

Appendix 2A. Multilateral peace missions, 2001

RENATA DWAN, THOMAS PAPWORTH and SHARON WIHARTA*

I. Peace missions in 2001

There were no new United Nations peace missions in 2001, for the first time since 1996. However, five new multilateral missions were initiated—one of them, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, on the authority of the UN Security Council. The remaining four missions—two led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), one led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and an international protection and support force in Burundi, under the leadership of South Africa—all received UN Security Council endorsement.¹ The range of actors involved in these missions illustrates the diversity of contemporary multilateral peace missions. Despite differences in mandate and function, the new missions in 2001, with the exception of the OSCE mission in the FRY, share one common feature: they are limited in size, scope and mandate. This is illustrative of an increased reluctance on the part of regional organizations and states to commit resources to open-ended peace missions. Where large peace missions exist, as in East Timor or Sierra Leone, they are under UN control. The peacemaking and peace-building challenges they continue to present have increased UN Security Council reluctance to embark on new peacekeeping initiatives.

Three small peace missions were terminated in 2001. The International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, under the responsibility of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), was terminated once its mandate to assist preparations for national elections had expired. This ended the successive multilateral peace missions present in Haiti since 1993.² The incorporation of the Western European Union (WEU) into the European Union (EU) brought an end to its two missions—the Multinational Advisory Police Element for Albania (MAPE) and the WEU Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM) in Croatia.³ These changes bring to 51 the total number of multilateral peace missions under way in 2001.

¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1345, 21 Mar. 2001; UN Security Council Resolution 1371, 26 Sep. 2001; and UN Security Council Resolution 1375, 29 Oct. 2001.

² See Dwan, R. *et al.*, 'Multilateral peace missions, 1999', *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), pp. 135–56; and Papworth, T., 'Multilateral peace operations, 2000', *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), pp. 128–48.

³ A European Commission follow-up training and institution-building assistance programme to the police mission in Albania was launched on 1 June 2001. European Union, General Affairs Council (GAC), 2342nd Meeting, Luxembourg, 9 Apr. 2001.

*SIPRI intern Hannes Baumann contributed to the preparation of this appendix.

The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

On 20 December 2001 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, organized and led by the United Kingdom, to be deployed in Afghanistan for a period of six months.⁴ The mission was the result of the UN-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany, to establish a political framework to bring to an end the civil war that has raged in the country since 1994. The initiation of this process was a consequence of the launch of US attacks on the ruling Taliban regime on 7 October 2001. The US-led campaign helped restore the fortunes of the loose coalition of opposition forces, the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance), and brought about the Taliban's defeat.⁵ The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement) of 5 December provides for the creation of an Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA) made up of representatives of Afghanistan's ethnic groups as well as an international force to assist it in the 'maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas'.⁶ The Military Technical Agreement subsequently signed between the ISAF and the AIA notes that the international force may also assist the AIA in reconstruction and in developing future security structures.⁷

The establishment of the ISAF is modelled on the 1999 Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET).⁸ As in that case, the Security Council authorized the ISAF under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,⁹ thereby enabling it to legitimately 'take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate'.¹⁰ It called on the UN member states to contribute to the force but noted that expenses would be borne by the participating states, not by the UN peacekeeping budget. The advantage of this ad hoc coalition approach to peacekeeping is the relative speed with which such a force can be deployed and the potential for coherent, effective action under a lead nation. An advance party of British troops arrived in the Afghan capital, Kabul, on 22 December 2001.¹¹

However, the ISAF's collaboration has been controversial in almost every aspect. British leadership of the force initially met with opposition from some Afghan leaders, conscious of the legacy of British imperial involvement in their country.¹² Domestic dissension within the UK itself on the extent and length of any commitment to a peace operation in Afghanistan led the government to underscore the limited nature of its task and its duration. The UK agreed to lead the ISAF only for the first three months of the operation while British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon emphasized that the ISAF was not a peacekeeping mission but rather an assistance mission

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 20 Dec. 2001.

⁵ For more on the Afghanistan civil war and the US-led attack, see chapter 1 in this volume.

⁶ Annex 1, para. 3 of the Bonn Agreement, available at URL <<http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm>>; and UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (note 4).

⁷ Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan ('Interim Administration'), 30 Dec. 2001.

⁸ For more on INTERFET see Dwan, R., 'Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution', *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (note 2), pp. 116–18.

⁹ Article 42 of Chapter VII grants the Security Council the authority to 'take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'. The text of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is available at URL <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>>.

¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (note 4).

¹¹ Thornhill, J. and Williamson, H., 'British troops spearhead stabilisation force', *Financial Times*, 22 Dec. 2001, p. 2.

¹² McGregor, R., 'Britain "should not lead peacekeepers"', *Financial Times*, 19 Dec. 2001, p. 11.

to the AIA.¹³ Germany, a key player in the negotiations on Afghanistan, objected to the proposal that the USA would have overall command of the mission. US command was seen as necessary to ensure that ISAF activities did not 'interfere' with the ongoing US military operation against suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda targets ('Operation Enduring Freedom').¹⁴ Germany insisted on a clear separation between the ISAF mission and the operation. This forced the UK to modify its description of its relationship to one of 'essential enabling support' for the USA to support for the ISAF, a task declared as 'vital and considerable'.¹⁵ The US relationship to the ISAF remains a sensitive question: while the US administration has ruled out US participation in any peace operation, there is recognition that the credibility of ISAF depends on the extent to which it is linked to US military power.¹⁶ The AIA, meanwhile, illustrated the ambivalence with which the deployment of any international force is regarded among its leadership in its initial call for a restricted use-of-force mandate (Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and in its insistence that the forces number 3000 instead of the 5000 first proposed.¹⁷

The lack of agreement on the nature and scope of an international peace operation force in Afghanistan reflects the enormity of the challenge of peace establishment and reconstruction in that country. Nor are there strong indications that Afghans are united in their commitment to the political settlement worked out in Bonn. Renewed fighting in January 2002 between rival factions and warlords as well as widespread lawlessness testify to the dangerous situation throughout the country. This instability hampers efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to the estimated 6 million people in need.¹⁸ The authority of the AIA remains entirely dependent on international military, economic and financial support.¹⁹

By early 2002, however, UN officials and Afghan leaders had begun to campaign for an expanded international force to be deployed throughout the country.²⁰ External actors, already baulking at the extent of their potential engagement in Afghanistan, are unwilling to commit themselves to comprehensive action until they have some indication that a stable peace is viable. However incapable the ISAF is of undertaking peace-enforcement and -maintenance tasks, the degree of its success in fulfilling its mandate to stabilize Kabul will be a key determinant for a future UN peace operation.

¹³ 'Blair outlines Afghan force options', BBC News Online, 17 Dec. 2001, available at URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk_politics>; 'Just the job for us', *The Economist*, 22 Dec. 2001, p. 39; and Nicoll, A., 'Force's role "to assist Afghans"', *Financial Times*, 11 Jan. 2002, p. 8.

¹⁴ Hoyos, C. *et al.*, 'Split threatens anti-terror pact', *Financial Times*, 20 Dec. 2001, p. 1.

¹⁵ Hoge, W., 'UK presses plan for Afghan force', *International Herald Tribune*, 20 Dec. 2001, p. 1; and Speech by Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon to parliament, 19 Dec. 2001, available at URL <http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1298>.

¹⁶ Leyne, J., 'US wary of peacekeeping', BBC News Online, 21 Nov. 2001, available at URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world>>; and Robinson, G., 'US agrees to support Afghan peacekeepers', *Financial Times*, 29 Jan. 2002, p. 4.

¹⁷ 'Limits urged on Kabul force', BBC News Online, 15 Dec. 2001, available at URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; and Robinson, G., 'Afghan leaders agree on foreign troop numbers', *Financial Times*, 31 Dec. 2001, p. 3. The text of Chapter VI of the UN Charter is available at URL <<http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter6.html>>.

¹⁸ Annan, K., United Nations, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/56/681-S/2001/1157, 6 Dec. 2001.

¹⁹ The World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimate initial reconstruction costs over the next 2.5 years at \$5 billion. Agence France-Presse (AFP), 'Afghanistan may need 30 000 peacekeepers: UN official', 23 Jan. 2002, available at ReliefWeb, URL <<http://www.reliefweb.int/>>.

²⁰ Hoyos, C., 'Troops in Kabul urged to expand mandate', *Financial Times*, 24 Jan. 2002, p. 4.

Peace operations in the Balkans

The two NATO peace operations launched in the FYROM in August and September 2001, Task Force Harvest (TFH) and Task Force Fox (TFF), respectively, were similarly limited in scope and duration. NATO became involved in the FYROM's conflict between government forces and armed ethnic Albanian rebels in June, at the request of the FYROM Government. NATO insistence on a ceasefire and peace agreement between the two parties before it would provide any security assistance helped bring about the signing of a peace accord on 13 August 2001. This accord included provisions for a NATO weapon collection operation.²¹ The TFH was activated on 22 August with a 30-day mandate to disarm rebel forces of the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and destroy collected weapons. The disarmament process was to be voluntary, with a figure of approximately 3000 weapons agreed in advance.²² In return, the FYROM Government committed itself to constitutional reforms to provide the country's Albanian minority with greater rights. The swift deployment of 4500 NATO troops helped maintain the fragile peace and was successfully concluded on 27 September 2001.²³

NATO recognition that continued engagement would be required to ensure that the peace process, slow though it was, moved forward lay behind its agreement to deploy an immediate follow-up operation, the TFF. The task of this 700-strong force is to provide security to the 150 OSCE and 30 EU civilian monitors deployed to oversee, *inter alia*, the return of refugees and police redeployment in former rebel-held villages.²⁴ A notable feature of these NATO operations is their European character. The USA provided only equipment support to the TFH and is not involved in the TFF.²⁵

Peace operations elsewhere in the Balkans are following a similar pattern. NATO defence ministers agreed in December to cut the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the NATO-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 18 000 to around 12 000. The size of the US force is scheduled to be reduced from 3100 to 1100.²⁶ The scheduled termination of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) in December 2002 led the EU to commit its fledgling civilian crisis management capability to take over the UNMIBH's police mission component, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), from January 2003.²⁷ The OSCE, the other regional organization active in peace operations in the Balkans, is also expected to increase its engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the UN's departure. It is the lead external actor in law reform, democratization and institution-building activities in Croatia, the FRY and the FYROM.

²¹ Richburg, K., 'NATO planners wary of Macedonia mission', *International Herald Tribune*, 14 Aug. 2001, p. 4; and NATO, 'Task Force Harvest background information', available at URL <<http://www.nato.int>>.

²² 'NATO accepts weapons count in Macedonia', *International Herald Tribune*, 25–26 Aug. 2001, p. 2.

²³ Transcript of NATO press briefing, 30 Aug. 2001, available at URL <<http://www.nato.int>>; and 'NATO/Macedonia', *Atlantic News*, no. 3324 (28 Sep. 2001), p. 1.

²⁴ Ripley, T., 'Macedonia monitoring group plan', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 Sep. 2001, p. 5; and NATO, 'Operation Amber Fox', NATO Press release 133, 27 Sep. 2001.

²⁵ The TFH was under British command, while the TFF is led by Germany.

²⁶ Loeb, V., 'Rumsfeld asks NATO for Bosnia troop cuts', *International Herald Tribune*, 19 Dec. 2001, p. 1; and Hill, L., 'NATO nears decision on force reduction', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 Jan. 2002, p. 4.

²⁷ European Union, GAC, 2406th meeting, Brussels, 28 Jan. 2002; and European Union, GAC, 2409th meeting, Brussels, 18–19 Feb. 2002.

Peace operations in Africa

The size and nature of the current UN peace operations in Africa contrast starkly with the multilateral missions described above. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is the largest current UN peace operation and for much of 2000 one of its most troubled.²⁸ UNAMSIL and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) were initiated in response to peace agreements to bring an end to two catastrophic civil wars that have spread beyond national borders. The problems besetting UNAMSIL and MONUC included lack of financial and human resources, the slow deployment of troops from contributing states and disagreement between international, regional and local actors on the conduct of the peace operation.²⁹ The fundamental issue, however, was the continuation of the conflicts whose termination UNAMSIL and MONUC were charged with monitoring. The fact that neither mission was authorized to use force except in self-defence when threatened compounded their inability to carry out their respective mandates. In UNAMSIL's case, this led to the near-collapse of the mission after the kidnapping of 500 peacekeepers by the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in May 2000. British forces, who intervened to rescue the UN peacekeepers, continue to guarantee the security of UNAMSIL and of Sierra Leone's President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, in the capital, Freetown.³⁰

UNAMSIL and MONUC fared better in 2001, expanding in size and in presence outside the national capitals. UNAMSIL was able to carry out its mandate to disarm and demobilize RUF rebels and assist in the start of a political process between the RUF and the government.³¹ Planning for a national reconciliation process, which includes a special court to try war crimes, is under way.³² MONUC benefited from the ceasefire that followed Joseph Kabila's assumption of the presidency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to expand its operational strategy and begin verification and monitoring of the disengagement of warring parties and their withdrawal to designated defensive positions.³³ By October MONUC was able to initiate a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.³⁴

The relative success of UNAMSIL and MONUC is due to the renewed political engagement of the UN and its member states in negotiating conflict settlements in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Increased coordination between the UN and the relevant regional organizations was an important element in this. Finally, increased financial and personnel contributions enabled each operation to reach full strength and to deploy throughout the country. The extent of the commitment required and the

²⁸ Reno, W., 'War and the failure of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone', *SIPRI Yearbook 2001* (note 2), pp. 149–61.

²⁹ Dwan, R., 'Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution', *SIPRI Yearbook 2001* (note 2), pp. 69–127.

³⁰ 'Sierra Leone: The spreading battle ground', *The Economist*, 7 Apr. 2001, p. 46; and Hoon, G. (MP, Defence Secretary), House of Commons, Hansard Written Answers for 14 Jan. 2002 (pt 13).

³¹ United Nations, Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN document S/2001/1195, 13 Dec. 2001.

³² 'The president's speech', BBC News Online, 18 Jan. 2002, available at URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world>>.

³³ United Nations, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN document S/2001/128, 12 Feb. 2001; for more on the conflict in the DRC, see chapter 1 in this volume.

³⁴ United Nations, Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN document S/2001/970, 16 Oct. 2001.

lessons that were demonstrated have deepened UN member states' caution with regard to new operations in Africa. This partially explains the Security Council's welcoming of South Africa's agreement to establish and lead a mission to support the fragile peace process in Burundi.³⁵ UNAMSIL's and MONUC's records also explain the mandate of the South African protection mission: the force is only intended to provide protection for politicians returning from exile until such time as an all-Burundi protection unit can be trained.³⁶

II. Table of multilateral peace missions

Table 2A lists 51 multilateral peace missions (observer, peacekeeping, peace-building and combined peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations) initiated, ongoing or terminated in 2001. The missions are grouped by organization, either sole or lead, and listed chronologically within these groups.

The first group, covering UN missions, is divided into three sections: 15 operations run by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 3 missions not properly defined as peacekeeping (under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter) and coordinated by the Department of Political Affairs; and 1 mission initiated by UN authority but carried out at UN request by an ad hoc coalition of member states. The next five groups cover missions conducted or led by regional organizations: 13 by the OSCE; 4 by NATO; 3 by the EU/WEU; 3 by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including 1 mission carried out by Russia under bilateral arrangements; and 3 by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).³⁷ A final group lists 6 missions led by other organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states recognized by the UN. Peace missions comprising non-resident individuals or teams of negotiators or operations not sanctioned by the UN are not included.

Missions initiated in 2001, or new participating states in an existing mission, are listed in bold text; operations or individual participation ending in 2001 are in italics. Legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation—UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by regional organizations—are cited in the first column. Personnel numbers include civilian observers or civilian staff only where indicated. The main exception is for observers in OSCE missions, who are usually civilian. Mission fatalities are recorded from the beginning of the mission until the last reported date for 2001 and as a total for 2001. Unless otherwise stated all figures are as of 31 December 2001. Budget figures are given in millions of US dollars. Conversion from budgets set in other currencies are based on 31 December 2001 conversion rates.

³⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1375, 29 Oct. 2001. The peace process is facilitated by former South African President Nelson Mandela. Dwan (note 8), pp. 78–129.

³⁶ Joint Communiqué of the 15th Summit of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, 23 July 2001; and United Nations, Interim report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi, UN document S/2001/1076, 14 Nov. 2001.

³⁷ The OAU will be replaced by the African Union (AU) after a transitional period. The OAU member states adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2000; it entered into force on 26 May 2001, formally establishing the AU, with headquarters in Addis Ababa. The AU will take over the OAU operations.