CONFERENCE REPORT
Sustaining peace: What works?

Stockholm, Sweden
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PREFACE

On 3–4 May 2017, over 330 policymakers, academics and practitioners participated in the fourth annual Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. The participants hailed from 47 countries and over 120 institutions, including 58 civil society organizations, 19 national governments, 18 think tanks, 10 universities, 9 research institutes and 7 multilateral institutions.

Initiated in 2014, the Stockholm Forum provides a neutral platform for interdisciplinary exchange among high-level experts from the peace and development communities through a series of structured workshops, plenary sessions, presentations and informal meetings. This report summarizes key takeaways from the conference as well as recommendations and next steps prescribed during individual sessions and select participant reflections.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

SIPRI would like to recognize its co-host, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, its 14 Forum partners and 5 affiliate organizations. Without their intellectual, financial and in-kind contributions, the 2017 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development would not have been possible. SIPRI is also grateful to the 2017 Masters Practicum participants, student volunteers from Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research whose written records of the Forum discussions served as the basis of the session reports.

PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS
AFFILIATE ORGANIZATIONS
Alliance for Peacebuilding, Build Up, the Institute for Security Studies, the Nordic Africa Institute, and the Stockholm Environment Institute

MASTERS PRACTICUM PARTICIPANTS
Jennifer Bradshaw, Alexandra Hallqvist, Sofia Jarvis, Michelle Maxon, Maria Osula and William Underwood
FOREWORD

Getting to 2030

BY GARY MILANTE AND KATE SULLIVAN (SIPRI)

There are three dimensions to sustainability: inclusive economic development, social justice and environmental protection.

The average citizen in most conflict-affected countries wants to answer the fundamental question: ‘How can I live in dignity?’

This is a critical moment for the 2030 Agenda: in the face of increasing polarization, militarization and multilateral withdrawal, the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) appear to be at odds with growing levels of insecurity and geopolitical uncertainty. While the tension between the optimism of an agenda adopted through global consensus and the barriers to its implementation is the source of considerable concern among peacebuilders, it has also prompted important discussions on how to move the agenda forward in spite of the daunting challenges. The remarks above, made at the 2017 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, capture the urgency and complexity of ‘getting to 2030’.

Designed around the question: ‘What works?’, the 2017 Forum challenged participants to articulate how to deliver the SDGs in different contexts over the next 13 years. Session discussions focused on identifying ways to adapt successful approaches, while also emphasizing the value of learning from failure. Participants evaluated the linkages between the Sustaining Peace Resolutions and the 2030 Agenda to determine concrete ways in which the two frameworks could be used to reinforce each other.

This overview summarizes the key takeaways from the 2017 Stockholm Forum under three thematic headings: inclusion, prevention and adaptation. The session reports and participants’ reflections offer insights into each of the individual topics addressed during the two-day conference.

INCLUSION

Many of the sessions at the Forum explored the broadened conceptualization of inclusion that has been incorporated into the SDGs and Sustaining Peace resolutions. The latter consider the inclusion of specific demographic, economic, political and geographic groups, as well as those from different sectors (i.e. the government, civil society, non-state and private sectors) and levels (i.e. the local, national, regional and international levels) of development, peace and participatory governance processes. Inclusion was raised from a rights perspective and with regard to the effectiveness of inclusive processes.

Women’s inclusion was among the most prevalent subareas of this discussion. Participants considered specific models that have proved effective at increasing women’s inclusion in various peace and development processes. One such example is the Women’s Situation Room (WSR),
which trains women as election observers and non-violence advocates. Since the WSR was piloted in Liberia in 2011, it has addressed thousands of incidents and mobilized hundreds of women to engage in national electoral processes. Frameworks and guidelines to overcome structural barriers to women’s inclusion, such as the Better Peace Tool, were also presented.

The inclusion of civil society was also a dominant subtheme in the discussion of inclusion. For example, although the first peace agreement in Colombia was rejected by referendum, the level of civil society inclusion lent legitimacy to the peace process and contributed to the ratification of a revised agreement at the end of 2016. In a departure from previous attempts, community perspectives expressed in local dialogues fed into the formal negotiations and the mobilization of civil society, especially women’s groups, helped to build and maintain momentum for an agreement. Participants also referenced post-conflict situations in which civil society is playing an essential role. In Sri Lanka, for instance, CSOs are facilitating community consultations to identify abuses committed during the conflict and other historical grievances of importance to transitional justice and reconciliation.

In contexts affected by shrinking civic space, civil society inclusion is especially challenging. In some cases, international actors’ demonstrations of solidarity with civil society have helped to relieve the restrictions imposed by repressive regimes. For example, when the Egyptian women’s rights defender Mozn Hassan was banned from travelling to Sweden to receive the Right Livelihood prize, the awarding entity travelled to Cairo to hold an award ceremony for her. In other cases, flexible funding and changes to application requirements can significantly increase civil society’s ability to contribute to peacebuilding and development.

The complexity of implementing the principle of inclusion was evident from the breadth of other discrete groups considered in the session discussions, of which non-state actors and diasporans were two. Non-state actors, such as tribal chiefs, often deliver services to their constituencies where state services are absent or inaccessible. Despite their role in the provision of governance and security, they tend to be excluded from reform initiatives or, when they are included, are afforded little political space to engage. They should be included in security sector reform and good governance initiatives. Although they are few, there are some examples of instances in which non-state actors have been included in peace processes, such as the Revolutionary United Front and Civil United Front in Sierra Leone.  

1 See ‘Strategies for inclusive peace and development processes’ on p. 43 of this report.
2 See ‘Strategies for inclusive peace and development processes’ on p. 43 of this report.
3 See ‘Strategies for inclusive peace and development processes’ on p. 43 of this report.
4 ‘Shrinking civic space’ describes the imposition of formal and informal measures aimed at restricting civil society engagement, such as violation of the rights to freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly. See ‘Strategies for inclusive peace and development processes’ on p. 43 of this report.
5 In addition to attending the ceremony, EU representatives put pressure on the Egyptian Government to drop the charges against Hassan, whose case (and the associated travel ban) was eventually dropped.
6 See ‘Good practices in security and justice reform’ on p. 17 of this report and ‘Balancing external support with domestic imperatives in security and justice sector reform’ on p. 47.
Leone. These two militias were disbanded and included in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) efforts while others have been maintained, with varying results, as part of the state’s security apparatus. The inclusion of diasporans offers different opportunities and challenges. Discussants considered the role of the Burmese diaspora in mobilizing international awareness about and support for peacebuilding in Myanmar and evaluated how its cross-cultural knowledge and networks might continue to support post-conflict development in Myanmar and promote investment and remittances.

Despite recognition among many participants at the Forum that young people and their perspectives should be incorporated into peace and development processes, few concrete examples were presented. This could be due to the relative novelty of youth inclusion in the field of peacebuilding. It therefore remains a challenge area, and this will be reflected in the planning for the 2018 Forum. Looking ahead, implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 should provide specific insights into what works in terms of integrating youth and youth perspectives into peacebuilding.

Regardless of their focus, all the sessions that raised inclusivity as good practice reflected on its quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Being in the room or even present at the table does not always mean that an individual or group can influence outcomes. As one frustrated participant noted: ‘We are now participating in many spaces where we weren’t invited before. And we’re participating, and participating and participating [...] but our voices are not reaching the high-level policies’. Meaningful inclusion, therefore, must overcome structural inequalities so that all stakeholders are afforded sufficient authority to influence decision making or otherwise effect change.

**PREVENTION**

Traditionally, peacebuilding has occurred in post-conflict settings to prevent the recurrence of conflict. However, the Sustaining Peace agenda urges global action to prevent ‘the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of conflict’ through tools that address different drivers across the conflict–peace spectrum. This approach goes beyond the temporal elements of a conflict cycle and is related to the holistic and flexible responses needed to prevent conflict. Throughout the Forum, discussion of the forthcoming United Nations/World Bank report on Sustaining Peace explored this continuum further with a focus on what has worked in the past and what is currently demonstrating success in preventing violence and promoting development.

Trust-building was a key component of many of the prevention discussions. In the session on preventing violent extremism, discussants identified three trust-building measures as being particularly effective: (a) the

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7 Despite the overall success of incorporating militias, the DDR process in Sierra Leone failed to include any of the active women combatants.
8 See ‘Leveraging the impact of diasporas on peace and development in their countries of origin’ on p. 27 of this report.
9 See ‘Strategies for inclusive peace and development processes’ on p. 43 of this report.
10 As of August 2017, the working title of the report was *Pathways to Peace*. 
establishment of grievance mechanisms; (b) the creation of safe spaces for dialogue between communities, civil society organizations and law enforcement; and (c) anti-corruption initiatives. The first two build trust by addressing the legacies of poor governance. The effectiveness of the third relates to the role of corruption in generating and exacerbating grievances, which is linked to radicalization and the exploitation of corruption and grievances by violent extremist organizations. The knock-on effects of trust building are seen in the provision of community safety, which has been shown to contribute to public trust in the police. For example, community policing programmes in rural Ukraine and Myanmar were cited as two examples where the trust built between local communities and the security forces increased the legitimacy of each country’s respective reform initiatives.

Corruption and the abuse of power comprised another notable prevention subtheme. In the session on security and justice sector reform, discussants offered examples of how corruption and the abuse of power undermine the effectiveness of state security and justice sector institutions, and their legitimacy. They agreed that transparency in defence and security expenditure could reduce perceptions of corruption and abuse but also touched on more complex challenges. Many sessions highlighted how public demand for ‘Mano Dura’ approaches and extreme repressive responses by state security and justice institutions to non-state actors involved in organized crime and terrorism have perpetuated conflict and driven extremism, particularly in instances where both the state and non-state actors flout the rule of law and violate human rights.

In addition to looking at obstacles to prevention, participants reflected on tools to enable and expand prevention efforts in different contexts. Among the suggestions were the use of mapping and spatial analysis to increase peacebuilders’ situational awareness and help them to better communicate complex narratives through visual representation. The Electoral Risk Management Tool, which enables users to upload data and generate risk maps in order to design prevention and mitigation strategies in advance of elections, and CIVICUS, an online platform that monitors and compares the state of civic space across countries over time, are two examples. Although not immune to the challenges associated with managing and sharing data in other contexts (sustainability, exploitation, validation, legal constraints on sharing proprietary information, etc.), mapping technologies can vastly improve the capacity of peacebuilders to monitor, plan, coordinate and adapt their interventions.

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11 See ‘Guns vs. butter: security and public finance’ on p. 19 of this report as well as ‘Political corruption and organized crime: drivers, effects and responses’ on p. 35 and ‘Preventing violent extremism through peacebuilding’ on p. 37.


13 See ‘Using mapping technologies and information management systems to monitor and build peace’ on p. 45 of this report.
INNOVATION AND ADAPTATION

The SDGs provide an opportunity to address aid ineffectiveness and recalibrate the existing peace and development systems. On the one hand, this requires innovation—technologies that can provide peacebuilders with new data and an expanded toolkit. On the other, it requires adaptation—processes and approaches that enable learning through failure and course-correction as new information becomes available. Participants highlighted diverse examples of innovation and adaptation at work in different peacebuilding contexts.

Arts- and technology-based interventions are increasingly being employed in combination with traditional peacebuilding techniques and, in some cases, as an alternative to them. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, open creative spaces and participatory film-making projects ran alongside national SSR and DDR dialogues and targeted women, youth and trauma-affected individuals who were not included in those dialogues. Creating art allows communities to shape a public memory together and collectively envisage a better future, which can elucidate avenues for reconciliation and restorative justice.¹⁴

Similarly, Peacetech approaches, such as virtual dialogues enabled through arts-based viral messaging and interactive technological platforms, are being used to foster empathy and forge common identities between communities in numerous country contexts. Because these types of interventions allow participants to create or reclaim physical and psychological spaces that have been destroyed by conflict, they can succeed where traditional interventions might not. By engaging with underrepresented communities, they can demonstrate the relevance of peacebuilding to those who would not normally be seated at the negotiating table, thereby further promoting inclusion.

Due to the complexity of peacebuilding, practitioners and institutions must have the ability to adjust as the situation on the ground changes. At the institutional level, this type of flexibility is achieved by various means, such as decentralizing the decision-making process to ensure that those who are closest to a given process have the authority to address feedback in real time and enact change without submitting to a lengthy chain of approvals. Peacebuilders also need to develop a systemic understanding of the context in which they are working that is driven by locally defined problems. Organizations in the Omidyar Group have been building their systems practice and often use maps to understand the forces driving the system’s behaviour and identify opportunities to leverage. Their approach is iterative, to allow practitioners to assess, test and adapt different interventions until an effective solution is identified.¹⁵

A common characteristic of many of the successful tools and approaches shared during the Forum is their flexibility. Institutions that have successfully adopted iteration and adaptation into their organizational strategies often do so by extending programme design timelines, allowing for flexibility in delivery and increased risk tolerance. This is

¹⁴ See ‘How do the arts contribute to sustainable peace?’ on p. 23 of this report.
¹⁵ See ‘It’s complicated: iteration, adaptation and systems thinking in complex peacebuilding processes’ on p. 25 of this report.
also reflected in staffing and training, moving away from an expert model towards processes that foster collective intelligence and create space for learning.

CONCLUSIONS

Unlike other ‘best practice’ models, which assume that solutions from one context will necessarily produce similar outcomes in another, the Forum’s focus on what works was intended to contribute to constructive dialogue on effective processes and innovative applications of peacebuilding tools that could be adapted to address similar problems across different contexts. The examples above and many more discussed at the Forum demonstrate how the meaningful inclusion of marginalized populations, trust-building, new tools and approaches, and the integration of learning and innovation into design can enable progress on sustaining peace despite the current geopolitical constraints.

War can cost a country a generation of development. We have seen from the Millennium Development Goals that countries that experience violence and instability are simply unable to overcome these to make significant progress with their goals. If progress is to be made on the SDGs, it is vital that the lessons of today are incorporated into development practice. To get to 2030, peace and development practitioners will need to adopt new, flexible and adaptive approaches that promote inclusion and, where possible, move ahead of the conflict cycle to promote prevention. The 2017 Stockholm Forum collected state-of-the-art practice and put it in the hands of leading researchers, practitioners and policymakers.
CAPACITY BUILDING BEST PRACTICE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVED REGIONAL PEACEBUILDING

CONTRIBUTORS: LINNÉA GELOT (FOLKE BERNADETTE ACADEMY), MIKAEL ERIKSSON (NORDIC AFRICA INSTITUTE AND THE SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY) AND MARINA CAPARINI AND YEONJU JUNG (SIPRI)

OVERVIEW

The African Union (AU) is rapidly emerging as a global peacebuilding actor. It has a formal role in the UN Charter as a regional consultation body with which to initiate conflict management efforts during threats to international peace and security. There are great expectations of the future role of the AU in continental peace and security. This session examined the role of the AU and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Discussion revolved around issues of financing, inclusivity and ownership. Participants suggested how best practices could be replicated and strengthened to enhance peacebuilding and development in Africa. Recent reform proposals by states and policy groupings in the AU and its RECs were discussed to highlight the opportunities they present for peacebuilding and development practice in Africa. The primary aim was to identify concrete achievements and the potential for continued capacity building and policy dialogue efforts across Africa.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 2016 AU Summit’s proposal for an AU Peace Fund represents a key opportunity to develop African ownership of peace operations and peacebuilding on the continent. It is a way not only to give responsibility to member states for the implementation of AU decisions, but also to create a common understanding among member states of what external actors see as financial problems, while at the same time creating an equitable partnership. This self-funding will ensure that African states are able to control their own agenda.

Through its proposed funding framework for peace and security, the AU is considering various other fund-raising mechanisms, such as from private sector mining companies, airlines, or banking and telecommunications systems. As part of its efforts to increase self-financing, the AU aims to fully implement a 0.2 per cent import levy on member states by 2018. Participants agreed that the AU cannot be effective if 60–70 per cent of its funding comes from external partners, but noted that continental ownership should not be contingent on its ability to self-finance.

Participants agreed that it was possible that the AU might become independent, but several issues were raised regarding Africa’s ownership of peacebuilding—not least the lack of stakeholder engagement and funding. The development and implementation of Agenda 2063, for example, have not been inclusive and have failed to secure stakeholder buy-in. In general, member states are not familiar with the content of AU resolutions and proposals, and the 2063 dream is not commonly shared or understood by ordinary people. Funding difficulties are likely to arise among states that belong to the AU and its RECs. For instance, the 15 member states that comprise the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to contribute to both organizations. As a number of them are considered fragile states, it is unclear whether they will be willing or able to meet their financial commitments to the AU. Furthermore, since each of the AU’s five major contributors—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa—are grappling with political, economic and/or security challenges, it is unlikely that African states’ contributions will be sufficient to manage the security challenges faced by its members.
Despite these challenges, several past and ongoing initiatives featuring long-term visions and action plans suggest progress. For example, the engagement of ECOWAS in Burkina Faso and Gambia demonstrated how sub-regional prevention coupled with strong political leadership by neighbouring states could enable effective peace-building. The AU and RECs continue to support preventive diplomacy and mediation in various ways. The AU is conducting training on mediation for women and, together with the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, it is seeking to strengthen mediation units to support envoys. ECOWAS has an operational mediation unit in place as well as a normative framework for engagement with civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs play an important role in holding national governments accountable and supporting policy implementation. For example, Gambian civil society’s mobilization of local communities ahead of the elections was instrumental in securing a peaceful resolution to the 2016 political crisis. Lastly, the UN Office in Central Africa is developing a regional action and capacity building plan based on experiences from Cameroon and the Central African Republic.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. **Initiate a genuine discussion on values between the AU and its partners wherein both groups’ perspectives are equally weighted.**
   - While bilateral partners and the international community should recognize Africa’s authority to take the lead in its own affairs, so too must regional actors acknowledge their responsibility to define their own security and development.
   - A better balance would help to mitigate the negative impacts of donor-driven agendas and dependence on external financing.

2. **Develop ongoing technical and political capacity building initiatives at different levels among key state and non-state actors to improve ownership.**
   - Capacity building of country representatives to the AU would increase the likelihood that decisions made at the headquarters are transmitted to and implemented by individual member states.

3. **Increase coordination to avoid duplication and increase effectiveness.**
   - Coordination should be horizontal, between regional institutions, and vertical, between donors and their (sub-)regional partners; and should occur at different levels in both cases.

4. **Prioritize policy assessments to promote stronger institutions.**
   - In the African context, the political culture does not oblige public servants to provide feedback to the public.
   - To strengthen the RECs, significant effort should be made to conduct policy assessments on the impact of funding as a means of ensuring transparency and accountability among public servants.

5. **Identify ways to increase the involvement of youth, women and CSOs in the development and implementation of Agenda 2063.**
CLIMATE-FRAGILITY RISKS IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION: SCOPE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESILIENCE BUILDING

CONTRIBUTOR: FLORIAN KRAMPE (SIPRI)

OVERVIEW

Multiple stressors converge in the Lake Chad region, which lies at the southern end of the Sahara desert. In the region around the lake, which borders Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, unemployment, depleted resources, poverty and conflict interact with climate change. Prolonged severe droughts have contributed to a massive shrinking of Lake Chad, a main source of livelihood for millions of inhabitants. The resulting livelihood insecurity and extreme poverty have escalated tensions between pastoralists, farmers and fishers. Insurgencies spreading from Nigeria have intensified the fragile security situation and increased cross-border displacement of populations. The impacts of climate change will exacerbate these pressures on the states and societies around Lake Chad.

The session on climate-fragility risks in the Lake Chad region brought together regional stakeholders, representatives of donor and development cooperation organizations, civil society representatives and hydrology experts. Considering the urgent and converging risks, the session aimed to inform the new research and policy agenda on climate-fragility risks in the region with the objective of understanding the different approaches to and next steps in building resilience. Specific focus was placed on the link between conflict prevention and climate change adaptation, and the role of youth and gender in addressing climate fragility risks.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development’s overall goal was to collect evidence on ‘what works’. Nonetheless, the complexity of the interactions between climate change and historic sentiments of exclusion among local communities, as well as the small evidence base on the effectiveness of responses in the region meant that the discussion on converging stressors in the Lake Chad basin centred on climate fragility risks. Inclusive development linking the population around the lake with national and local governments and other communities is believed to be essential to the sustainability of the Lake Chad region. Each of the countries bordering the lake contain peripheral regions that have seen little public investment over the years and are now experiencing the added pressure of climate change. These marginalized communities, which have limited access to education or information about regional challenges and interventions, have become susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram and other violent extremist and insurgent groups that have become vehicles for exporting their concerns to the centre. Moreover, the food and water insecurities caused by climate change and the mismanagement of resources have resulted in deteriorating livelihoods and displacement. The resulting influxes of displaced persons provide a breeding ground for inter-group conflicts.

In the light of these challenges, ensuring equitable access to water in all parts of the region is critical to mitigating the conflict risk. Participants agreed that identifying and supporting the management of existing natural resources, and understanding how to increase their value chains, should be central to conflict prevention and resilience building strategies. The discussion also highlighted economic development as a pathway to reducing vulnerabilities among local populations and agreed that creating youth employment opportunities and increasing
market access for local populations would improve regional resilience. Unfortunately, due to their focus on national responses, aid institutions are largely ill-equipped to address most of the challenges facing local communities. Discussants indicated that strengthening regional cooperation would support trans-boundary responses, and that increased exchange between the riparian countries on the use of resources could help mitigate conflict risks in the long run.

Both civil society representatives and donors emphasized the importance of initiating education and information sharing programmes for youth and local women. As gender discrimination is rampant in the region, improving the education level of girls and implementing context-specific, gender-sensitive programmes were seen as preconditions for sustainable peace and resilience. However, tribal norms and the strong Islamic cultural heritage mean that only education perceived to be in line with traditional madrasa teaching would be acceptable to local communities. Ecologists and members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission stressed the need for reliable monitoring of the lake’s ecosystem. As there is very limited data on the lake’s real water level, effective monitoring systems would lead to a better resource management strategy and assist the Commission in fulfilling its mandate.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

Based on the challenges identified, participants agreed on several important steps and made recommendations to various policy levels. To help promote action on climate security issues at the global level, the Swedish Government pledged support for a High Representative on Climate and Security at the United Nations. Members of the G7 climate fragility working group indicated an interest in focusing on the Lake Chad region and suggested that the findings and local experience presented would directly inform the shape of the group’s future action.

At the regional level, discussants agreed on the need for a comprehensive risk analysis. In addition to mapping fragility risks, this would indicate priorities for engagement and the knowledge gaps requiring targeted research. The current work of the G7 Working Group on Climate and Fragility should be of great value. Furthermore, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2349 of 31 March 2017 on Lake Chad tasked the UN Secretary-General with organizing another high-level visit to the region with the World Bank to explore the scope for conflict prevention and resilience building.

At the local level, participants stressed the importance of inclusive and gender-sensitive approaches to providing education, employment and livelihoods. This could be achieved by making better use of the region’s natural resources and strengthening institutions at the national and regional levels. There was clear consensus that education and information sharing, livelihood creation, and improved governance and institutional capacity building were the top three priorities for addressing the drivers of vulnerability in the region. However, participants noted that single sector responses to tackling these issues would not work. The linkages between the different drivers of conflict and climate risk need to be assessed further in terms of their implications for these sectors and responses would need to address these joint risks or at least do no harm to the others by addressing one. The stability and predictability of the lake’s waters are deemed more important to helping local communities plan their lives and livelihoods than actual water levels. Efforts to strengthen monitoring of the lake’s water table, for example, through more community-led monitoring stations, would be a valuable source of information to inform local communities and policymakers alike.
GOOD PRACTICES IN SECURITY AND JUSTICE REFORM

CONTRIBUTOR: MARINA CAPARINI (SIPRI)

OVERVIEW

The establishment of effective, legitimate and accountable security and justice institutions is a core objective of peacebuilding and development that responds to the fundamental needs for safety, security and access to justice. Comprehensive reform faces significant challenges linked to its complexity, financial and political cost, and protracted timeframes. Nonetheless, the session sought to learn lessons and identify good practices.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The relationship between the security and justice sectors is one of complex interdependence. This necessitates a holistic perspective and a coordinated approach when undertaking reform. Security and justice institutions in post-conflict and transitional contexts typically face the common challenge of rebuilding trust and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Both often suffer from high rates of personnel turnover during periods of transition, which depletes institutional memory, knowledge and capacity. Despite their many interlinkages, there are also important differences: security system reform (SSR) seeks to establish democratic civilian control over military and security institutions while justice system reform (JSR) is primarily concerned with establishing the independence of the judiciary.

A recent United Nations (UN) and World Bank study has shown that spending on police reform without reciprocal spending on the courts can reduce crime but may result in bloated and jammed courts. It found that a system-wide public expenditure review is needed when planning and implementing reform.¹ The Latin American experience illustrates that police reform alone is insufficient to deliver security and justice if judicial systems are underfunded, ineffective, corrupt or subject to political interference. Successful JSR can be achieved narrowly, as in the case of the Chilean criminal justice reform, but broader reform requires sustained political commitment, financial resources and coordination. A spectrum of actors such as judges, prosecutors and lawyers should play a role in pushing reform agendas across the entire chain of justice. In Tunisia, for example, the efforts of the police and judges were needed to effect systemic transformation. Similarly, the UN recognizes that building police capacity to combat organized crime must be preceded by the political will to tackle the problem and followed up by bringing the judiciary and the entire penal chain into the reform process. Close coordination and cooperation have therefore emerged between two key external actors supporting reform—the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ standing police capacity unit and the UN’s justice and corrections standing capacity.

The ‘chain of justice’ is broadly inclusive, and can comprise not only police, judges and prison officials, but also psychologists, the military and the executive. Tunisia’s concept of democratic governance and planned constitutional reforms included subjecting the military courts to fair trial rights. In Rwanda, military reform included the ability of police to arrest senior military officers. In other cases reform has been undermined by lack of confidence in or cooperation between the security and justice sector actors. In Somaliland, for example, despite

the increasing confidence of the public in the formal courts, the continuing failure of the security institutions to cooperate with the justice sector has impeded successful reform.

Setting priorities and sequencing reforms is also necessary because of limits on resources, and because the effectiveness of some reforms hinges on prior reforms. Training is not merely a technical issue, but one where success is linked to a framework of governance. Police training was seen to be of little value in the absence of institutional transformation, a human rights framework and functioning accountability mechanisms. Funding put into training and equipping without governance reform is unlikely to achieve an effective, accountable and legitimate security sector—as demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Kenya, the new constitution and democratization reforms frame security and justice reform. In contrast, the lack of governance reforms in Guinea-Bissau led to the training of soldiers who subsequently participated in a coup d'état. In addition, despite much donor investment in South Sudan, problems continue due to the lack of effective governance reforms. An assessment of earlier training should be conducted before new training is implemented. The effectiveness of human rights training, for example, may be affected by prior training in counterinsurgency tactics. There is also a need to train not only security sector personnel but also civilians and civil society in order to truly achieve local ownership. Civil society should not just contribute to oversight of the security sector, but help set the security and SSR agendas. Participants saw civil society actors as accelerants of social change.

At the same time as bridging institutional silos was seen as good practice, taking individual security sector actors ‘out of their comfort zone’ was also seen as beneficial. One example was provided by a European Commission programme run in Myanmar and Ukraine. It took police who did not habitually go on patrols out into the community on a regular basis, resulting in positive outcomes.

Participants recognized that security and justice reform generally takes a minimum of 15–20 years, and the need for a long-term approach that includes cultural transformation, particularly with regard to attitudes about sexual and gender-based violence. In South Sudan, police tend to blame the victims of sexual assault; in Ghana such blame-the-victim attitudes can often be found at the executive and judicial levels.

Improving evidence collection is important to support SSR and transitional justice processes, but measuring two main objectives of SSR, effectiveness and accountability, can skew implementation. Effectiveness is more straightforward and measurable but accountability is difficult to capture and requires a long-term approach.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. A system-wide public expenditure review will be needed that encompasses the security and justice systems and informs long-term planning and implementation.

2. Reform must be holistic, coordinated, sequenced and measured—and bridge institutional silos.

3. An appropriate governance framework must precede SSR and JSR; cultural attitudes must be addressed.

4. Actors across the security and justice systems and civil society must be mobilized in support of reform.
GUNS VS BUTTER: SECURITY AND PUBLIC FINANCE

CONTRIBUTOR: MARINA CAPARINI (SIPRI)

OVERVIEW

The issue of how much money and what resources a country should spend on the military and security sector compared to how much money it should spend on the civilian sphere in areas such as health care or education is summed up in the classic trade-off known in economics as ‘guns v. butter’. Increasingly, research is challenging the belief that investing in security and financing development are mutually exclusive, and these are now being seen as mutually dependent. Moreover, the public financial management of security institutions has been found to be an essential, albeit often neglected, dimension of security sector reform (SSR). This is partly because of the compartmentalization of international assistance. International financial institutions have for many years resisted providing technical assistance to the security sector. The security–development nexus therefore lies at the heart of resource allocation both to government institutions and within security and justice institutions such as the military, the police and the courts.

This session examined the state of the art in fiscal governance of security and justice institutions, using the recently published World Bank publication, Security Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector, as the basis for discussion and to identify specific examples of successful reforms and enabling environments. Key questions concerned: the impact of security spending on macroeconomic and fiscal sustainability; resource allocation across the public sector and within the security sector; public financial management, including payroll and procurement; accountability, oversight and performance; and donor assistance.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

It is important to consider the role of institutions—and institutional silos—in political economy. For example, finance ministry officials often have difficulty understanding the culture of security institutions, and the processes and rationales by which decisions are made. Similarly, defence ministries and security institutions are often not in a position to plan against a specific budget envelope or take account of constraints other than security. Financing is ultimately an expression of civilian control, and government accounting offices and internal auditing bodies can increase public accountability where the capacity exists to perform these functions effectively.

It is also important to understand the politics and the political process. While an analysis of the resources available in a sector is a technical process that can provide a neutral evidence base for discussion among political actors, political factors re-emerge as policymakers take budgetary decisions, and political and security actors have to implement those decisions. Modelling the financial and other consequences of internal security reform, such as for access and legitimacy, is a way to try to understand the influence of political factors. A lack of transparency in budgeting and spending in the security sector makes it difficult to understand the reasons behind increased spending on security. Cases from Thailand and Indonesia were discussed to illustrate how a lack of structural transparency with regard to military budgets enables commanders to spend budgeted funds as they see fit with little accountability. On the other hand, some aid-recipient countries such as Somalia are quite transparent, providing detailed breakdowns of spending categories. Conditionality needs to be used carefully but could potentially be used to increase transparency.
Various potential entry points exist. Middle-income Latin American countries experiencing violence and conflict-affected countries in Africa are looking to cost their SSR processes, and in post-conflict countries the transition from international peace operations to national security systems. Development occurs more slowly than SSR. Even though it is faster to ramp up security, however, there is a need to ensure that both security and development needs are addressed.

The objectives of specific SSR must be well defined. Decisions on the funding of security and development raise sensitive issues regarding who it is that defines the security threats facing a country, as well as how much funding should be allocated and where. Donors have their own objectives and spending preferences, which might differ from those of the local population. Donors must find a balance between assistance and imposing their preferences if the principle of local ownership is to be upheld.

The full professionalization of the security sector—the armed forces, police and the courts—necessarily entails a public finance perspective, as well as related issues such as payroll, human resources policy, rank pyramids and performance. The Public Expenditure Review in Liberia, which was completed in 2012, resulted in regular dialogue between internal security officials and finance officials, and created greater exchange at the national policymaking level.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Build frameworks for public accountability and transparency when it comes to spending on the security sector. Be creative with oversight; allow for qualitative aspects as well as quantitative.

2. The cost of arms and the size of other areas of spending in the security sector should be transparent.

3. Establish clear indicators and definitions of security. Focus on measuring the outcomes of security institutions, not just the outputs or the amount of funding invested.

4. Focus on objectives and who defines them, as well as how success is defined, be it financial effectiveness, effectiveness in the eyes of the public, legitimacy and so on.

5. Specifically include women and women’s perceptions of security and development.
HOW CAN THE NEW DEAL AND SDG 16+ BE ACHIEVED?

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OVERVIEW

The Millennium Development Goals were criticized for failing to deliver results in the most fragile countries. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, agreed in 2011 by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, sought to address this failure with a new model that prioritized peace, justice and governance, and the ownership of sustainable development by fragile and conflict-affected states. These principles, advocated by the g7+, later served as the basis for Sustainable Development Goal 16 and were widely integrated throughout the 2030 Agenda.

Together, the New Deal, SDG 16+ and the Sustaining Peace resolutions, which were adopted by the UN Security Council and General Assembly in 2016, provide a comprehensive policy platform for supporting inclusive, nationally led efforts to build resilience, promote sustainable development and prevent conflict. Mainstreamed across the development architecture, peace and justice provisions such as governance and the rule of law are now recognized as essential for sustainable economic growth, development and stability. However, translating the frameworks’ policy commitments into concrete achievements on the ground remains a challenge, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

This session examined how the peace-, governance- and justice-related goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda and the New Deal have been operationalized. It drew on lessons learned in fragile and conflict-affected states such as South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria and Tunisia. The discussion was structured around the themes of implementation, impact and inclusivity.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

While the 2030 Agenda sets global goals to be achieved by all countries, the New Deal is a tool specifically designed to allow fragile and conflict-affected countries to achieve sustainable development through inclusive, nationally led processes. Countries affected by conflict and fragility face specific challenges and have limited capacities and resources. A key focus of the New Deal process in the past year has been to reflect on how lessons learned to date can support implementation of the newer and relatively untested 2030 Agenda while ensuring that fragile and conflict-affected countries are not left behind.

Somalia is an example of the strengths and weaknesses of New Deal implementation to date. Adoption of the Somali New Deal Compact in 2013 helped to end a prolonged period of isolation by bringing the country back into international frameworks and allowing it access to international support. However, despite progress on some development objectives, advancement towards objectives of profound importance to the Somali people such as improved health care and security has stagnated. Concerns that Somalia’s development efforts have been top-down, rushed and insufficiently inclusive reflect a broader concern about implementation of the New Deal—that a
process originally meant to allow donors to enhance the relationship between governments and their people has in some cases promoted a bilateral relationship between governments and donors instead.

The experience of South Sudan reveals the challenges but also the need to aspire to implement the principles of the New Deal. Despite the current conflict, important steps have been taken to build consensus and public understanding around the New Deal goals, including mainstreaming them into government work and the national development plan. South Sudan's country-led fragility assessment was most valuable in fostering a local rather than outsiders' understanding of the drivers of fragility and priority actions. For the first time in South Sudan's short history the priorities for a national development policy emerged from local consultations. Efforts to rebuild and enhance relationships among communities, institutions and long-standing international partners are not just in line with New Deal principles—they may represent the only way out of the conflict.

The development and application of indicators based on sound methodologies will be critical to measuring and monitoring progress with both the SDGs and the New Deal. The Praia Group on Governance Statistics is developing a handbook on governance statistics for national statistical offices. This initiative is intended to help build the statistical capacity of fragile countries to produce evidence of national implementation of peace and development goals.

A further lesson of New Deal implementation is the need to focus on resilience as a positive reframing of the concept of fragility. Assessing resilience rather than fragility can provide a greater focus on how to build capacity or utilize the assets that exist in a country to recover from shocks at the local or national levels.

Somalia's experience with the New Deal indicates the crucial need to maintain an inclusive and bottom-up approach. This lesson is also reflected in Tunisia, where obstacles to access to justice for women have emerged as a litmus test of inclusivity in ensuring that justice goals support sustainable development. Tunisia further demonstrates the importance of regional inclusivity. The fact that social and economic disparities were addressed in the 2013 National Dialogue process prevented the collapse of the political process and resulted in a roadmap that all parties have cleaved to. Finally, the inclusion of civil society is crucial to any development agenda as a means of holding governments accountable and ensuring that national priorities reflect the views of all groups in society.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To seek new synergies, bridge gaps in current knowledge and identify areas for further research, the following ideas were drawn from the discussion:

- The need to act: the New Deal, the 2030 Agenda and the Sustaining Peace resolutions constitute a comprehensive policy platform for action.
- The need to be politically smart: consensus must be actively built around development, peacebuilding and state building goals.
- The need to build trust between state and civil society through national systems.
- The need for an inclusive approach to development, including conducting joint analyses to determine priorities and build trust between state and civil society through support to national systems.
- The need to ensure that the global development agenda is implemented and measured in a manner that is adapted to local contexts and priorities.
HOW DO THE ARTS CONTRIBUTE TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE?

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OVERVIEW

Creativity—the process of making something new—is essential to sustainable social, political and economic change. Artists offer unique insights into creative processes that have been shown to turn challenges into opportunities. The arts can contribute to peacebuilding aims and help fill a ‘blind spot’ in political science-focused approaches to security and development policy and practice. Based on a discussion of arts-based peacebuilding initiatives in diverse contexts from India to Palestine, Uganda, Lebanon, Ghana, Afghanistan, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), the session devised recommendations on how to connect arts-based peacebuilders with donors and others in the traditional peacebuilding community who are well-placed to support this work. It was complemented by live performances by ten peacebuilding artists at an event that preceded the 2017 Forum.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Session participants identified six ways in which the arts serve peacebuilding goals. First, the arts can feed directly into peace processes by giving a voice to illiterate, oppressed and marginalized populations and increasing the relevance of peacebuilding aims. Community-based arts initiatives leverage attention-grabbing art and performance, and culturally relevant ritual to generate the political will for peace. Artistic forms of expression support formal negotiations and mediation, especially when verbal communication reaches its limits or the local population is uninformed about the process. In the CAR, Build Up exemplified how parallel, participatory, arts-based processes at the local level can inform national dialogue processes, and how the use of film and multimedia forms helped communicate to the grassroots the outcomes of the USAID-funded joint-border peace committee between Sudan and South Sudan. In post-conflict Sri Lanka, street theatre groups actively reached out to previously marginalized communities to bridge the persistent gap between policymakers and the grassroots. These examples stand in contrast to ineffective means of integrating local voices into and communicating the outcomes of peace processes, such as reading a peace accord over a loudspeaker.

Second, art can reduce fear in public spaces by activating the imagination in relation to people’s daily surroundings. Artists change public perceptions by changing public spaces. The murals painted by the Fearless Collective in Delhi, India in reaction to a 2012 gang rape, for example, galvanized a 400-person movement to dispel fear of sexual violence that has since grown into a worldwide network. Lebanese-led Clown Me In has been using theatre and storytelling in Syrian refugee camps in Lebanon and Greece to mitigate the challenges of displacement by providing opportunities for children to engage in meaningful play.

Third, because the arts stimulate different parts of the brain than those stimulated by rational thinking, arts-based programming often generates new ideas and approaches. Creative thinking has been applied strategically to help conflict-affected communities develop empathy for their adversaries and to solve problems non-violently. The Splendors of Dawn Poetry Foundation in Ghana and Nigeria uses poetry in peer mediation in schools, drawing on the topics of peace, reconciliation, restorative justice and trust. Research on creativity supports the idea that the arts unlock previously overlooked ideas for solutions of mutual benefit and stimulate the imagination in ways that motivate action.
Fourth, art can generate gainful employment and stimulate local economies. An example from northern Uganda shows that the production and sale of local crafts in Internally Displaced Persons camps supported livelihoods and decreased the need to travel through insecure areas to sell goods. Many women emerging from conflict experiences support themselves and their families through microenterprises based on traditional handicrafts that express and dignify their community’s identity.

Fifth, artistic practices can heal, reconcile and lead to substantive reparations. Songs sung by women returning as refugees in northern Uganda helped community leaders identify psychological distress and provide assistance. Song and dance also helped women face the challenges associated with the slow and inconsistent return of children abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Previously suppressed indigenous peacemaking ceremonies involving descendants of colonial settlers and aboriginal peoples led to the return of land that had been taken centuries before.

Sixth, the arts encourage and sustain non-violent resistance and activism. The arts are vehicles for protesting injustice and providing hope amid despair, which allows people to envisage and work towards better futures. Images, song and dance can bring deeper meaning to struggles against powerful political forces, becoming part of the public memory and collective narratives that shape identity.

Although not an exhaustive list, these six functions exemplify the relevance of the arts and culture to the peacebuilding and development fields. There is now a need for broader recognition and financial support.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Generate opportunities for artists, policymakers, donors, philanthropists and scholars to come together and work across different sectors and countries.
   - This will mean persuading sceptics and overcoming peacebuilders' past marginalization of the arts.
   - The arts community and the peace and development communities must collaborate to remove the communication barriers that exist between them, establish strategic partnerships and increase funding.

2. Directly integrate arts programming into larger peacebuilding projects.
   - The arts need to be recognized as assets and embedded from the start into peacebuilding interventions that, in contrast, typically lead with political science methodologies.

3. Translate the proposals, creative processes and outcomes of arts-based work into products that are relevant to policymakers and donors, such as cost-benefit analyses, theories of change and policy briefs.
   - At the same time, however, policymakers and donors should work to increase their understanding of artistic methodologies and recognize that the value of the arts lies largely in new possibilities that may not be captured in preconceived frames.
Peace processes and peacebuilding are non-linear and the complex and fragile environments in which they occur require adaptive and flexible programming and problem-solving. The peacebuilding community is developing new tools for systems analysis and others that will improve the culture of monitoring to make it more conducive to adaptive learning. Nonetheless, peacebuilding still lags behind fields such as public health and education.

Drawing on the expertise of leading thinkers on context-specific adaptive programming, systems thinking and complexity science, this session identified good practices from diverse contexts on how to build learning, adaptation and feedback mechanisms as well as flexibility into programme design. The session began with an overview of systems thinking and complexity science, which focused on how the two relate to adaptive management. The subsequent plenary discussion and group work focused on overcoming barriers to working in more flexible and adaptive ways.

**Key takeaways**

Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) and other similar approaches help peacebuilders to better understand how to tackle the complex challenges that surround conflict and fragility. To enable adaptive learning approaches, peacebuilders must begin with a hypothesis rather than a solution. Furthermore, adaptive learning entails an iterative, step-by-step model that allows for failure and adjustment along the way. Adaptation and the development of locally defined solutions is only possible by learning through ‘feedback loops’. Unfortunately, the trend for adopting best practices and exchanging lessons learned often means that peacebuilders transplant solutions from one country context to the next without first interrogating whether they are fit for purpose.

Barriers to applying PDIA in peacebuilding

Donors tend to be risk-averse, seeking linear approaches to peacebuilding that have been tried in other conflict contexts. Their reluctance to invest in approaches that promote exploration and risk failure impedes learning by prioritizing the safety of what is known over the possibilities of what has yet to be tested. Based on their understanding of donor preferences, peacebuilders and peacebuilding organizations package their programmes to deliver a specific set of known outcomes in a linear process.

PDIA approaches are time-consuming because they require implementing organizations and donors to evaluate the effectiveness of their peacebuilding approaches on a continuing basis. The time and effort inherent in this process and the practice of questioning long-standing methods can be unsettling for experienced practitioners and difficult to achieve while at the same time trying to deliver results. Furthermore, the switch from an expert model, in which individuals are believed to possess the organization’s expertise in their respective issue areas,

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to a more fluid model, in which the process of learning and the context on the ground are valued above thematic expertise, can be traumatic.

Finally, with some exceptions, the peacebuilding community has been more preoccupied with developing a broad definition of peace than identifying everyday peace indicators. This big picture focus hinders efforts that would approach peacebuilding challenges at the local level, testing one piece of the puzzle at a time.

*Overcoming barriers to PDIA*

At the programme level, peacebuilders should seek to build a healthy system by focusing on processes instead of outcomes. Systems are neither broken nor fixed: they are dynamic. Participants discussed testing a dynamic map of the theory to avoid confining their approach to the short term or a particular linear process. The experts leading the discussion recommended using a 10-year plan as a guide for structuring programme-level learning.

At the organizational level, peacebuilders should work on building shared, collective and aligned intelligence across all levels of the organization. Equally important is the need to communicate learning objectives to donors and partners to increase their risk tolerance and patience. Within the organization, leaders need to change the organizational culture in such a way that learning itself becomes an outcome in service of the desired impacts. One way to bring about this type of cultural change is by establishing regular check-ins to discuss what staff members are learning and how they have adapted in response to each lesson. Decentralizing decision making can also encourage a culture of learning by removing the bureaucratic obstacles to adaptation.

At the system level, mapping helps to visualize data sets and system dynamics to discover opportunities for integrating feedback loops. Systems maps also help to illustrate the ‘core story’ and ‘supporting stories’, or the narratives of the primary and secondary hypotheses being tested and the results of that exploration processes.

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Introducing adaptive peacebuilding approaches is tough in large organizations. Start by getting buy-in from key stakeholders at various levels and then test pilot projects. It is important to identify early signs of impact and how to measure these types of outcomes.
- Fail smart in ways that limit damage and maximize learning. To do so, peacebuilders must first identify ‘easy wins’ and areas of least resistance on which to build.
- Build collective intelligence in your organization and break up the decision-making process into three parts: (a) explaining the context; (b) defining perceived opportunities; and (c) identifying the means (method, resources) of seizing them.
- Maximize learning in the early stages of a programme and only as the programme evolves become more linear in approach and focused on outcomes.
- To every linear programme, build in the space to try something innovative.
- Use a narrative to engage stakeholders in the learning process. Stories are easier to remember than lists of ideas or statistics.
LEVERAGING THE IMPACT OF DIASPORAS ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

CONTRIBUTORS: WINNIE LEUNG (SIPRI), OTTILIA MAUNGANIDZE (ISS) AND LINA ANTARA (INTERNATIONAL IDEA)

OVERVIEW

Diaspora groups vary in their composition, allegiances and experiences, and each group evolves differently over time. Such groups may have a positive, neutral or negative influence on conflict dynamics and development efforts in their countries of origin. Certain groups have exacerbated conflict and impeded development by financing armed groups or other political actors that use violence or exclusion to secure or maintain power. Many others, however, have made a positive contribution to their homelands.

This session focused on the formal and informal mechanisms through which various diaspora groups, including forced and voluntary migrants driven by political, economic, social and conflict-related factors, exercise a positive influence in their countries of origin. Participants discussed opportunities for effective diaspora engagement in political activities, and peace and development processes.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Diasporas can facilitate development in their countries of origin, most notably through their remittances and investment in local and national development. For example, annual remittances from the various Somali diasporas are thought to amount to over US$ 1.2 billion.¹ These are used primarily to fund basic household expenses, such as education, food and clothing, as well as community development and political projects. In Myanmar, remittances are largely used to cover basic household expenses. Formalizing remittance flows and promoting competition between the financial institutions that facilitate international money transfers are two ways in which governments could maximize the economic contribution of their respective diasporas.

Diasporas also play a role in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation. For instance, the Tamil diaspora fuelled the violence in Sri Lanka in many ways, but it was also largely responsible for raising global awareness of the conflict and securing Norwegian mediation. During the 2004–2005 ceasefire, the Sinhalese and Tamil diasporas funded relief and rehabilitation projects in communities with little or no state presence. In 2015, the Government of Sri Lanka introduced dual citizenship to encourage further diaspora engagement and secure a lasting peace.

The ability of the diaspora to transfer knowledge, skills and values between countries can be an asset for peace and development. Diasporas hosted in pluralist societies with good governance and respect for human rights can influence local perceptions of freedom, tolerance and accountability in their country of origin by describing their experiences abroad. More direct means of influence include supporting political parties and civil society organizations. Forum Syd’s Somali Diaspora Programme, for example, helps ethnic Somali groups in Sweden facilitate socio-economic development in Somalia.

¹ Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, Somalia (FSNAU), Family Ties: Remittances and Livelihoods Support in Puntland and Somaliland (FSNAU: June 2013).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Clarify the concept of the diaspora and understand the various contexts in which it can be part of peace-building and development processes. The term covers diverse groups, such as refugees, economic migrants and second- or third-generation migrants (generational diasporas). Clear definitions of the various categories are essential when developing relevant policy on emigration or electoral processes.

2. Develop international electoral guidelines for the involvement of diaspora in political and electoral processes in their home countries. In the absence of explicit international electoral guidelines, different countries have different electoral laws governing the extent to which the diaspora can contribute to political and electoral processes back home. In some countries, such as Eritrea and Zimbabwe, people in the diaspora are prohibited from voting or standing in elections. Zimbabwe also forbids people in the diaspora from funding political parties in the country.

3. Use technology to overcome the financial and logistical obstacles associated with voting from abroad. Options for electronic voting (i-voting), for example, might assist in this area.

4. Host countries should support the integration of diaspora groups. According to the United Nations, the average duration of stay for refugees in exile is 26 years. Diaspora groups that are well integrated into their host countries are better able to support their communities back home through remittances, activism or political involvement.

5. Enhance the role of the diaspora in areas of particular interest, such as justice initiatives. Support from host states for transitional justice processes in countries of origin can be deeply significant for diaspora groups. Many in the Syrian diaspora in Sweden are unhappy that the legal process is disadvantageous to opposition fighters and seemingly benefits pro-regime supporters.

6. Civil society groups that support peacebuilding and development initiatives should form strategic partnerships with diaspora groups. The Somali Youth Development Network, for example, works directly with local communities and engages with members of the Somali diaspora on issues relating to youth participation, peacebuilding and development. Such networks offer contextual understanding of key issues, local buy-in and sustainability.

7. Work to change negative public stereotypes of diasporas in host societies. Populist rhetoric, stereotypes and the criminalization of immigrants reduce the potential impact of diasporas. As a starting point, the public conversation and understanding of diasporas must change.
MANAGING CONFLICT AND ENSURING PEACE IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY

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OVERVIEW

Mining activities and competition to access natural resources and mineral wealth can give rise to conflict. Areas of contention emerge out of latent inequalities in power relations, particularly when related to gender, inter-generational or geopolitical disparities. The participants in the roundtable on managing conflict and ensuring peace discussed political strategies to address inequalities in the extraction of mineral resources. Drawing on perspectives from civil society, the private sector, multilateral organizations and academic research, the roundtable highlighted initiatives that aim to mitigate the potentially negative economic, social and environmental impacts of mining activity. In addition to regional views, focused on Africa in particular but with mentions of Latin America, specific cases were presented on Burkina Faso, Zambia and Sweden. The examples highlighted the commonalities in experiences across extractive locales and the different scale of effort required to ensure peace and engagement between mines, communities and the state.

Disputes in the extractive sector are often connected to who benefits from mining activity, changing land use rights, environmental concerns and the rapidly shifting socio-economic landscape. These changes affect young people and women in particular, especially those in rural areas where mines in effect create an enclave economy that socially and economically separates those who work directly in the extractive sector and those outside it. Participants in the roundtable presented initiatives to create a bridge for dialogue between these different stakeholders, as well as examples of pragmatic engagement with mines and the state. While acknowledging that some of these efforts have been successful on a local or regional scale, the often lucrative nature of the global demand for mineral resources means that not enough effort is invested in them.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Recognition of the highly unequal position of communities affected by mining, in comparison with the influence of mining companies and the state, has led some civil society organizations to adopt an increasingly pragmatic approach. In Zambia, a civil society organization representing a community that lost its lands to mining activity and was forced to relocate decided to identity and persuade sympathetic influential state actors to work with the affected community to negotiate mitigation. As in similar cases around the world, the rural community in Zambia, particular the women, had lost access to water, their smallholdings, firewood and access routes. Without their means of production, their dignity was also taken away. Thus, rather than agitating for the community to be embroiled in cycles of protest, with little hope of a positive outcome given the politically marginalized situation of rural women and youth, an alliance of influential church leaders worked with the communities to get state actors involved. Such alliances can lend a weightier voice to otherwise excluded groups, forcing often reluctant mining companies to take community concerns seriously. These strategic partnerships have grown up across Zambia and are addressing emerging concerns, such as the capacity and wisdom of a country with weak environmental regulatory mechanisms mining toxic mineral resources such as uranium.

Strategic relationships between communities affected by mining and state-owned companies, like some in Sweden, can create a lack of clarity over who is responsible for addressing the impacts of mining, such as the damage to land and the relocation of homes. However, state-owned companies might be more responsive to
redistributing mining revenues than privately owned ones. Nonetheless, fluctuations in commodity prices can negatively affect a company’s best intentions to address the impact of mining or reimburse the local community. Such concerns highlight the need for overarching institutions that consider overlapping rights, in particular for indigenous groups that the world over experience underdevelopment and loss of their way of life through degrading mining practices.

There are cases of mining companies working closely with local communities to ensure that they are having a positive impact on the areas in which they operate. In Burkina Faso, for example, a mining company operating in a city of over 100,000 inhabitants must consider the complex interests exposed by working in such a context, especially when it comes to identifying leaders considered legitimate to work with. Furthermore, the company is attempting to develop programmes that provide women with jobs, while at the same time navigating cultural sensitivities around local gendered expectations, such as the view of some local men that women should look after the domestic sphere. Tensions in mining can be exacerbated by cultural misunderstandings and failures to identify legitimate leaders or brokers. The Burkina Faso example highlights the need for companies to tailor their corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices to local needs rather than non-reflexively transferring policies from other contexts.

However, most CSR programmes are voluntary and governments in Africa are moving towards imposing legal obligations on mining companies to mining-affected communities. The aim is to allow for dialogue between multiple parties and for expectations to be understood in advance. To achieve this, more transparency is needed around the mining process. One initiative by a World Bank project, the Africa Mining Legislation Atlas, makes a database of all of Africa’s mining laws accessible to anyone with an Internet connection. The database also has a guide template that can be used by local communities to formulate agreements with mining companies. The comparative aspect of the database allows different country governments and regions to identify regulatory gaps. Initiatives such as these, which are on an international scale, aim to highlight and address regional inequalities, and to steer policies in the extractive sector towards those that invest in people, focus on healthy rural sectors rather than rapid industrialization and minimize mining’s footprint by careful land mapping.

Issues over land use and mapping apply not just to large-scale mining, but also to small-scale artisanal and informal mining. The repercussions of the uneven distribution of mining revenues sometimes mean that youth and women engage in informal mining activity, bringing them into conflict with larger mines and the state. Initiatives that recognize the need for informal mining livelihoods and provide support for them can bridge the gap between small-scale and large-scale mining.

**RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS**

A wider comparative perspective should be taken of the mining communities affected by the extractive sector. In the context of weakly regulated mining sectors in some countries and the invisibility of certain groups, such as youth and women in rural communities or those who belong to marginalized indigenous groups, the scale of the issues around mining tends to be underestimated. The most important mining companies around the world tend to be multinational giants consolidated into a small number of commodity traders. An intersecting international response is needed to ensure peace in the extractive sector. There might be a need to map not only legislation, but also the state of affairs in each extractive locale around the world, creating an open platform for communities, in particular youth and women affected by mining, to highlight their grievances and expectations, and seek redress. The roundtable discussion indicated that there are initiatives to manage relations in the extractive industry, but they are not shared and tend to focus on narrow issues, which limits the potential for fruitful engagement between communities, mines and the state.
PEACE FINANCING

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OVERVIEW

As the sustaining peace agenda pivots towards prevention, new financing will be necessary to underwrite prevention activities. A recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) found that donor-funded peacebuilding makes up a relatively small proportion of global Official Development Assistance (ODA). Only 16 per cent of an indicative set of 31 conflict-affected countries’ total ODA allocation (US$ 6.8 billion) was spent on peacebuilding.

Peace financing can take multiple forms—from new resources committed to peacebuilding and prevention to resources previously committed to development or security resources being redirected to peacebuilding. The reprogramming for peace need not be explicit—how a project is designed might make it a peacebuilding project. The Bridge for Peace Project in Nepal, for example, connected several valleys and was crucial for peace building between previously isolated communities. Peace can also be financed through different channels. Donor funding can be directed through bilateral and multilateral aid, while individual donors and foundations can contribute philanthropically—including through crowdfunding.

In this session, participants discussed financing mechanisms for peace—current gaps, what works, what could work and how it might work—to gain insights from the experiences and expertise of the group and inform future policy.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Although there have been recent improvements in peace financing—as shown by the performance of multi-donor trust funds in Somalia and Afghanistan and the recent replenishment of the UN Peacebuilding fund—many challenges remain.

There is little coherence between donors, and common financing frameworks are required to resolve this incoherence. Innovative financing mechanisms may be useful here. Furthermore, there is a need for agreement on the strategic goal of financing peacebuilding efforts, or development projects with a peacebuilding component, if the funding gap is to be filled. Fragility assessments can help to align donors and recipients around specific objectives.

There is limited capacity at the country level to take ownership of projects, design national plans or transparently report on expenditure. National actors struggle to understand what funding is available, to manage many stakeholders, including uncoordinated donors, and provide direction on the use of finance in peace projects. One discussant noted that, ‘the proliferation and complexity of the funding system is a challenge on many levels and for various actors’. If financing is to be scaled-up in such environments, capacity will have to expand to accommodate it.

The financing of peace is neither neutral nor apolitical. Financing affects recipient and donor behaviour, power relations, and decisions and transparency within and between states.

Bridging the peace financing gap through new or redirected resources will require innovation. Discussants considered two specific models—peace bonds and an arms trade tax—not to debate the merits or drawbacks of each, but to focus on how new mechanisms might contribute to problem-solving in the peace-financing space.

Peace and Social Impact Bonds

New financing instruments such as Payment by Results are attractive to donors because they link financing to outcomes, which has increased the evidence base on effectiveness. Similarly, social impact bonds (or peace bonds) are mechanisms for funding programmes or projects that yield returns to investors when specific outcomes are
delivered. Peace bonds can link those with an interest in peace outcomes (be it financial, reputational or social) directly to the funding and monitoring of an activity. Early piloting of social impact bonds in Chicago and various criminal justice systems show promise regarding their effectiveness in mobilizing local and crowd-sourced financing for peace projects.

*The Arms Trade Tax*

Arms and arms transfers have negative spillover effects. An arms trade tax could be designed to offset these negative externalities. Arms transfers would thereby become a source of funding for peace. In addition to raising finance, an arms trade tax would increase transparency in arms transfers. It could also positively influence industries to increase responsible production and trade. The discussion centred around whether the tax should fall on exporter nations or producers, or on the importers. The concept was formulated in a background paper that is included with this Forum report.

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The definitions of peacebuilding and prevention are still evolving, which complicates efforts to identify needs, gaps and new sources of financing for these sectors. Strategic coherence is required on what constitutes peacebuilding in order to better identify whether resources are contributing to peace. Recent successes in Payment by Results, Social Impact Bonds and even direct cash transfers, such as through GiveDirectly, demonstrate the importance of linking not just donors and recipients, but all the stakeholders directly involved in aid activity and those most vested in peaceful outcomes. An arms trade tax is a practical example of how negative externalities can be measured and monetized. Furthermore, if traditional financing models are to be expanded, these models will require innovation to align donors and build absorptive capacity.
PEACE IS EVERYONE’S BUSINESS:
ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR

CONTRIBUTORS: Winnie Leung (SIPRI) and Jennifer Bradshaw (MA candidate, Uppsala University)

OVERVIEW

Businesses ‘usually do not see building peace as part of their mandate, unless their business model is tailored so they profit significantly more from peace than conflict’.¹ There are growing expectations in wider society, however, that companies will be more proactive in ensuring that their economic activities will have peaceful and stable outcomes. Similar calls are made for those that support economic development from other angles, such as donors, governments, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, to factor in definitions of corporate responsibility to their approaches.

This session used case studies to explore the role of government and the private sector in positively supporting peacebuilding through economic activity and policy. The session highlighted ways of maximizing contributions to peace without undermining the authority and comparative advantages of the public and civil society sectors.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

National government perspective

The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ARC) is the state division responsible—along with other public and private sector bodies—for advising on, coordinating and assisting the return of demobilized combatants from illegal armed groups to normal social and economic life. From this top-down perspective, it was emphasized that for the private sector to assist in building the capacity of the population, the intersection between areas of opportunity and the needs of the private sector must first be identified.

Civil society perspective

Peacebuilding cannot be owned by a single sector. Collaborations among civil society and between the public and private sectors are key when trying to cultivate a strong peace culture for business to thrive. Each sector reinforces a different level of security and assists a different need of an ex-combatant. Frequent engagement and high-quality dialogues are needed in such collaborations to address both common and diverging interests. It is important to be aware that such partnerships are difficult to navigate and confrontation is inevitable. As a result, all parties must allow space for disagreement to occur and have mechanisms in place to collectively progress.

Business perspective

Businesses need to be legitimate in the eyes of government in order to be able to proactively support peacebuilding. Rooted in this belief, the Mindanao Business Council in the Philippines built a coalition of businesses that was strong in number and could effectively advocate for economic rights before the government. This coalition built partnerships with local communities and became a bridge between local people and the government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Encourage sustainable and responsible private investment practices to minimize the risk of fuelling conflict.
   - To achieve sustainable and responsible outcomes, the social, environmental and financial dimensions of results should be evaluated, which is known as the triple bottom line.
   - The shareholder, customer and investor can all push businesses to be a force for good and to consider the triple bottom line in their daily operations. This would include where companies set up shop, how meaningful or long term their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) commitments are and who they hire, all of which can have a huge impact on decreasing inequalities.

2. Remember that private sector businesses can still thrive in conflict zones.
   - Businesses such as social enterprises often thrive in conflict zones when providing essential goods, such as food, power, water and gas, and especially when there are no other traders in the market.
   - It is therefore important to leverage the underlying networks in conflict zones when seeking to build peace.

3. Acknowledge and leverage the power of private sector companies to play the role of ‘economic diplomat’.
   - In cases where the state fails to deliver public goods and services to its society members, private sector companies have the power to become the provider.
   - This generates competition between the public and private sectors. In turn, given that private sector providers are ultimately profit-seekers, this creates pressure on the state to act to ensure that all its society members have access to a certain quality of life and level of provision, regardless of their financial capacities.

4. Utilize private sector knowledge, resources and networks to resolve conflicts.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME: DRIVERS, EFFECTS AND RESPONSES

OVERVIEW

In recent decades, greater attention has been paid to the capacity of organized crime to corrupt political systems, chiefly by pouring illicit money into political campaigns and institutions. Conflict and weak governance enable such networks to engage in political corruption. If not properly addressed, the increasing number and intensity of global conflicts and the democratic backsliding seen in recent years are likely to negatively affect efforts to tackle political corruption linked to organized crime. In this session, participants considered two pre-developed scenarios to explore how these trends might affect the drivers and effects of political corruption and organized crime, in an attempt to determine how current policy responses might be adapted to meet future challenges.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Democracy is never perfect but exists on a spectrum and in a variety of forms. While each context is specific, there are some commonalities between states that share similar socio-economic conditions, conflict dynamics or historical experiences. For example, in post-colonial states, democratic systems are often inherited and reflect the administrative structures of colonialism, which used politics to maintain power. In situations where there is little expectation of accountability among citizens, the mechanisms to support it are often lacking even where the political will exists.

Democratic backsliding can also be the result of a lack of trust in political institutions. The latter is frequently linked to changes in the state-society relationship, which may weaken over time as a result of corruption, weak governance, limited access to justice, low levels of social cohesion or poor service delivery. While good governance does not ensure an absence of organized crime, poor governance creates opportunities for it to flourish. Ungoverned spaces, corruption and weak rule of law enable organized crime to finance and develop its operations. The informal and illicit markets that emerge in the absence of a strong formal sector can provide livelihoods in the short term, but empower criminal networks and undermine state authority in the medium to long term.

Increasing conflict and conflict recurrence can exacerbate the above-mentioned challenges and create new ones. For example, when the proportion of public resources directed towards military operations increases, other sectors such as health care, education, security and justice may suffer cutbacks resulting in a reduction in the quality or quantity of services provided. In such instances the void created can be filled by non-state actors such as community- and faith-based organizations, humanitarian or development actors, insurgent groups or local militias. While the delivery of services by non-state actors can have positive impacts on the local population, it can also undermine state legitimacy and contribute to greater instability, particularly if the non-state actors delivering services have political objectives or are otherwise profiting from the conflict. Moreover, during times of conflict involving high levels of displacement, organized crime networks may benefit from human trafficking or profit from selling arms to and financing the parties to the conflict—whether state and non-state actors—using money earned through drug smuggling.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Participants agreed that there is no single solution that can address all the above-mentioned challenges associated with democratic backsliding or increased conflict, or the opportunities that these create for organized crime networks to engage in political corruption. However, a number of partial solutions were suggested to strengthen existing policy frameworks and address their deficiencies. The recommendations identified below and others suggested during the forum session and pre-forum workshop will be further developed by International IDEA in a forthcoming policy paper.

First, civil society plays an important role as both a watchdog and an advocate of democratic principles. Building the capacity of civil society organizations and increasing finance to those that monitor corruption and human rights in particular could help hold public officials to account and bring about a cultural shift that stigmatizes corruption. Participants also discussed how greater support for programmes that promote media independence and freedom of speech, and those that educate journalists on how to responsibly monitor and report on corruption might be effective in certain contexts.

The group discussions revealed that one of the greatest obstacles to addressing both organized crime and corruption is the lack of incentives to refrain from such practices. Positive incentives, or ‘carrots’, were proposed, such as educating political leaderships in the principles of good governance, implementing tax amnesties and rewarding governments that implement transparency measures with larger aid packages. Various disincentives, or ‘sticks’, were also suggested. For instance, by investing in justice sector reform and pairing it with anti-corruption measures, development actors would enable greater judicial independence and facilitate better enforcement of laws already on the books. At the international level, discussants considered the possibility of expanding the mandate of international judicial organizations to prosecute corruption cases linked to organized crime, learning from the experiences of such bodies as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala.

Participants agreed that corruption should be at the forefront of the international development agenda, rather than an issue to be addressed after economic recovery and institutional capacity have passed a certain threshold. Participants noted that by treating corruption as a secondary priority, the current approach ignores its systemic relationship with governance, security and justice, reducing the sustainability of the immediate development and statebuilding gains of the post-conflict period.

Finally, the discussion highlighted the need for better analysis and greater context specificity in the design and implementation of programmes that seek to address political corruption and organized crime. In fragile and conflict-affected states, resources and capacity are limited. The needs associated with addressing political corruption and organized crime should be prioritized to ensure citizen security and restore state legitimacy. Government initiatives must complement and be sequenced with civil society and private sector interventions, and each other. Regional and international actors must develop a deeper understanding of the political actors, criminal networks and institutional vulnerabilities in a given country, as well as the relationships between them.
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PEACEBUILDING

OVERVIEW

In contrast to more reactive, state-centric security responses to the phenomenon of violent extremism, peacebuilders have tended to stress interventions that mitigate root causes earlier in the conflict cycle, as well as structural factors that can produce and reproduce vulnerabilities to recruitment. However, the field of peacebuilding and violent extremism is relatively understudied and more research, analysis and sharing of practice is required. This session aimed to explore the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions in this regard, examining specific examples of interventions explicitly designed to address violent extremism. It drew on the participating practitioner-experts’ important insights into what has been and can be effective in different contexts. In order to hone in on the concrete practicalities of implementation, conceptual questions related to definitions, metrics and theories of change were addressed in an earlier workshop. Participants highlighted country cases from Nigeria, Pakistan, Morocco and Kenya, and brought their regional perspectives to the debate.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

While it is clear that both problems and solutions are highly context-specific, a number of common threads were drawn across cases in relation to violent extremism. Among these, grievances against the state were identified as an important cross-cutting driver of violent extremism at the group level. That structural transformation of the violence cycle often requires governance problems and abuses by state actors to be addressed was implicit in many of the cases. Furthermore, each of the effective interventions presented by session discussants: (a) provided a holistic or multi-sectoral response that included different segments of society, such as women, religious leaders, youth and law enforcement; and (b) were either community-driven or community-led. Although further research is needed to assess their effectiveness across contexts and over time, the cases presented during the session provide peacebuilders with several tools and approaches that show early indications of success. Chief among these are conflict resolution capacity building, media education and training on the deconstruction of stereotypes and the creation of safe spaces for dialogue between communities and law enforcement.

The session discussion also provided a number of insights into ineffective practices and approaches. For example, interventions that target or securitize specific communities have been generally unsuccessful as they tend to upset social cohesion and generate grievances. This was the case with the Kenya Transition Initiatives, which only targeted members of the Somali diaspora. Interventions that focus exclusively on religious ideology (e.g. ‘good’ Islam versus ‘bad’ Islam) have also achieved relatively low levels of success. Discussants attributed the failure of the latter to the lack of credibility of the implementing organizations as faith arbiters or the perception that the intervention was being instrumentalized to further a particular political agenda. Because of their do-no-harm perspective, peacebuilders may be relatively more aware of these sensitivities than other types of intervention agents, such as military personnel.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Interventions implemented by civil society organizations (CSOs) have been most successful where they have long-standing ties to the community and understand the local social and political context, which increases their legitimacy. For example, one discussant presented a programme from northern Nigeria in which women’s groups collaborated with local government and Islamic leaders to develop counter-narratives to those propagated by Boko Haram. Collectively, the three stakeholders implemented training and radio programmes to help community members overcome the stigma associated with secular education. Their initiative resulted in a substantial increase in public primary school enrollment. Donors and implementing agencies should partner with CSOs to design and implement Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programmes in vulnerable communities to ensure that interventions are suitable to the local context and responsive to community needs and concerns.

Without diminishing the work of women peacebuilders already engaged in PVE, participants observed that the potential of women PVE agents remains largely untapped in countries with high levels of gender inequality. They recommended that sustainable prevention strategies should consider how to empower women with the knowledge, skills and authority required for them to take on a larger role as peace and security actors. However, discussants cautioned against framing the gender dimensions of violent extremism in binary terms. Women and girls have actively participated in and supported violent extremism and are increasingly being recruited by extremist organizations. Practitioners and policymakers need to develop a greater understanding of how different constructions of masculinity interact with violent extremism.

Overall, the session emphasized the complexity of tackling violent extremism and demonstrated that the causal chain of radicalization is often unclear. Discussants stressed the need to move away from approaches that focus exclusively on profiling individuals and communities that support violent extremism towards those that address the relationships between structural drivers, individual incentives and enabling factors. For example, the successful de-radicalization programmes are those that have been able to address participants’ self-esteem, ideological and political tenets, individual and group identities, experiences of exclusion, exposure to violence and personal relationships. Participants further noted that the desire to simplify violent extremism and, in some cases, exploit it has sometimes contributed to the misuse of labels (i.e. jihadist, Islamist, Nazi) in policy frameworks and legislation. While there is a need to establish common definitions of different types of extremist activities and actors, discussants highlighted several examples in which labels have been selectively applied, politicized or exploited to justify particular security responses. Discussants cautioned that labels often reinforce negative stereotypes, further marginalize vulnerable populations and inhibit interveners’ response capacity.¹

REIMAGINING PEACEBUILDING THROUGH INNOVATION

CONTRIBUTORS: HELENA PUIG LARRAU (BUILD UP) AND YEONJU JUNG (SIPRI)

OVERVIEW

Technological innovation offers promising approaches to the development of more effective strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This session considered the technology tools and innovation processes adopted by peacebuilders, an emerging body of practice often referred to as ‘peacetech’. Case studies were presented to illustrate the different possible functions of technology in peacebuilding initiatives (information, communication, networking and mobilization) and the technology innovation processes (hackathons, innovation labs and user-centred design) that peacebuilders are adopting to develop peacetech.

Building on the case studies, the session critically reviewed the key challenges facing peacetech: (a) ensuring compliance with ethical principles and local ownership of technology to deepen engagement; (b) finding a balance between scaling solutions and trust building; and (c) measuring the impact of technology tools on peace processes. The key takeaways and conclusions from this session will inform further discussion at events organized by Build Up, such as the Build Peace conference on peacebuilding innovation.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Ethical concerns beyond data privacy

Conflict sensitivity and do no harm are standard considerations for any peacebuilding project. Peacetech projects raise additional ethical concerns. Most of the conversations to date have focused on privacy concerns about data technologies. Discussants highlighted other equally important ethical challenges with regard to the unintended consequences of technologies for people living in conflict-affected areas. For example, a representative of Elva Community Engagement explained that some participants in its virtual reality project in the Caucasus had experienced overpowering emotions and even trauma when ‘walking through’ the area from which they had been forced to flee due to conflict.

Engagement and ownership

Peacetech does not by definition increase engagement in peace processes. In fact, it can be extractive and top down. Session discussions emphasized the importance of locally owned and locally driven technologies to ensuring that technology development is driven by local problems rather than external solutions, uses context-relevant technologies and does not ‘reinvent the wheel’. If done well, innovation processes can serve as platforms for dialogue, becoming peacebuilding processes in their own right. For example, solutions developed at International Alert’s peacehacks, which bring together practitioners and coders to develop prototype tech-based solutions, draw on the distinct skills and perspectives of different groups of professionals to adapt existing technology tools to current peacebuilding challenges.

Trust, scale and impact

Soliya’s Connect Program is a virtual exchange for university students that fosters constructive conversation across political, cultural and identity lines. Initiatives like the Connect Program use technology platforms to scale connection between individuals, thereby providing avenues for participation in peacebuilding for marginalized
groups. Discussants noted that the challenge lies in finding the correct balance between scaling participation through a technology platform and ensuring that there is sufficient human contact so that trust building is not weakened. They considered ways to combine face-to-face human interaction with connections mediated by a technology platform to overcome the latter obstacle. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) mentioned its exploration of mapping technologies in support of peacebuilding. When measuring impact, discussants agreed that scale should not be the only measure of success. It is critical that approaches to measuring the impact of peacetech evaluate both quantitative engagement (the number of people who interact with a tool or platform) and relationships (perceptions, attitudes and behaviour changes that are central to peace), and that they clearly distinguish between the two.

From peacetech evolution to peacetech revolution?

Diverse successful peacetech initiatives are currently being deployed to address gaps in peacebuilding processes rather than improve them or create new processes. Build Up's Fellows programme works with local peacebuilders to introduce technology into an existing initiative through a process of user-centred design that enables them to also become more effective stewards of technological innovation within their organizations. Participatory technology innovation processes like the Fellows programme are structured around consultation on an existing process to deliver effective, grounded peacetech. Session participants explored whether user-centred innovation design processes based on an alternative vision for peacebuilding rather than consultations on an existing process might be vehicles to challenge today's peacebuilding architecture and push the peacetech field even further.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop ethical principles for peacetech.
   • As peacetech grows, it is critical to facilitate continuing discussions between technologists and peacebuilders regarding how to manage the introduction and application of technology tools into peace processes.
   • Initiatives such as JustPeace Labs’ Ethical Guidelines for Peacetech are already working towards this.

2. Invest in processes that put peacebuilders in the driving seat of technology development.
   • For innovation processes to be truly locally owned, investment should focus on enabling peacebuilders to better interact with opportunities for innovation.
   • Supporting peacebuilders to gain skills in technology design and product management is key to impactful peacetech.

3. Fund exploratory work on innovation to reimagine peace processes at every level.
   • Peacetech initiatives currently focus on adding to existing peace processes but fall short of addressing the larger structural issues in peacebuilding. For example, despite the opportunity for greater participation through technology, track 1 peace negotiations remain largely closed-door processes.
   • A space for visionary peacetech could push this field further forward.

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1 This is discussed in detail in ‘Using mapping technologies and information management systems to monitor and build peace’ on p. 45 of this report.
SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE: ADDRESSING THE GENDERED THREATS TO PEACEBUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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OVERVIEW

The term ‘shrinking civic space’ refers to formal and informal measures that aim to restrict civil society engagement. Among the most common indicators of shrinking space are limitations on the freedoms of speech, the press and assembly, legislation that limits the activities or financing of civil society organizations (CSOs) or that would classify their staff as terrorists or foreign agents, the detention of civic actors without due process, or slander and intimidation. In recent years, increased levels of militarization, rising nationalism and the growth of populist movements have helped to shrink civic space in countries around the world. While this threatens many types of civic actors, it particularly affects women human rights defenders (WHRDs) by reducing their ability to advocate for or exercise political influence.

Women carry out a large proportion of grassroots peacebuilding and development activities. However, since formal political processes are often inaccessible to them, women primarily engage through the civic space. In countries characterized by pervasive gender inequality, civil society is the only sphere in which women can organize. Because of the crucial role that WHRDs play in peace and development, this session sought to raise awareness about the gendered aspects of shrinking civic space. The most notable among theses are the promotion of patriarchal values and binary gender roles in nationalist rhetoric, the physical and verbal abuse of women and gender queer activists and the targeted repression of organizations that promote gender equality and women's rights. The session also sought to highlight effective means of cooperation between donors and CSOs in contexts of shrinking civic space, discussed regional differences and outlined practical ways in which international donors and implementing organizations can support WHRDs and enable civic engagement in restrictive environments, based on participants' own experiences.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Montenegro has been portrayed as a leader in European integration but many European institutions overlook the state’s oppression of civil society actors. Violence against women, corruption and human trafficking are widespread but the organizations and individual activists that draw attention to such abuses are routinely vilified by public officials.

Egyptian civil society has been subjected to a systematic crackdown since 2011. Restrictive legislation seeks to silence critical voices that have, for instance, documented the rape and sexual violence that occurred during public demonstrations. Participants representing organizations in Egypt and the Middle East noted that it is becoming increasingly difficult to network and build coalitions as a result of new bureaucratic obstacles.

In Colombia, which participants suggested should be regarded as ‘post-agreement’ rather than ‘post-conflict’, territories previously controlled by the FARC guerrillas are now under the control of other armed groups. Thanks in large part to the efforts of civil society and the women’s movement throughout the peace process, women’s rights have been included in the peace agreement. However, to what extent the peace agreement will be implemented across the country remains to be seen.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With the international community distracted by the immediate needs associated with the conflicts in Yemen, Syria, South Sudan and Afghanistan, CSOs in many fragile and conflict-affected contexts are suffering from reduced support for and interest in their work. Although the indicators of shrinking civic space and its impacts on WHRDs vary by country and region, the recommendations set out below are broadly applicable.

First and foremost, women’s security needs to be taken seriously. Detention, disappearances, sexual harassment and assault, burglary and even torture have been used to control and intimidate WHRDs and their families. In addition to providing security and risk management training, donors and partners should work with local activists to evaluate what other tools and approaches could further protect them.

Second, while they may seem trivial, demonstrations of solidarity between CSOs and their international partners and public recognition of human rights defenders have the power to effect change. In Montenegro in 2014, a newspaper printed pornographic material modified to portray a WHRD who had recently criticized the public authorities for misuse of state funds. Although the Montenegrin state failed to take legal action against any of those responsible for altering or publishing the images, one individual had his application for EU funding rejected in response to a petition signed by 53 civic organizations and international donors protesting his role in the scandal.

This example illustrates the importance of creating global platforms for civil society engagement. In addition to bringing attention to the mistreatment of WHRDs, global platforms can facilitate exchanges between civic actors and provide funding sources when the national environment becomes dangerous or is paralysed. In Afghanistan, for example, a civil society working committee comprised of 10 CSO representatives provides a forum for experience sharing, advocates for the interests of national civic actors in policy discussions and solicits emergency grants from international donors when needed.

CSOs also need access to flexible, long-term funding that they can apply strategically to address new challenges. Donors should sensitize themselves to the environments in which their partners operate and remove restrictions on funding so that their partners can adapt to rapidly changing conditions on the ground. Smaller donor organizations can sometimes provide complementary financial support in issue areas not funded by larger donors, which helps CSOs spread their financial risks.

Finally, it is essential that donors respect the expertise, independence and capacities of local actors. Considerable EU funding is channelled through, for example, UN bodies before it is distributed to women’s organizations in the field. By using third parties to issue its grants, the EU implies that the former are better equipped to manage the funds than the latter. Although inadvertent, donors undermine the credibility of local actors in this way and perpetuate power structures that undervalue local expertise. Donors should empower local CSOs to manage their own funds, to assess the security of their staff and to determine what activities and communications are safe at any given time.
STRATEGIES FOR INCLUSIVE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

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OVERVIEW

The success of international peace and development efforts, which include conflict prevention, management and resolution, depends greatly on the inclusion of marginalized groups, such as women and youth. In this session, four experts led thematic group discussions on transitional justice and reconciliation, youth engagement and women's inclusion. Using their own experiences with inclusivity initiatives as a starting point, these experts challenged participants to consider why and how the inclusion of actors from various levels and sectors of society has increased the success of formal and informal peace and development processes.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The discussion on inclusive transitional justice and reconciliation processes provided poignant examples of the complexity of post-conflict societies. Transitional justice is known to be an important step towards building and sustaining peace, but it can be viewed as an obstruction of justice when punitive measures do not meet victims' expectations. For example, many Colombians were disappointed that the military was able to negotiate impunity despite evidence of severe human rights violations perpetrated by both state soldiers and FARC combatants. On the concept of justice in post-conflict societies, discussants considered the challenge of implementing programmes that adequately address abuses at different levels and balance individual and group interests. For example, in Sri Lanka, individual victims primarily sought acknowledgement of atrocities while NGOs focused on holding perpetrators to account.

The discussion on women's inclusion concentrated on connecting local and national peacebuilding agendas, and the diverse ways in which women peacebuilders have helped to bridge the two. The Cameroonian section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) reflected on its contributions to the country's National Action Plan (NAP) on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and how it engages activists from different regions to diffuse ownership of this agenda and increase the credibility of the NAP among diverse Cameroonian communities. In so doing, WILPF Cameroon also provides access to the national agenda for community actors and allows them to identify how the WPS agenda and the NAP might affect local realities. Discussants agreed that women peacebuilders should include traditional leaders and men in their work as a means of mainstreaming women's role as peace and security actors and to gain access to decision makers.

In the thematic discussion on youth, peace and security, participants assessed existing youth contributions to peace and development as well as opportunities to support youth engagement following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security. Effective youth inclusion requires the engagement of young people at all levels and sectors of society, including those who are marginalized due to their gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation or religion. Drawing on the knowledge and perspectives of various peace and development actors, including through regional consultations with youth, the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security is an example of how inclusive processes can strengthen the engagement of young people. Discussants suggested that youth inclusion
advocates should learn from past efforts to engage women in peace and development. Platforms connecting women’s organizations to youth initiatives in Somalia have facilitated the sharing of lessons learned between the two.

The fourth thematic discussion focused on engaging marginalized youth in ‘peaceful’ countries. The activities of Fryshuset and the Pluralism and Dialogue Institute (PDI) were presented as an illustration of the need for and successful examples of inclusion of marginalized youth in the Swedish context. Non-judgemental approaches that create opportunities to engage all marginalized youth regardless of their prior associations or activities are seen as critical. Effective programming at Fryshuset/PDI frequently uses music, sports and other passionate interests as means of engaging young people. The use of positive role models—often former criminals, gang members and violent extremists—has also proved successful in building trust between youth and peace and development initiatives and authorities, particularly in disengagement and reintegration projects. Examples from Pakistan and Kenya demonstrate the benefits of similar context-based approaches to engaging marginalized youth in conflict-affected countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Transitional justice for national reconciliation
   - Inclusive transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives must analyse the underlying inequalities that perpetuate conflict in order to transform a society and sustain peace.
   - Transitional justice processes must acknowledge and balance individual and group interests at different levels.
   - Time should be allocated to planning the sequencing of transitional justice activities and room left to adapt the activities and schedule along the way.

2. Women’s engagement: from local to national to global
   - Efforts to engage women in peace and development processes should create opportunities for their inclusion at the local, national and international levels. Engaging women from different regions increases the credibility of national initiatives and ensures that diverse perspectives are represented.
   - Donors and implementing organizations should facilitate the use and development of existing international legal and political frameworks by grassroots organizations.
   - Women peacebuilders and advocates of women’s inclusion should engage local faith and traditional leaders, as well as men and boys.

3. The inclusion of youth in peace and development
   - To facilitate youth inclusion, donors should reform funding structures to allow for greater flexibility in providing financial and technical support to smaller youth peacebuilders and initiatives, including through small-scale grants.
   - Recognizing the diversity of youth and that the definition of ‘youth’ varies according to context, implementing organizations should consider mechanisms that engage a multitude of young people from different backgrounds, and with different experiences and perspectives, and those from more marginalized sectors of society.
   - Create and support platforms that promote intergenerational exchange—including with authorities and decision makers—as well as mentoring opportunities and knowledge sharing between different inclusivity agendas.
   - Promote a positive narrative on the role of youth in their communities and provide young people with positive alternatives to violent and destructive environments.
USING MAPPING TECHNOLOGIES AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS TO MONITOR AND BUILD PEACE

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OVERVIEW

Geographic information systems (GIS) store, analyse and map information about the world, such as the location of buildings, travel time between two points, water access, elevation or risk level. These layers can be overlaid or presented in time series to reveal spatial relationships between different dimensions or indicators, such as the proximity of vulnerable populations to specific hazards. Historically, mapping technologies have been used by the actors in a conflict to gain strategic and tactical advantage through the use of geographic intelligence. While the military applications of maps are well documented, their peaceful applications are less well known. Due to their ability to visually communicate complex information, GIS can provide a useful platform for engagement, analysis and discussion between different stakeholders in peacebuilding efforts.

The session on mapping technologies and information management systems (IMS) provided examples of the ways in which mapping technologies are currently being used to identify and prioritize peacebuilding interventions—and to monitor and communicate their impacts. Participants reflected on the diverse needs and expectations of the peacebuilding community with regard to maps, geographic information and data platforms in order to better understand how spatial awareness could be further leveraged for good while avoiding certain pitfalls associated with access to and the use of potentially sensitive information. Key takeaways from the case studies elaborated below relate to the primary peacebuilding applications of GIS and other considerations for peacebuilders applying GIS. Suggestions from the session will be used to improve the GIS4Peace Platform hosted by GICHD. GIS4Peace provides peace practitioners with a digital platform to access relevant GIS resources and exchange experiences.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Planning, implementing and monitoring interventions

Spatial data is one of many inputs needed to analyse conflict dynamics and assess risk. Given the complexity of fragile and conflict-affected environments, GIS can improve peacebuilders’ situational awareness through the provision of spatial data. For example, GIS data is an essential component of International IDEA’s Electoral Risk Management tool, which is used to prevent and mitigate election-related violence. In Kenya, the tool informed the sequencing and geographic targeting of interventions and enabled users to develop an early warning system that tracked changes in political behaviour in 2011–12.

In post-conflict contexts, maps can be used to track progress with the implementation of peace agreements. In Indonesia, for instance, Elva employed GIS to track and document community perceptions of transitional justice to help the Truth and Reconciliation Commission determine its focus in different regions. During reconstruction, GIS data can be used to map infrastructure that has been damaged or destroyed and track movements of displaced persons and returnees to estimate the demand for public services in various locations. The latter applications are already in use in eastern Ukraine, where the national government is also planning to use its new data platform to
coordinate donors and implementing organizations engaged in peacebuilding and recovery in the conflict-affected regions.

**Promoting dialogue, local ownership and accountability**

As a visual communications tool capable of capturing diverse and multifaceted information, maps can serve as a starting point for discussion between stakeholders with opposing perspectives or competing interests. In Myanmar maps were used to initiate dialogue between electoral stakeholders in order to mitigate the risk of violence. In Kenya, the Danish Demining Group used maps to enable inclusive dialogue on infrastructure development in the coastal region. The maps revealed that development concerns varied significantly by location, which validated the claims of certain local leaders who felt that their communities’ perspectives had been marginalized. Representatives of those communities went on to use GIS data to challenge the government on its perspective regarding the impact of local infrastructure projects.

The latter example demonstrates how GIS can level the playing field between actors with varying levels of authority: it is the data not the source that determines the narrative. While data can be manipulated and exploited when available only to a powerful few, technological progress is rapidly making GIS accessible at low cost to an increasing range of stakeholders. When paired with basic technical training for users and data management support, GIS can empower local communities to take a larger role in their own development and make interveners more accountable.

**Learning and challenging assumptions**

Mapping can help track the results of projects and programmes in real-time, enabling interveners to adjust their approach as new information becomes available or the situation on the ground changes. The Danish Demining Group used its GIS platform to identify and promote synergies between interveners and assess the effectiveness of its own projects as they were implemented. This learning function can increase the effectiveness of interventions. In Iraq, Build Up discovered through the use of GIS that there was no spatial relationship between the water disputes that it was monitoring and physical access to water. This revelation allowed it to refocus its conflict resolution interventions on water governance, which was the root cause of the conflicts.

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The above-mentioned takeaways highlight the potential of GIS as a peacebuilding support tool and, through its convening power, as a peacebuilding process in itself. However, participants were careful to temper their optimism with a number of practical considerations regarding the peacebuilding applications of mapping technologies. First there is the need to keep maps and IMS platforms simple and targeted to specific purposes. Too much information can overwhelm rather than assist users to resolve problems. GIS technologies must have a user-centred design in order to provide value. Second, GIS can be used either to empower or to exploit vulnerable populations. Peacebuilders should be conscious of the sensitivities and risks that may arise from storing and sharing certain types of data. Finally, there is a variety of GIS software available at different price points. Peacebuilders should assess the appropriate balance between cost and functionality to increase accessibility to users with different means; and evaluate partnerships with, for example, the private sector that could reduce the costs associated with licence fees and system maintenance.

The discussions in this session will inform continued development of the GIS for Peace Forum (www.gis4peace.org). The Forum offers peace community members a platform to discover and access GIS resources relevant to their work, share their experiences and insights, and ultimately ensure that GIS are used to their maximum potential in support of peace.
Recent interventions by multiple stakeholders in African states have sought to introduce good practices in security and justice sector reform (SJSR) processes, with widely divergent outcomes. This brief reflects on the questions raised in the session on good practice in SJSR and on participants’ responses. It analyses the key challenge of how to balance external support for SJSR processes while responding to domestic imperatives.

DEFINING AND MEASURING GOOD PRACTICE

SJSR is a process-driven, rather than an event-based, activity. Determining what constitutes success and so-called good practices should be based on whether a practice or approach meets certain minimum international standards, such as ownership, effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and transparency, and on human rights and the rule of law. These goals and principles define practice and whether it should be up-scaled or replicated in other contexts. The ability to understand and interrogate the success of reforms in the security and justice sector is also a function of measurement, specifically the indicators of success and the extent to which they are standardized across different contexts. Because measurement is influenced by timeframes (the short-, medium- and long-term objectives of the reform process), an incremental and iterative approach is needed to measuring SJSR success.

Ultimately, success should be determined by the extent to which people (society) feel safe in their communities. For instance, deploying more qualified and responsive police officers to increase the police presence and visibility on the streets and in neighbourhoods could achieve the purpose of deterring firearms-related crime in the community. However, if individual police officers harass commercial drivers and extort monies from them, intimidating the people they are supposed to be protecting, they will become a source of insecurity, defeating the object of enhancing safety. Thus, an understanding and the measurement of good practice must take account of its multiple dimensions, including both the intended and unintended consequences of reforms.

After several decades of security and justice sector reform, it has become even more pertinent to question who shapes understandings and discourses of good practice: is it international actors, state representatives, epistemic communities, institutions or individuals? While the discourse regarding whose ideas and approaches matter is ongoing, experts, donors and their partners have thus far assumed this role with regard to SJSR. Once a reform practice conforms to their minimum standards, it is assumed to be good practice. The UN, African Union and the Regional Economic Communities have adopted their own set of ‘conditions’ and principles, which are enshrined in their policy frameworks that guide
how SJSR should be conducted. The 2005 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee security sector reform (SSR) guidelines were the first attempt to identify criteria, standards, principles and indicators for measuring success and identifying good practice. Since then, a number of individual states have adopted their own constitutional, legislative and policy frameworks to guide their SJSR practices.

**CONTEXT SPECIFICITY MATTERS**

Contextual factors, such as politics, history, culture and local social dynamics, have dominated concerns regarding the success of SJSR to date and whether good practices could be replicated. Context is often assessed from a geographic or developmental perspective in relation to the funder and objective of a given set of reforms (i.e. South–South, North–North, South–North or North–South). There is a tendency to put a premium on a unidirectional North-South support framework while overlooking South-South reform experiences, especially in Africa. Yet, scaling up or replicating good practices in a context that is vastly different from that where the original template was developed runs the risk of failure. It is recommended that some of the underlying assumptions of good practices, on for example effective oversight, capability, authority and attitude, are questioned and contextualized to specific cases before implementation in other contexts.

**IMPLICATIONS OF SECTORAL DISTINCTIONS FOR REFORM PRACTICE**

SSR and justice sector reform are often conflated. Although they are closely related, the two processes have important differences. For example, security and justice sector reform approaches in most post-conflict and fragile countries incorporate recruiting, training and advising critical security and justice sector actors. This approach often has high levels of international support for reform in both the security and the justice sectors, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. This high degree of international involvement tends to create the impression that the process is externally driven, which means that local ownership and sustainability often suffer in the long term—especially after the external support is withdrawn. By contrast, the prioritization and sequencing of reform processes tend to differ by sector. Typically, judicial and corrections reform come last in order of priority. This can leave in its wake huge human rights deficits relating to ballooning numbers of pre-trial detentions, cases pending in the courts and insufficient rehabilitation efforts in prisons.

The differing approaches also have implications for states implementing reforms. Prioritization and sequencing have impeded the establishment of fair criminal justice systems in many contexts, but whole-of-government approaches require huge budgetary resources. International partners often ‘cherry pick’, however, supporting certain favoured tasks as part of police reform, justice reform or penal reform, rather than supporting a systemic reform process.

Since patriarchal norms are prevalent in many of the developing states subject to programme interventions, reform efforts must also address the
unique challenges associated with the inclusion of minority groups. Interventions that seek to recognize and take cognizance of minority issues raise critical and ethical questions relating to levels of inclusivity of women, youth, minority groups, rural residents, displaced communities and others, and the extent to which such inclusiveness is considered and incorporated into good practices relating to security and justice sector reforms.

The Liberian national security architecture provides one example. Liberia’s national security strategy was developed inclusively through nationwide consultations. This led to the creation of decentralized county-level, district and chiefdom Security Council committees. These committees are composed of chiefs, civil society organizations and, most importantly, issue-led representatives such as of youth, sande and poro groups, and women. They identify, analyse and respond to their security and justice needs at the local level and provide early warning to the National Security Council of impending problems or tensions. All this has been framed in national legislation on enhancing acceptance, legitimacy and authority.

**SJSR AND THE SUSTAINING PEACE FRAMEWORK**

Good practice in SJSR reflects a main theme of the sustaining peace agenda. According to the dual UN resolutions, sustaining peace means ‘activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development’. The sustaining peace framework is an inherently political process that encompasses prevention, mediation, conflict management and resolution. As a result, when local ownership is built into reform processes from the outset, there is a greater likelihood that participation in and engagement with identifying, analysing and responding to local security and justice issues will be broadly based. This is the reason why stakeholder analysis is pivotal to the SJSR process. Similarly, it is crucial that the political authorities demonstrate leadership and commitment to the reform process in order to ensure its sustainability.

Several factors can impede inclusivity and, by extension, wider stakeholder buy-in:

- A narrow interpretation of security that allows military actors, rather than civilians, to lead the reform process;
- Skewed transitional justice processes;
- Inadequate national reconciliation activities and/or a lack of political consensus among the political actors that represent different segments of society; and
- Reforms that are driven by technical considerations.

These potential impediments should be addressed by SJSR practitioners and policymakers when designing reform initiatives. Discussion of how to increase inclusivity and ownership throughout SJSR processes must also assess whether and, if so, how to address the provision of security and justice by non-state actors. Policymakers and donors need to confront the reality that in resource-constrained states, security and
justice services are not just by provided by statutory institutions. When looking to engage non-state security and justice providers, reformers and capacity building practitioners must take into account differences in the former’s professionalism and skill levels, areas of influence and control, networks with other non-state and trans-border actors, and interest in and motivations for participating in the SJSR processes and political agendas. There is no doubt that more nuanced contextual analyses are necessary to tease out what lessons can be learned from such processes, and even more importantly how such lessons can be applied to improve the effectiveness, success and buy-in of critical stakeholders.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

SJSR processes have been implemented in several weak and post-conflict societies. While in many instances these interventions have contributed to the development of more effective and responsive security and justice sectors, two critical factors must be addressed if such interventions are to be successful more widely. First, there is the need for greater recognition and inclusion of large segments of minority groups, the involvement and roles of which have been overlooked. Second, there is a need to be cognizant of the fact that in many resource-constrained states, the provision of security and justice goes beyond the remit of the formal state. As a result, processes must be instituted that acknowledge and incorporate the roles of non-state security providers and justice services.
CORE ISSUES OF AN ARMS TRADE TAX
BY MICHAEL BRZOSKA (INSTITUTE FOR PEACE RESEARCH AND SECURITY POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG)

OVERVIEW

The idea of an arms trade tax has been around for some time.¹ It has received limited support in debates on the links between disarmament and development, and development finance and global public goods (bads), but never officially from any government.²

Two interrelated, but not necessarily linked, objectives have dominated discussion of an arms trade tax. The first is to curtail the transfer of weapons. It would act as a Pigouvian tax based on the assumptions that arms transfers have negative costs for societies and that fewer arms transfers would lead to more peaceful conflict resolution and to a reduction in armed conflict.³ The second motive is to generate funding for the promotion of peace, for instance through measures designed to prevent armed conflict, or to compensate persons harmed in armed conflict, negate the negative effects of armed conflict or fund post-conflict reconstruction.

A QUESTION OF SCOPE

Most of the discussion on an arms trade tax has focused on the international arms trade, or some segments of it, rather than on, for instance, all arms purchases or military spending. There are several reasons for this. One is that arms imports are often seen in public discourse on military issues as more problematic than domestic purchases because a large number of arms importing countries are low-income countries, although in terms of monetary value middle- and high-income countries import more; and because almost all armed conflict occurs in poor countries, largely using imported arms. Another reason is that while highly controversial, an arms trade tax may hold greater political promise than a tax on alternative forms of military power. For one,

¹ I am grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions received from Henk-Jan Brinkman, Gary Milante, Elisabeth Sköns and during the Stockholm Forum meeting on an earlier draft. All the views expressed and any remaining errors are my own.

² The idea of an arms trade tax first gained international prominence in 1980 as one of the main recommendations of the Report of the Independent Commission on International Development, chaired by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt (the Brandt Report). Later separate proposals came from the former presidents Oscar Arias (Costa Rica), Jacques Chirac (France) and Lula da Silva (Brazil). The basis for Chirac’s intervention was a report on innovative development financing by a group of experts chaired by the then Executive Director for France at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Jean-Pierre Landau, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/LandauENG1.pdf>. Chirac and Lula were joined by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and President Lopez (Chile) in calls to investigate, among other ideas, an arms trade tax as an innovative international financing mechanism, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Financing Development: Aid and Beyond (OECD: Paris, 2007), pp. 75–76. The idea was also introduced on to the Agenda of the G8 Summit in Evian in June 2003 by Lula da Silva, see Burrows, G., ‘Arms and the taxman’, The Guardian, 1 July 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/01/armstrade.g8>. See also Brock, G., ‘International taxation’, eds S. Benatar and G. Brock, Global Health and Global Health Ethics (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011), p. 280.

³ A Pigouvian tax is a tax on an activity generating negative externalities, that is social costs beyond private costs of competitive markets, named after the English economist Arthur Pigou (1877–1959).
political support would seem to be more widespread and stronger judging by the level of past support for various alternatives. Implementation would also be easier. More data is available on the international arms trade than on weapons procurement, for example, which would make enforcement of such a tax easier.

However, there are also important counterarguments. An arms trade tax charged at the border would affect arms importing countries, which are generally poorer, more than the wealthy developed nations, which largely produce weapons domestically. Depending on the interplay between demand and price, it might lead to higher spending on arms in importing countries by providing incentives for an increase in untaxed domestic arms production or otherwise contribute to an expansion of the black market in arms. Finally, while most recent armed conflicts have been fought predominantly with imported weapons, arms imports are not among the major causes of armed conflict.4

Clearly, not all international arms transfers carry the same risks of harm. This leads to the idea of taxing only those arms transfers that harm civilians. However, it is often only possible to tell long after the delivery of arms whether they have contributed to human suffering.

**INCIDENCE**

In terms of who would bear the burden of an arms trade tax, much would depend on the nature of the tax, the way it were collected and the allocation of the revenue raised.6 In particular, it would be important to distinguish between a goods tax and a country tax, and between the allocation of revenues to the taxing authority or other entities.

A traditional export goods tax, one raised on goods at border crossings, could be raised from exporting arms-producing companies by the exporting state and would enter the coffers of the exporting state. Alternatively, an import goods tax could be levied by arms importing countries and raised from the procurement authorities. The latter would increase the importing government’s income but would also increase government expenditure on arms in order to compensate for the higher costs of importing weaponry. While it is easy to identify the entities from which such goods taxes would be raised and those which would receive the revenue, it is more difficult to assess the incidence of such a tax. Because they have an impact on price, demand and supply, the burden of such taxes on the arms exporting companies and importing procurement authorities would depend on the parameters of the arms market and practical issues of tax collection, such as transparency, ease of evasion and the capacities of taxing entities. However, because exporters and importers are linked through the common price of transferred arms, the incidence of ‘import goods taxes’ and ‘export goods taxes’ converges, even though revenue will be raised at different locations.

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4 See the literature reviews on civil wars by Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, in which arms imports are not mentioned among the potential factors increasing the likelihood of armed conflict (*Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 48, no. 1 (2010), pp. 3–57).

However, the amount of revenue is also dependent on the parameters of the arms market. Unfortunately, information on price and demand sensitivities in the arms trade are not sufficiently reliable for exact projections to be made of the incidence of goods taxes. However, the scant available evidence on the price elasticities of demand and supply for arms suggests that the cost burden of a tax would be split between arms importers (the armed forces or defence ministries) and arms suppliers (the exporting companies). Arms exporting companies would be likely to increase prices to recover some of the tax whereas arms importers would probably need to offset the increase in prices by reducing the quantity of weapons imported, while possibly also ending up with higher overall costs for arms procurement. A more exact estimation of the distribution of the tax burden between suppliers and importers would be required to determine the probable distribution of the tax burden in order to assess its impacts.

A traditional goods tax would increase the tax income of importing or exporting governments, depending on which is collecting the tax. This could be used to partly compensate the losers from the tax—arms exporting companies in the case of a tax collected from exporters or the armed forces in the case of a tax collected from importers. However, this would reduce the effects of an arms trade tax on the level of arms imports, which would also reduce its effectiveness. The tax income could, however, be spent on other objectives, both domestic and international.

An alternative to a goods tax is a tax on arms importing and/or exporting governments (a ‘country quasi-tax’), where the tax income goes to some kind of non-governmental, or more likely international, organization. Unless such a quasi-tax were recovered through arms importing countries reducing spending on arms imports (turning it into an ‘imported goods tax’) or from arms exporting countries by taxing arms exporting companies (turning it into an ‘exported goods tax’), such a tax would not affect the price of arms exports. There would therefore be no effect on the demand for arms and thus on the amount of arms imported. The lack of any effect on the demand for arms would also mean that such a tax would raise greater revenues than a goods tax.

A Pigouvian tax and a quasi-tax on countries best serve the two potential major objectives of an arms trade tax differently. As long as its revenue is not used to compensate the importers (the armed forces) or the exporting companies, a Pigouvian tax will raise the costs of arms and would likely reduce the amount of arms traded. This means that revenues will shrink with higher tax rates, depending on the elasticities of supply and demand. Country quasi-taxes, on the other hand, raise revenue with little or no effect on the amount of arms transferred. The level of revenue can be set without impacting decision-making on arms transfers by arms importers.

**COLLECTION CONSIDERATIONS**

Goods taxes, particularly those imposed by importing countries but also those of exporting countries, are standard practice. They require the valuation of exports, including those that are transferred at zero cost. The
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) contains some important definitions of which goods to tax.

In theory, an international organization could levy and assess such a tax based on information on international arms transfers. Without an enforcement mandate, however, that international organization would have to rely on the willingness of governments to collect the tax and remit it to an international body.

Country ‘taxes’, in the proper sense, run contrary to the fiscal sovereignty of states. There are existing cases of quasi taxes, however, in the form of assessments of contributions to international organizations. Most international organizations are funded on the basis of such assessments, which are based on criteria similar to those used in national taxation. Thus, contributions to the regular UN budget are assessed on the basis of a modified calculation of national income, similar to a national income tax. The World Trade Organization is funded by member states’ contributions, which are assessed based on their share of international trade, which in turn is based on trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights in the most recent five-year period for which data is available.

A LIABILITY AND INSURANCE SCHEME AS AN ALTERNATIVE

The introduction of liabilities, and corresponding insurance schemes, for the use of weapons against civilians or in violation of international law has sometimes been discussed as an alternative to taxation. Such a scheme could be limited to certain types of weapons, such as small arms, or to ammunition.

Unlike a Pigouvian tax, payment would only be made in cases where loss or damage caused by weapons that had earlier been transferred can be established. For such a scheme to function, the specific uses of the weapons which violate international law would have to be defined. The liability might fall on the exporting company or the exporting government, whichever was deemed responsible for assessing the risk of the unlawful use of the arms. Exporting governments could require arms exporting companies to take out insurance for all arms exports, to avoid default on claims. Such insurance could be offered by private sector insurance companies or, if they found the risk too high, by governments.

One advantage of such a scheme would be the direct link established between the harmful effects of arms transfers and the funding of remedies. It might also lead to more cautious behaviour by arms exporting companies and governments. However, the legal and practical aspects of attributing arms transfers to particular instances of illegal or harmful use are daunting. Nonetheless, there are enough historic cases of arms transfers being linked to illegal and harmful later use of weapons, resulting in

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6 A Group of eminent persons chaired by the former Prime Minister of France, Michel Rocard, and the President of Mali, Alpha Omar Konaré, suggested compulsory third party damage liability insurance for small arms transfers in a White Paper published in 2000 and presented by the Government of Mali to the first UN Conference on the ‘Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects’: <http://archive2.grip.org/bdg/g1754.html>.

7 This would require a political decision to allocate responsibility to either exporters or governments. Both are a possibility and have their merits. Such an approach would require courts to settle disputes.
major damage, to make such a scheme worthy of further consideration as a measure to curtail the most egregious and risky arms transfers.

**A VOLUNTARY SCHEME**

Mandatory schemes would clearly be preferable in terms of achieving the aims of an arms trade tax, but they are far away from the current political reality. This raises the idea of voluntary schemes. Goods taxes and country quasi-taxes could both be introduced on a voluntary basis. A goods tax imposed only on some exporters would reduce their competitiveness. However, there are already many areas, including domestic taxation, in which governments in arms exporting countries affect the competitiveness of their arms exporters, so that cannot count as a principal objection. A voluntary importer goods tax is counterintuitive, as its objectives could be achieved simply by refraining from spending on arms imports.

A proposal that is technically less attractive (because of the lesser effect on levels of arms transfers) but more politically feasible is a voluntary exporter country quasi-tax. Governments willing to participate could pay a percentage of the total value of their arms exports into a dedicated fund earmarked for conflict prevention, peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction. This would demonstrate their willingness to recognize that arms exports can potentially have negative effects, which is politically sensitive in several ways. On the one hand, it might suggest that governments are not scrutinizing arms exports sufficiently before licensing, which governments will deny. On the other hand, arms exports might be more acceptable to internal critics of the arms trade if governments showed an increased willingness to contribute to mitigating the harm caused by arms transfers. An alternative might be to link a voluntary scheme to a pre-set amount of income for a purpose clearly linked to the negative effects of conflict, instead of a fixed percentage of the value of arms exports. This would make it very similar to the assessments of contributions to international membership organizations. Even a small number of arms exporting countries could start such a scheme.

**USE OF TAX INCOME**

Spending the income from an arms trade tax on preventing violent conflict or mitigating the consequences of armed conflict has some plausibility. In contrast to some other recent international agreements on arms, the ATT contains limited provisions on international assistance for the implementation of the treaty but none on victim support or compensation. Thus, while the Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel mines and the Oslo Treaty on cluster munitions encourage governments to cooperate—including financially—on mitigating the costs of earlier uses of banned weapons, the ATT restricts such calls to the implementation of the treaty itself. However, there are existing voluntary financial mechanisms, such as the Peacebuilding Fund, that could benefit from an arms trade tax.
**ESTIMATED REVENUES**

The financial volume of the arms trade has been estimated at about US$ 100 billion. Even a comparatively low tax rate, of say 10 per cent, would raise sizeable revenue. However, US$ 10 billion would represent an upper maximum that is hard to reach. First, a good tax, whether on exports or imports, would be likely to result in a reduction in arms exports as price elasticity of demand is not perfectly inelastic. However, as noted above, the relationship between price (including tax) and demand is not well established. In the case of an exporter or importer country quasi-tax, the volume of revenue would depend on political decisions on whether and how to finance the costs of the tax. Second, substitution by domestic products and an increase in black market trade are likely to reduce revenue.

**POLITICAL SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION**

Support for an arms trade tax (or further thinking on it) has so far been limited to prominent individuals, former politicians and expert commissions. Although it does not seem to have been discussed in the negotiation process of the ATT, the treaty might provide new momentum for discussion of an arms trade tax. However, as the ATT clearly distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate international trade in arms (the latter is not permitted), the link to the harmfulness of the transfers that have been licensed by governments is not immediately obvious. However, there are strong arguments for such a link, such as the later misuse of arms that had been delivered earlier under different circumstances, or through the retransfer of arms. The empirical foundation for these arguments could be made stronger through additional research.

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8 The SIPRI Yearbook 2016 published a conservative estimate of US$ 94.5 billion for 2014, based on published government data that is far from complete.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(2030 Agenda/Agenda 2030)
On 25 September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, along with a set of new global goals known as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹

Agenda 2063 (2063 Agenda)
In January 2015, the heads of state and governments of the African Union adopted Agenda 2063, which serves as the strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. Agenda 2063 represents both a vision, rooted in Pan Africanism, and an action plan on African development, based on the principles of sustainability, inclusion and resilience.²

Fragility
While there is no generally agreed definition of ‘fragility’, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently proposed a working model for analysing countries’ risks across five clusters of fragility indicators: violence, justice, institutions, economic foundations and resilience. The five proposed dimensions of fragility reveal distinct patterns of vulnerability.³

Fragile settings
Fragile settings, especially in terms of service delivery, are situations in which the government or relevant authority is insufficiently trustworthy or capable of providing services directly to its people, due to the existence of various dynamics such as different levels of violent conflict.⁴

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)
The IDPS or International Dialogue (ID) is the first forum for political dialogue to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners and civil society. The ID is composed of members of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states and member organizations of the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS).⁵

¹ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>
⁵ <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/>
The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)
INCAF is a unique decision-making forum that brings together diverse stakeholders to support development outcomes in the world’s most challenging situations. Based on a whole-of-government approach, INCAF adopts an inclusive approach to its work by engaging with multiple policy communities and partner countries. INCAF was established in 2009 as a subsidiary body of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

The g7+
The g7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The group was established to give a collective voice to conflict-affected states, and a platform for learning and support between member countries. The g7+ currently has 20 member countries.

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal)
The New Deal is a key agreement between fragile and conflict-affected states, international development partners and civil society to improve current development policy and practice in fragile states. It was developed through the ID and signed by more than 40 countries and organizations at the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, on 30 November 2011. The New Deal calls for five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to be at the forefront of all international efforts in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
The PSGs are the priorities of the New Deal and represent agreement on what is required to move towards peace and recovery. The five PSGs are: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services.

SDG16+
SDG16+ is shorthand for the range of commitments in the 2030 Agenda to peaceful, just and inclusive societies (not exclusively the targets under SDG16).

Sustaining Peace
Sustaining peace is a new, overarching framework that calls for better linkages between the UN’s three pillars: peace and security, development and human rights. The term emerged from the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report and was affirmed through the adoption of dual resolutions in the Security Council (S/RES 2282) and the General Assembly (A/RES/70/262). According to these resolutions, sustaining peace is both

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6 <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/theinternationalnetworkonconflictandfragility.htm/>
7 <http://www.g7plus.org/en/>
a goal and a process that encompasses activities to prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict through diverse means such as mediation, stabilization and conflict resolution, support for reconciliation, statebuilding and institutional reform. The framework and Agenda 2030 place considerable emphasis on promoting respect for human rights, inclusion and gender equality, and are considered complementary and mutually reinforcing.¹⁰

**UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES 1325)**
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security on 31 October 2000. It was the first Security Council resolution to specifically address the impact of armed conflict on women, and women's contribution to conflict resolution and sustainable peace.¹¹

**UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (S/RES 2250)**
In December 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2250 to increase the representation of youth in decision-making at all levels. The resolution recognizes the important contributions of youth to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and affirms the role of young people in the prevention and resolution of conflicts.¹²

**UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review (AGE Report)**
On 29 June 2015, the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) designated by the UN Secretary-General submitted its report on a 10-year review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), which was agreed in 2005. One significant outcome of the report was the emergence of the concept of sustaining peace as a new framework for building peace in the UN system. The UN PBA is composed of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The report represents the first part of a two-stage review of the role and positioning of the PBC, PBF, PBSO and other UN operational entities active in peacebuilding.¹³

**UN Peace Operations Review (HIPPO Report)**
The UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was established on 31 October 2014 to make a comprehensive assessment of the current state of UN peace operations and to assess emerging needs for future peace operations. Its report, published on 17 June 2015, calls for four essential changes—recognizing the primacy of politics, a full spectrum of UN peace operations, stronger global-regional partnerships, and field-focused and people-centred approaches—to ensure that UN peace operations are better able to play their role in building and sustaining peace.¹⁴
Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS Agenda)
The WPS Agenda is a collection of eight UN resolutions that seek to address the role of women in peace and security processes. The WPS Agenda has four pillars: participation, protection, prevention and peacebuilding.¹⁵

ABBREVIATIONS

AGE  Advisory Group of Experts
ARC  Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (Colombian Agency for Reintegration)
A/RES United Nations General Assembly Resolution
ATT  Arms Trade Treaty
AU  African Union
CAR  Central African Republic
CSO  Civil Society Organization
CSPPS  Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC  Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DHF  Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EU  European Union
FARC  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
GICHD  Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS  Geographic Information Systems
HIPPO  High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
ICAN  International Civil Society Action Network
ID  International Dialogue
IDPS  International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IEP  Institute for Economics and Peace
ILAC  International Legal Assistance Consortium
IMS  Information Management System
INCAF  International Network on Conflict and Fragility
ISS Africa  Institute for Security Studies Africa
JSR  Justice Sector Reform
NAP  National Action Plan (on the Implementation of S/RES 1325)
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGC  Oslo Governance Centre (UNDP)
PBA  Peacebuilding Architecture
PBC  Peacebuilding Commission
PBF  Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO  Peacebuilding Support Office
PDI  Pluralism and Dialogue Institute
PSGs  Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
PVE  Preventing Violent Extremism
REC  Regional Economic Community (AU)
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
SJSR  Security and Justice Sector Reform
SLRC  Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
ABBREVIATIONS (CONTINUED)

SSR  Security Sector Reform
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
USIP  United States Institute for Peace
WASL  Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership
WHRDs  Women Human Rights Defenders
WILPF  Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WPS  Women, Peace and Security Agenda
WSR  Women’s Situation Room
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