

Appendix 8A. Confidence- and security-building measures in Europe

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I. Introduction

On 1 January 2000 the Vienna Document 1999 entered into force. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) participating states continued their efforts to implement various confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) at the European regional level and to further develop subregional CSBMs.¹ Section II reports on the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) review in 1999 of the CSBM record of the Vienna Document 1994 and the new provisions in the Vienna Document 1999.² Section III examines the implementation of the 1996 Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which continued successfully in 2000, and addresses other regional confidence-building measures (CBMs). The conclusions are presented in section IV.

II. Vienna Document CSBMs

In the light of changes in the CSBM regime the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) reorganized its working groups, without altering their mandates, in January 2000 as follows.

1. Working Group A continues to develop new approaches to the items contained in the mandate of the FSC, taking into account the specific characteristics of the armed forces of the individual participating states. It monitors and discusses the implementation of measures, decisions and commitments adopted by the FSC; prepares the AIAM as outlined in Chapter XI of the Vienna Document 1999; prepares the appropriate follow-up of that meeting; and, if appropriate, prepares for FSC discussions on implementation. At least once a month a meeting of Working Group A is to be devoted to implementation issues.

2. Working Group B addresses future challenges and risks to military security in the OSCE region and develops goals and methods for building, maintaining and improving stability and security in the region as a whole and at the regional level.

3. The OSCE Communications Group is organized and addresses issues in accordance with the OSCE Communications Network Document and reports regularly to the FSC.³

¹ For a list of the OSCE participating states see the glossary in this volume.

² Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, reproduced in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), pp. 799–820; and Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, OSCE document FSC.DOC/1/99, 16 Nov. 1999, available at URL <<http://www.osce.org>>. The 2001 AIAM more fully reviewed the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999.

³ Decision no. 1/00, FSC Working Groups, OSCE document FSCE.DEC. 1/00, 26 Jan. 2000.

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The country which chairs the FSC also chairs Working Groups A and B, with the assistance of the FSC Troika.⁴ The OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) participates in all meetings of the FSC and its working groups and provides assistance in accordance with its mandate. It assists the Troika and supports the activities of the working groups, particularly regarding questions of implementation.

The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting

At its tenth AIAM, held in Vienna on 28 February–1 March 2000, the FSC assessed the implementation of the existing CSBMs and other norm- and standard-setting measures and discussed their operation and application in accordance with Chapter X of the Vienna Document 1994. It noted that there had been some improvement in the provision of CSBM information for 1999/2000. The delegations credited the Announcing and Reminding Mechanism and the simultaneous announcement of deadlines by the CPC and the OSCE for the more timely submission of information.⁵

As in previous years, six informal working groups met to discuss the Vienna Document CSBMs, answer questions put by OSCE participating states and facilitate information exchange among them. In the light of the experience of 1999 and the new Vienna Document 1999, proposals and suggestions were made within the framework of nine broad topics.⁶

1. *Annual exchange of military information.* The majority of the participating states furnished their military information on time, and two-thirds of them did so via automated data exchange. Four states failed to comply and, more disquieting, they did not answer the repeated appeals for explanation and offers of assistance by other participating states. The conflict in the Russian republic of Chechnya prompted the suggestion that regular updates of information should be provided in cases of protracted military activities, crisis situations and multinational peacekeeping operations. (Russia has failed to provide information on the extent to which notifiable thresholds had been exceeded.)

2. *Defence planning.* The exchange of views on defence planning was moderate. More countries completed returns in 1999, and the quality of the returns was better. Support was expressed for a regular dialogue on defence planning, especially with regard to defence and military doctrines. A seminar on this topic was deemed desirable in the light of the signing of the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Agreement on Adaptation) and the resulting

⁴ The FSC Troika meets on a weekly basis and comprises the chairman and the previous and succeeding chairmen. It has no formal right to table proposals. The current chairman issues a 4-week schedule of meetings for the subsidiary working bodies based on proposals from delegations. After discussion in the Troika, weekly draft agendas are prepared. The working groups report to the FSC on their activities. Their work is organized on a rolling schedule and additional meetings are convened as necessary. The working groups may also recommend that the FSC holds seminars on specific topics.

⁵ Decision no. 10/98, OSCE document FSC.DEC/10/98, 25 Nov. 1998, entered into force on 1 Jan. 1999. It authorizes the CPC to remind participating states of their commitments 2 months before the deadline for providing information ('Level A') and obligates them to explain in written form the reason for missing a deadline not later than 2 weeks after the missed deadline which it failed to meet. A delinquent state must also specify a new date for providing the information. If an explanation is not made within 2 weeks, the FSC Chairman sends a reminder letter to the state that it has not fulfilled its commitment ('Level B').

⁶ OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, 1999 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, Reports of the Working Group Co-ordinators, Vienna, 28 Feb.–1 Mar. 2000, OSCE document FSC.AIAM/32-40/00, 1 Mar. 2000.

changes in defence structures.⁷ (In the autumn of 2000 the participating states decided to hold a fourth military doctrine seminar.⁸) Some participants expressed their interest in receiving more information on both national planning processes and defence plans. As a measure for clarifying changes in annual military budgets, it was suggested that percentage change figures be added to the data submitted. In this context, some states noted that it was difficult to observe the new Vienna Document 1999 deadline of three months for the submission of budget returns (from when budgets are approved).⁹

3. *Military activities*. Under this heading, work focused on the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999. It was noted that military conflicts in 1999 had revealed 'grey areas' in the application of CSBMs in crisis situations, particularly regarding notification, observation of military activities and conduct of inspections. While supporting the 'all-weather' character of the CSBMs, the working group also noted that the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 are inadequate and cannot be fully implemented. They advocated further discussion of these problems in order to strengthen confidence and security. Some states insisted that the nature of a given situation and the need for 'operational security' should be taken into account in applying CSBMs. The time frame for observation of activities in which notifiable levels have been exceeded was discussed, as were the mutual complementarity of CSBMs and political instruments at the regional level to ensure conflict prevention and resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation. The problem was also raised of adjusting threshold levels and expanding the provisions for notification and observation set out in the Vienna Document 1999. The prevailing view is that this should occur on the bilateral or subregional level.

4. *Compliance and verification*. It was noted that there had been an increase in regional measures (bilateral and unilateral inspections and increases in passive quotas).¹⁰ However, there was no solution to the problem of the rapid utilization of the quotas of inspection and evaluation visits in the first months of the calendar year. Participants called for the clarification of terms (e.g., 'auxiliary personnel' and 'single working day') and a better format for the reports on verification. It was suggested that changes be made with regard to inspections and evaluations, that the scope of multi-lateral inspections, evaluation visits and bilateral measures be widened, and that reporting should be improved.

5. *Risk reduction*. None of the three measures under Chapter II, on risk reduction, of the Vienna Document 1994 was activated in 1999, nor was a substantial regime for risk reduction developed. Delegations differed on how to enhance the risk-reduction CSBMs. Some favoured enhancing the consultation and cooperation mechanism for unusual military activities; others called for proper utilization of the mechanism and better harmonization with the political context of a given situation. The discussion on the other two risk-reduction measures (hazardous incidents and dispelling concern about activities) demonstrated that it is still difficult to achieve consensus on these matters.

⁷ During the AIAM the Swedish delegation held a defence planning workshop. For the text of the Agreement on Adaptation, see *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), pp. 627–42. See also chapter 8.

⁸ Decision no. 8, Seminar on military doctrines, OSCE document FSC.DEC/8/00, 25 Oct. 2000.

⁹ It should be noted that this deadline was extended; the Vienna Document 1994 required that returns be submitted within 2 months.

¹⁰ A passive quota is the number of inspections/evaluation visits a state must accept on its territory under the relevant provisions of the Vienna Documents.

6. *Contacts.* It was noted that several states had not met their obligation to arrange airbase visits, and these states were urged to fulfil their commitment before the end of the current five-year period (1997–2001). With regard to military cooperation, demands for synchronization were later in the autumn met by an agreement that common five-year periods for airbase visits will also apply to visits to military facilities, military formations and observation of certain military activities.¹¹ Several states have still not improved their demonstration of new types of weapon and equipment systems, and bilateral cooperation was offered.

7. *Regional measures.* Delegations shared their experiences of existing regional measures and agreements. Russia criticized the NATO operation in Kosovo. It appeared that many regional initiatives go far beyond the measures listed in Chapter X of the Vienna Document 1999, both in substance (e.g., Black Sea maritime operations) and geographical confines (e.g., the Asian CBM initiative).¹²

8. *Communications.* In 1999 the OSCE Communications Network underwent a significant change because of the Phase I year 2000 upgrade. The upgrade involved the replacement of hardware, operating systems and communications software in use at each end-user station (EUS) and at the central mail server. By the time of the AIAM, 34 states and the OSCE and NATO had been connected by new EUS, while 12 countries had not yet ordered new EUS. Several countries are not connected to the network at all. The cost of an EUS, the difficulty for some countries to establish a reliable means of communication, and the availability and affordability of information technologies were discussed and measures to address individual cases were proposed.

Phase II of the upgrade will provide 24-hour connectivity to the network at reduced cost and will increase participation. Recommendations concerning Phase II were presented to the Configuration Control Board in March 2000 and those which were approved were forwarded to the Communications Group for a decision to proceed with implementation. A new Integrated Notification Application (INA) system will implement the notification provisions of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna Document 1999. In June 2000 the FSC tasked the technical subgroups with designing, developing and presenting a network solution, taking into account various general requirements, including the participation of all OSCE states, common standards, compatibility with existing EUS hardware and notification applications, centralization of the network administration, integrity and privacy of messages, and so on.¹³ As in previous years, throughout 2000 the FSC discussed modernization of the network, but a final decision on the measures to be taken was not reached.

9. *Other agreed measures/documents.* The participants reported on their implementation of the norm- and standard-setting measures and documents. Discussion centred on the 1994 OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and its applicability in recent crisis situations.¹⁴ Attention was drawn to the role that stabilizing measures could play in averting or dealing with regional conflicts.

¹¹ Chairperson's Statement, OSCE document FSC.JOUR/313, 22 Nov. 2000.

¹² For a discussion of the Asian CBM initiative, see *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (note 7), p. 606.

¹³ Decision no. 6/00, Solution for Phase II of the upgrade of the OSCE Communications Network, OSCE document FSC.DEC/6/00, 21 June 2000. The Netherlands intends to discontinue its operation of the central mail server on 1 July 2001.

¹⁴ Budapest Document 1994, Budapest Decisions IV, Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, URL <<http://www.osce.org/docs/english/summite.htm>>. See also Lachowski, Z., 'Confidence- and security-building measures in Europe', *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (note 7), p. 615, footnote 5.

At the AIAM there was a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement among the participants as to how to address and deal with 'foul-weather' situations, notably, the absence of suitable measures as opposed to the proper utilization of existing ones.¹⁵ Although the AIAM seemed to offer the most appropriate forum to evaluate how CSBMs operated or did not operate in the crises that occurred in 1999, there was a lack of spontaneous discussion at the meeting.

In the wake of the AIAM discussions on how to improve the implementation of CSBMs several proposals were tabled in the FSC in 2000. A recommendation was made that Working Group A should revitalize its commitment to facilitate full and correct CSBM implementation (e.g., through brainstorming sessions).¹⁶ More concrete proposals concerned access to military installations and overflight procedures (proposed by Finland, Russia and Sweden), the size of the area specified for inspection (a Russian proposal), auxiliary personnel, duration of the evaluation visit and possible observation of the personnel and major equipment systems in the course of the evaluation visit (a proposal made by Ukraine).¹⁷

The relevance of CSBMs in crisis situations

Discussion of whether the Vienna Document CSBMs are relevant in crisis situations continued in 2000, especially in the light of the resumption of the fighting in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999.

Russia has repeatedly confirmed that its concentration of forces in the North Caucasus has exceeded some of the thresholds established by the Vienna Document 1994 (para. 38.3.1). Russian force concentrations in Chechnya comprise forces engaged in war, and Russia claims that it has demonstrated exceptional goodwill and transparency in providing updated information on its military operations against the Chechen rebels. However, the European Union (EU) and NATO states demanded that Russia provide not only numbers but also details of the purpose, level of command, time frame and envisaged area of the operation (paras 41 and 43), as well as other relevant information. Western countries also urged Russia to allow an observation visit in accordance with the Vienna Document 1999 (paras 47.3 and 47.4).¹⁸ In February 2000 Russia therefore invited a German inspection of the area adjacent to Chechnya. The inspection was in excess of Russia's annual passive quota.

At the time of the German inspection Russia announced its intention to hold an additional observation visit in mid-2000, and in May representatives of the OSCE participating states were invited by Russia to take part in such a visit to the North Caucasus. The number of participants was limited to 15 for security reasons. Doubts were expressed about the value of the visit because of the limited number of observers invited, the lack of both adequate security arrangements and updated information

¹⁵ An interesting observation, apparently in the context of Yugoslavia, was made by the Russian delegate, that 'a state or a group of states can conduct a mass-scale military activity, making use of only the naval or air component of its armed forces' (i.e., not subject to the Vienna Document regime). OSCE document FSC.AIAM/29/00, 1 Mar. 2000.

¹⁶ OSCE document FSC.DEL/378/00, 6 Sep. 2000.

¹⁷ OSCE document FSC.DEL/472/00, 22 Nov. 2000 (Finland, Russia and Sweden); OSCE document FSC.DEL/491/00, 6 Dec. 2000 (Russia); OSCE document FSC.DEL/440/00, 8 Nov. 2000 (Ukraine).

¹⁸ EU and NATO countries have pointed out that, apart from its CSBM non-compliance, Russia has probably violated the provisions of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. In Sep. 2000, at a hearing in the Russian State Duma, the first since the campaign began in the autumn of 1999, Russian forces were severely criticized for human rights abuses.

regarding the military situation, the failure to abide by the formal provisions of the invitation, and so on. A number of delegations pointed out that such visits cannot substitute for a regular observation under the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999. However, it was recognized that the visit was to take place under special circumstances not outlined in the Vienna Document 1999. Ultimately, 22 states were represented at the visit, held on 19–22 June, to two military divisions: one in Khankala/Grozny (Chechnya) and one in Botlikh (Dagestan), the latter designated as a ‘region of military activities’. The observers met with Russian commanders, who provided information about the number of Russian military forces, although they failed to include information on other armed forces (e.g., internal security forces and border guards). Despite these minor deficiencies the visit was highly appreciated, given that it was conducted in an region of active conflict, and it was deemed a useful precedent for future missions in similar circumstances.

In the summer of 2000 some 200 tanks, 1800 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and 600 artillery pieces were notified by Russia as engaged in ‘anti-terrorist operations’ in Chechnya. The official number of Russian troops involved in the hostilities was approximately 46 000–49 000. (By the autumn the number of Russian troops had dropped to about 44 000.) The figures apparently did not include tens of thousands of internal security troops (i.e., a total of approximately 100 000 troops) in the region.

The implementation record for 2000

As in previous years, Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to participate in the annual exchange of military information for 2000 (as of 15 December 1999). However, at the end of 2000, Bosnia was able to provide information for 2001 under the exchange. Three other states failed to furnish their reports on time.¹⁹ While fewer states have provided information on defence planning and military budgets, there has been a steady improvement in recent years. The voluntary CSBM record is also improving. In 2000 there were no requests for explanations of unusual military activities.

Six military exercises to be held in 2000 were notified in 1999.²⁰ In 2000 two pre-notified exercises were scaled down below the notifiable level. Austria conducted a ‘Granit 2000’ exercise which, due to the increase of troops, became subject to notification. The ‘Destined Glory 2000’ exercise also increased the number of troops for the amphibious phase, thus becoming notifiable (table 8A). As noted above, Russia notified the OSCE three times that its military activities had exceeded the threshold in Chechnya, and an observation visit was conducted. In 2000, 49 states submitted annual calendars, but only one military manoeuvre was pre-notified—the NATO ‘Destined Glory 2001’ exercise of some 15 000 troops, to be held in Spain in October 2001. By the end of 2000 a total of 83 inspections had been requested and 77 conducted. An additional 8 inspections were carried out on the basis of bilateral agreements. Fifty-four of the 55 requested evaluation visits took place, and an additional 19 evaluation visits under bilateral agreements between or unilateral initiatives by participating states were carried out.

¹⁹ The 3 states are Kazakhstan, San Marino and Uzbekistan. A fourth state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, notified the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre that its military information was delayed.

²⁰ Lachowski, Z., ‘Confidence- and security-building measures in Europe’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (note 7), pp. 620–21.

Table 8A. Notified military activities planned for 2001 and information on additional activities held in 2000

States	Dates/start window	Type/name of activity	Area	Level of command	No. of troops	Type of forces or equipment	No./type of division	Comments
1. Spain <i>et al.</i>	5–23 Oct. 2001	Destined Glory 2001, Livex	Spain, Western Mediterranean	Division level STRIKEFORSSOUTH	15 000
<i>Additional activities held and information provided in 2000^a</i>								
1. Russia	Feb. 2000	Land forces concentration	North Caucasus Military District	..	45 950	Ground forces	..	375 MBT, 2 210 ACV, 740 artillery
2. Russia	as of July 2000	Anti-terrorist operations	North Caucasus Military District	..	48 958	Ground forces	..	202 MBT, 1 784 ACV, 600 artillery
3. Russia	as of Nov. 2000	Anti-terrorist operations	North Caucasus Military District	..	44 149	Ground forces	..	163 MBT, 1 572 ACV, 418 artillery
4. Austria	7–11 Aug.	Granit 2000	Allensteig Training Area	..	10 000	Land and air forces	2 infantry brigades	41 MBT, 168 ACV, 24 artillery Mobile defence, combined arms combat, attack, local recon, train changing conditions of combat service support (HQ II Corps)
5. France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey UK, USA	9–25 Oct. 2000	Destined Glory 2000	Doganbey (Izmir) and Saros Bays (Turkish Thrace and Izmir areas)	AFSOUTH, STRIKEFORSSOUTH and brigade level	4 700	Land and amphibious forces	..	Improve operational capability of CAFMED; 5 Sep. 2000, no. of troops for amphibious phase established at 3 100

Notes: ACV = armoured combat vehicle; AFSOUTH = Allied Forces Southern Europe; BCTP = Battle Command Training Program; CAFMED = Combined Amphibious Force of Mediterranean; FTX = field training exercise; HQ = headquarters; Livex = live exercise; MBT = main battle tank; recon = reconnaissance; STRIKEFORSSOUTH = Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe.

^a Two exercises notified in 2000, the Corps BCTP Warfighter and the Livex FTX in Spain, were scaled down below the notifiable levels.

Compliance issues

Three cases involving compliance issues, all concerning Central Asian states, drew attention in 2000. In March the USA requested inspection of an area in Uzbekistan in which army-level activity could have been conducted. The Uzbek authorities denied the request for inspection on the date requested because they could not resolve 'organizational issues' in the short time frame envisaged. They suggested that the inspection be carried out at a later time and subsequently claimed that they lacked sufficient resources to receive an inspection because of the demands of an ongoing military exercise. The reply also suggested that the area which the USA had requested to inspect exceeded the Vienna Document application framework, and a readjustment of the specified area was proposed. The Uzbek response was met with harsh criticism by the USA.²¹

In August Uzbekistan refused a second US inspection request because of financial and technical problems and because another inspection had been carried out by Italy 10 days earlier. A Spanish inspection in Tajikistan in October also had to be cancelled because of a similar inability of the host country to cope with the Vienna Document requirements. All these cases were intensely discussed in the FSC, and many states expressed concern over the poor implementation of the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 and suggested ways to improve it.²²

There were several other cases of refusal. Moldova refused an inspection by Germany, claiming *force majeure*, which Germany did not accept. There was also a complaint by Belarus regarding denied access to a US base in Germany. The USA pointed out that the Belarussian request to grant its inspection team access to military installations pertains to another Vienna Document regime—that for evaluation visits.

III. Regional CSBMs

Implementation of the Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The 1996 Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina—negotiated under Article II of Annex 1-B of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement)—outlines a set of measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict in the country.²³ The parties to the agreement are Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska. Stability and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain dependent on a strong international engagement and presence. Several major domestic factors also determine the level of military security. Formally, two separate armed forces exist, but in reality there are three, because two components (the Croats and Bosnian Muslims) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been integrated. There is a lack of transparency in military budgets and the joint institutions are very weak. In 2000 Bosnia and Herzegovina was able to receive an inspection under the Vienna

²¹ Statement on Uzbekistan delivered by Ambassador David T. Johnson to the Forum for Security Cooperation, US Department of State, 'US Statement on Uzbekistan to Security Cooperation Forum', *Washington File*, 10 Apr. 2000, URL <<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/security/archive/2000/april/ds10411.htm>>.

²² *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, no. 6 (2000), p. 788.

²³ The Agreement on Regional Stabilization is reproduced in *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996), pp. 241–43.

Document 1999; however, it failed to conduct the scheduled Article IV (subregional arms control) inspections in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

The OSCE assists in the implementation and development of CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In November 2000 the annual report by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office (CIO) for the 8th OSCE Ministerial Meeting, held in 2000, noted progress in the area of notifications and inspections.²⁴

With substantial assistance from OSCE assistants and inspectors, a total of 11 inspections were carried out, expending 23 quotas, and some minor discrepancies were revealed. In accordance with the 1999 Protocol on Visits to Weapon-manufacturing Facilities, which was amended by the Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) in 2000, three visits were made to six factories. Training continues for inspectors and the personnel of the verification centres, and the OSCE and the NATO School (SHAPE) at Oberammergau held courses for assistants and inspectors.²⁵ By November 2000 more than 450 individuals from each of Bosnia's Croat, Serb and Muslim populations—including the defence ministers and their deputies, chiefs of defence, and other top military, defence and political personnel—had participated. Under a memorandum of understanding between the OSCE and the Stabilization Force (SFOR), modalities for risk reduction (Measure III) and specified area inspections with the use of helicopter overflights were agreed.

Under Measure I (exchange of information) of the Article II Agreement, the problem of notification of canton police forces was solved and, for the first time, all 10 cantons provided exchanges of information valid as of mid-2000. A temporary solution was found to the problem of the choice of the head of the delegation of the Federation to both the Sub-Regional Consultation Commission (SRCC, for the operation of the Article IV Agreement) and the JCC. A dispute between the minister and deputy minister of defence regarding the allocation of quotas for various events between the two components of the Federation under the programme of military contacts and cooperation was resolved with the help of the Personal Representative of the CIO.

A field exercise of a joint Bosnian battalion to be hosted by Italy, which was intended to contribute to a chain of command and control at both the state and joint unit levels, was cancelled because of the reluctance of one party. The relocation of the General Staff of the Bosnian Serb armed forces from Bijeljina to Banja Luka caused operational problems for the Bosnia–Muslim military liaison office.

The OSCE supported an aerial observation initiative with active support from Denmark. Trial flights were conducted over the territories of each of the entities. In October 2000 an aerial observation exercise was carried out over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with assistance from Czech, Danish, SFOR and entity experts.²⁶ A proposal for an Aerial Observation System was drafted and submitted to the JCC under Measure III with the aim of furthering transparency.

Measure XI (contacts and cooperation) voluntary activities gained in importance in the implementation of the Article II Agreement. Efforts by the international community, and the CIO Personal Representative in particular, have increased in this area. In

²⁴ Yearly Report on the Implementation of Articles II and IV, Annex 1-B, Dayton Peace Accords, 2000, 01 January–27 November 2000, Lieutenant General Carlo Jean (Italian Army, rtd), Personal Representative of the OSCE CIO.

²⁵ For information on the NATO school, see URL <<http://www.natoschool-shape.de/>>.

²⁶ The Czech Antonov-30 flew in tandem with MI-8 helicopters from each entity forces. In 1997–99, 5 demonstration flights were carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to train the military personnel of the Federation and the Republika Srpska for such missions.

2000 workshops on disaster response preparedness and military budgets were held, as were seminars on military budget transparency, a code of conduct in politico-military matters, the state dimension of security and Vienna Document training, including information exchange and inspections, for Bosnia and Herzegovina. A seminar on multilateral formations and experiences of neighbouring countries in cooperation and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions was organized in Neum. Inter-university security studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and cooperation with various research institutions continue to function well, and are supported or sponsored by research centres in the states participating in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and other countries.²⁷ In 2000 NATO held security cooperation courses for Bosnian military and civilian officials, and a seminar for Bosnia's senior defence and foreign ministry officials was organized by Norway in the summer. The record of voluntary activities was marred by the failure of Bosnia's Croat and Serb components to allow the scheduled audit of the defence budgets for foreign military assistance; only Bosnian Muslims agreed to accept the UK-led international team of auditors.

In the view of the CIO Personal Representative, the implementation of the Article II Agreement and the activities of the international organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be further harmonized in the light of the decisions of the Peace Implementation Council of May 2000 concerning greater responsibility for SFOR in restructuring the entity armed forces, developing a common security policy and strengthening the joint institutions. OSCE assistance will also be necessary for promoting cooperation, transparency and mutual confidence between the parties.

The third Article II Agreement review conference was scheduled to take place in Vienna on 19–21 February 2001.

Other regional CSBMs

The Vienna Document 1999 encourages the participating states to complement the OSCE-area CSBMs with voluntary politically and legally binding measures tailored to regional needs. Since 1991 more than 20 CSBM-related bilateral and multilateral accords have been entered into by states in Europe with the aims of enhancing transparency, openness and confidence; developing military contacts and cooperation; and exchanging detailed information. The first bilateral agreements were reached in the Balkan region between historical adversaries (Hungary and Romania in 1991 and 1996, and Bulgaria and Turkey in 1992) and were followed by similar agreements between Bulgaria and Greece (1993), Bulgaria and Romania (1995), Albania and Turkey (1995), and Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1995). Most of these accords were concluded in the shadow of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The notable exception is the lack of a similar agreement between Greece and Turkey, which have been unable to enter a bilateral CSBM arrangement of this type because of their mutual distrust and disputes.

There were additional CSBM agreements in the latter half of the 1990s. Hungary entered into agreements with Slovakia and Ukraine (both in 1998), and Slovakia and Ukraine signed an agreement in 2000. In 1998 Finland and Sweden each accepted one additional inspection and one evaluation visit beyond their Vienna Document obliga-

²⁷ For the text of the Stability Pact on South Eastern Europe, see *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (note 7), pp. 214–20; and for the participants of the Pact, see the glossary in this volume. Within the OSCE FSC Security Dialogue Framework a number of sessions were held in the first half of 2000 on the topic 'Who is doing what in South-Eastern Europe?'.

tions, and they encouraged other Baltic Sea states to follow suit. Russia has signed bilateral accords with Estonia, Finland and Lithuania on additional evaluation visits and exchange of information. In 1999–2000 voluntary inspections accounted for some 10 per cent of the total number of such missions, while evaluation visits comprised more than 20 per cent. Another important trend is the inclusion of CSBMs and conflict-prevention and crisis-management arrangements in the synergetic packages of measures that are proposed to handle crisis and post-conflict situations. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe is an example of such an approach.²⁸

Another attempt at Aegean confidence building

The cooperation between Greece and Turkey in their assistance to the victims of the earthquakes which occurred in the two countries in 1999 and other developments, such as progress on Turkey's pursuit of EU membership at the end of 1999, led to hope that advances might be made in building military confidence and trust. However, Greece and Turkey are locked in two major disputes: over Cyprus and issues related to the Aegean Sea area. Because the Cyprus question remains intractable, current efforts focus on the Aegean Sea.

In early 2000 Turkey presented a plan for CBMs which was later discussed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Greek Foreign Minister George A. Papandreou.²⁹ In mid-2000 efforts were made to prepare an accord. For example, an adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit proposed that the Turkish Aegean Army be disbanded.³⁰ Although the proposal was not accepted, suggestions were made at various bilateral meetings to reduce the level of armament and the resulting financial burden on both countries.³¹ During the June NATO 'Dynamic Mix 2000' exercise 150 Turkish soldiers took part in a mock landing on a Greek beach and Turkish aircraft flew over Greek territory. However, a violation of the 1998 'summer moratorium' agreement on overflights by Turkey and the landing of fighter aircraft on Cyprus halted further discussion.³²

The greatest test of Greek–Turkish rapprochement came in October, during another NATO exercise, 'Destined Glory 2000'. The exercise was intended to confirm the climate of goodwill between Greece and Turkey, but problems arose when Greek air-

²⁸ See chapter 8 in this volume.

²⁹ Turkey's plan envisaged: (a) reducing the size, number and range of the Greek and Turkish manoeuvres in the Aegean; (b) equipping all aircraft flying in the Aegean with foe-or-friend recognition systems; (c) installing a transitional joint air operation centre; (d) carrying out unarmed flights of Turkish and Greek aircraft over the Aegean; (e) conducting joint military and Partnership for Peace exercises in the Aegean and the Mediterranean; (f) allowing reciprocal visits of warships to each other's ports; (g) extending mutual invitations to monitor each other's manoeuvres; (h) monitoring training flights under an open skies agreement; (i) installing a direct line of communication between the chiefs of the General Staff (later omitted, but still supported by Turkey); and (j) establishing a joint military committee (later dropped). '10 point plan awaiting response', *Istanbul Hurriyet* (Ankara), 4 Aug. 2000, in 'Turkish, Greek people said implementing Turkish plan for military trust in Aegean', Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report–West Europe* (FBIS–WEU), FBIS–WEU-2000-0806, 14 Aug. 2000. Except for points b, c and d, Greece is reportedly either positive or 'not negative' to the proposals. 'First test of trust', *Ta Nea* (Athens), 18 Sep. 2000, in 'Papandreou–Cem agreement on CBMs to undergo initial test 29 September', FBIS–WEU-2000-0921, 18 Sep. 2000.

³⁰ 'Turkey considers scaling back military challenge to Greece', *New York Times*, 8 June 2000.

³¹ 'They discuss arms reductions', *Athens Exousia*, 4 Oct. 2000, in 'Greek, Turkish defence ministers discuss arms reductions within CBMs framework', FBIS–WEU-2000-1004, 4 Oct. 2000.

³² For the moratorium agreement, see Lachowski, Z., 'Confidence- and security-building measures in Europe', *SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p. 650.

craft flew over two Greek islands off the Turkish coast.³³ Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, carrying out the 'Nikiforos-Toxotis' exercise on Cyprus, exacerbated the situation by engaging in intense mock dogfights with Turkish aircraft. Turkey responded by essentially closing its airspace to Greek aircraft, and Greece pulled out of the manoeuvre on 22 October.

Nonetheless, on 1 November the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers concluded a CBM accord in Budapest. The agreed CBMs are to be discussed at either the bilateral or NATO (as proposed by Greece) level. The CBMs are based on the Turkish plan and include five proposals for the Aegean area: (a) a reduction in the number and scope of exercises; (b) use of an electronic reconnaissance system by the aircraft of both countries; (c) communication and exchange of flight information at the NATO subcommands in Larisa (Greece) and Eskisehir (Turkey); (d) flights of unarmed fighter jets; and (e) briefing NATO's planning committee or the other party on scheduled national exercises planned for the next year so that war games do not coincide.³⁴

On 6 December NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced that the CBM talks between Greece and Turkey have led to a modest agreement to notify each other in advance of respective national exercises scheduled for 2001. Subsequent changes or additions to the schedules are to be notified through the usual diplomatic channels on a case-by-case basis.³⁵

V. Conclusions

The year 2000 was the first year of operation of the Vienna Document 1999, but the annual assessment of implementation, carried out in the beginning of the year, followed mainly the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994. Two major challenges have confronted the OSCE participating states in recent years as regards CSBMs: at the OSCE level, the applicability of CSBMs in adverse conditions (e.g., domestic conflict) and, at the regional level, the need for greater transparency and improved contacts and cooperation among states. There has been some success at both these levels. In Chechnya, for example, Russia allowed a precedent-setting multinational observation visit to be made to a 'region of on-going military activities'. The visit fostered transparency and was deemed useful. As regards conflict prevention and crisis management, there is disagreement as to whether additional, more suitable, measures are needed or whether existing CSBMs should be more effectively utilized. In this context, it is telling that a tool such as stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations³⁶ has never been used in actual time of crisis. It is generally felt that CSBMs should be integrated in political processes so that they can function synergistically. An example of such a CSBM is the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons which was adopted in November 2000.³⁷ The process of confidence- and security-building is already well advanced in South-Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region. In the Black Sea region and Asia, CSBMs are being discussed and tested, while in the volatile Caucasus a regional CSBM regime is still a long way off.

³³ Turkey claims that they are within a demilitarized zone.

³⁴ 'Greece wins on a procedural level', Athens to Vima, 2 Nov. 2000, in 'Greek paper says agreement reached in Budapest by Cem, Papandreou "satisfies both sides"', FBIS-WEU-2000-1102, 2 Nov. 2000.

³⁵ Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, on confidence-building measures between Greece and Turkey, NATO Press Release (2000)118, 6 Dec. 2000.

³⁶ CSCE FSC, 49th Plenary Meeting of the Special Committee, *Journal*, no. 49 (24 Nov. 1993).

³⁷ The document is reproduced as appendix 8B in this volume.