a mistake, especially in respect of the Treaty of Friendship between Russia and the DPRK. As was mentioned before a devaluation of the Treaty and its subsequent denunciation, to a great extent, provoked Pyongyang to pursue a more aggressive policy on the international arena. What is more, the Yeltsin administration policy towards North Korea led to the exclusion of Russia from the political processes in the region situated next to its borders and of great importance for the security in North East Asia (NEA).

Due to objective flaws in the Agreed Framework in respect of the supply of light-water reactors, the agreement could not be implemented fully. KEDO could not begin the shipment of reactors under influence of criticism from the Republican majority in the US Congress as well as because of obstacles in the negotiations on transparency and the export of spent nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, some positive results have been achieved. The existing North Korean nuclear reactor has not been functioning, American equipment enabling the discovery in time of unauthorized access to spent nuclear fuel storage facilities has not been installed. The IAEA renewed its inspections of the idle reactor. The USA refused to provide food aid to the DPRK and KEDO has been paying for fuel oil shipments for North Korean thermal power stations.

The DPRK comes out of diplomatic isolation but relations with the US worsen

As some conditions of the Agreed Framework were fulfilled attention to the North Korean nuclear program was reduced. At the same time, participants in the Agreed Framework and some other states were not satisfied with the document as it had some flaws and was not fully implemented. That is why it came as no surprise that Agreed Framework could not survive the considerable changes which occurred on the Korean Peninsula since 2000.

After the death of the “Great Leader”, Kim Il Sung, a new generation of the North Korean leadership came to power. This led to speculations on the possibility of some changes in the country, including economic reforms. The decision by the new, “Dear Leader”, Kim Jong Il, to abolish food rationing may be considered a sign of movement in that direction. For the DPRK, where one of the most rigid administrative-command systems in the world has been in force for decades, such a move can be seen as a real revolution and be compared to the introduction of “new economic policy” (NEP) in Lenin’s Russia or Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in China.

The international position of the DPRK has also changed. The new leadership has reacted positively to the “sunshine policy” initiated by then South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and decided to thaw relations with South Korea.

With the first meeting between the two leaders the inter-Korean political dialogue has begun as well as economic and humanitarian exchanges.

Moscow, being unhappy with its exclusion from developments on the Korean Peninsula, has made corrections in its policy towards Pyongyang. In 2000 the Russian president V. Putin visited the DPRK. It was the first official visit of a Russian Head of State in the whole history of Russian–Korean relations. In the following two years Kim Jong Il made two trips to the Russian Federation. The year 2002 witnessed another historic event—the first official visit paid by the Japanese Prime Minister to the DPRK. This helped to start a normalization of bilateral relations. North Korea has also attracted increased diplomatic attention from the EU. Finally, contacts between Pyongyang and Beijing have been activated.

Against this background a pause in relations between North Korea and the USA looked clearly an anomaly. In 2000 it was expected that president Clinton would visit Pyongyang before the US presidential elections. But instead the White House concentrated its efforts on the Middle East peace settlement, without achieving a breakthrough, however. Thus, the generally progress in US–North Korean relations in the 1990s has not been preserved. From the beginning, the new Washington administration made it clear that it had no intention of carrying on any dialogue with Pyongyang. What is more, in February 2002, Washington included the DPRK in the “Axis of Evil” together with Iraq and Iran.

On its part, North Korea has also taken some steps, which have led to a worsening of its relationship with the USA. While the Agreed Framework was being partially implemented the issue of the North Korean missile program became the main problem in bilateral relations. In the 1990s the DPRK continued the modernization of the Soviet ballistic missiles (Scud-type) it bought from Egypt in 1982. Using a number of rather primitive technological innovations, the DPRK managed to increase substantially their range at the expense of their reliability, accuracy and payload.

In August 1998, Pyongyang tested a ballistic missile with a trajectory over Japan. The missile fell into the Pacific ocean. The DPRK announced that the aim of test had been to launch into orbit a satellite and that this had been successfully achieved. But many experts were sceptical and considered the launch of a missile as an attempt by Pyongyang to produce missiles with the capability of hitting targets on the US mainland.

The North Korean missile test launch of 1998 had far reaching consequences for international politics, in general. In the USA a character of the debates on necessity to deploy a national ballistic missile defense (NMD) radically changed. Before the North Korean missile test a majority in the US political establishment had expressed their doubts on the existence of any threats to justify such a deployment. After the test the threat had become real. In Japan the fact that a North Korean missile had passed over Japanese territory provoked lively discussions. Some voices were raised in favor of the remilitarization of Japan and even in favor of Japan obtaining nuclear status. Though those discussions have not led to practical steps in that direction so far, Tokyo has decided to review its very cautious attitude towards ballistic missile defense (BMD) and to expand cooperation in this field with the USA.

In 2002 the DPRK agreed to announce a moratorium on further test-flights of ballistic missiles and confirmed that promise during Kim Jong Il's visit to Moscow. Another important issue was remained unresolved, however,—the issue of North Korean exports of missile technologies to other Asian countries. In the US missile exports of North Korea are estimated as amounting to nearly \$100 million which may possibly constitute the biggest part of the country's hard currency income. It is also assumed that the DPRK has provided significant assistance to Iran and Pakistan in the development of their missile technology.

Who is to blame?

North Korean secret activity in developing nuclear weapons based on enriched uranium has turned into a most serious problem. Since North Korea has been involved in that activity since 1994 this constituted a flagrant violation of the conditions imposed by the Agreed Framework. When, in 2002, the Bush administration finally decided to resume talks with North Korea a high-level American delegation, after arriving in Pyongyang, requested from North Korea explanations on its continuing secret nuclear program. It came as a surprise to the American side, when after an overnight break in the negotiations the DPRK's delegation not only acknowledged the violations of the Agreed Framework but refused to give any

guarantees to stop activities, which contradict the provisions of the Agreed Framework.

In response, the USA suspended fuel oil shipments (through KEDO) after consultations with Japan and South Korea but continued food aid. Pyongyang reacted extremely angrily. The USA was accused of harbouring aggressive intentions against North Korea. Pyongyang announced the dismantling of the American control equipment (controlling the storage of spent fuel rods) and the IAEA inspectors were also expelled. Simultaneously, the DPRK denounced the Agreed Framework and walked out of the NPT. At the same time, however, the North Korean representatives said that their country had no intention of producing nuclear weapons for the time being.

In this way, the DPRK bears the main responsibility for the current crisis. What are the reasons for the North Korean inadequate reaction when the non-compliance with international obligations was discovered? According to some observers, several factors help to explain such behavior: security considerations, dissatisfaction with US policy, as well as some diplomatic calculations.

Russian experts have expressed long ago their concern that unilateral military operations, not-based on international law, could encourage some countries to obtain nuclear weapons in the name of self-defense. For example, if Miloshevich had had nuclear weapons would NATO have dared to bombard Yugoslavia in 1999? The North Korean leadership might fear that it would be the next target for such an intervention. These concerns were increased when North Korea became a part of the “Axis of Evil” and another member of the “axis”—Iraq—was facing military intervention in order to change Iraqi regime. From this point of view Pyongyang’s unexpected openness on its nuclear plans may be explained by the desire to give a clear signal—the DPRK is not as defenseless as Yugoslavia or disarmed Iraq and is capable of responding appropriately.

It is also probable that reformist elements within the North Korean leadership found themselves vulnerable to attacks by conservative forces. It is quite possible that the hard-liners accused the moderates that their “concessions” (agreement for inter-Korean dialogue, moratorium on missile tests, termination of reactors activity, admission of abductions of Japanese nationals) have not led to the retooling of DPRK’s nuclear energy industry and normalization of relations with the USA. On the contrary, the country faced a threat of US intervention. In such circumstances the moderates were forced to stop, temporarily, quarrel with the conservatives on the issue of nuclear ambitions.

It can not be excluded that some circles in Pyongyang have plans to use the current crisis for a diplomatic trade-off in order to get some additional concessions. In particular, the North Koreans have expressed their

desire to conclude a non-aggression agreement with the USA and to achieve full normalization of the DPRK's relations with key countries, in the first place the USA and Japan.

America has found itself in a rather difficult situation. The option of military intervention against the DPRK is not being considered for the time being. Washington is obviously trying to pacify Pyongyang by saying it wants to resolve the current crisis in a peaceful way. The US key allies in the region, Japan and South Korea as well as China and Russia, are against a military scenario. Combat operations on the Korean Peninsula could lead to heavy human casualties and material destruction, especially if the DPRK has WMD. Such a development could produce an unpredictable reaction in Beijing where the Korean war in the 1950s, when Chinese "volunteers" had suffered significant losses, is well remembered. Finally, the USA can hardly count on delivering accurate strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities as Washington lacks a complete list of relevant targets because of North Korean secretiveness.

Nevertheless, one should not overestimate Washington's self-restraint. If Pyongyang engages in a noticeable expansion of its nuclear capabilities and does not show enough flexibility to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means, a military operation could appear to be the only way out of the current situation for the USA.

The use of another leverage against North Korea—sanctions—is hardly likely to have the desirable effect. The inwardly orientated North Korean economy has achieved a high level of self-sufficiency. The only card the USA can play is food aid. But this is difficult to implement in practice without running the risk of being blamed for provoking mass famine in North Korea. The powerful American agricultural lobby also would not be happy to lose big government contracts if food aid to North Korea were terminated. On the other hand, to bow to North Korean demands to conclude a non-aggression pact would mean for the Bush administration loss of face and make it vulnerable to criticism within its own party.

In such conditions the USA has decided to expand the format of a Korean settlement and called on China and Russia to join in efforts to persuade the DPRK to give up its nuclear program and rejoin the NPT. In this way the strategy of excluding Beijing and Moscow from a settlement on the Korean Peninsula, on which KEDO was based, has failed.

What to do?

To resolve the crisis caused by North Korea's nuclear ambitions is absolutely necessary for a number of reasons. If an acceptable solution cannot be found, Pyongyang's secession from the NPT will create a

precedent for some other members of the NPT, who are suspected of being eager to obtain nuclear weapons.

The only way for the near future is to conduct with Pyongyang a delicate, cautious and persistent dialogue trying to convince it to desist from unwise steps towards proliferation of WMD. A dialogue of this kind requires coordinated efforts of all the parties concerned, first of all by the DPRK's four neighbors—South Korea, Japan, China and Russia—and, of course, the United States.

The imperative goal of the talks should be North Korea's decision to give up its nuclear program, to return to the NPT and to accept IAEA guarantees. In order to secure a more reliable mechanism to verify Pyongyang's compliance with its obligations North Korea should be asked to accept more intrusive IAEA guarantees—in accordance with the Program 93+2.¹ Some experts even suggest a more radical regime of inspections—of the Iraqi type. It is hardly likely, however, that North Korea will agree to such inspections. Since it will fear that they will be used to collect information on the country's nuclear facilities in order to hit them.

In addition to these measures it might be possible to buy from North Korea its stock of produced fissionable materials. Most likely, the facility under control of the IAEA in accordance with the Agreed Framework stored only part of the fissionable materials produced during the functioning of the gas-graphite reactor. That is why it would be undesirable to return simply to the situation, which existed before the current crisis. When assisting North Korea in exchange for its acceptance of the proposed measures, the mistakes of the past should not be repeated. Taking into account North Korea's tendency to engage in secret activities, it is hardly sensible to return to plans for the re-equipment of the North Korean nuclear power industry with light-water reactors but to give any assistance to the country in the nuclear power field at all. Instead North Korea should be offered aid in developing other sources of electricity generation. In particular, this mountainous country possesses some hydro-energy resources and could be helped in building a number of hydro-electrical power plants.

Another option is to guarantee long-term supplies of electricity from neighboring countries. It is quite possible that after the Bureya hydro-electrical power plant will operate on full capacity some surplus of electricity in the Russian Far East will become available for export to North Korea. In the long term new thermal power plants can be built in the DPRK using Russia's natural gas as fuel. To secure the supply of natural gas from Russia, North Korea can be included into a system of oil and gas pipelines designed to export Russia's resources to the countries of North

¹ The Program 93+2 consists of additional protocols, concluded between the IAEA and member-countries. After ratification of the protocols a member-country allows Agency's inspectors to visit all facilities and not only those declared, as it was before.

East Asia. If there are, anyway, plans for nuclear energy development, a new nuclear power plant should be built in the South with the aim of supplying the North with most of its generated electricity.

After Pyongyang has accepted the conditions proposed by the international community it is necessary, in order to finance above-mentioned projects and renewed shipments of fuel oil, to restore KEDO on a new basis. This means: excluding nuclear power activity from its competence, expanding financial support for projects to supply energy resources, building new hydro-electric and thermal power plants, and, partly, pipelines. KEDO should also accept China and Russia as new members. Moscow could then raise the question of the collective financing by all KEDO members of Russian energy supplies for the DPRK. Russia could also ask for Russian companies to be invited to take part in the development of the North Korean energy sector.

North Korean spent nuclear fuel could be stored in Russia as was successfully done with the same materials from the Yugoslav nuclear reactor in Vinche. A limited amount of these materials would not increase noticeably any ecological damage as compared to the huge amounts of spent nuclear fuel accumulated in Russia itself.

As far as the security guarantees, demanded by the DPRK are concerned, it is difficult to anticipate a restoration of the old Soviet–North Korean treaty or the signing of a full-scale non-aggression pact between North Korea and the USA. There are, however, prospects for alternative steps. For example, both Koreas, the USA, Russia, China and Japan could sign multi-lateral document, a kind of 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It could fix the basic principles of relations between the states on the Korean Peninsula and around it. Beside economic and humanitarian “baskets”, a certain sections of the document should be devoted to military security, particularly to confidence-building measures, limitations on military exercises and other kinds of military activity, and also to the non-aggression issue.

In the end, the long-term solution to North Korea’s possession of WMD and delivery systems may be found on the path of peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula based on democratic principles. Such unification is achievable only by encouraging Pyongyang to pursue long-awaited economic and political reforms. In doing so rash steps, which could lead to the rapid collapse of the North Korean state followed chaos, should be avoided. A key role in reforming of North Korea could be played by broadening humanitarian exchanges, involvement of the North Korean elite in international co-operation and the development of the country’s economic ties with the outside world. A comprehensive international document covering military and political issues together with economic and humanitarian obligations would best serve these goals.

5. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY (ROLE OF COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES)

Alexandre KALIADIN

The norm prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) constitutes a key element in the present world security order. It is spelled out in a number of multilateral treaties and conventions with the widest membership. Above all they include the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (188 parties), the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (148 parties), and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (153 parties)¹.

Specific non-proliferation regimes, based on the listed international treaties, have played a crucial role in securing the observance by the states of the obligatory rules of behaviour in respective areas. They reflect the

¹ One may add to this list other widely accepted norms and multilateral instruments that deal with issues of proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems: the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR (an informal, voluntary association of 33 countries that share the goal of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for WMD and seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation); the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, ICOC (a group of 104 subscribing states which recognise the need to prevent and curb the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering MDW and the importance of strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (the convention obligates its 64 parties to protect nuclear material for peaceful purposes while in international transport), Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Treaty of Tlatelolco (33 parties to the original treaty); South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Treaty of Rarotonga (13 parties); Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Treaty of Bangkok (10 parties); African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Treaty of Pelindaba (18 parties, in addition 32 states signed but not ratified the treaty).

widespread conviction that the acquisition of nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) weapons represents an infringement of international law.

However, existing non-proliferation mechanisms proved to be insufficient to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the acquisition of illegal NBC capabilities. Weakening regard for traditional non-proliferation regimes has been a phenomenon of the international life.

The non-proliferation regimes have been too dependent on the good will and willingness of the parties to implement voluntarily assumed commitments and to co-operate in good faith on the issues of compliance. Some member states got caught lying to the international community. In defiance of international norms they made concentrated covert efforts to acquire technology and materials with NBC applications, while several nations have not yet even acceded to international agreements on WMD. Besides, there are governments that do not exercise full control over their territory, which is used as a haven for terrorist groups aspiring to get hold of weapons and materials of mass disruption.

Proliferation of WMD as a threat to international peace and security

Three processes have speeded up the erosion of the traditional non-proliferation regimes and highlighted the need for additional measures (including coercive ones) to ensure compliance with international agreements on WMD.

Firstly, the challenge of international terrorism posed by the emergence of well-organised and well-financed non-state entities, assailing the values of the international system as such, ready to commit crimes against humanity and civilisation, including the use of any weapon. Transnational terrorist networks represent asymmetrical threats that cannot be addressed by classical deterrence. It is evident that traditional politico-diplomatic methods (negotiations, treaty-making, economic and diplomatic sanctions, etc.) can hardly be considered as appropriate tools in the struggle against such opponents. That raised the question about adapting international law to the realities of the early 21st century environment allowing effectively to tackle the danger arising from terrorist groups armed with WMD.

Secondly, a frontline challenge posed by fanatical, unpredictable and unstable rulers with a disregard for the accepted norms of international behaviour seeking weapons of mass destruction as more and more countries are faced with the prospect of aggressive and obscurantist groups coming into power and threatening to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Brutal rulers do not hesitate to use WMD against both their own

population and neighbours². A possible collusion between terrorist networks and dictatorial regimes seeking NBC weapons through covert programs in disregard of international law represents an extreme danger. The same states aspire to acquire ballistic missiles for delivery of NBC weapons. These developments have recently led to most acute international crises in several regions. At the same time attempts to settle them exclusively by means of “soft persuasion” and “appeasement” have not been notably successful. Under the present circumstances it is difficult to lend support to the thesis that coercion should on no account be applied to influence the behaviour of malicious proliferators.

Thirdly: growing interdependence of the modern world, global communication, wide circulation and availability of dual-use technologies and dangerous NBC-materials due to technological advance. It is pertinent to note, that adverse political shifts in the sphere of proliferation occur against a background of expanding civilian nuclear power programs and diffusion of know-how in the field of chemical, biological and missile technologies. The greater opportunities exist for abusing them.

Fragmentation and erosion of the state administration in some regions is another disturbing trend in some regions: there are well-known facts of the absence of effective central administration over some territories and even of submission of national governmental institutions to the purposes of international terrorism (for example, Afghanistan under the Taliban regime). Decaying states have proved incapable to ensure good governance of the territory they are supposed to control, they spread instability, arms smuggling, terrorism, religious fanaticism etc.

The above factors have affected the balance between military and non-military, consensual methods of addressing the threat posed by of international actors who wilfully and blatantly breach the principles and norms of non-proliferation. Naturally the international security agenda has to be widened to include the creation of collective capability to counter infringements of the global non-proliferation regime.

The growing concern about the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction was reflected in several events in 2002–2003. A number of countries pressed for the acquisition of the technological capability to produce such items. Late in 2002 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) acknowledged that it was pursuing plutonium and highly enriched uranium (from which nuclear explosive devices are made) and was entitled to have a “nuclear deterrent”. By the end of the year the IAEA inspectors who carried out control over the North Korean nuclear activities were expelled from the country. In January 2003 the DPRK became the first country to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation

² Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Kurdish population of Iraq and in the war against Iran.

Treaty signalling its intention to become a nuclear weapon power and creating a dangerous precedent³. It is supposed that North Korea, in addition to developing its own nuclear-missile capability, has rendered significant assistance to Iran and Pakistan in rocket engineering⁴.

The Middle East has caused particularly grave international concern with regard to the WMD spread. Iraq has become a grim hotbed of destabilisation largely as a result of proliferation controversies⁵. Revelations of the Iranian activities in the field of uranium enrichment have increased international suspicions concerning the character of the nuclear program of this country⁶. In December 2003 the Libyan authorities publicly acknowledged that over many years Libya has been trying to develop WMD. Libya disclosed that it had been working to produce a nuclear fuel cycle to enrich uranium and possessed aerial bombs to drop chemical weapons as well as stocks of nerve gas and carried out missile-related activity. Only concerted international pressure forced Libyan leader Col Muammar Gaddafi to make a decision (reported by the press on 20 Dec 2003) to scrap his country's programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, dismantle its WMD and allow international inspectors to verify and oversee the process⁷.

On the other hand, in 2003 the world became the witness of illegitimate application of armed force (on the basis of the national decisions and without the authorisation of the UN Security Council) with the express purpose of elimination of the Iraqi illicit WMD capability. However, the Iraqi events have shown, that the attempts to react to infringements of the non-proliferation norm by means of unilateral coercive actions, undertaken without the authorisation of the UNSC and lacking the approval by world public opinion, are counterproductive. The military action in Iraq turned out to be regression. It had rather incongruous consequences from security and non-proliferation points of view. Though it was undertaken under the rallying cry of the deprivation of the Iraqi ruling regime of its illegal WMD capability, the very fact that the operation lacked the proper

³ In July North Korea claimed to have completed reprocessing 8000 spent fuel rods at its Yongbyon reprocessing plant, a step that would give it enough plutonium for five or six atomic explosive devices.

⁴ On the North Korean nuclear crisis see Section 1.4 in the Special IMEMO Supplement.

⁵ The issue of the Iraqi WMD remains open. The report on the results of the work of the Commission on weapons of mass destruction, published in October 2003, disclosed evidence was that there existed a number of secret laboratories and containers with dangerous biological toxins as well as facilities for the manufacture of the fuels for the prescribed missiles, etc.

⁶ In 2003 the IAEA's inspectors uncovered serious failures of Iran in its disclosures about nuclear activities (use of laser technology to enrich uranium, a critical element in the manufacture of nuclear weapons). Iran pledged to cease its uranium enrichment activity.

⁷ *Izvestia*, 22 December 2003, p.2.

mandate of the Security Council caused deep enough split in the international community. The rifts over the US-led intervention in Iraq in fact made it more difficult to develop a united and effective response to the threats posed by malicious proliferators. The case of Iraq attests: the WMD proliferation cannot be effectively combated by methods that violate international law. When individual states resort to force unilaterally and exclusively to their own perceptions of threats and how to deal with them, they are clearly laying up problems for themselves. Unilateral uses of force (illegal under international law), if persisted, are certain to provoke instability, accumulation of WMD, regionalisation of arms race and lead to the exacerbation of local and international disorder.

It is important that proper lessons be learnt from this experience, as recurrence of acute proliferation crises in future is probable. They can be triggered off by the emergence of illegal WMD capabilities (or attempts to preserve them), by allegations concerning the creation of WMD, the acquisition of WMD-related materials or their export to whatsoever recipients. International crises are certain to be triggered off by withdrawals of states from international disarmament treaties and conventions. The acquisition of WMD weapons or materials by fanatics and other extremists for use in terrorist acts will in all likelihood provoke major international upheavals and unpredictable reactions.

In what circumstances should states parties to international conventions on WMD consider measures involving coercion when they find themselves confronted with problems arising from systematic material breaches of the non-proliferation obligations and refusal of proliferators to dismantle their illegal WMD assets? Wouldn't it be prudent to have in place, well in advance, appropriate arrangements and facilities to neutralize threats of this type. Wrongdoers should not be allowed to amass WMD and to develop their means of delivery. Of special significance in this context is the problem of creating a broad international consensus on the issues of active nonproliferation in order to prop-up the global nonproliferation system. Anti-proliferation goals are to be attained through collective efforts of the members of the world community undertaken on the basis of the rules of international law within the framework of such a strategy of active non-proliferation, that enjoys the widest possible support in the world.

The enforcement arm of the global non-proliferation regime

Diplomacy, non-military influence have been generally regarded as the best way of dealing with the international concerns about WMD proliferation and, normally, as a preferable alternative to the use of other means

in preventing this⁸. But will diplomatic action be sufficient if defiant and unscrupulous proliferators are determined to develop their WMD skills and brandish them?

The interconnected challenge posed by international terrorism and dangerous regimes seeking (and threatening) WMD rather suggests that contingencies are more likely to arise in future, which are unlikely to be settled exclusively by “soft” means. It is evident that such means alone will not make the WMD proliferation problem go away. All options should be on the table. Most certainly proliferation crises will require concerted international pressure, including direct and active uses of coercive means, to force wrongdoers to comply with non-proliferation rules. There are troubling signs that expectations that the principles and norms of non-proliferation will be universally and voluntarily observed, are not vindicated. On the contrary, we witness the growing urgency of resolute enforcement measures to be used (in combination with diplomacy and positive collaboration) against those who dabble in weapons of mass destruction. An urgent need exist for a resolute multilateral approach to complement existing efforts against WMD proliferation.

In what way will the international community be able to respond more effectively to the current challenges of unlawful WMD? How should it seek to eliminate illicit WMD programs and arsenals by legal means? How pre-empt developments threatening to undermine the global anti-proliferation effort?

Opinions differ far and wide (in Russia also) on the legality, expediency, effectiveness and timeliness of the resort to coercion in the context of the global anti-proliferation effort and, in particular, on the unilateral use (or the threat of use) of preventive and pre-emptive force for these ends.

How to confer legitimacy on enforcement measures (including anticipatory action) in order to promote anti-proliferation objectives? In what concrete situations is it justified (or indispensable) to resort to specific enforcement measures? Under what guidelines or rules?

Under the Charter of the UN its Security Council is vested with powers to take preventive and enforcement measures (which UN member states are obligated under the Charter to carry out) if peace is threatened or breached⁹. The Council, a fifteen member body, alone is able to confer global legitimacy on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action against current or anticipated WMD proliferators—against whatsoever entities which violate proliferation taboos.

⁸ On this see Section 2.8 of the Special IMEMO Supplement.

⁹ Chapter of the United Nations. Chapter VII Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

It is pertinent to note that WMD proliferation has already been (on various occasions) characterised in international conventions and authoritative UN documents as constituting a threat to international peace and security.

The preamble of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty unambiguously points out that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war”.

On 31 January 1992 the chairman of the Security Council (reflecting increasing international concern over further proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as of military technology) made on behalf of its members an important statement on this theme. He explicitly referred to the proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction as a situation posing a threat to international peace and security. The statement says that Council members are obligated to press for the prevention of the proliferation of technologies, involved in research connected with WMD and its manufacture, as well as to take appropriate measures to this effect¹⁰.

The Security Council resolution 1441 (dealing with the Iraqi situation), unanimously adopted on November 8 2002, went much further in pursuing anti-proliferation objectives. It recognised the threat which Iraq’s non-compliance with the Council’s disarmament resolutions and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security. Iraq was held responsible specifically for not providing an accurate, full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres. The UNSC expressed determination to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq with its obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions and warned that Iraq would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its [non-proliferation] obligations. The resolution also contained detailed provisions on international monitoring, inspection and verification to insure compliance. (However, resolution 1441 did not authorise at that point military intervention against Iraq. A separate resolution of the Security Council was required authorising the application of armed force in case of need).

Thus, certain multilateral, normative frameworks are actually available for enforcement actions through concerted international pressure. However, they are clearly no longer adequate to deal with brutal dictators and terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction.

The world community should be better prepared to effectively respond to material breaches of the non-proliferation norm and to the attempts by the proliferators to use their nascent WMD capabilities for black-mailing

¹⁰ UN Document S/PV. 3046.

the neighbourhood and extracting concessions (from other states, the UNO, etc.). In particular deficiencies in the UNSC capabilities for combating WMD proliferation should be addressed. There is a need for this purpose to strengthen existing (or create additional) collective mechanisms and tools to manage probable international proliferation emergencies.

It is evident that appropriate additional provisions should be internationally agreed on to dissuade potential or actual proliferators from pursuing WMD and to force them to amend their behaviour and disarm. The international enforcers need to have at their disposal legal instruments, physical means and facilities, necessary for the purpose of effective countering proliferation threats.

The international provisions concerning enforcement measures, including the use of military force, should take account of the recent experience. They have to cover explicitly situations arising from threats to the peace and international security posed by gross violations of the non-proliferation norm, thus allowing the international community to tackle the suspected cases of WMD proliferation before they can cross the fatal threshold.

The UN Charter is no barrier to action in this area. Authority of the UNSC could be extended by supplementary arrangements, rules and practical procedures governing the application of enforcement measures in order to stem the proliferation of WMD and ensure compliance with international WMD conventions (and incidentally to complicate illegal resort to force for these ends). It is probable that by itself readiness to apply collective enforcement measures promptly and, above all, the availability of the corresponding operational capability at the disposal of the UNSC would in itself serve as a powerful restraining factor. On some occasions it may even be sufficient to deter potential proliferators from risky moves and the temptation to play a card of the WMD possession and to use it for whatsoever purposes, thus reducing the likelihood that the coercive means will need to be used.

Certainly, collective enforcement measures should be worked out and applied by states parties to the international non-proliferation arrangements under the auspices of the UN Security Council. This is a necessary and crucial precondition of winning a sufficiently wide international support for the conception of enforcement in the context of the anti-proliferation strategy. It has the advantage that interests of all member states and their cultures would be taken into account.

International anti-proliferation operations should generally remain under the political and operational control of the UN Security Council, enjoy its unswerving support and rely on clearly expressed determination of the UNSC to act promptly in the event of a failure to comply with its resolutions. On some occasions international operations against WMD-proliferators may be realised within the framework of ad hoc coalitions of

states formed on the temporary basis. However, in executing enforcement measures they should not clash with international law.

To be able to respond effectively to proliferation contingencies, the UNSC should be provided with necessary operational capability to counter WMD proliferation threats. This might require additional tools and specific procedure for anticipated activities that should take full account of the challenges posed by “states of concern” and terrorist groups seeking and threatening WMD.

There is scope for innovation in establishing a consensual and legally defensible basis for joint enforcement action. For example, the UNSC could consider passing a special resolution on combating WMD proliferators. It might contain, in particular, provisions on enforcement measures in response to specific proliferation activity (the creation of illicit WMD-related facilities, testing and experimentation, the acquisition or transfer (export) of proscribed technologies, equipment, materials, etc., the refusal to accept international inspectors and implement corrective measures, mandated by the UNSC.) It might also include provisions on sanctions (designing sanctions that can apply to particular targets), mandatory monitoring and compulsory disarmament. The issue of dealing with the danger of terrorist acts involving the use of WMD-related materials should be also addressed.

It is worthwhile to consider the establishment within the framework of the UNSC of an ad hoc body to work out ideas on forceful containment, coercion and punishment in the context of WMD non-proliferation¹¹. It would be useful also to create a Situation centre (under the auspices of the UNSC) to monitor proliferation-related developments on a continuous basis. Practical steps are long overdue to make available to the UNSC national contingents for combined international enforcement action. (They are to be provided by permanent members of the Council and other states that are in a position to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43 of the UN Charter). It would be appropriate simultaneously to work for the transformation of the currently inactive UN Military Staff Committee. This body should be able to advise and assist the UNSC on all questions relating to its military requirements for combined action in WMD proliferation prevention operations (and endowed with significant operational capabilities and authority).

When additional relevant UN capacities are in place, the UNSC resilience to meet the WMD proliferation challenge with effective enforcement would be significantly enhanced.

Certainly, politically the realisation of the proposals, cited above, is a complex and difficult diplomatic task. But this is not the main hurdle. Passing additional UNSC resolutions, establishing (or modifying) interna-

¹¹ The experience of the Anti-terrorist committee of the UNSC, created soon after the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the USA, should be taken into account.

tional enforcement mechanisms and even new arrangements for a standby UN force in themselves are insufficient in themselves to effectively stem WMD proliferation, although such steps would have facilitated progress in that direction.

The main difficulty is linked with the fact that major the powers-permanent members of the UNSC have yet failed to work out a common approach to specific challenges in the field of WMD proliferation. They still differ in the definition of proliferation threats to their respective national interests and in the evaluation of the circumstances, which require forceful action against perpetrators. The entrenched stereotypes of the Cold War period also inhibit consensus and combined action.

There is a hope that responsible members of the international community will increasingly wake up to the benefits of the joint active non-proliferation strategy.

It is a cause of certain optimism that difficulties in this area are gradually being overcome with the setting up of new institutional frameworks for partnership between the Russian Federation and the West, including that on the level of the armed forces. Several areas for co-operation have been identified in 2002–2003 within the framework of a new Russia–NATO Council (RNC), and specifically an outline for a more thorough assessment of the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD. The RNC has on its agenda the question of interoperability of forces. Progress in this field is indispensable for ensuring successful implementation of combined proliferation prevention operations.

Russia and the USA develop practical co-operation in the field of strategic stability and WMD non-proliferation despite their disagreements on specific issues. Views of their elites on the threat of the WMD proliferation and ways to respond to it are gradually converging. It is pertinent in this connection to cite the recent document “Principal tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”, which states views of the Russian Ministry of Defence on these issues in the foreseeable future¹². This doctrinal document lists major external threats to the RF. It cites among them: the realisation of the programs for the creation WMD by the states, organisations and movements; proliferation of equipment, technologies and components, used for the manufacture of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as dual-use technologies, which can be used for the production of WMD and their means of delivery. The neutralisation of such threats, says this document, “is to some extent the function of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (emphasis in the named document). In particular, according to this paper, the tasks of the Armed Forces include participation in peace operations

¹² *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 11 October 2003, pp. 3–7.

under the UN mandate (peace-keeping and peace enforcement) and within the framework of coalitions, created by international organisations to which Russia belongs or on an ad hoc basis, or to enforce international sanctions, introduced on the basis of the decisions of the UNSC.

The deepening of multilateral interaction on the issues of combating WMD proliferation (within the framework of the UNSC, the Group of Eight, RNC, etc.) for the purposes of the creation of the potential of responding to the WMD proliferation emergencies would have put perpetrators in a difficult situation. In all probability they would have been forced to take account of risks they are certain to face if they challenge the states pursuing the policy of active non-proliferation and reconsider their plans. On the other hand, the partisans of the global non-proliferation regime would possess greater flexibility and options, including diplomatic action, in handling crises linked with the attempts to acquire materials and equipment related to WMD, openly or covertly. This would strengthen deterrence to proliferation and help to bring the perpetrators to book.

Conclusions

Only some urgent and somewhat under-studied problems relating to the international strategy of active non-proliferation are addressed above. Simultaneously with their resolution it is certainly necessary to continue and intensify searches of ways of tackling the roots of WMD proliferation and of controlling the impulses that might lead to proliferation again.

Continuous brutal terrorist attacks around the world and disclosures of covert WMD activity in various places make it ever more urgent to build up combined efforts of concerned states to strengthen the barriers to WMD proliferation. The dynamics of this process would depend on many factors and above all on closer formal and informal practical interaction among permanent members of the UN Security Council—most powerful international actors, using effective tools of enforcement of non-proliferation rules.

The significance of the international active non-proliferation strategy in an emerging world security order is certain to grow. Russia has all the grounds to play its full part in shaping and implementing this strategy and assuring its increased efficacy.

6. OUTER SPACE AND BMD: PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA–USA COOPERATION

Alexander SAVELYEV, Ludmila PANKOVA

Introduction

The history of cooperation between the USSR/Russia and the USA in Outer Space witnesses to possible, successive and effective interaction between the two leading space powers in the realization of projects of various scale.

However, despite the fact that the development of geopolitical situation since the beginning of 1990s has opened quite new opportunities for cooperation between the participants in the exploration of Outer Space, the possible development of effective and functional relations between Russia and the USA as space exploring partners poses more questions than it gives answers. To name but a few: how to reach the maximum achievable level of cooperation between partners with a minimum risk to their national interests? What role can be played by space partnership in developing telecommunications with the help of space technologies, and in forming of a new architecture of strategic stability? What is the future impact of intensively growing commercial exploitation of Outer Space (including space information systems with capabilities close to systems designed for military purposes) on the development of strategic interaction between Russia and the USA in Outer Space at a state-to-state level?

So far most of these questions have not received a clear answer. Moreover, there are opposite views on the prospects for Russian-American cooperation in Outer Space. Not only the deepening technological and economic gap between the two countries but continuing uncertainty of the very character of strategic partnership between the two sides are responsible for existing contradictory opinions on cooperation in space. Of course, this does

not contribute to the active development of partnership between Russia and the USA both in the military and civilian exploitation of Outer Space. Anyway, it seems that the potential for such cooperation is quite big and could be realized with high effectiveness if current difficulties and disagreements are overcome.

The Russian potential in space

The RF space industry has the best potential among other industries of the country's economy to occupy its place in the world markets. Since 1993 the RF participation in international space programs and projects has become a necessary development for the domestic space industry. While in 1989–2002 state expenditure on space industry decreased 20 times in absolute figures and from 0.73% to 0.12% of the GDP, international cooperation has helped the Russian space industry to survive and to retain its technological potential. Currently international cooperation in Outer Space is one of the main directions in the activities of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviacosmos) and embraces “practically all directions of work including in the Russian federal space program”.²

In the foreseeable future (at least till the end of the next decade) Russia will have every chance, despite serious financial difficulties, of remaining one of the leading space powers.

The Russian space-missile industrial complex is a treasure-house of scientific and technological ideas and original technical inventions. At the beginning of 1990s, according to estimates of some American experts, the Soviet Union was a leader in nearly half of the existing space technologies. In the crisis years of the 1990s many of them have been lost (up to 300 technologies) as well as time and the rate of development has significantly decreased. But Russia's potential in the area of space and missile technologies remains substantial. Among well-known Russian technology achievements are rocket engines using different fuels and fuel components, electrical power systems, orbital space stations, new, first of all composite, materials, hydrogen technologies, azot injectors, etc.³ The development of single-pass engines deserves special attention⁴ as well as the Russian experience in building heavy ekranoplans.⁵ Besides, there are large intellectual investments in new technologies, including quantum-vacuum tech-

¹ A decrease in the GDP for the period of 1989-2002 also should be taken into account.

² B. Bodin. Russia's Space Program. Aerospace Courier (in Russian), 2000, no.1, p.13.

³ *Izvestia*, 13.04.1992.

⁴ The kerosene fuelled single-pass engine has no analogues in the world—GLL “Raduga” (made at MKB “Raduga” and was shown at the MAKS-99 aviation exhibition).

⁵ 24th Academic Proceedings on Cosmonautics (in Russian).—Moscow, 2000, p. 186.

nologies and adaptive optical systems, etc. At the same time, in 2002, the budget of Rosaviacosmos was 35 times less than the budget of NASA and 3.5 times less than the average year budget of the European Space Agency (ESA) for 2002–2006.

The USA spends \$80 billion on space programs, Japan—\$3.6 billion, Europe (ESA member-countries)—\$3 billion, France—\$2.5 billion, China—\$1.9 billion, India—\$ 550 million and Russia—only \$193 million⁶, though her potential capabilities in space technologies remain sufficiently large.

Russia–US partnership in Outer Space

After going through a quite optimistic stage in 1993–2000 (projects such as the International Space Station—ISS, the “Sea Launch” project, etc.) cooperation between the RF and the USA in the civilian exploitation of Outer Space has come almost to a standstill. Moreover, at the beginning of the new Millennium an orientation towards military space developments at the expense of civilian research began to predominate in the USA and Washington’s interest in cooperation with Moscow in Outer Space began to decline. In this respect it was indicative when for the first time issues of cooperation in Outer Space were not included in the final documents of bilateral summit in May 2002.

After the space shuttle “Columbia” disaster in February 2003, the US interest for cooperation with Russia has increased to some extent. In the opinion of S. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary (the US Department of State) for Arms Control, currently the USA depends on the Russian rocket launches for the ISS project.⁷ Nevertheless prospects for Russian–American cooperation in Outer Space for the future are still unclear.

Some factors contribute to this uncertainty. First, the bilateral Russian–American commission on economy and technology cooperation (the so-called Gore–Chernomyrdin Commission), established in 1993 at the Yeltsin–Clinton summit in Vancouver, was dissolved. Cooperation in Outer Space occupied a very important place in the commission’s activities.⁸ During, the 1990s, Gore–Chernomyrdin Commission has been the chief coordinating body for cooperation between Russia and the USA in Outer Space. Second, the activity of the special committee on the Prevention of the Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) has virtually stopped.⁹ The rea-

⁶ *Cosmonautics News* (in Russian), 2001, no.8, p.58.

⁷ *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 2003, no.10, p.2.

⁸ Within the Commission the Committee on Space demonstrated successful activity together with commissions on nuclear power, on science and technology, etc.

⁹ PAROS was established in 1985 within framework of the UN Commission for Disarmament.

son—a consensus has not been reached on the format of negotiations. Third, the most serious obstacle for further expansion of international cooperation in Outer Space is the USA' position on this issue. The US does not attach much attention to international cooperation in space and prefers to solve basic problems in space developments unilaterally.¹⁰ Indeed, the USA has superiority in space technologies and possesses the most modern space industry. Nevertheless, the USA unchallenged technological superiority at all dimensions in space cannot stand forever. Leading developed countries seek for independent access to space development and can undermine US dominance in space research in future.

It should be stressed that Russia and the USA have several options for possible cooperation in Outer Space. Let's take only one—information technologies. Here projects for a global information security space system; the reduction of the vulnerability of space objects and systems; the mutual analysis and exchange of information data on moving objects in Outer Space; cooperative research on protecting space information flows; the mutual monitoring of threats to information security in space segment; the mutual monitoring of Outer Space parameters, including the level of radioactivity, intensity of Sunwind, the characteristics of the magnetic field, which has the ability to disrupt the circulation of information flows, etc., may be singled out.

The implementation of prospective space technologies will make it possible by the end of the next decade to come close to undertaking big civilian space projects. For example, it is very important to develop an energy industry in space to prevent coming energy and ecology crises. On the agenda are projects for the construction of orbital sun power stations and transfer of the energy they will generate to the Earth. Space technology can also help mankind in solving the problem of “managing weather”¹¹, to deal with typhoons, gas emission effects, and “ozone holes”. By the way, according to the opinion of some Russian experts, there is the possibility of using weapon-designed laser systems, invented in the USA, to produce global means for the restoration of the Earth ozone layer. There are also projects to establish orbital systems on sun-synchronized orbits with powerful lasers to fuel photochemical reactions in the Earth atmosphere at the altitude of the ozone layer (the Russian rocket-space corporation “Energiya” does research on a relevant project).¹² Among other prospective projects are the isolation of particularly dangerous toxic waste in space, radioactive waste first of all, the fight against dangerous meteor activity, the

¹⁰ Though no political decisions on the matter have been taken yet.

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¹² Cosmonautics and Solving of Mankind Problems (in Russian)/Ed. Senkevich V.—Moscow, 2002, vol.21, p.238.

deployment of production facilities in Outer Space, etc. International manned missions to Mars and the establishment of bases on the Moon beyond 2020 are also among quite possible projects.

Russia's cooperation in space with other countries

For the last ten years Russia has increased its cooperation in Outer Space with the international community significantly. The country's estimated earnings from this cooperation exceeded \$4 billion in 1994–2001. A good part of the money came from the use of Russian rocket launchers in the world space markets.¹³ At such enterprises as Chrunichev Center the share of earnings from activity on foreign markets varies between 80% and 94% of all earnings.¹⁴

According to Yu. Koptev, the general director of Rosaviakosmos, at the beginning of 2002 Russia had bilateral government agreements for cooperation in Outer Space with 18 countries, including the USA, Japan, China, India, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria and countries of ESA.¹⁵ Rosaviakosmos has signed agreements with space agencies of 19 countries and ESA. Cooperation with large foreign corporations, international consortiums and international organizations are developing successfully, including training (the Gagarin cosmonauts' training center) and launching international space crews into orbit.

Organizational forms of cooperation are becoming more and more various and flexible,¹⁶ as has been shown by a number of projects. Among them are: the agreement at government level to establish the ISS (January 29, 1998)¹⁷; the joint venture between NPO "Energomash" and "Pratt and Whitney" to supply rocket engines RD-180; an agreement between KB "Khimavtomatika" and "Aerojet" to develop a three-component rocket engine based on RD-0120; space service agreements between KB "Polet", on the one hand, and the USA and Sweden, on the other, for the satellite launch of the research apparatus FAISAT and ASTRID; agreements on mutual exchanges of space services (on exchange of satellite weather information within the framework of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); on the international satellite system for search and rescue—Cospas-Sarsat). There is also cooperation between space agencies and corporations. For example,

¹³ Aerospace Courier (in Russian). No. 1, 2002, s. 10.

¹⁴ Roundtable on problems of the Russian Cosmonautics. In: Cosmonautics News (in Russian), 2003, no.2.

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Rosaviakosmos signed an agreement with Western European corporation EADS18 (December 2000).¹⁸

The main stimulus for Russia in developing international cooperation in space is the survival of the country's space industry (to maintain research institutes and design bureaus, production enterprises, space launching sites, points of control, personnel, etc.) when federal budget financing has significantly decreased.

In addition to financial stimulus there are some other considerations as well. The accumulated experience of cooperation between laboratories, firms witnesses to the importance of ties between specialists and the significance of involvement in world science and technology and the industrial community. This is particularly important bearing in mind the processes of integration and globalization. The sharply increased movement of scientific and technological knowledge, ideas, specialists and resources between countries; the merging of financial resources, high technology production facilities and scientific-technological innovations in the space industry; emerging markets for the commercial space industry—all these developments allow to speak of the continuing process of the formation of a global scientific and technological basis of the space industry. The possibility and ability to work together with this global basis of the space industry becomes more and more important for the effectiveness of each country's activity in Outer Space.

Conclusion

Russia has managed to maintain its unique space science and technology potential and is able to expand cooperation with the USA, leading EU states and China. There are various reasons for the current low intensity of military and civilian cooperation in Outer Space with the USA and EU: the loss of the mechanism for taking decisions at high governmental level (the Russian–American commission on economic and technology cooperation); American and European corporations in the space industry are interested in the development of their own space technologies and in increasing new work places in their own countries; lack of sufficient experience and flexibility makes it difficult for high Russian officials to successfully participate in major international projects. This can be illustrated by the unsuccessful attempts to unite efforts to establish a cooperative navigation system based on the Russian orbital system GLONASS (deployed by 1996 but subsequently cut by more than half due to lack of financial resources) and the European project “Galileo”. As a result an agreement was

¹⁸ Aerospace Courier (in Russian), 2001, no.2, pp.12-13.

concluded with China to join the European project despite China's lack of experience in developing such systems.

But the profound reason for the slow development of cooperation between Russia and the USA in Outer Space is mutual distrust, accumulated for decades of the Cold War. This plays a particular important role when cooperation in such sensitive areas as military space and double-purpose projects are under consideration. Examples of this problem are the negotiations continuing for years on the space experimental program RAMOS and lack of progress even in cooperation on the development of information orbital system for a joint BMD, despite many general declarations in favor of cooperation.

At the same time activity in space, in view of its global character, is the most realistic sphere where historically formed obstacles to solving security problems by cooperation, including in all its existing and prospective directions can be overcome. Cooperation between Russia and the USA can play a particularly important role in global control of Outer Space by national information systems, including means of detecting rocket launches and providing data for BMD.

This cooperation does not exclude the movement, stage by stage, towards a new system of international security with participation of not only the two leading space powers but other states, as well, which are interested in building a new world order and ready to share responsibility for it.

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concluded with China to join the European project despite China's lack of experience in developing such systems.

But the profound reason for the slow development of cooperation between Russia and the USA in Outer Space is mutual distrust, accumulated for decades of the Cold War. This plays a particular important role when cooperation in such sensitive areas as military space and double-purpose projects are under consideration. Examples of this problem are the negotiations continuing for years on the space experimental program RAMOS and lack of progress even in cooperation on the development of information orbital system for a joint BMD, despite many general declarations in favor of cooperation.

At the same time activity in space, in view of its global character, is the most realistic sphere where historically formed obstacles to solving security problems by cooperation, including in all its existing and prospective directions can be overcome. Cooperation between Russia and the USA can play a particularly important role in global control of Outer Space by national information systems, including means of detecting rocket launches and providing data for BMD.

This cooperation does not exclude the movement, stage by stage, towards a new system of international security with participation of not only the two leading space powers but other states, as well, which are interested in building a new world order and ready to share responsibility for it.

7. ACCOUNT OF THE SEMINAR “IMPERATIVES OF THE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF COUNTERACTION AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN A NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT”

Galina OZNOBISHCHEVA

On 15 April 2003, within the framework of the presentation of the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2002, a seminar on the imperatives of the global strategy of counteraction against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in a new international environment was held at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Prominent foreign experts, among whom: Dr Alyson Bailes, Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Dr Ian Anthony, Deputy Director of SIPRI, participated in the seminar. On the Russian side, the seminar was attended by such well known Russian politicians and experts as A. Arbatov (IMEMO), V. Baranovsky (IMEMO), M. Vinogradov (Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Arms Control), V. Dvorkin (IMEMO), G. Zhukov (Peoples' Friendship University of Russia), A. Kaliadin (IMEMO), E. Kirichenko (IMEMO), D. Kobayakov (PIR–Center), A. Konovalov (Institute of Strategic Estimates), V. Mikheyev (Institute of the Far East, RAS), Yu. Morozov (Institute of Europe, RAS), A. Savelyev (IMEMO), S. Oznobishchev (Institute of Strategic Estimates), A. Pikayev (IMEMO), N. Romashkina (IMEMO), I. Safranchuk (Moscow Bureau of the Center for Defense Information), Yu. Fedorov (Institute of Applied International Studies).

In his opening address V. Baranovsky, Deputy Director of IMEMO, noted that the question under discussion is one of today's hottest issues. After the events of 11 September, 2001, our notion of international security imperatives is changing and becoming more complex. The Iraqi crisis testifies to that. The problem of non-proliferation of WMD is becoming increasingly important. The theme proposed for discussion at the seminar is to ponder on ideas of what should be done in this area in a new environment.

V. Baranovsky stressed that in this connection it is important to find, during the discussion, an answer to the following question: what principles should be added to the current global strategy to render the regime of non-proliferation of WMD and to make it more universal?

The seminar consisted of two meetings. At the first meeting, chaired by A. Arbatov, two opening addresses “International Strategy of Active Non-Proliferation of WMD. The role of Collective Coercive Measures” and “Present-Day Challenges to the Regime of Non-Proliferation and Russia's Approach” were delivered by A. Kaliadin, principal researcher at the IMEMO Center for International Security (the report, slightly abridged, is presented in this Supplement), and A. Pikayev, Head of the IMEMO Department of Disarmament and Conflicts Settlement.

In his report A. Kaliadin stated that, over a period of years, the international system of non-proliferation experienced a serious crisis, which has been dramatically aggravated recently. We have witnessed North Korea's demonstrative and yet unpunished withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Before our eyes, the United States of America and Great Britain have launched a military operation in Iraq without a mandate of the UNSC. As a consequence of the proliferation of WMD, i.e. because of the accumulation of illegitimate arsenals of WMD (or attempts to retain them), accusations of the creation and proliferation of such arsenals or the withdrawal of some countries from relevant treaties and agreements, international armed conflicts are very likely to break out in the future.

In the author's opinion, today, the declared potential of international regimes of non-proliferation has not been realized; they have not been able to stop the creation of illegitimate arsenals of WMD. Despite all its military, economic and political power, the USA is unable, on its own, by means of unilateral coercive actions, to ensure non-proliferation in a satisfactory way, nor is it able to create and maintain an effective world order in this area, which could be recognized by most countries. In his report, A. Kaliadin outlined a number of top-priority problems concerning the elaboration of a new strategy of non-proliferation.

In his report A. Pikayev noted that in recent years there have emerged a number of new threats both to the regimes of non-proliferation and to the system of international legal regimes as a whole. The present-day system of these regimes developed for the most part during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War there emerged new threats to security, including those from non-state groups, such as, for instance, terrorist ones. Besides, the balance of forces between the leading states of the world changed significantly. For example, three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council lost their former positions and became "marginal". At the same time there emerged new centers of force, whose role has not yet been internationally acknowledged. The contemporary international legal system fails to take into account all the changes that have occurred and, thus, cannot adequately respond to emerging threats.

As far as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable delivery vehicles is concerned, this represents a two-fold threat: from a number of states and non-state groups. As to these states they are situated in two regions: the Middle East and East Asia. Many East Asian states, including Taiwan, have developed a good potential for the creation of nuclear weapons; however, they have shown restraint for political reasons. But those countries can revise their position if North Korea starts nuclear testing. Such a course of events would trigger off debate on the nuclearization of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Middle East's technological potential is much lower but its political motivation to gain access to nuclear weapons is incomparably higher. The situation in the region can be

defined as “nuclear asymmetry” where Israel in contrast to its Arab neighbors is most likely to possess nuclear weapons. The most developed nuclear infrastructure is available in two non-nuclear states: Iran and Algeria, and it will take them only a few years to acquire a nuclear-weapon capability if they take the political decision. In contrast to East Asia, the Middle East is most likely to become the region for the proliferation among non-state groups, as a result of the eventual disintegration of a number of Islamic states or due to the deliberate transfer of weapons by radicalist regimes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-State groups is very likely to entail the use of those weapons, because such groups, unlike states, defy all attempts at restraint.

Yu. Fedorov, who delivered a report during the follow-up discussion, noted that the most burning question, within the analysis of the problem of proliferation, concerns the ability of international terrorism to gain access to WMD and the implications of such access for Russia. Undoubtedly, the situation is dangerous for our country since it works in concert with the US, Europe, China and India to counteract new threats.

If we consider the situation around Iraq in terms of non-proliferation, Russia does not have sufficient grounds “to cast stones” at the USA and Great Britain. Coercive methods, including those employed in Iraq in such a dramatic way, only promote non-proliferation. When we speak about the consolidation of non-proliferation regimes, one can think that we are referring to certain universal regimes similar to the one established on the basis of the NPT. Their characteristic feature is universal membership and, accordingly, a common system of decision-making, a system for their correction, which is based on general agreement of all its members. Yu. Fedorov’s opinion such regimes are beginning to belong to the past and the current non-proliferation crisis is caused by inefficiency of such approaches. In the future, counteraction against proliferation will be based on the resolution of a number of concrete problems and a specific selection of political, economic and military factors.

The current crisis of the UNSC has been caused, in A. Arbatov’s opinion, solely by the policy of the US who tried to legitimize the action in Iraq through a SC Resolution. However, that action has in fact nothing to do with either the fight against terrorism or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Iraqi regime obviously had very many negative features but in terms of the two above aspects, it was far more inoffensive than many others. After the introduction of sanctions and the resumption of inspections, Iraq has become the most inoffensive and least dangerous country to the international community.

The Iraq crisis provoked by the US poses a number of very serious problems for the future. The threat of terrorism and the problem of non-proliferation of WMD do not necessarily “walk hand in hand”. There are three groups of states causing deep concern in this respect. The first group comprises Israel and India. Those two states are considered to bear the

main blame as far as the proliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned. At the same time they are the most reliable and consistent as regards the fight against international terrorism and it would be very unwise, and what is more, impossible to impose sanctions on them.

The states that are to blame, in some way or another, for proliferation and associate with international terrorism belong to the second group. They are Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. But here the interests and hence the positions of Russia and the USA differ radically. One can hardly imagine that the US would allow taking measures against Pakistan with its current regime, despite the fact that it is, undoubtedly, responsible for proliferation of WMD and is linked with international terrorism. Nor can one imagine that Russia would take any measures against North Korea and Iran. If anything of this kind were to happen we would find ourselves in a blind alley since, both for the USA and Russia their specific interests will take precedence over the issues of non-proliferation and international terrorism.

The third group is formed by Sudan, Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia, the countries that do not constitute a serious threat as regards the use of weapons of mass destruction but have close ties with international terrorism. Those states are put "on the agenda" as far as the use of force is concerned.

A. Konovalov dwelt on the problem of state sovereignty and the legitimacy of the efforts of the international community to limit it in the context of countering terrorism and WMD proliferation. The proportion of states with "weak sovereignty" that are unable to control their territories is growing, thus making those territories more accessible to terrorists (who use them for setting up training camps, arms depots, etc.).

There is no longer a need for the universal regime of non-proliferation. There is an increasing necessity for concrete measures against specific states developing nuclear weapons. An important question, however, remains: what are the limits of the legitimacy of measures that can be taken by the international community to prevent the enlargement of "the nuclear club".

The encouraging example of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its still "virtual nuclear potential" conveys a message to the other countries that instead of military intervention, as in Iraq, they can get humanitarian aid as a result of talks with the most powerful states. In conclusion A. Konovalov noted that, in the context of the theme under discussion, a problem of vital importance is the enhancement of the efficiency of the UNSC in such a way that it would really be able to check the proliferation of WMD.

In the opinion of S. Oznobishchev today's crisis of the non-proliferation regime is rooted in the superficiality of the approaches of the '90s, when reports on numerous achievements concealed serious failures. For instance, cheerful reports on the indefinite prolongation of the NPT in May 1995 did not mention the fact that the Treaty did not cover such "semi-legal members of the nuclear club" as India, Pakistan and Israel. The policy of non-proliferation depends for its efficiency on a number of factors:

the general political climate, the level of cooperation /partnership in resolving a wide range of problems, the efficiency and intensity of the actions taken by the countries possessing nuclear weapons, the restrained conduct of those countries on the international arena, their compliance with generally recognized international law, the predictability of their actions, the efficiency of counteractions of international institutions against the proliferation of WMD.

As to the first factor, the situation here leaves much to be desired. For instance, cooperation with Washington has been declared but in fact has hardly been realized. As a result, the degree of confidence between the countries is still very low and the level of mutual anxiety still quite high. The countries possessing nuclear weapons pursue a slack policy to ensure security in the world. The control over these weapons is clearly stalling. Analysis of the third factor brings us to the distressing conclusion that US action against Iraq has become a telling argument in favor of the armaments build-up and WMD acquisition by all possible means. International institutions both in "Iraqi" and "Korean" situations, putting it mildly, displayed scant effectiveness.

To get out of the current situation, unified approaches to the existing and potential challenges are required. The international community should work out a unified algorithm of activities in different situations, connected to the proliferation of WMD and terrorism, including measures towards the states representing a threat to the world.

N. Romashkina dwelled on Israel's, India's and Pakistan's role in the new conditions, as, to her mind, these states have seriously undermined the existing balance of forces and the level of strategic stability.

Today the attention of the whole world is concentrated on the potential nuclear distributors. However, the concrete actions aimed at the limitation of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in India, Pakistan and Israel and their destruction, could force those who wish to possess nuclear weapons to think again and, possibly, to suspend their work on their development, especially since this, as a rule, is related to the serious economic problems of the threshold states. The ultimate aim should be the involvement of Israel, India and Pakistan in the NPT, even of only in the long run. Recognition the nuclear status ever at the official international level, at which India and Pakistan are aiming, by any means, such as a separate document, an internal agreement or an addendum to the NPT, could only become an accelerator of the nuclear weapons proliferation process. The elaboration of a global strategy to resist proliferation creation is an important counterbalance to military force in the solution of this problem.

I. Safranchuk noted that the politicians and experts could hardly acknowledge that the NPT is insufficiently adapted to the modern world. The weapon can fall into terrorists' hands only through state sources. Thus arises the problem of "countries-incubators"—states assisting the terrorists in WMD proliferation. In the case of North Korea, for example, it is

based on economic and ideological motives, but there could be other stimulants. The essence of the “new deal”, which the international community would have to accept, involves agreement with those countries, but not with the terrorists themselves, which is, of course, impossible. Such a deal would bear a non-formal character—in the form of secret treaties with Iran, North Korea etc.

The problem is also that the UN SC, with all the existing procedures, is practically incapable of elaborating any effective solutions. In addition, in the Iraqi situation the institutions, which should have secured the acceptance of the solutions within the SC framework—the behaviour of the IAEA international inspectors, was quite inadequate. Thus, in his reports on Iraq, Mr. Hans Blix practically suggested arguments to the parties supporting the exactly opposite positions. Such institutions should act not as political, but as expert organizations.

V. Mikheev supported the scheme of expansion suggested in A. Kaliadin’s report. In his opinion, the fact should be added that striving for nuclear weapons possession enhances a state’s political image. In the struggle against proliferation should also be included elements, connected to this or that state’s political system. Thus, if the present “bad regime” is striving for nuclear weapons possession, than the replacement of the “bad” regime by a “good” one could be considered as part of the non-proliferation program.

To the general non-proliferation context should also be added such an important element as global disarmament. It is impossible to struggle effectively for non-proliferation is based on double standards, when five states are permitted to have nuclear weapons and the rest are not.

The way out of this dead end should be looked for in the addition to the system, which already acts on a UN basis. One of the directions should be agreed and tougher sanctions against those leaders who take decisions, promoting WMD proliferation.

Yu. Morozov evaluated the global and regional challenges and threats to Russian national interests. The biggest challenge to international and Russian security in the beginning of the 21st century, to his mind, is the crisis in the system of international relations and international security. The crisis in the decision-making process in the UNSC is obvious, and not only because of US and NATO unilateral actions. The effectiveness of other international institutions is diminishing. A serious threat to Russia security is the process of proliferation of WMD, especially of nuclear weapons. This problem has become more actual recently as the world community and, first of all, the leading country—the USA, did not react (or did not want to react) to the start of official nuclear weapons proliferation in Pakistan and India. As a result of this inactivity and the following crisis in respect of Afghanistan, which made the two countries factual allies of the West, they have legitimized their nuclear status and acquired additional prestige and influence. Thus, from a politico-psychological point of view, the non-proliferation regime was substantially weakened. Apparently, Rus-

sia, taking into consideration the danger, which WMD proliferation represents for it, should change its policy in this sphere and become not merely the object, but one of the leaders pursuing active policies on the prevention of WMD proliferation.

At the second session (chairman Dr A. Bailes) Dr I. Anthony, the SIPRI Deputy Director, delivered the opening report on “New directions in the field of arms control and non-proliferation”. Anticipating this report, Dr Bailes stated an important thesis that the existing political situation factually encourages states to acquire nuclear weapons, looked upon as the guarantee, that no force would be used against countries possessing such weapon. If we really want to resist nuclear weapons proliferation, it is insufficient just to confine ourselves to punishing those who already have them or want to acquire them. It is necessary to restrict the very possibility of the use of nuclear weapon, the motives stimulating such actions.

In his report Dr I. Anthony underlined, that the events of September 11, 2001 and the beginning of the full-scale struggle against terrorism, firstly, greatly influenced the decision to solve the disarmament and non-proliferation problems in the direction of intensification of their solution. Secondly, it is observed that measures for export control are being strengthened. Thirdly, there is a number of new aspects in the joint activity to reduce threats reduction and, in the first place, the Big “Eight” and European Union are activating their work. Fourthly, more and more global approaches to the solution of concrete problems are developing. We mean the application of universal solutions in relation to some states.

Finally, there is another new tendency, which emerged against the background of the mentioned events—we mean the attempts to apply the rules and principles, existing in the non-proliferation framework with respect to those who violate the regime.

In the recent past we have seen concrete measures, directed towards joint efforts to fight terrorism, elaborated by Russia and the European Union. Undoubtedly, the Big “Eight” decisions on “Global Partnership” against nuclear weapons proliferation considerably influence the context of the whole problem as well. Until now the possibilities of so-called people’s diplomacy have not been sufficiently exploited.

We know the US position and actions, but different administrations have different approaches to the solution of concrete problems in the non-proliferation sphere. However, in any case, the effective struggle against WMD proliferation is possible only on the basis of wide cooperation, where the dialogue between the EU and USA becomes the key element. At the same time the dialog between the EU and Russia in this sphere would also be very important for the process of the further armaments reduction and for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

V. Dvorkin, who spoke during the discussion stressed that the missile technology control regime (MTCR) undoubtedly played a considerable role. At the same time, it could not prevent North Korea from becom-

ing an important donor, which supplied many countries with problem regimes with its missiles. Practically all Iranian missile programs were realized with North Korean assistance (different modifications of “Shekhab” missiles are based on the “Scud” and “Nodong” type missiles). The same is true of Pakistan and Yemen. Egypt, Syria and Libya are trying to acquire the same technologies. (In 1987 as the result of massive funds “injections” into North Korea, Iran obtained the first 100 “Scud”-type modernized missiles with a range of more than 350 km).

The MTCR, to a considerable degree became the stimulus for developing own missile programs. Especially Iran, which plans to become the most powerful missile state in this region, has been successful in this.

There are enough grounds for assuming that North Korea is close to nuclear ammunition production. And there is no assurance that it will not start trading in nuclear-missile weapons. In this connection it is doubtful whether it is enough just to toughen the WMD and missiles proliferation regime in the legal framework in force.

To possess the nuclear weapon it is required to carry out at least one test. From then on, it does not require much time to produce ammunition suitable for combat use. What should the world community do in this case? Should it quickly create a new legal base or take a consolidated decision on the disarmament with the use of force?

The latter method is, in V. Dvorkin’s opinion, much more effective. That is why, to his mind, the choice should be made: either there is a consolidated decision to use force or there is little doubt that the USA will take an individual decision to deliver a strike against missile launching sites and plants producing nuclear charges (ammunition). From these two variants one can not choose the best one, but only minimize the negative consequences for the regional and global strategic stability.

E. Kirichenko drew attention to the fact that the expansion of international technology transfer channels promotes proliferation. A very important aspect here are the intangible transfer forms which also should be controlled—many countries have included corresponding provisions in their legislation. The problem of the influence of export control on national security interests also requires its solution. The key factor here is technological superiority, the importance of which in modern conditions is evident. In these conditions export control, limiting access to the “technologies piggy bank”, can be considered as a factor undermining national security. In the civil sector, which produces science intensive goods also appear stimuli to reduce export control limitations. As result need for a complex solution of all these contradictory problems arises while at the same time preserving key elements of the non-proliferation policy.

In M. Vinogradov’s point of view, the weak and vulnerable spot in ensuring nuclear security is protection of radioactive isotopes usage, which is typical both for Russia, the USA and other countries. The theft of such materials gives terrorists the possibility to create so-called “dirty bombs”.

The explosion of such bomb will not have such effect as the explosion at a nuclear power plant. But the main danger lies in the fact that as a result of such an explosion a considerable area will be radioactively contaminated and the population will panic.

In spite of the fact that a great deal of work on the accounting of nuclear materials, their storage and physical protection and the control of nuclear fuel production has been done and is still being done, one cannot assert that all leaking channels are securely closed. There is a lot to be done in this respect.

V. Novikov drew attention to the danger of the solution of the non-proliferation problem by force. Thus, a cruise missiles strike at a nuclear reactor would evidently cause radiological pollution to the terrain. The example of the Israeli strike at Iraq is not convincing as the reactor was not loaded.

G. Zhukov touched in his report on the legal aspects of the missiles non-proliferation regime. As the MTCR is not an obligatory legal agreement, it does not establish a universal international-legislative regime, in respect of missiles as established in the nuclear weapons non-proliferation sphere. Taking into consideration legally non-obligatory character of the MTCR, great significance is implementation of its principles in internal legislation of the states-participants. An example is Russia where Presidential Decree of 8 August 2001 "On the confirmation of the list equipment materials and technologies which can be used during missile weapon production and in respect of which export control has been established" is in force.

He also dwelled on the Global Control System for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies (GSC) an initiative, proposed by Russia in June 1999 at the G8 summit. The GSC is directed at limitation and containment of missile proliferation; it envisages a package of measures to be applied to states, possessing missile weapons and connected technologies.

V. Baranovsky delivered the closing speech. He summed up the work of the seminar, and drew attention to the two approaches to the problem discussed. The first approach was stated in Dr I. Anthony's report and consists in the development and strengthening of the already existing regimes. The second approach consists in the military means use of force to destroy the sources of possible proliferation. In practice, probably, one will have to bear in mind both approaches. It is necessary, undoubtedly, to work out effective joint measures against proliferation, against threats, which may emerge very soon and which will require the determined use of force for which the international law is not ready. Nevertheless, priority should be given to the work within the traditional framework of the regimes, which created by lengthy mutual efforts and which make it possible to achieve concrete results. The questions discussed at the seminar will require further elaboration and concrete analysis.

PART II. COMMENTARIES

8. Prospects for Global Partnership after Evian
9. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Its Present and Future
10. The New Russia–NATO Council: Achievements and Prospects
11. Defense Appropriations in the Federal Budget for 2004

8. PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AFTER EVIAN

Daniil KOPYAKOV, Vladimir ORLOV

The program “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” was one of the key points on the agenda of the G8 Evian summit in June 1–3, 2003. On the eve of the summit Global Partnership had not been among its main issues. Sustainable development, environment protection, the fight against poverty, and various economic issues were considered of higher priority. Anyway, problems of proliferation occupied a significant place during discussions in Evian were the focus of attention both of the G8 leaders and Western media. A number of new documents on international security, including the “Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A G8 Declaration”, G8 statement and G8 action plan both with the same title: “Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Security of Radioactive Sources” were adopted. In the “Declaration” G8 leaders called on North Korea and Iran in rather tough wording to put their nuclear programs under international control.

All these developments have proved once more that security problems belong to the most acute issues in world politics, particularly after the war in Iraq and the emergence of new challenges to non-proliferation regime. In this respect, it is particularly important to find measures to fully implement the decisions taken in Evian on Global Partnership.¹

Evian Summit outcome

From the point of view of Global Partnership, the main outcome of the Evian summit was that the G8 leaders confirmed their obligations to allocate \$20 billion for non-proliferation projects in Russia to implement the “Global Partnership” program. For the first time specific sums for each member country were fixed in official documents of G8 (see table below).

¹ See Posle Eviana: sdelat tak, chtobi dokumenti summita ne stali “vodoi”, *Yadernii Kontrol (Nuclear Control)*, no.3, Autumn 2003.

Table. Assistance under the “Global Partnership” program fixed at the Evian Summit for each member country

Country	Assistance funds
Great Britain	\$750 million
Germany	1.5 billion euro (\$1.7 billion)
Italy	1.0 billion euro (\$1.2 billion)
Canada	Can\$ 1 billion (\$727 million)
Russia	Not less than \$2.0 billion
USA	\$ 10 billion
France	750 million euro (\$883 million)
Japan	\$200 million
Total	\$18.6 billion

Source: Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. G8 Senior Officials Group. Annual Report. (Evian. June 1–3, 2003); Global Partnership Update, July 2003,¹ 1, Center for Strategic and International studies (CSIS).

The figures in the table show that, at the moment of the Evian summit, G8 countries had not been able to reach the \$20 billion target they had fixed at the previous summit in Kananaskis in 2002.² It should be underlined that these figures have been declared but not actually allocated. In the financing of “Global Partnership” program there is a continuing gap between declarations and the sums actually given for concrete projects.

In Evian the desire to implement Global Partnership in practice was expressed as one of the main goals of the partners in the program. This was confirmed once more in the Evian summit documents, particularly in the G8 Action plan for Global Partnership.³

Among the main achievements of the Evian summit is the expansion of the geography of Global Partnership. To encourage more countries to join this initiative was declared an aim already at the G8 summit in Kananaskis. During the year between Kananaskis and Evian, G8 members have been engaged in talks and consultations with countries that showed interest in taking part in the program. Representatives of 17 potential donor-countries were invited to take part in meetings of the G8 coordinating body for Global Partnership—the Senior Official Group (SOG). For example, information meetings were held in Paris (8 April, 2003) and in Washington (25 April, 2003). As a result the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden, both before and during the Evian summit, officially stated their intention of joining the Global Partnership program.

² See G8 Statement “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (Kananaskis, 27 June, 2002).

³ See Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. G8 Senior Officials Group. Annual Report. (Evian. June 1–3, 2003); Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. A G8 Action Plan (Evian. June 1–3, 2003).

According to the statement issued at the Kananaskis summit, the Global Partnership program has to concentrate on the realization of projects in Russia. The G8 countries have also expressed their readiness to start negotiations with other (than Russia) candidate-countries for financial assistance. On the eve of the Evian summit, Ukraine made an official request for participating in Global Partnership. It was discussed by SOG and received a positive response “in principle”. At the same time, in the SOG report at the Evian summit it was stated that programs under Global Partnership were at the initial stage and currently efforts should be concentrated on cooperation with Russia.⁴

The implementation of the Global Partnership program

SOG is the main coordinating body for the Global Partnership program. It comprises senior officials from different departments of donor-countries that take part in the realization of various projects under this initiative. The main tasks of SOG are to evaluate priorities of Global partnership, to prepare documents to be adopted at high level and to inform and cooperate with other countries—aspiring members of Global Partnership.⁵

In Russia the activities of ministries and departments, involved in projects, are coordinated under the supervision of the Prime Minister M. Kasyanov. Deputy ministers or deputy heads of departments are coordinators of projects. The inter-ministerial coordinating body holds its meetings every month.⁶ It seems that implementation of the program could be more successful if other member countries of the Global Partnership program also had single coordinating bodies headed by officials of the same high rank as their counterparts in Russia.

Direction of cooperation

The leaders of G8 have identified the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapon scientists as priority fields for cooperative projects.⁷ For Russia the most important issues are chemical disarmament and the dismantling of decommissioned

⁴ Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. G8 Senior Officials Group. Annual Report . (Evian. June 1–3, 2003).

⁵ Global Partnership Monitor, Spring 2003, no.1, p.2.

⁶ Russia’s ambassador at large A. Antonov. Statement at the meeting of PIR–Center Club, April 10, 2003 (in Russian).

⁷ G8 Statement “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (Kananaskis, 27 June, 2002).

nuclear submarines.⁸ Unresolved problems in these two fields constitute the greatest danger from the points of damage to the ecology and non-proliferation and require urgent and effective measures.

As far as the disarmament of chemical weapons is concerned there exist some objective problems negatively affecting Russia's fulfillment of its obligations in accordance with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Despite the fact that the final date for the elimination of all chemical weapons has been moved for Russia from 2007 to 2012, it will still be extremely difficult to achieve this goal for several reasons. Among the main of these are the huge volume of accumulated stock of chemical weapons (CW), the poor state of a great number of CW munitions as well as the lack of significant funds needed to implement the CW elimination program. Russia's CW stocks consist of 40 000 tons of CW munitions spread over seven storage sites: Pochev (Bryansk Oblast)—18.8 %, Maradikovskii (Kirov Oblast)—17.4 %, Leonidovka (Penza Oblast)—17.2 %, Kambarka—15.9 % and Kizner (both Udmurt Oblast)—14.2 %, Schuchie (Kurgan Oblast)—13.6 % and Gornii (Saratov Oblast)—2.9 %.⁹

According to estimates made by N. Kalinina, advisor at the Secretariat of the RF Prime Minister, the total cost of the CW disarmament program will amount to around \$5.52 billion (inflation added). The financing of the program from the federal budget funds has miscarried from the beginning. It will obviously be impossible for Russia to fulfill the CW disarmament program without financial support from foreign partners.¹⁰

The international community understands this problem. In this respect a number of states have expressed their willingness to assist Russia in the destruction of CW. By mid-2003 among these were the U. K., Germany, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the USA, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden and EU.¹¹

The first practical step in cooperation in this field was realized with the commissioning of CW destruction facility in Gornii, which was built with the assistance of Germany and the EU. In April 2003 the first 400 tons of iprit were destroyed at the Gornii's plant (1 % of the whole Russia's CW stockpile).¹² Thus, Russia is fulfilling its current obligations in compliance with the CWC.

The Evian summit served as an additional stimulus to increase the financing for the CW disarmament programs. New funds have been allotted

⁸ The statement of the Russian president V. Putin at the press-conference at the end of the Evian G8 summit of heads of states and governments (3 June 2003). Information Bulletin. MID RF (in Russian), June 4, 2003.

⁹ The Russian Munitions Agency. <http://www.munition.ru/rus/objhran.asp>.

¹⁰ N.I. Kalinina. Efektivnost Konventzii po kximicheskomu oruziu zavisit ot deistvii Rossii. *Yadernii Kontrol (Nuclear Control)*, no.1, 2002, p.94.

¹¹ See Vestnik Globalnogo Partnyorstva, 1 1, 2003 (in Russian)//*Yadernii Kontrol (Nuclear Control)*, no. 2, 2003.

¹² ITAR-TASS News Agency, April 26, 2003.

for the construction of a CW destruction facility in Kambarka and the development of the infrastructure of the same type of facility in Schuchie.

Foreign partners have been also asked to help to build certain other objects.

By 2003, 192 nuclear submarines had been decommissioned in Russia, but of them with only 80 submarines have been dismantled. Out of the 112 unutilized submarines left, 81 contain unloaded nuclear fuel with an enrichment level of between 20 and 90 percent. Since many submarines have been out of operational use for the last 15-20 years the level of radioactivity of their nuclear fuel has been reduced. This fuel has ceased to be self-protecting and become dangerous from the point of the proliferation of nuclear materials. The situation with respect to nuclear fuel discharged from submarines earlier and at present stored at the shore bases is even worse. These stockpiles are not in a satisfactory conditions both from the view of the environmental and the physical protection of fuel. In addition, these bases store huge amounts of radioactive waste, left after the utilization and exploitation of submarines.¹³ In the estimate of experts of the Russian Ministry for the Nuclear Power Industry the dismantling of nuclear submarines will require nearly \$3.9 billion.

Initially, foreign financial assistance was directed at the utilization of ballistic missile submarines. But there has been always a real need for the dismantling of other types of submarines as well as of ship servicing nuclear technology. In this respect the multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNERF), which was signed in Stockholm on May 21, 2003, constituted a very important achievement.¹⁴ The conclusion of the MNEPR has solved some legal problems (taxation, damage responsibility, etc.) and has removed obstacles to the expansion of nuclear submarines dismantling programs mainly with the financial assistance from the European states. Another step forward was the signing of an agreement between Russia and Japan for the utilization of multi-purpose submarines in the Russian Far East. The RF considers the MNEPR as a model for working out other bilateral agreements within the Global Partnership framework.¹⁵ But not all donor-countries are in favor of this approach. The United States, for example, did not sign the additional protocol to the MNEPR for nuclear damage responsibility. Washington considers the regulations for damage responsibility included in the USA–Russia bilateral agreement of 1992, as very advantageous and would like to preserve them.

¹³ Russia's ambassador at large A. Antonov. Statement at the meeting of PIR–Center Club, April 10, 2003 (in Russian).

¹⁴ Among signatories: Russia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United States, EU and EUROATOM.

¹⁵ See footnote 14.

By mid-2003, funds allocated for the dismantling of multi-purpose submarines allowed for utilization of at least another five submarines and 248 active reactor zones.¹⁶

At the Evian summit it was pointed out that some progress had been made at international negotiations on supporting the Russian plutonium disposal programs (including increasing financial assistance, and reaching agreements on effective management of programs and control over their implementation). G8 senior officials have also noted improvements in security and safety at biological research facilities.

At the Evian summit some progress was also made in employment programs for former weapon scientists. A number of countries, Canada, for example, declared their intention to expand the financing of relevant projects within the framework of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). In addition to the ISTC some direct contacts with enterprises, formerly engaged in WMD production, have been established to help them to convert to the production of civilian needs.

Global Partnership prospects

Among the problems to be solved under the Global Partnership program is that of access for foreign experts to Russian facilities. According to the annual report of the SOG at the Evian summit, the new proposal to simplify access to facilities by reducing advance notification from 45 to 30 days through a procedure of annual lists has been an improvement on past practice. Some partners in the Global Partnership still consider this proposal as insufficient, however.

Among other problems of the implementation of the Global Partnership the following are worth mentioning: disagreements between the Russian Federation and a number of partners on priorities of directions and programs for cooperation; insufficient direct financing; flaws in coordination of assistance programs for Russia by donor-countries; domestic political obstacles to finance programs in Russia in some donor-countries; laying down additional conditions for financial support for Russia.

But despite new countries joining the Global Partnership and the increased euro/dollar exchange rate in the first half of 2003 (as a result sums committed before in euro increased in dollar equivalent) the level of \$20 billion fixed at the Kananaskis summit has not been reached. Many experts even consider \$20 billion as the minimum and not the ceiling for required financing¹⁷. But governments have not accepted this suggestion so far.

¹⁶ After Evian: let us prevent the summit documents "turning into water" (in Russian). *Yadernii Kontrol (Nuclear Control)*, no.3, 2003.

¹⁷ See Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, CSIS, 2003, p.5.

Despite unresolved problems, the Global Partnership after the Evian summit has gradually turned from a platform for loud political declarations into a platform of practical cooperation. Progress in the solving of legal aspects of financial support programs and new money allocated for concrete projects of the Global Partnership witness in favor of this.

To achieve the aims of the Global Partnership it is necessary to make this process sustainable and viable. One of the key issues is whether this process will continue after the programs of financial support has been fulfilled. To make this possible some experts suggest, among various options, to increase the share from the Russian budget in the finance for the projects, to improve control over the spending of the allocated funds, to convert and commercialize of the projects whenever this is possible. A useful role in the implementation of the Global Partnership projects could also be played by non-government and scientific research organizations. In this connection the establishment of the Council for Sustainable Partnership for Russia (CSPR) in June 2003 with as its main aim to assist in a successful realization of the G8 Global Partnership program should be welcomed.¹⁸

The G8 Global Partnership As a New Mechanism For International Cooperation

The G8 Global Partnership shows that G8 has increased its role in ensuring international security in recent years. After the RF had become a full member of G8 the latter has ceased to be a pure “Western club”, where a narrow circle of questions were discussed, and has to become an organization on a global scale. It is quite logical that one of the main challenges in the 21st century—the proliferation of weapons, materials and technologies of mass destruction—should occupy a leading position on the G8 agenda.

Under circumstances of a crisis of the existing world order and institutions and continuing disagreements on international security issues between a number of key players (which the Iraqi situation has clearly revealed), the significance of the G8 as a coordinating mechanism of world politics is on the rise. All members of the international community are interested in preventing proliferation of WMD and related materials. Cooperation on such an actual problem makes it possible to find a common ground for the positions of different states and to work out a constructive agenda to achieve international security.

¹⁸ See about CSPR in Vestnic Globalnogo Partnerststva (in Russian), no.2, 2003, p.15.

9. THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE

Gennady CHUFRIN

In June 2001, at their summit meeting in Shanghai, the leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan decided to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for the purpose of the joint struggle against international terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, organized crime, illegal trafficking of narcotics and weapons and other forms of transnational criminal activities as well as against massive illegal migration. As can be judged from this list of the SCO tasks its creation was determined by a whole range of lasting challenges and threats to the national security of the founding member-states that emerged in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet the immediate reason for setting up the SCO became the continuous escalation of extremist and separatist activities in Central Asia, mostly on the territories of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as in the Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region of China. In 1999 and 2000 the state of security in these areas was seriously destabilized following activities of rebellious forces that exploited the slogans of Islam and nationalism and enjoyed the active ideological, financial, logistical and organizational support from international terrorist centers, including those located on the territory of neighboring Afghanistan which was at that time under the rule of the Taliban regime.

The formation of the SCO was by no means the first attempt undertaken by Russia, China and their neighbors among the former Soviet Central Asian republics in order to organize cooperation in maintaining security in Central Asia. Already in 1996 Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed in Shanghai an agreement “On strengthening military confidence-building measures in border areas” and one year later in Moscow – another agreement “On mutual reduction of military forces in border areas”. These agreements which envisaged reduction of military personnel deployed on each side of the former Soviet-Chinese border as well as destruction or removal of armaments and other military equipment

from the agreed 100 km-wide zone helped to promote an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation among the parties to the agreements and to establish on this basis the “Shanghai Five” (renamed “Shanghai Forum” in July 2000), an organization aimed at ensuring security and stability in the region by collective efforts of its members.

The establishment of the SCO which became a heir to the “Shanghai Five” (“Shanghai Forum”) was aimed not only at making a new important contribution to the strengthening of inter-state relations among its members but also at facilitating their resistance to common security challenges and threats. By uniting all the regional states against international terrorism, separatism and ethno-religious extremism the SCO, whose ranks were expanded by the inclusion of Uzbekistan, was indeed expected to enhance the effectiveness of fighting these destructive forces. However, the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 in Washington and New York and the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan in the wake of these events revealed that the SCO was actually completely unprepared to undertake active anti-terrorist steps. In fact the 2001 Declaration on the establishment of the SCO reflected only the common political will of its members regarding the necessity and desirability of strengthening their cooperation on regional security. However, there was not much progress beyond this point and even one year after the first SCO summit was held Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister, had to admit in an interview given to the Russian newspaper “Izvestia” that “strictly speaking the SCO as an organization still does not exist”.¹

Meanwhile the process of forming a new system of international security in Central Asia sharply accelerated. The central place in this system was taken by the United States which succeeded in achieving a quick and decisive military victory over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. As a result the US not only established their military presence in this country but also gained long-term access to air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which only recently were expected to be leased to the US Air Force for a limited period of time, i.e. up to the end of the active stage of military operation in Afghanistan. Simultaneously the US began or considerably expanded their military-technical cooperation with other Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. It is worth noting that while consolidating their positions in the post-Soviet Central Asian states the US acted not only in accordance with their own strategic interests but enjoyed the consent of the local ruling regimes too. For the latter the US military presence in the region was seen as the most effective guarantee of their survival under conditions of the yet incomplete victory over the forces of ethno-religious extremism which continued to operate (although in different forms than before) using to their advantage widely spread dissatisfaction

¹ *Izvestia*, June 3, 2002.

among the local population with the hard socio-economic living conditions. In addition the transformation of Central Asian states' views on the regional security structure was in no insignificant way influenced by the extremely low effectiveness of the earlier established regional security organizations, including the SCO. In other words, the US (and Western) military presence in Central Asia stopped to be regarded by regional post-Soviet states as something strange or short-term but began to be considered by them as a long-term or even a permanent factor of regional security.

These fundamental changes in the Central Asian security structure obviously could not leave indifferent its neighbors, Russia and China in particular.

In Beijing, for instance, the US military presence in Central Asia, unthinkable only a short time ago, was received, especially against the background of a continuing and even growing US–Chinese strategic rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region, with serious concern. No wonder that China displayed deep interest in mitigating the possible negative consequences of these changes for its national security. To achieve this goal China facilitated its bilateral military-technical cooperation with the Central Asian states, including sales to them of Chinese military equipment. At the same time China displayed interest in transforming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization into a well functioning regional body where Beijing expected to play a prominent and, in time, possibly a leading role.

As for Russia, a country which played a dominant role in Central Asian security affairs until only recently, its attitude towards the latest developments in this area remained ambivalent. On the one hand, Moscow refrained from any formal criticism of the US and its NATO allies' plans to extend the duration of their military presence in Central Asia indefinitely. This line of behavior appeared to be a logical continuation of Russia's earlier declared policy of extending support to the activities of the international anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan. On the other hand, critical appraisals of the US and its allies' intentions to consolidate their military presence in the post-Soviet Central Asian states became more prominent in parliamentary debates, the public statements of several well-known politicians and in the mass media.

In the opinion of those critical of such a development of the security situation, the Russian national interests in regional and global security were bound to suffer serious damage that would be difficult to repair because of the inevitable loss by Moscow of its still formidable political influence in Central Asia. Moreover, there was a growing danger that Russia's interests would be damaged in a larger and strategically highly important Caspian region as well, since the strengthening of the US positions in Central Asia was accompanied by a similar process in the Transcaucasus—in Azerbaijan and particularly in Georgia.

The apprehension regarding the reinforcement of the US and its allies' strategic positions in Central Asia, shared by Moscow and Beijing, induced

them to facilitate the SCO formation process and to ensure an early start of its concrete activities. On their initiative in June 2002 the second SCO summit was held in St.-Petersburg where the SCO Charter, the basic legal document of this organization, as well as an agreement on establishing a Regional Anti-Terrorist Center (RATC) were adopted.² As a result a much needed legal basis for implementing practical cooperation in the framework of the SCO among its members was created.

More vigorous inter-governmental contacts among the SCO member-states which addressed both conceptual as well as pragmatic aspects of the functioning of this organization became an important follow-up of the decisions taken in St.-Petersburg.

Firstly, the SCO concrete tasks and functions were finalized. The primary one among them was declared to be the need to strengthen security and stability in the Central Asian region. It was reiterated that the basic threat to regional security was presented by international terrorism, separatism and extremism, organized crime, illegal trafficking of narcotics and weapons.

At the same time, in accordance with the principle of multiple activities of the SCO that was incorporated in the SCO Charter work began to formulate concrete tasks in different areas such as coordination of foreign policy on issues presenting common interest for the SCO members as well as development of economic partnership among them and preparation of a long-term program of multi-lateral trade, economic and investment cooperation.

Secondly, concerted efforts were undertaken to facilitate practical cooperation among various government structures of the SCO member-states, including their foreign policy, defense and border guard ministries, law enforcing and special services, emergency services and ministries of culture. In the course of this work a common position began to evolve on what concrete forms the SCO activities should assume.³ At the same time, it is important to underscore that cooperation among defense ministries did not envisage a transformation of the SCO into a military alliance. Leaders of the SCO member-states repeatedly stated that the SCO did not present a block or a closed alliance and its activity was not directed against any state or a group of states. Moreover, the Central Asian members of the SCO by no means wanted this organization to be seen as a counterweight to the US security policy in Central Asia.

Thirdly, the SCO member-states began to undertake steps to broaden the scope of the SCO activities expanding them beyond mere regional ones. For this purpose at its meeting in Moscow in November 2002 the Council of foreign ministers of the SCO adopted an Interim scheme of cooperation between the SCO and other international organizations and states on is-

² *Diplomateskiy vestnik*, 2002, no.7, p.25.

³ Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Press release, February 26, 2003; *Diplomateskiy vestnik*, 2002, no.9, p.17.

sues of peace and security in accordance with the goals and principles of the UNO Charter.⁴

In 2003 the SCO formation process, as it was stated by the participants of the SCO third summit (Moscow, May 2003), entered its final stage. It was decided at this meeting that it was necessary during 2003 to complete the process of the coming into force of the SCO Charter and the agreement on the RATC, to facilitate the creation of the RATC Council, to sign an agreement on the formation and implementation of the SCO budget and to adopt the first SCO budget at a session of the Council of the Heads of Governments of the SCO.⁵ In the opinion of participants of the Moscow meeting, successful and timely completion of these tasks would allow permanent SCO organs, including its Secretariat with headquarters in Beijing and the RATC with headquarters in Bishkek, to start functioning already at the beginning of 2004. Consequently the SCO would be transformed from a still largely illusory into a full-fledged international organization and would be able to proceed with implementing the goals already in the near future incorporated in its Charter.

These expectations appear to be well founded, especially taking into account the notable progress achieved in the SCO formation process over the last two years. Favorable prospects of the SCO are substantiated also by the fact that this organization, though still in its formative stage, invites the attention of the international community as a body potentially capable of making an important contribution to strengthening peace and stability in the Central Asian region and beyond its borders.

It is worth noting in this regard that among countries displaying an active interest in the SCO and expecting to receive the status of an observer or of a dialogue partner are India and Pakistan. Also the first contacts between the SCO and ASEAN have been established. Finally, the SCO has begun taking part in the work of the counter-terrorist committee of the UN Security Council.

Taking note of these positive tendencies in the SCO formation one cannot but point out that this organization is yet to prove its efficiency in fighting threats and challenges to regional security, in promoting economic partnership among its members and in carrying out coordinated foreign policy activities. The future will show whether the SCO-founding countries are capable of moving from their declared intentions to filling them with concrete substance. The way the SCO is going to function as well as what will be the main direction of its activities will also strongly depend on what actual role its two principal members, Russia and China, will play (together as well as separately) in this organization.

⁴ *Diplomaticheskij vestnik*, 2002, no.12, pp.39-40.

⁵ *Diplomaticheskij vestnik*, 2003, no.6, pp.45-48.

10. THE NEW RUSSIA–NATO COUNCIL: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS

Boris KHALOSHA

The time that elapsed after the transition of relations and cooperation between Russia and NATO to the new format of Twenty in May 2002 abounded in developments. Issues of mutual relations and cooperation between the parties were discussed within the framework of the Russia–NATO Council (RNC). The new format of cooperation stipulates monthly meetings at the level of ambassadors and military representatives, and six-monthly meetings at the level of foreign ministers, defense ministers and chiefs of general staffs. Intensive consultations of experts took place. But more important was the fact that the organizational novelties reflected the parties' desire to fill their relations with new content. The “19+1” formula (19 NATO member countries plus Russia) was useful in discussing traditional issues dealing with the relations along the “East-West” line (i.e. exchanging information on the military infrastructure or on military doctrines). But when the time came to start closer cooperation because of the new common threats and the need to jointly react to them, that format was no longer in line with the new requirements. “For our organization,—said Guenther Altenburg, NATO Assistant Secretary-General on Political Affairs,—it has become important to have Russia's participation at an earlier stage of decision-making, given its unique political prospects and experience.”¹

At a session of RNC at the level of foreign ministers that took place June 4, 2003, it was emphasized that that structure was becoming an efficient mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation and joint actions. Extremely important was the fact that the parties undertook obligations to act in “their national capacity” and not within the exhausted “19+1” formula that were embedded into the cooperation mechanism. The preliminary exchange of opinions takes place within the framework of the Preparatory Committee. Seven permanent working groups were set up: on

¹ NATO News, no.1, 2003, p.3.

terrorism, WMD proliferation, peace-keeping, TMD, cooperation in the use of air-space, civilian emergencies and military reform.

The participants in the Twenty consider combating terrorism one of their key areas of cooperation. Joint assessments of different aspects of terrorist threats in the Euro-Atlantic region are formulated and constantly improved. The Russian Ministry of Defense and NATO organized two conferences on the role of armed forces in combating terrorism. The first one took place in the NATO War College in Rome in February 2002, and the second one in Moscow in December 2002.

RNC engages in an active dialogue on military reform aimed at expediting the prospecting transformation of the armed forces by the RNC member countries.

The first round of discussions of the sphere of practical cooperation on the military reform took place October 10, 2002 at a workshop in the NATO Military College in Rome. The plan of action for 2003 was agreed upon. A special working group on the military reform was set up to look into the specific ways of cooperation.

The RNC working group on TMD was able to reach concrete results in formulating the conceptual basis and common terminology for a possible joint deployment of TMD to support crisis-response operations with the participation of Russian and NATO forces. The first phase of looking into the compatibility of technical requirements and possibilities for joint operations began.

Before the end of 2003, a document is to be adopted on the joint assessment of threats of the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as their delivery systems.

Adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe was confirmed, the Treaty being one of the corner-stones of European security, as well as the necessity to fulfill obligations set out in the Final Document of the Conference of CFE Treaty member countries in 1999. The RNC Foreign Ministers will continue cooperation on the ratification of the Treaty by all the member states and on the coming into force of the Agreement on adaptation of the CFE Treaty that would allow non-member states to join the Treaty. The Foreign Ministers supported the countries who are not members of the CFE Treaty and who declared their intention to join the adapted Treaty after its coming into force, considering that their joining the Treaty will make an additional contribution to European security and stability.

The progress reached in cooperation between Russia and NATO was confirmed by a number of new agreements reached within the RNC framework. Thus, February 8, 2003 in Munich the Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and NATO Secretary-General George Robertson signed a Framework Document on cooperation in search and rescue operations of distressed submarine crews. This document was under preparation for almost two years. Under the agreement, the necessary rescue equipment is

to be provided by NATO, because a number of NATO member states possess it. This provides ground for cooperation in the field of standardization of search and rescue procedures, development of the needed rescue equipment, exchange of pertinent information and conduct of the joint exercises.

Earlier, January 13, 2003 a joint agreement on Russia's participation in the NATO catalogization system was signed in Moscow by Boris Alyoshin, Chairman, RF State Committee on Standardization and Metrology and John Clark, Chairman, Council of National Directors on NATO Catalogization. The agreement facilitates Russian export of military-purpose products.

Measures in the field of civil emergency planning were also carried out. Thus, for example, the scenario of a large-scale field exercise "Bogorodsk-2000" that took place in September 2002 in Noginsk included a terrorist attack on a chemical plant with a lot of casualties, contaminated terrain, demolished buildings and a need for mass evacuation. That field exercise was organized by the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations. The exercise was coordinated by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC). The results of this exercise will enable NATO member countries and Russia to develop cooperation in cleaning-up the consequences of terrorist attacks and other civil emergencies.

At the same time, rather serious hurdles continue to slow down cooperation between Russia and NATO, as was noted at an enlarged conference of the leadership of Russia's Ministry of Defense that took place October 2, 2003 and at a "Russia–NATO: New Agenda for Military Cooperation" international conference organized right after the first one by Center for Integration Studies and Projects (CISP) and the Baltic Club supported by the NATO Information Bureau in Moscow. Participants from NATO countries, as well as from its future member states Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia discussed concrete steps in translating into reality the course proclaimed by the Russian leadership and aimed at developing strategic partnership between Russia and NATO, as well as information exchanges in the field of military reform and military education.

The report by the Russian Defense Minister, as well as the conference materials, on the one hand, note the positive results of the cooperation with NATO given above. On the other hand, it is said that if NATO is preserved as a military alliance with the existing offensive doctrine, this will call for a radical restructuring of Russian military planning and principles of development of the Russian armed forces including a change in nuclear strategy.

At the "Russia–NATO" conference it was noted that the cooperation within the "Twenty Russia–NATO" format has so far not resulted in a breakthrough in relations in terms of specific projects of equal cooperation, for example, in the sphere of long-range radar detection, and information exchanges that would make it possible to bring the cooperation from a largely political to a military level, as well.

The process of NATO enlargement still remains a rather sensitive issue. Declarations made by the West to the effect that NATO enlargement poses no threat to Russia's interests, virtually ignore the opinion of Russia itself, since it is difficult to give an adequate assessment of other people's worries. NATO on its part, does not take sufficient steps to remove Russia's worries.

What conclusions can be drawn from the cooperation between Russia and NATO member countries within the Russia–NATO Council at the current stage?

First of all, a general understanding has been reached that in the era of increased risks and threats of the 21st century, Russia–NATO partnership has a considerable potential for jointly countering the new challenges both at present and in the long term. Furthermore, that the existing differences on the use of force in international relations and on NATO enlargement should not create problems for cooperation in those areas where the parties' interests are close or coincide. If cooperation between Russia and NATO becomes more profound and wider, this fact can, in the long term, make an impact on reducing tensions relating to the existing contradictions.

To counter the new and unprecedented threats, the Euro-Atlantic community can pattern itself on the emerging coalition of which NATO and Russia is its nucleus. Such an idea was put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin, and seems to be shared by the heads of states and governments of the NATO member states. The goal is to bring that idea to its logical conclusion—to transform the relations between Russia and NATO into a true basis for peace and cooperation in the whole Euro-Atlantic region.

11. DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET FOR 2004

Pyotr ROMASHKIN

General characteristics of the draft Federal Budget for 2004

On 26 August 2003 the Government of the RF submitted the draft federal law “On the Federal Budget for the Year 2004” to the State Duma. On 15 October 2003 the draft law was passed on second reading.

The main figures in the draft budget were as follows:

Gross domestic product (GDP) – 15 300 bln rubles;

Revenue – 2 742 850.4 mln rubles;

Expenditure – 2 659 447.0 mln rubles;

Surplus – 83 403.4 mln rubles.

In comparison with the figures of the Federal Budget for 2003, the 2004 figures increased:

GDP – by 17.2 %;

Revenue – by 13.7 %;

Expenditure – by 13.4 %;

Surplus – by 15.5 %.

In the draft budget prepared for 2004 expenditure under the section “National Defense” grew faster than the total expenditure of the federal budget (19.4 % and 13.4 %, respectively). At the same time, the expenditure envisaged for the section “Military Reform” is reduced almost two-fold. This means that the reduction in numbers of the Armed Forces (AF) has in fact been halted.

Expenditure envisaged under the section “National Defense”

It is proposed that expenditure under the section “National Defense” should amount to 411 472.7 mln rubles., i.e. 2.69 % of GDP (in 2003 this

expenditure amounted to 2.65 %) and 15.49 % of the total expenditure envisaged in the federal budget (in 2003 this amounted to 14.74 %).

For the technical re-equipment of the AF (R&D, the purchase of armaments and military equipment, repair work conducted at industrial enterprises and the construction of special facilities) 137 366 mln rubles are allocated, which amounts to 33.38 % of the expenditure on national defense. In 2003 expenditure for these purposes amounted to 117 909 mln rubles (34.22 % respectively). Thus, expenditure on technical re-equipment has decreased. While, R&D expenditure has grown from 45 485.5 mln up to 51 900 mln rubles. Appropriations for the purchase of armaments and military equipment has diminished somewhat—from 55 200 mln to 54 864 mln rubles. At the same time, repair costs of armaments and military equipment at industrial enterprises have increased from 9131.2 mln to 21 795.7 mln rubles, as have the costs of constructing special facilities (from 8092.3 mln to 8806.3 mln rubles). These figures indicate that the greater part of expenditure for the technical re-equipment of the AF is scheduled for R&D, and the appropriate level of the reliability of arms and military equipment is expected to be maintained through regular repair work.

Previous experience has shown, however, that to allocate 30–35 % for the technical re-equipment of the AF is an inadmissibly low figure. It leads to the moral and physical obsolescence of armaments and military equipment, and the reduction of the share of new arms and equipment (with a lifetime of 10 years and less) to 3–5 %. The necessary level for the financing of investment should be at least 40–45 % of the defense budget.

Table 1 shows the dynamic of change of the expenditure level, in proportion to GDP and total expenditure in the federal budget under the section “National Defense” in 1995–2003, based on figures of the previous authorized federal budgets as well as the forecast for 2004.

Table 1

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
% of GDP									
3.76	3.59	3.82	2.97	2.34	2.63	2.66	2.60	2.65	2.69
% of the total expenditure of the federal budget									
2085	1892	1976	1732	1629	1645	1729	1460	1474	1549

Unlike the draft federal budgets submitted in the previous years—when only 5 items (subsections) under the section “National Defense” were submitted to the State Duma for authorization,—the draft federal budget for 2004 contained over 100 items, in detail (subsections, target items and types of expenditure).

Some distinctive features of the draft budget, related to the provision of housing and other types of allowances for servicemen, are discussed below.

Housing. In 2004 a total amount of 11.57 bln rubles, including expenses envisaged under all sections of the federal budget, is scheduled to be spent on solving the housing problem of servicemen. This will provide only 13.5 thousand apartments. Thus, creating adequate housing conditions for servicemen will remain the main unresolved problem in 2004. The negative trend that has developed in recent years—cutting down housing required by the Ministry of Defense through the federal budget—still continues. While in 1999–2000 28–29 thousand apartments were provided, in 2003 this figure was decreased to 23 thousand, and in 2004 only 13.5 thousand apartments are scheduled to be provided. In fact at least 30 thousand apartments should be acquired by the Ministry of Defense to provide for the number of servicemen who need housing and prevent the further growth of this number in 2004. To implement previously adopted legislation envisaging the complete solution of the housing problem for servicemen by the year 2010, the Ministry of Defense should acquire at least 33.5 thousand apartments in 2004 (and this estimate does not take into account the backlog created in 2001–2003).

As for the “State Housing Certificates” program, this remains the main and in fact only practical source of obtaining housing for those discharged from military service. However, the considerable reduction in the issuing of certificates, envisaged in the draft budget for 2004, will not permit the timely discharge of servicemen. This, in turn, will result in an additional burden being placed on the federal budget, and the Ministry of Defense will have to bear unplanned expenditure on their maintenance. Citizens discharged from military service, have been waiting for apartments on the territory of the RF for 10 years and more. Due to the reduction in the issuing of certificates, these people will now have to wait for housing for 15–16 years.

Subsistence. The problem of replacing food rations by subsistence allowance, equal to the cost of the ration, remains one of the unfulfilled tasks in the field of subsistence for servicemen. The cost of the rations, provided to the Armed Forces, currently amounts to 51.45 rubles per day, though the draft budget for 2004, like the budgets in the previous years, is based on a money equivalent of 20 rubles per day. Thus, Article 14 of the Federal Law “On the status of servicemen”, in its part related to the payment and amount of money compensation instead of food rations, has in fact lost its validity.

According to the estimate of experts, an additional 6736.1 mln rubles is needed to properly implement this legislative norm.

Expenditure under the section “Utilization and destruction of armaments, including the implementation of international treaties”

In the draft federal budget, it is proposed that expenditure will be decreased from 10759.8 mln rubles in 2003 ã. to 10364.8 mln rubles in 2004 (by 4 %).

The considerable number (approximately 100) of nuclear-powered submarines, withdrawn from operational service and currently berthed alongside piers with their nuclear reactors still loaded, is a subject of particular concern. Work on their dismantling should be envisaged under the subsection “Utilization and destruction of armaments excluding international treaties”, and the expenses amounting to 501.3 mln rubles (against 768.3 mln rubles in 2003) included in this subsection of the draft budget. In order to utilize only 15 such submarines, an additional 2.5 bln rubles will be needed. In addition, the development of sites for spent fuel storage will also have to be funded properly. At least 1 billion rubles will be needed for this.

All expenditure under this section of the draft budget related to target items and types of expenses remain closed (except for expenses on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention).

Expenditure under the section “Military Reform”

It is suggested that expenditure on military reform should be cut down considerably—from 15 800.3 mln rubles in 2003 to 7245.6 mln rubles in 2004.

This confirms the fact that the process of further reduction of the Armed Forces has come to a halt, as only 563 mln rubles are allocated for discharge payments—allowing the discharge of about 28 thousand officers and NCOs. Approximately the same number of servicemen is scheduled to start active service, these are mainly graduates from military and civil higher education institutions.

Under this section of the budget, expenditure on the construction of housing for discharged servicemen is scheduled to be cut by more than half—from 11 000 mln to 5281.5 mln rubles.

Funding of social benefits (related to the status of servicemen)

In the section “Social Policy” (subsection “Pensions for servicemen”), it is proposed to decrease expenditure for these purposes in 2004 from 67.7 billion (2003) to 66.6 billion rubles. This is explained by the fact that, according to the Ministry of Defense, less servicemen will be discharged in 2003 than was planned when the 2003 budget was adopted.

The draft law envisages changes and suspension of certain provisions in legislative acts of the Russian Federation, and this will inevitably result in the deterioration of the social status of certain categories of servicemen.

The following provisions of the Federal Law “On the status of servicemen” are suspended:

- payment of compensation instead of food rations at the rate of their cost (article 14, § 1);

- payment of full compensation instead of issue of items of clothing: the draft budget establishes a maximum annual compensation of 3000 rubles, while in accordance with the law, discharged servicemen must be paid the full amount of money owed to them in the past and current years of service (article 14, § 2);

- granting of subsidies, from the federal budget funds, to servicemen on contract, to citizens discharged from military service having no permanent dwelling space and to those whose housing conditions need improvement, and who become members of cooperative building societies or build (purchase) houses (article 15, § 7);

- payment, by local self-government bodies, of compensation from federal budget funds to citizens discharged from military service or to members of their families for the sub-renting of housing until it is provided (article 15, § 13);

- reimbursement of expenses on professional re-training of certain categories of servicemen discharged from military service (article 19, § 5);

- granting of privileged credits for the construction of individual houses, construction and repair of garden houses and improvement of garden plots to members of servicemen’s families who lost their breadwinner (article 24, § 2).

It is proposed that Article 5 of the Law of the RF “On additional guarantees and compensations to servicemen who do their military service on the territories of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic states and the Republic of Tajikistan and those who perform missions under emergency circumstances and in the course of armed conflicts” should be suspended. This implies that servicemen who performed missions in the course of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic and adjacent areas are not entitled to compensation for the cost of a stay in a sanatorium or other health resort in case such a stay is not provided, even when this is medically recommended.

For the first time, it is proposed that the following provisions of the Federal Law “On military duty and military service” should be suspended:

- the performance of a medical examination of citizens during the initial registration for military service, and of medical treatment for these citizens at the expense of the federal budget (article 16, § 3). The government’s proposal to suspend federal funding is made on the grounds that such measures are available to all citizens within the general framework of the state healthcare system, i.e. at the expense of obligatory medical in-

surance payments made by the executive bodies of the subjects of the RF (for unemployed citizens) or by employers (for employed citizens);

— the conclusion of contracts with citizens who did not do their military service before entering military educational institutions of professional education (article 35, § 2). According to the draft budget, these citizens obtain the status of servicemen called up for military service and conclude the first contract during the last year before graduation (according to the law, after one study year) from the above-mentioned educational institutions, with the obligation to serve ten years in the Armed Forces starting from graduation (currently, 5-year military service is envisaged).

**ANNEXE. KEY DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
(JANUARY–AUGUST 2003)**

Pyotr ROMASHKIN, Tamara FARNASOVA

1. LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Federal Law no. 27–FL “On the introduction of changes in Article 52 of the Federal Law “On military duty and military service”

Passed by the SD on 24 January 2003, approved by the FC on 12 February 2003 and signed by the President of the RF on 22 February 2003.

The change made in the third paragraph of point 1 of Article 52 of the Federal Law “On military duty and military service” is formulated in the following wording: “those who have successfully completed the training course in accordance with the program of training for reserve officers at military sub-faculties of state, municipal higher professional educational institutions or non-state institutions having state accreditation for the related training programs (specialities), or those graduated from the above mentioned educational institutions”

Federal Law no. 56–FL “On the Ratification of the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization”

Signed in Kishinev on 7 October 2002. Passed by the SD on 25 April 2003, approved by the FC on 14 May 2003 and signed by the President of the RF on 26 May 2003.

Federal Law no. 57–FL of 26 May 2003 “On the Ratification of the Agreement on the Legal Status of the Collective Security Treaty Organization”

The Agreement was signed in Kishinev on 7 October 2002. The law was passed by the SD on 25 April 2003, approved by the FC on 14 May 2003, signed by the President of the RF on 26 May 2003.

Federal Law no. 62–FL “On the Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions”

The Treaty was signed in Moscow on 24 May 2002. The Law was passed by the SD on 14 May 2003, approved by the FC on 28 May 2003 and signed by the President of the RF on 29 May 2003.

Its outlines the basic principles for the implementation of the Treaty by the Russian Federation, its obligations and rights in accordance with the SORT.

2. NORMATIVE ACTS OF THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES

Decree no. 36 of the President of the Russian Federation of 14 January 2003 “On confirmation of the List of dual purpose equipment and materials and related technologies used in nuclear purposes that are covered by the export control regulations”

In accordance with article 6 of Federal Law “On export controls”, the decree confirms the List submitted by the Government of the RF (the full text is enclosed).

Ordinance no. 77 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 6 February 2003 “On signing the Protocol on the introduction of changes in the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America on cooperation concerning plutonium production reactors of 23 September 1997”

The Government of the RF decides: 1) to approve the Draft Protocol on the introduction of changes in the Agreement submitted by the RF Ministry for Atomic Energy. To instruct Minatom of Russia to sign the Protocol on behalf of the Government of the RF, with the right to introduce minor changes and additions; 2) that Minatom of Russia would conduct negotiations on signing the Agreement between the RF Ministry for Atomic Energy and US Department of Energy on the termination of plutonium production by the functioning reactors ADE-4, ADE-5 in the town of Seversk (Tomsk oblast) and the ADE-2 reactors in the town of Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk region); 3) to ascertain that Minatom in cooperation with the Department of Energy ensure the proper execution of work aimed at the creation of alternative energy sources on the basis of organic fuel that are designed for replacement of ADE-4, ADE-5 and ADE-2 reactors.

Ordinance no. 83 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 10 February 2003 “On signing the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the European Space Agency on

cooperation and partnership in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”

The draft of the above-mentioned Agreement submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Russian Aerospace Agency and concerted with the Federal Executive authorities concerned and the European Space Agency, is approved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia is instructed to sign the above-mentioned Agreement on behalf of the Government of the RF, and is allowed to make changes and additions to the attached drafts that are not a matter of principle.

Decree no. 158 of the President of the Russian Federation of 13 February 2003 “On measures to implement Resolutions no. 1439 of 18 October 2002 and no. 1448 of 9 December 2002 of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization”

With regard to the above mentioned resolutions of the UNSC, this decree obliges all state institutions, industrial, trade, finance, transport and other enterprises, firms, banks, organizations, other legal entities and individuals under the RF jurisdiction, to proceed in their activities from the fact that starting from 14 November 2002 measures aimed at the limitation of foreign trips of UNITA members are terminated, and starting from 9 December 2002 other measures related to UNITA that had earlier been introduced by the UNSC, are also terminated.

Directive no. 272-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 4 March 2003

Approves the proposal of Rosaviakosmos (the Russian Aerospace Agency), concerted with the Federal Executive Authorities concerned and the Belarus side, on the development of the draft scientific and technical program of the Union State “Development and use of advanced space equipment and technologies in the interests of economic and scientific-technical progress of the Union State. It recommends the Council of Ministers of the Union State to define Rosaviakosmos as the state customer for the given program on the part of the Russian Federation and assign this body the functions of a state customer-coordinator.

Ordinance no. 141 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 5 March 2003 “On approval and submission for ratification of the Treaty on cooperation of the state parties to the Commonwealth of Independent States in the struggle against terrorism”

The Government of the RF decides to approve and submit for ratification the above mentioned Treaty that was signed in Minsk on 4 June 1999.

Decree no. 311 of the President of the Russian Federation of 11 March 2003 “On the State Committee of the Russian Federation on defense orders attached to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation”

For the purpose of optimizing the activities related to the formation and placement of state defense orders, in accordance with this decree the State Committee of the RF on defense orders (Goskomoboronzakaz) is established; it is accountable to the Ministry of Defense of the RF and ensures the implementation of the comprehensive state policy in the field of development, production, unification and standardization of general-purpose arms and military equipment. The decree defines the tasks of this body, determines the maximum number of its staff. The Government of the RF is instructed to define the sources of financing Goskomoboronzakaz.

Ordinance no. 180 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 1 April 2003 “On a non-recurrent voluntary contribution to the budget of the Administration of the Supreme Commissioner of the United Nations Organization for Refugees by the Russian Federation”

With regard to the appeal by the UN Secretary General to the President of the RF to participate in financing humanitarian operations on the African continent, the Government of the RF, by this ordinance: 1) approves the proposal submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerted with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Ministry of Justice of the RF, on a non-recurrent voluntary contribution of \$2 mln to the budget of the Administration of the Supreme Commissioner of the United Nations Organization for the Refugees by the Russian Federation; 2) obliges the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to bear the expenditure related to making the above-mentioned payment, at the expense of the funds allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 2003 federal budget in the category “International activities in respect of contributions to international organizations” and to inform the Supreme Commissioner of the UN for the Refugees about the decision taken by the Government of the RF.

Directive no. 175-rp of the President of the Russian Federation of 10 April 2003 “On signing the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan on cooperation in the field of security”

Approves the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerted with the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Federal Security Service of Russia, on signing the above-mentioned Agreement. It is deemed expedient to sign this document at the highest level.

Ordinance no. 211 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 11 April 2003 “On signing the Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Italian Republic on the provision of assistance by Italy in the destruction of chemical weapons stockpile in the Russian Federation of 20 January 2000”

The ordinance approves the draft of the above-mentioned Supplementary Protocol submitted by the Russian Munitions Agency, concerted with other Federal Executive authorities of the RF concerned and elaborated, on a preliminary basis, with the Italian side. The Russian Munitions Agency is instructed to conduct negotiations with the Italian side and, upon reaching an agreement, to sign this document on behalf of the Government of the RF, being allowed to introduce minor changes and additions to the enclosed draft, if needed.

Decree no. 499 of the President of the Russian Federation of 5 May 2003 “On the recall of the contingent (military formations) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation participating in the peace-making operation of multinational forces on stabilization in the course of the implementation of the General Framework agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the international security presence in Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro)”

The decree instructed: 1) to recall the above-mentioned contingent of the Armed Forces of the RF and withdraw it, before 1 August 2003, with related arms, military equipment and stocks of materials, from the territories of the above-mentioned states back to the territory of the RF; 2) to assign to the Ministry of Defense the task of managing the withdrawal of the military contingent; 3) for the Government of the RF, to ensure proper financing of expenditures related to the withdrawal of these military formations.

Directive no. 247-rp of the President of the Russian Federation of 14 May 2003 “On signing the Protocol on the introduction of changes to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1977”

The proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerted with other Federal Executive authorities concerned, on signing the above-mentioned protocol, is approved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is instructed to sign this document on behalf of the Russian Federation on condition of its ratification.

Directive no. 263-rp of the President of the Russian Federation of 22 May 2003 “On certain international treaties signed within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States”

The directive accepts the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerted with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice of Russia,

to send the depositaries notifications of the intention of the Russian Federation not to become a party to the following international treaties:

the Agreement on the concept of military security of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed in the city of Bishkek on 9 October 1992;

the Agreement on collective peace-keeping forces and joint measures on material and technical maintenance, signed in Moscow on 24 September 1993;

the Protocol to the Agreement of 24 September 1993 “On collective peace-keeping forces and joint measures on material and technical maintenance signed in Almaty on 10 February 1995”

Ordinance no. 302 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 26 May 2003 “On confirming the Statute on the provision by the Russian Federation of information to the Register of conventional arms of the United Nations Organization and the Statute on the provision by the Russian Federation of information about conventional arms supplies in accordance with the Wassenaar agreements”

For the purpose of ensuring the fulfillment of international obligations of the Russian Federation with regard to the Resolution 46/36L of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization “Transparency in arms” of 9 December 1991 and the decision of the OSCE Forum on cooperation in the field of security no. 13/97 of 16 July 1997, as well as in accordance with the Wassenaar agreements on export control over conventional weapons, dual-purpose goods and technologies, the present ordinance confirms: the Statute on the provision by the Russian Federation of information to the UN Register of conventional arms; the Statute on the provision by the Russian Federation of information on arms supplies in accordance with the Wassenaar agreements. The text of the above-mentioned Statutes and the related documentation are enclosed.

Directive no. 304-rp of the President of the Russian Federation of 9 June 2003 “On signing the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on joint planning of the use of troops (forces) in the interests of ensuring joint security of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan”

The directive accepts the proposal of the Ministry of Defense, concerted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Federal Executive authorities concerned, on signing the given Agreement and approves the draft of the Agreement, elaborated on a preliminary basis with the Kazakh side. The Ministry of Defense is instructed, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to conduct negotiations with the Kazakh side and, upon reaching an

agreement, to sign this Agreement on behalf of the RF, being allowed to introduce minor changes and additions to the enclosed draft.

Decree no. 650 of the President of the Russian Federation of 10 June 2003 “On confirming the Statute on the State Committee of the Russian Federation on defense orders attached to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation”

The Statute defining the main tasks, functions and responsibilities of Goskomoboronzakaz, is confirmed. The full text of the Statute is enclosed.

Decree no. 680 of the President of the Russian Federation of 17 June 2003 “On the central competent authorities of the Russian Federation responsible for the implementation of the Shanghai convention on the struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism”

For the purpose of ensuring the implementation of the above mentioned Convention, the decree signs, as the central competent authorities of the RF responsible for its implementation: the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Guard Service, the Ministry of Defense, the General Prosecutor’s Office and Financial Monitoring Committee.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is instructed, in accordance with the established procedures, to notify the depositary of the Shanghai Convention of the central competent authorities of the RF responsible for the implementation of this Convention.

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