



GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE ON POST-SHIPMENT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS OF MILITARY MATERIEL

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INTRODUCTION

Post-shipment on-site inspections are physical inspections of military materiel conducted by the exporting state on the territory of the importing state. They are one of a range of measures that exporting states can adopt to try to prevent the diversion of exported military materiel by ensuring that assurances provided by the importing state relating to the authorized end user and end use of the military materiel are upheld.

The United States started its first end-use monitoring programme and associated system of post-shipment on-site inspections in 1990.¹ Other states have also conducted post-shipment on-site inspections or have introduced measures that allow for them to take place. They include Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.² In addition, several multilateral instruments have produced guidance documents on arms export controls that include provisions relevant to requiring or conducting on-site inspections, such as templates for end-user certificates (EUCs) or lists of elements that they should contain.³ Post-shipment on-site inspections have also become an important topic of discussion in multilateral forums and are one of the main focuses of the German presidency of the Eighth Conference of States Parties (CSP) to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which is scheduled to take place on 22–26 August 2022.⁴

¹ Varisco, A. E., Brockmann, K. and Robin, L., 'Post-shipment control measures: European approaches to on-site inspections of exported military materiel', SIPRI Background Paper, Dec. 2020, p. 6; and US Department of State, 'United States support for the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects', 17 July 2007, p. 3.

² Bromley, M., Brockmann, K. and Varisco, A. E., 'Post-shipment on-site inspections of military materiel: Challenges and responses', SIPRI Policy Brief, Dec. 2021, p. 1. See also Conflict Armament Research (CAR), 'Weapons of the war in Ukraine: CAR case studies: Mapping weapon supply sources to DPR/LPR armed formations in Ukraine', accessed 1 Aug. 2022.

³ Varisco, Brockmann and Robin (note 1), p. 8.

⁴ See e.g. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 'President', [n.d.]; and Arms Trade Treaty, 'Working paper presented by the President of the Eighth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty

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SUMMARY

● In order to prevent the diversion of exported military materiel, an increasing number of states have conducted post-shipment on-site inspections (i.e. physical inspections of exported military materiel on the territory of the importing state) or have introduced measures to allow for them to take place. Several multilateral instruments have produced guidance documents on arms export controls that include provisions relevant to requiring or conducting post-shipment on-site inspections and this topic is one of the main focuses of the German presidency of the Eighth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty.

This SIPRI Good Practice Guide is aimed at states that are in the process of developing post-shipment on-site inspections or are considering their future adoption. It highlights a series of good practices that states can apply when developing and implementing this tool and follows four steps that are part of a post-shipment on-site inspection process: (a) adopting on-site inspections, (b) requiring on-site inspections, (c) conducting on-site inspections, and (d) follow-on steps after on-site inspections. The Good Practice Guide draws from experience of states that have conducted post-shipment on-site inspections, relevant guidance and policy documents, and the work done by SIPRI on this topic.



This SIPRI Good Practice Guide draws from the experience of states that have conducted post-shipment on-site inspections, and relevant guidance and policy documents (see annex A), to outline a set of good practices that states can apply when developing and implementing this policy tool.⁵ It is primarily aimed at states that are in the process of developing on-site inspections or are considering their future adoption. It focuses on highlighting ways in which post-shipment on-site inspections can be adopted and used in ways that build trust and confidence between the exporting and importing states and contribute to preventing post-shipment diversion. It outlines four key steps that are part of a post-shipment on-site inspection process: (a) adopting on-site inspections, (b) requiring on-site inspections, (c) conducting on-site inspections, and (d) follow-on steps after on-site inspections.⁶ At all stages, the guide seeks to use the words ‘shall’, ‘should’, ‘may’ and ‘can’ in accordance with the way these terms are used in International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards.⁷

ADOPTING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

Adopting on-site inspections refers to the process of first determining whether this tool can help to support the goals of a state’s export controls and then establishing the legal, regulatory and bureaucratic provisions that allow a state to attach an inspection clause to an export of military materiel. The previous experiences of states that have adopted on-site inspections or considered their adoption provide indications of the practical and political concerns and challenges that can arise at each stage of this process, and how they can be addressed. These concerns and challenges include (a) establishing a legal basis for on-site inspections, (b) ensuring that the exporting state’s application of the controls does not create an assertion of legal extra-territoriality, (c) determining whether on-site inspections are effective in preventing diversion, and (d) overcoming costs and resource limitations.⁸ Export control instruments and good practice guides also provide indications as to the potential benefits that post-shipment on-site inspections can generate, and language that can be used when attaching on-site inspection clauses to a particular export of military materiel.

(ATT): Post-shipment controls and coordination: Effective export verification and good-faith cooperation between exporters and importers: Status quo and guidance (“Toolbox”), ATT/CSP8/2022/PRES/732/Conf.PostShip, 22 July 2022.

⁵ This guide also draws on work conducted by SIPRI on post-shipment on-site inspections since 2020, which included an extensive desk research, interviews with state officials, a survey of 39 states (comprising the 27 European Union member states and 12 other selected states) that generated 21 responses, a tabletop exercise simulation of two on-site inspections involving 13 officials from 8 European states and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and a workshop with a total of 26 experts on diversion that included officials from the EEAS and European states, industry representatives, practitioners and researchers.

⁶ These four stages build on work presented in Bromley, Brockmann and Varisco (note 2). For national practices of on-site inspections see Varisco, Brockmann and Robin (note 1).

⁷ Hence “shall” indicates a requirement; “should” indicates a recommendation; “may” is used to indicate that something is permitted; “can” is used to indicate that something is possible, for example, that an organization or individual is able to do something’. International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ‘Foreword: Supplementary information’, [n.d.].

⁸ On the possible responses to these challenges see Bromley, Brockmann and Varisco (note 2).



Determining the need for on-site inspections

States that export military materiel should assess the potential benefits and costs of adopting on-site inspections as a component of their export controls. The assessment should involve all domestic stakeholders with an interest and expertise in this area, including (a) the ministry or agency with primary responsibility for arms export controls and the licensing authority, (b) the security services, (c) the ministry of foreign affairs and other relevant ministries, (d) parliamentary committees with a role in export controls, (e) manufacturers and exporters of military materiel, and (f) relevant non-governmental organizations and research institutes. The assessment may also involve consultations with other states that have adopted on-site inspections.

This assessment should consider the types of military materiel that the state exports, the importing states and end users that it has supplied and seeks to supply, the types of diversion risks that it has encountered, actual cases of post-shipment diversion that it has identified, and the likely responses of the importing states and end users that it has supplied and seeks to supply if they were asked to allow on-site inspections to take place.

The potential benefits of introducing on-site inspections that should be considered include (a) identifying risks that may not have been apparent during the assessment of the export licence application, (b) establishing a mechanism that could help to build trust and confidence with the national authorities of the importing state, (c) collecting information about actual cases of post-shipment diversion that can inform future export licensing decisions of the exporting state concerned and other exporting states, (d) reducing risks of actual cases of diversion and reputational damage for both the government and industry, and (e) establishing a platform for promoting and conducting outreach and assistance activities aimed at improving standards in physical security and stockpile management (PSSM).

The potential costs that should be considered include (a) the allocation of the financial and human resources needed to plan and conduct on-site inspections, and (b) the domestic and international consequences of having to forgo certain sales of military materiel if an importing state refuses to have an inspection clause attached to an export.

Establishing a legal and regulatory framework

States that adopt on-site inspections should conduct a detailed review to determine which changes are needed to their export control legislation, regulations and practices to allow inspections to be required and conducted. At a minimum, the wording of the EUCs may need to be altered to allow on-site inspection clauses to be attached to a particular export. In addition, officials from the export licensing authority, security services or ministry of foreign affairs will need to be tasked with conducting on-site inspections.

The experience of some states that have adopted on-site inspections indicates that it is possible to adopt them with minimal legislative changes. This is most typically the case when the on-site inspections (a) cover exports where a state is the end user and the inspection clause is added to the EUC or a government-to-government agreement attached to the export, and (b) are



focused on identifying and mitigating diversion risks in cooperation with the importing state rather than on enabling the extraterritorial application of the exporting state's domestic export controls. However, it is important to note that states' legal systems in the field of export controls—and the broader legislative frameworks in which they exist—differ and more substantial legislative changes may therefore be required.

Establishing the necessary bureaucratic framework

Exporting states adopting on-site inspections should identify a national authority responsible to make decisions about when a particular export should have a relevant clause attached. States should ensure that the authority has the staff, resources and expertise necessary to take on this task. Establishing an inter-agency process to support and inform the decisions made by this authority can be particularly valuable as it enables a more comprehensive assessment. This inter-agency process should involve all national authorities with a role in export controls, including customs authorities. Institutional memory should be retained within the authority by documenting the process and rationale of decisions to require on-site inspections in case of a change of personnel.

REQUIRING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

Requiring on-site inspections is the process through which an exporting state that has adopted on-site inspections in its legislation decides to attach the possibility of conducting an inspection to a particular export of military materiel. The practical and political concerns and challenges that can arise in connection with this step include establishing the processes and decision-making powers needed to determine which exports should have an inspection clause attached and overcoming the political sensitivities and sovereignty concerns that can arise when an importing state is requested to allow an inspection clause to be attached. Requiring on-site inspections can entail a delicate diplomatic process that involves several different actors with a stake in the transfer, including the exporting state, the company manufacturing the military materiel and the importing state and end user. The following subsections set out the good practices that have been identified to guide states through the process of requiring on-site inspections.

Raising awareness of on-site inspections

States should take steps to raise awareness among the manufacturers and exporters of the military materiel that will be the focus of controls about the value of on-site inspections. This may include outreach activities to explain the framework and practice of on-site inspections, the role of inspections in preventing diversion and the value of conducting inspections for certain exports.

States should also raise awareness among importing states about the specific framework and process for inspections that they have put in place and the intended benefits. Awareness-raising activities may include outreach visits and workshops as well as initiatives aimed at building understanding



and support in the importing state, which are two factors that are fundamental for successful inspections. These outreach visits and workshops should emphasize that post-shipment on-site inspections are ideally conducted as part of a larger framework of building cooperation and trust between exporting and importing states (see below).

States should seek insights and advice from other states that have adopted and conducted post-shipment on-site inspections on how best to design outreach programmes to industry, and consult importing states that have already hosted inspections from other exporting states. Such efforts can include training seminars and dialogues with embassy personnel, government officials, end users, and foreign businesses and trade partners.

Maintaining existing standards in export licensing risk assessments

On-site inspections should be seen as a complementary measure aimed at building on existing measures for preventing and mitigating the risk of post-shipment diversion. States that adopt post-shipment on-site inspections should not consider them a substitute for a thorough export licensing risk assessment. In addition, they should not replace the use of other mitigation measures, such as (a) the addition of clauses in EUCs that commit end users not to re-export the materiel or re-transfer it to other end users or for other end uses, (b) the request and issuance of delivery verification certificates, and (c) the request, prior to authorizing an export, of assurances related to the storage conditions and stockpile management of the materiel.⁹

States that adopt post-shipment on-site inspections shall continue to fully apply the export licensing assessment criteria that they are legally or politically required to implement, such as those under the ATT, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement), and the European Union (EU) common position on arms exports.

Deciding under which circumstances to require on-site inspections

States that have adopted on-site inspections shall establish a process that guides decisions on requiring on-site inspections as part of an export authorization. Such a process should develop selection criteria that consider different aspects of the transfer, including the type of materiel exported (i.e. focusing particularly on man-portable air-defence systems or arms that can be more prone to diversion such as small arms and light weapons), and the previous records of the end user and other actors involved in the transfer (e.g. brokers and transport providers). Factors to consider in relation to the transfer can include diversion risks, previous cases of diversion, the enhanced risk of diversion due to the presence of an armed conflict, the levels of domestic and regional stability, the human rights situation, and the risk of the materiel being used against the civilian population. States can also take into account

⁹ Some EUC prescriptions, for instance, restrict re-export, which is the onward export to another destination country, or re-transfer, which is the onward transfer to another end user or end use in the same country. South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), *Toolkit For Addressing Unauthorized Re-export or Re-transfer of Arms and Ammunition* (SEESAC: Belgrade, June 2014).



strategic considerations linked to the undesired effects of diversion, such as the risk that certain weapons and technologies, if diverted, might fall into the hands of the exporting state's opponents. Ideally, the process of deciding when to require on-site inspections should be dynamic and consider changes in the risk of diversion associated with a specific end user, and adapt accordingly. Information on alleged cases of diversion from intelligence, the media or other sources should help to inform this dynamic assessment.

Operationalizing the requirement of on-site inspections

When adopting post-shipment on-site inspections, states may consider having an initial pilot phase—which may involve a limited set of weapon systems and a limited number of inspection visits—to assess the feasibility and benefits of the mechanism.

States should operationalize the requirement to allow post-shipment on-site inspections by including relevant language either in the EUC or in a government-to-government agreement attached to the export. Such a commitment can also indicate details of arrangements for the on-site inspections, such as the possibility to have more than one inspection in a certain time frame or repeated inspections of the materiel. This written commitment is very important since it will constitute the basis upon which a state may require that the end user allows on-site inspections after the delivery has taken place. A possible formulation that may be used is as follows:

I/We certify that the competent authorities of [NAME OF EXPORTING STATE] have the right to verify the end use and end-use location of any supplied item at any time on their demand.¹⁰

States may consider adding qualifying language to address possible concerns of the importing state. These may include stating that inspection visits will be agreed through a diplomatic process, that they will take place at a time and place that is jointly decided by the exporting and importing states, and that they will involve personnel from both states.

CONDUCTING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

Conducting on-site inspections is the process through which a state that has attached an inspection clause to a particular export triggers the clause and then plans and conducts an on-site inspection of the materiel in the importing state. This process entails taking a decision on triggering an inspection clause, notifying the importing state of an intention to conduct an on-site inspection, and planning and conducting the inspection in the importing state. Several diplomatic, logistical and practical challenges can arise when a state plans and then conducts an on-site inspection. These include making contact with relevant officials from the importing state, obtaining responses from the appropriate authorities and ministries, ensuring that the funds and appropriate personnel required to conduct inspections are available, and overcoming logistical and security challenges associated with carrying

¹⁰ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'Template for end user certificates for small arms and light weapons', 28 Sep. 2011.



out inspection visits.¹¹ The following subsections set out the good practices that have been identified to guide states on planning and conducting on-site inspections.

Planning an inspection

Once the decision on triggering an inspection clause is made, an exporting state should start planning the on-site inspection. The planning phases should cover the following steps: (a) determining what the aims of the inspection are (depending on the commitments made in the EUC attached to the export), (b) formulating the request that will be addressed to the importing state, (c) deciding which official(s) to contact in the importing state and how to make contact (i.e. through which authority and channels), (d) establishing the number and types of weapon (including the relevant serial numbers) that will be covered by the inspection, (e) reaching an understanding with the importing state about where these weapons are located and which facilities can be inspected, (f) anticipating and discussing with the importing state possible practical and logistical challenges related to the inspections, (g) assessing all aspects of the on-site inspection visit according to the available resources and the time needed for the inspections, (h) deciding the team that will conduct the inspections, and (i) prioritizing and scheduling the inspections.

States may need to adjust some planned activities, as necessary, when on-site inspections are conducted and in case of changes of circumstances in the importing state. The list of good practices outlined here can thus help in planning and conducting on-site inspections but may need to be adapted to the particular circumstances of each inspection.

Involving local embassies and seeking help from third parties

Exporting states conducting on-site inspections should seek facilitation through their local embassies and diplomats stationed in the importing state or in the surrounding region. Such officials should establish preliminary contacts with the end user and other relevant representatives of the importing state, explain the practice of on-site inspections, and take other steps to prepare for the inspection. Diplomatic personnel or a governmental authority from the exporting state should conduct the inspection. Where possible, defence attachés can also assist in the preparation of the inspection and/or participate in it.

The exporting state should engage with representatives of the importing state during the preparation, coordination and implementation of an on-site inspection. For instance, as part of the inspection, states can plan to have an introductory meeting in the importing state with representatives of the end user and other relevant government officials to establish an initial relationship, and explain the process and plan for the inspection. Establishing such cooperation can help to prevent possible practical challenges or issues linked to restricted access and confidential information (see below).

¹¹ On the possible responses to these challenges see Bromley, Brockmann and Varisco (note 2).



States can consider requesting the assistance of third parties in conducting on-site inspections, particularly in cases where the exporting state has no diplomatic presence in the importing state. Third parties that can provide assistance and/or facilitate inspections include other states, personnel from regional or international organizations such as EU delegations for EU member states, or professional organizations that work with weapon inspections. For instance, as part of the EU-funded iTrace project, the organization Conflict Armament Research can support or provide ‘on official request by EU national arms export licensing authorities, post-shipment/post-delivery verification capacity to Member States’.¹² Such third-party involvement should be mutually agreed with the importing state.

Providing training to inspectors

Exporting states should provide regular training of personnel conducting on-site inspections, including how to identify and, when needed, safely handle, disassemble and reassemble relevant weapons. Before every inspection, inspectors should be provided with or compile a list of weapons that they will be inspecting and verifying, which should include all the necessary information (i.e. serial numbers and information on the location of the marks on the weapons). The company manufacturing the military materiel being inspected can also provide ad hoc training and briefings to familiarize personnel with the materiel’s characteristics before the inspection. Third parties—including other exporting states—that have conducted similar inspections can also provide training on how to conduct such types of activity.

Conducting an on-site inspection

Exporting states should establish and apply a list of activities that they can require and conduct as part of an on-site inspection. These may include visual inspection of the materiel, checks of the serial numbers of the weapons, checks against inventory records, production of photographic evidence of the serial numbers and the materiel, checks of storage conditions of the materiel, disassembly/assembly of the weapons, and interviews with relevant personnel.

Exporting states should establish a detailed set of ‘red flags’ that present potential indications of risks of post-shipment diversion. These may include the following:

1. A lack of willingness on the part of the importing state or end user to allow an on-site inspection.
2. Limited cooperation from the end user during the on-site inspection.
3. An inability to show or account for all the delivered weapons.
4. An inability to account clearly for any lost or misplaced weapons.
5. Poorly maintained storage facilities.

¹² Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 Dec. 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer (‘iTrace IV’), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L330, 20 Dec. 2019.



6. Insecure storage conditions and/or behaviour and practices at the facilities.

The different activities required and conducted during an on-site inspection and the list of red flags can guide follow-on steps after an on-site inspection and can also facilitate the adoption of a comprehensive approach to preventing weapon diversion. They can guide possible offers of assistance to the importing state or end user, either bilaterally or in other ways, aimed at enhancing its weapon and ammunition management practices (see below).

Good practices to overcome possible practical challenges

Conducting on-site inspections can entail overcoming a range of practical and logistical challenges. These can include inspecting a large volume of items; inspecting weapons that are distributed across several different locations; negotiating access to inspect military materiel stored in sensitive or secretive locations or used by end users involved in sensitive activities, such as intelligence services; and conducting inspections on specific types of weapon that might require technical knowledge on the part of inspectors. The complexity of the logistical challenges and the related costs of an inspection can be at particularly high levels when the importing state is large in size, there are many weapons or facilities to inspect, and/or the weapons are stored in remote locations. In these cases, states can opt to inspect only a portion of the weapons, or request that weapons be gathered in selected locations. Health- or security-related risks and travel restrictions, such as those caused by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, can also constitute additional challenges. States should task an authority with developing possible responses to these challenges and taking decisions on how to react to them when they arise.

To overcome travel restrictions, exporting states may consider conducting virtual video inspections of the military materiel with the assistance of officials from the importing state or end user. Such a measure should be used as a first step of a post-shipment inspection that would later be completed by an in-person inspection when conditions permit.¹³

FOLLOW-ON STEPS AFTER ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

States that adopt on-site inspections should apply procedures aimed at ensuring that the tool is used in a way that builds trust and confidence with the importing state and end user. Exporting states should also, however, develop procedures for determining how to respond in cases when (a) an importing state or end user refuses to allow an inspection to occur, (b) one of the red flags identified above is raised, or (c) an inspection uncovers evidence of post-shipment diversion. These procedures should be integrated into the broader set of practices and procedures used by exporting states to identify and respond to cases of diversion. This includes cases in which previously

¹³ E.g. in 2021 Germany agreed with Mexico to conduct a 'virtual inspection' in which the relevant national authorities showed a part of the exported materiel and their serial numbers by video from 21 different locations. These virtual inspections were to be followed by physical on-site checks. Bromley, Brockmann and Varisco (note 2), p. 8.



supplied military materiel has been re-exported or re-transferred to another end user or for another end use in ways that contravene commitments provided in the EUC. The following subsections outline the good practices that have been identified to guide states on steps to take after an on-site inspection has taken place.

Compiling a report with findings from an on-site inspection

At the end of an on-site inspection, inspectors should seek clarification from the end user when there are unaccounted weapons or other issues and concerns discovered during the inspection. The officials involved should also prepare and compile a report highlighting the key findings from the inspection. The report should be shared with the exporting state's embassy in the importing state and with other relevant national agencies. The report can highlight the level of cooperation received from the importing state and end user, and possible follow-on steps, if any, that have been discussed and agreed with the importing state and end user. Findings from the inspections should feed into future export licensing risk assessments and decisions about requiring and requesting on-site inspections for future exports.

Building trust and confidence with the importing state

Following an inspection visit, the exporting state should discuss the findings with the relevant authorities of the importing state. In addition, the exporting state can consider preparing and compiling a second report with the importing state, highlighting the findings from the inspection and possible follow-on activities that have been discussed and agreed to address potential challenges. Exporting and importing states can also establish joint investigations and/or a committee on how to rectify and/or improve (future) collaboration. This practice could help to build trust and confidence between exporters and importers, and promote further post-delivery cooperation.

Following an inspection visit, the exporting state may conduct outreach activities to maintain an active dialogue with the importing state and the end user. Importing states and end users can also be invited to participate in similar outreach and dialogue activities at the regional and international levels to discuss the value and practice of post-shipment on-site inspections with other actors. Additionally, exporting states may either promote or offer capacity building and other assistance to help to prevent diversion of military materiel from national stockpiles. This can include activities aimed at improving record-keeping and PSSM practices in importing states.

Investigating cases of diversion

A single agency or authority should be made responsible for coordinating and managing all aspects of the exporting state's response to any diversion of exported military materiel that is uncovered through a post-shipment on-site inspection or other source of information.

During an investigation into diversion of exported military materiel, states should consider halting the issuing of new licences for arms exports to the importing state or end user. Valid export licences for exports of arms and



their spare parts to the importing state or end user may also be suspended. States should ensure that they have the necessary legal mechanisms in place to implement such licensing freezes.

Responding to detected cases of diversion

Any verified case of diversion that is uncovered through a post-shipment on-site inspection or another source of information should inform future decision making on the issuing of export licences. Equivalent procedures should also apply when an importing state or end user refuses to allow an on-site inspection to take place.

The exporting state's response to a verified case of diversion may include an indefinite freeze on all arms exports to the importing state or end user, an indefinite freeze on all exports of the diverted military materiel to the importing state or end user, enhanced risk assessments for future export licences, and a request to the importing state or end user to provide additional assurances and to allow further inspections by the exporting state.

Where appropriate, exporting states should share information with other national authorities on any verified case of diversion that is uncovered through a post-shipment on-site inspection or another source of information. If the exporting state is a member of the relevant instruments, then information can be shared via the mechanisms of information exchange established by the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM), the ATT Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, as well as via other informal bilateral and multilateral channels. Exporting states may also consider sharing information on cases where an importing state or end user refuses to allow an on-site inspection to take place. In addition, capacity building for importing states should be promoted to address some of the challenges that may emerge from an inspection.



ANNEX A. GUIDANCE MATERIAL

Multilateral guidance material

Arms Trade Treaty

Arms Trade Treaty, ‘President’, [n.d.], <<https://thearmstradetreaty.org/president.html/>>.

Arms Trade Treaty, ‘Working paper presented by the President of the Eighth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT): Post-shipment controls and coordination: Effective export verification and good-faith cooperation between exporters and importers: Status quo and guidance (“Toolbox”)’, ATT/CSP8/2022/PRES/732/Conf.PostShip, 22 July 2022, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP8_President's%20Working%20Paper%20on%20Postshipment%20Controls%20and%20Coordination_EN/ATT_CSP8_President's%20Working%20Paper%20on%20Postshipment%20Controls%20and%20Coordination_EN.pdf>.

Arms Trade Treaty, Fourth Conference of States Parties (CSP4), ‘ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation: Chair’s Draft Report to CSP4’, ATT/CSP4.WGETI/2018/CHAIR/355/Conf.Rep, 20 July 2018, annex D, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP4_WGETI_Draft_Report_EN/ATT_CSP4_WGETI_Draft_Report_EN.pdf>.

European Union

Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/38 of 15 Jan. 2021 establishing a common approach on the elements of end-user certificates in the context of the export of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L14, 18 Jan. 2021, <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D0038>>.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 Dec. 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer (‘iTrace IV’), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L330, 20 Dec. 2019, <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D2191&from=EN>>.

Council of the European Union, ‘User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment’, 12189/19, 16 Sep. 2019, <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/40659/st12189-en19.pdf>>.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Template for end user certificates for small arms and light weapons’, 28 Sep. 2011, <<https://www.osce.org/fsc/83178>>.



Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Co-operation, 547th Plenary Meeting, Decision no. 5/08 updating the OSCE principles for export controls of MANPADS, FSC.DEC/5/08, 26 May 2008, <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/e/32082.pdf>>.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Co-operation, 436th Plenary Meeting, Decision no. 5/04 standard elements of end-user certificates and verification procedures for SALW Exports, FSC.DEC/5/04, 17 Nov. 2004, <<https://www.osce.org/fsc/16941>>.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), *Toolkit For Addressing Unauthorized Re-export or Re-transfer of Arms and Ammunition* (SEESAC: Belgrade, June 2014), <https://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Arms-Exports-Control-4/Toolkit-for-Addressing-Unauthorized-Re-export-or-Re-transfer-of-Ar_2.pdf>.

United Nations

United Nations, International Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG), 'End-user and end-use of internationally transferred ammunition module', Second edition, IATG 03.40, 2015, <<https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-03.40-End-Use-V.2.pdf>>.

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